Y. V. GANKOVSKY ■ L. R. GORDON-POLONSKAYA

A HISTORY OF PAKISTAN

1947-1958

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

A HISTORY OF Pakistan

Y. V. GANKOVSKY
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USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF ASIA

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A HISTORY OF PAKISTAN

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PREFACE

Our generation is witness to remarkable changes in the life of the peoples of Asia and Africa. Deprived of their statehood and even of the right to have their own history, they had suffered colonial exploitation for hundreds of years.

The bourgeois historians of the colonial powers generally treated the civil history of the colonies in isolationfrom the internal processes of development. Their periodisation was based on the succession of viceroys and governors-general. The studies made by national historians of the pre-colonial period when many of these peoples were more highly developed than the subsequent oppressors, and their works, which depicted the heroic anti-colonial struggle, were either neglected or simply banned and destroyed. Many manuscripts did not see the light of day until after the country concerned had flung off the colonial yoke.

The world scene has changed beyond recognition after the Second World War. New states are emerging before our eyes, and the newly-free peoples are blazing new trails toward independent economic and political development. It is only natural that their wish to learn more about their country and its history is steadily growing.

Lately, many works have appeared on the different chapters in the past and present of the peoples of Pakistan. That country's destiny differs greatly from that of most other countries born of the liberation struggle. Pakistan is the only state to have arisen on a religious, rather than national, foundation.

How to explain at this time when new nations are emerging so rapidly in the East and socialist ideas are winning ever greater currency among the former colonial peoples, that religion operated as a determinative factor in the political arrangement of India, a land that had always had a highly developed national-liberation movement?

The answer is to be found in the peculiar features of the development of the peoples of Northern and Central India, on the one hand, and in Britain's colonial policy, on the other.

Pakistan emerged in 1947 on the crest of the anti-colonial movement in the north-west and north-east of the Indian subcontinent. Historically, these areas were closely associated with the rest of India. The differences of religion did not interfere with the national consolidation of the various peoples. For example, one of the most developed Indian peoples, the Bengalis, had two religions, Hinduism and Islam.

Neither did differences of religion impede India's economic, political and historical integration, a process that began in the pre-colonial period. There was religious tolerance, as a rule, in the feudal Indian empires of the Muslim rulers and in the States of the Hindu rajahs. To be sure, feudal India, too, had its outbreaks of reaction and religious persecution before Britain ever conquered the land. This was the case under Aurangzeb, a ruler of the Mogul Empire. But usually religious intolerance was a concomitant of the decay of the feudal states and not at all typical of the pre-colonial period as a whole.

In some parts of feudal India differences in religion coincided with class and social differences. After the Muslim conquerors came to India, some of the larger states had Muslim rulers and some of the feudal nobility in Northern India were also Muslim. The merchants, money-lenders and the bulk of the population, in the meantime, were mostly Hindu, while many peasants and artisans embraced Islam. Take Bengal, where a large section of the small landholders are Muslim.

After the coming of the Muslim conquerors, many people adopted Islam to escape caste discrimination, for castes were firmly rooted in the life of feudal India. The Muslim community itself became a kind of caste or group of castes. Due to the assimilation of the Muslim newcomers with the indigenous population and the reciprocal influence of Hinduism and Islam, the Muslims adopted many local social institutions, and the institution of castes among them. This particular feature in India's historical development was later skilfully exploited by the British colonialists.

The Indian peoples put up a heroic resistance to the colonial enslavement of their country. Differences of religion did not interfere with their sense of national unity. This was strikingly demonstrated in the great liberation struggle of 1857-1859.

Opposing Hindus to Muslims became the corner-stone of British colonial policy after the popular uprising of 1857-1859. In many cases, the colonialists succeeded in giving a religious complexion to the class and social contradictions in the country. This split the national-liberation movement to a great extent. Many of the features in the formation of the Indian bourgeoisie helped the British in their design. Trade and money-lending, the main source of primitive accumulation for the Indian bourgeoisie, were chiefly in Hindu hands. It was not until much later that Muslim merchant capital was channelled into capitalist enterprise. The Muslim bourgeoisie appeared more than half a century later than the Hindu bourgeoisie. The first Muslim bourgeois educator, Syed Ahmad Khan, was active in the three last decades of the 19th century, while the early Hindu bourgeois educator, Rammohan Roy, lived in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

It was the landlords who took the lead in the Muslim communal movement, because the Muslim bourgeoisie was weak.

The many feudal survivals in colonial India, chiefly the caste and communal system, helped the British authorities to impart a religious context to the competitive struggle of the various groups of the Indian bourgeoisie. That was the ground on which the Muslim communal movement arose; the formation of Pakistan was a logical culmination of this movement in an environment where the peoples of India strove for independence and national self-determination in the teeth of continuous British counteractions.

In Pakistan, power fell into the hands of the classes which had led the movement for Pakistan—the Muslim landlords, bent on seizing the commanding political heights in areas with a Muslim majority, and the big Muslim bourgeoisie, which was out to win a market of its own and to get rid of more powerful competitors.

Until 1947 the history of the Pakistan peoples was part and parcel of the history of the peoples of the Indian subcontinent. To understand why a state based on a religious foundation sprang up in the 20th century and to bring out the distinctive features of Pakistan's development in the contemporary period, one would have to delve into the Muslim communal movement and explain how the Pakistan slogan won the minds of the masses. This is why the present authors devoted Part One of this volume to the Muslim communal movement in colonial India, which emerged under the direct influence of British colonial policy at the close of the 19th century and culminated in the formation of Pakistan in 1947.

The other parts of the volume are devoted to the history of Pakistan proper, which the authors believe consists of several periods.

The first period, from 1947 to 1950, is coloured by the painful consequences of the preceding colonial period and the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two states. The trends of Pakistan's independent economic and political development were in their incipient stage in this period, and so was the appreciation of these trends by the country's social classes. The policy of the ruling party, which took final shape in the early 1950's, failed to satisfy most sections of the population, and even many members of the ruling bloc. Mass political opposition parties and organisations appeared, ushering in a new period in the history of Pakistan.

The second period, from 1951 to 1955, was marked by a more distinct alignment of the country's class and political forces. The Six-Year Economic Development Plan was tackled in this period, the new constitution was drawn up, and Pakistan entered military blocs sponsored by the United States.

The bitter struggle between the proponents and opponents of Pakistan's reactionary development and the aggravation of class and national contradictions brought about a political crisis. This crisis (1954-1955), the first in Pakistan's history, became a divide between the second and third periods.

The third period, 1956 to 1958, opened with a temporary abatement of the democratic movement, adoption of the constitution, and with a summing-up of the Six-Year Economic Development Plan, of the first results of Pakistan's entry into military blocs and the effects of imperialist "aid."

The crisis of the economic policy of the ruling groups, discontent over their foreign policy and their treatment of the national question produced a new political crisis. The upswing of the democratic movement differed from that preceding the first political crisis. This time the working class was more active politically and the country's democratic forces showed a striving to unite. But growth of opposition on the left wing was attended by a growth of opposition on the right wing, and by a consolidation of feudal reaction. The ruling bloc tried to avert the approaching crisis by establishing a military dictatorship. The coup of 1958 marked the end of the third and the beginning of a new period in Pakistan's history.

A number of new important works dealing with this latter period and calling for special study, have appeared since the publication in Russian of the present volume. The history of Pakistan after 1958 is therefore not examined in this English-language edition.

The history of the pre-partition Pakistan movement has been dealt with prolifically by both Indian and Pakistani historians. There are interesting observations on this score in the works of the progressive Indian historians, Dr. Ashraf, Prof. Mukerjee, Sajjad Zaheer, and others.

There is a tendency among Indian bourgeois historians to explain the formation of Pakistan by the intrigues of individual ill-wishers, and to deny the fact that the partition was prompted by the interests of certain classes and social groups.

Most Pakistan historians adhere to the standpoint of the so-called Muslim nationalism.[1] This Muslim nationalism is based on the theory of "two nations"—Hindu and Muslim. The "two-nation" theory was formulated with the direct assistance of the British imperialists during the colonial period. This theory served as the ideological basis for the founding of Pakistan. The Pakistan historians seek to isolate the history of the peoples inhabiting Pakistan from the history of India as a whole, and date the inception of Pakistan history to the time Islam appeared in India. Most of the

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[1] For titles, see Bibliography.

Western authors, above all the apologists of imperialism, hold the same view.

But this approach is untenable for progressive historians. The ideologists of the movement of the peoples of Pakistan for national self-determination hold far more progressive views than the official Pakistan historians. The works of Dr. G. M. Sayed and a few others, who advocate free national development for Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baluchis and Bengalis, essentially repudiate the theory of "two nations" and contain valuable information about the situation in the various national areas of Pakistan.

A fairly strong economic school has developed in Pakistan in the post-partition period, represented by such economists as Dr. S. M. Akhtar and Professor S. Hussain. We make no examination here of their economic conceptions, with some of which we cannot agree, but we believe it is only fair to say that their works contain a wealth of material on agrarian relations, the situation of small-scale production, questions of planning and the country's industrial development.

As for Western historiography on Pakistan, it is chiefly represented by economic and geographical surveys and by investigations of some of the state institutions and the activities of the constitutional bodies in the young Islamic state. None of these works, including that by K. Callard, which is undoubtedly of great interest, offers a systematised description of Pakistan's internal affairs. The labour and peasant movement, the situation of the middle strata in the towns, the rise of democratic parties and organisations, and the movement of the Pakistan peoples for national autonomy are virtually ignored. *Pakistan* by Y. Stephens (London, 1963), which appeared after the publication of the Russian-language edition of the present volume, is no exception in this respect.

Stephens' book is practically the first attempt in Western historiography to offer a systematised history of the Pakistan movement and of the home and foreign policies of Pakistan up to and including the 1958 coup. Yet the choice and presentation of the material is highly tendentious. In certain cases, as for example when the author gives an appraisal of the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, there is an obvious misrepresentation of facts typical of anti-communist propaganda, which has nothing in common with a historical analysis.

In writing the various parts of this book the authors made use chiefly of official Pakistan documents and the statements of political leaders and statesmen, and of the press. The authors proceeded from the Marxist-Leninist theory on the national and agrarian questions and on the role of religion in the social development of the peoples.

The authors were greatly helped by the collective studies of Soviet Orientalists on the modern and contemporary history of

India, particularly by the studies of A. M. Dyakov concerning the national question, the different stages in the history of the Muslim League, the establishment of Pakistan and the early years after partition.

Interesting views on the causes of the establishment of Pakistan are contained in the works of N. M. Goldberg, V. V. Balabushevich and L. I. Yurevich.

The authors also made extensive use of the investigations by V. I. Pavlov on the origin of the various groups of the Indian bourgeoisie, and by V. G. Rastyannikov and S. A. Kuzmin on the basic problems of Pakistan's economic development, and of the works of the younger Soviet students of Pakistan (S. Levin on the origin of the Muslim Khoja bourgeoisie and its role in the Pakistan movement; L. Sukhachyov on the development of Urdu literature and the Aligarh movement; V. Moskalenko on Pakistan after 1958).

The authors are grateful to all who gave them unstintingly of their assistance and advice.

* * *

The Preface and Chapters I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, IX, XII, XVI and XVII are by L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya; Chapters VI, VII, X, XI, XIII, XIV, XV, XVIII, XIX and the Conclusion are by Y. V. Gankovsky.

PART ONE

MUSLIM COMMUNAL MOVEMENT IN INDIA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PAKISTAN

Chapter I

ORIGINS OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNAL MOVEMENT

The Muslim communal movement in India, which culminated in the establishment of Pakistan, sprang up after the Great Revolt of 1857-1859 ("the Indian Mutiny") at about the same time as the all-Indian national-liberation movement and bourgeois nationalism. This is to be explained by the specific features attendant on the formation of the Indian bourgeoisie and bourgeois ideology in the various national areas of India, whose socio-economic development differed from area to area. An upshot of the British "divide and rule" policy, the religious communal problem gained increasing prominence in the country's social affairs at the end of the 19th century.

It was not the orthodox ulamas,[1] who represented a moribund system, but people who had savoured the fruits of European education, who helped to spread European culture and were associated in one way or another with the emergence of new capitalist relations, that promoted the first Muslim organisations. The early ideologists of religious communal exclusiveness also advocated modernisation of Islam and its adjustment to the changed social environment.

The National Muslim Association and the Mohammedan Literary Society (two early Muslim educational groups in India) were founded in Bengal, the cradle of Indian bourgeois nationalism, in the early 1860's by Abdul Latif, a prominent writer and public leader closely associated with the Western-educated Bengal landlords.[2]

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[1] Ulamas (علما), from Arabic "alim" (عالم) ("learned men"), body of scholars trained in the Muslim religion and law.

[2] Abdul Latif (1828-1893), son of a Calcutta lawyer. Educated at a madrasah and at Calcutta University. A government employee after 1846. Was member of the Bengal Legislative Council and Calcutta Corporation. Head of Income Tax Commission in Calcutta, 1861-1865. Conferred title of Nawab by the British Government in 1880, and of Nawab Bahadur in 1887.

It is generally believed that before the appearance of the early educational societies of the 1860's, the Muslim section of India's intellectuals were unacquainted with European education and English literature, and inimical to their spread in India. This is not so. It is, indeed, quite true that the educated segment of the feudal Muslim society did not take the British educational system close to their hearts. But neither did they consider it blasphemous. They strove to be educated in their native tongue, but many attended the British Delhi College and Fort William College in Bengal. There is evidence that the natural sciences were very well taught at these colleges. Many young people of the Muslim landlord families and the younger generation of divines were enrolled in Delhi College. Many members and leaders of the 1857-1859 uprising came from this college, and the college itself was closed during the uprising. Thus, by the mid-19th century there existed in North-West India, apart from Bengal, a distinct group of Western-educated Muslim intellectuals. But their influence on Muslim public opinion was as yet insignificant. The grey-bearded mullahs and the ulamas, keepers of the orthodox faith, still ruled the minds of the feudal landlords, the merchants, the petty traders and artisans. Semi-literate themselves, the mullahs were also the sole "bearers of culture" in the villages.

The brutal reaction that broke out in North-West India after the suppression of the uprising and the barriers erected by the British authorities against the admission of Muslims to higher educational establishments and the civil service retarded the development of a Muslim bourgeois intelligentsia. In the circumstances, therefore, the early Muslim educational societies were destined to perform an unquestionably positive mission. The founding of schools, translation of English books into Bengali and Urdu, literary debates and political discussions, no matter how loyal in tone, tended to break the fetters of religious scholasticism and stimulated an interest in public affairs.

However, the religious communal mould of these educational societies gradually reduced the effects of their work to nought. The National Muslim Association opposed Muslim to Hindu intellectuals and called for the exclusion of Muslims from the all-Indian national organisations.

The early Muslim educational societies had a marked influence on the socio-political development of Muslim intellectuals outside Bengal and, in particular, on the development of the outlook of Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), known as the architect of the Muslim communal movement.[3]

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[3] Л. И. Юревич, «Саид Ахмад-Хан и зарождение мусульманского общинного движения в Индии», *Ученые записки Тихоокеанского института*, т. II, М.—Л., 1949.

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India's Muslims of different political trends pronounce the name of Syed Ahmad Khan with equal deference. Many bourgeois ideologists of the all-Indian national-liberation movement, too, hold him in high esteem, and so did officials of the colonial administration and the apologists of British rule in India. There is a distinct stamp of deep-going conflict and duality on everything done by Syed Ahmad Khan in the socio-political field, and on his ideology.

What, then, were the sources of the strength and the weakness of this distinguished Muslim thinker and political leader?

Syed Ahmad Khan belonged to the feudal élite of Delhi of the first half of the 19th century. His father, a learned ulama, exercised a very strong influence on his son's socio-political views. Associated from childhood with outstanding Muslim theologians, poets and artists, Syed Ahmad Khan, as his biographers indicate, acquired a thorough, if somewhat haphazard, knowledge of Arabic and Persian literature and Muslim theology.

He attended the madrasah in Lucknow, studied basic Arabic and Persian literature, philosophy, English literature and a few other subjects, his education equalling that of an average graduate of an English university-level school, and passed the examinations to the office of magistrate. At seventeen he took part, on an equal footing with prominent poets, in the brilliant Delhi mushā'ara,[4] and had his verse printed in a magazine published by his elder brother, Mohammad Ahmad Khan.[5] Mirza Ghalib, the distinguished Indian poet of the mid-19th century, was very fond of the gifted young man and lavished high praise on his poetry.

The teaching of Waliullah Shah, the Indian 18th-century religious reformer and philosopher, was highly popular at that time among the educated Muslims. His ideas on the revival of the original purity of the Holy Quran, the restraints he advocated on the despotism of the power-holding minority and his pleas for social equality had a marked influence on the young Syed Ahmad Khan. The young man considered himself a follower of Waliullah Shah and was for a time a pupil of Mohammad Ismail, the most prominent continuator of Waliullah Shah's educational activities.

But in the course of time, Syed Ahmad Khan's ideals changed. He described the enthusiasms of his youth as a "sweet dream."

In 1847, Syed Ahmad Khan entered the British civil service. He began studying the history of India. His historical conception reveals the duality of his socio-political views, which led up to the subsequent ideological substantiation of the Muslim communal movement. His utterances about the crisis and decay of the feudal Mogul Empire, best formulated by him in his *Asar ul-Sanadid* (*Antiquities of Delhi*), projected and developed the views of Waliullah Shah. But Syed Ahmad Khan's conclusions clashed with the teaching of that outstanding 18th-century philosopher.

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[4] Mushā'ara (مشاعره), from Arabic (شَعَرَ) ("compose poetry"), literary contests of Eastern poets.

[5] الطاف حسین حالی — حیات جوید — علی گڑه — ۱۹۲۳ (Altaf Husain Hali, *Hayat-i javid*, Aligarh, 1923).

Waliullah Shah, who lived before India became a colony, urged the improvement of the state by domestic reforms aimed at restoring social justice and invigorating the country in face of the menace of a European invasion. Syed Ahmad Khan, on the other hand, for whom Britain's conquest of India was a *fait accompli*, believed that since India's old political system had become invalidated, British rule was inevitable and beneficial.[6]

He considered the great independence struggle of 1857-1859 to be merely an attempt at restoring the old feudal order, and, deeply convinced in its futility, took the side of the British. This did not mean that he approved of the British system of government as a whole. He was displeased with Britain's policy on the eve of the uprising and believed that the British authorities had insulted Indian "national pride" and given the Indians ample cause for discontent.[7] He believed the government should take urgent steps to improve the wretched existence of the people and that Muslims should strive to combat poverty and ignorance. He refused to accept the landed estate presented to him by the British government for his assistance during the uprising, saying, "it is not fitting for me to become a taluqdar[8] and to appropriate the people's wealth, while the people suffer."[9]

In his *Asbab-i bagavat-i Hind* (*The Causes of the Indian Revolt*), popular in the latter half of the 19th century, Syed Ahmad Khan urged the admission of Indians to the Legislative Assembly.[10]

Let it be said to Syed Ahmad Khan's credit that he raised the matter of admitting Indians to the country's administration soon after the uprising was quelled, at a time of reaction when all Indian political activities were being suppressed. Therefore, no matter how far removed his wishes were from the demand for genuine self-government, they were unquestionably progressive and bound to win him popularity among his compatriots. His political creed of the 1850's and 1860's reflected the sentiments of the smaller landlords, the rising bourgeoisie and the intellectuals of Northern India, who were dissatisfied with the old feudal system and annoyed by the policies of India's British rulers, though still hopeful that the latter would furnish them support. "It was the way of the middle class that was burgeoning at the time," wrote Mumtaz Husain, a contemporary progressive Indian author. "All the vacillation of Sir Syed was the vacillation of this class."[11]

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[6] مضامین سر سید — از عزیزالدین اختر ادیب فاضل مع تبصرہ از نسیم قریشی ایم اے بی اے — علی گڑھ — ص ۱۰ (*Muzamin-i Sir Syed*, compiled by Azizuddin Akhtar, Preface by Nasim Qureshi, Aligarh, [s. a.], p. 10).

[7] سید احمد خان — اسباب بغاوت ھند — علی گڑھ — ۱۹۰۳ (Syed Ahmad Khan, *Asbab-i bagavat-i Hind*, Aligarh, 1903, p. 65).

[8] Taluqdar (تعلقہ دار — "owning a taluq"), a big landholder; taluq (تعلقہ), a landed estate.

[9] *Muzamin-i Sir Syed*, p. 10.

[10] Syed Ahmad Khan, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 11-12.

The Muslim middle class stemmed largely from the section of Muslim landowners who were ruined by Hindu money-lenders and despised by the British authorities after the 1857-1859 rising. It was the attitude of these landowners towards many current issues that dominated the development of Syed Ahmad Khan's socio-political views. This is evident, in particular, from his book *Asbab-i bagavat-i Hind*, in which appeals to the British authorities to change their treatment of the Muslims alternated with anti-Hindu utterances, subsequently employed by the author and his followers to propound Muslim communal exclusiveness.

In the 1860's, Syed Ahmad Khan became the most popular educator in North-West India. In 1864, he founded a scientific society that translated literature into Urdu and advanced new interpretations of Persian and Arabic theological works and literary sources. It popularised English literature in India, and won its founder the acclaim of poets, philosophers and scholars.

In 1877, helped by the British authorities, Syed Ahmad Khan founded the Muslim College at Aligarh, which developed into the biggest ideological and political centre of the Muslim propertied classes in India and educated many generations of Muslim intellectuals. The college was headed by English principals, and Indian princes and landlords were its trustees. It spread separatist sentiments, a spirit of loyalty to the British, and sought to keep the Muslims from joining the Indian National Congress. But, concurrently, it did much to rouse the Muslim intellectuals politically, and furthered the emergence of a Muslim political party in India.

Muslim intellectuals, almost without exception, read Syed Ahmad Khan's journal, *Tahzib ul-Akhlaq* (*Social Reformer*). In the journal and in his public lectures to the students of the Aligarh College, Syed Ahmad Khan attacked religious bigotry and advocated secular education and European culture. He deplored the ignorance of the people and urged the development of Urdu literature, which he wished to place within their reach. At the same time, he attempted to adapt certain postulates of Muslim theology to Western philosophical thinking. The course of theology at the Aligarh College was based on the notion that the tenets of Islam were proved by their conformance to the laws of nature. Hence the name of Syed Ahmad Khan's philosophical school, *nechari* ("natural," "close to nature"). According to Mohammad Iqbal, the famous Indian poet, philosopher and political leader, Syed Ahmad Khan was "the first Indian Muslim who felt the need of a fresh orientation of Islam and worked for it."[12]

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[11] ممتاز حسین — نئی قدریں — لاہور — ۱۹۵۱ (Mumtaz Husain, *Nai kadrin*, Lahore, 1951).

Syed Ahmad Khan advocated industrial development and busy commerce, and appealed to his countrymen to do something about the wretched plight of the masses and the injustices of the taluqdars.

He was a champion of Hindu-Muslim unity until the establishment of the Indian National Congress in 1885. "Do not forget that Hindu and Muslim are names referring to the religious denomination," he said in one of his lectures, "but whether Hindu, Muslim or Christian, so long as these people live in our country they form one nation (قوم) regardless of their faith. And since they are all one nation they must also be one in their concern for the general political interests of their country.... We must unite to solve the common problems. If we do so, we will survive, and if not, such relations will be disastrous for Hindus and Muslims alike."[13]

It is almost inconceivable that the author of the above passage should a few years later become the founder of a separatist movement with a communal religious foundation. At first glance, the reversal in Syed Ahmad Khan occurred soon after the establishment of the National Congress. But in fact, deep-going contradictions prevailed in Syed Ahmad Khan's outlook from the beginning of his educational activities.

He wrote at length about the need to develop commerce and to promote enterprise. It was due to his efforts that a section of Muslim youth in Northern India received a European education. All this was undoubtedly beneficial. But his efforts to instil loyalty to the British authorities and to whitewash the colonial regime, to proclaim it a boon to India, gradually nullified Syed Ahmad Khan's progressive endeavours.

Syed Ahmad Khan had his roots in the feudal class, whose decay he so vividly portrayed in his writings. Like the Muslim bourgeoisie, still in its formative stage and not as yet a "class per se," he was restrained by his intimate relations with the feudal nobility and by his dependence on the British colonialists.

It should also be borne in mind that the bourgeoisie of North-West India, which, for historical reasons, emerged later than the bourgeois groups in Bombay and Bengal, was much weaker than the latter and often had to rely in the competitive struggle against them on the support of local landlords and the British authorities. All this was distinctly reflected in the socio-political views of Syed

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[12] Mohammad Iqbal, *Islam and Ahmadism*, Lahore, [s. a.], pp. 31-33.
[13] See *Muzamin-i Sir Syed*, pp. 8 -82.

Ahmad Khan, and came to the surface most strikingly in his attitude towards the National Congress, the first nation-wide party of the Indian bourgeoisie.

The consolidation of the Indian national bourgeoisie and the emergence of bourgeois ideology was attended by a sharpening of contradictions between India and Britain, on the one hand, and between sections of Indian society, on the other.

In this setting, the spearhead of the British "divide and rule" policy could not but gradually change its direction. Earlier, the accent was laid on dividing the Indian princely states. Now, its purpose was to sow discord between the various class segments. And inasmuch as bourgeois intellectuals were prominent in the Indian national-liberation movement of that time, British politicians chiefly exploited the differences between the national and religious groups of the intelligentsia. As has been said above, the Muslim communal movement came into being at about the same time as the all-Indian national-liberation movement. Through the open encouragement of the British authorities, Muslim educationalism assumed an anti-Congress, and later also an anti-Hindu orientation. The reasons for that were multiple.

The Muslim intellectuals who headed the early Muslim educational societies were much more closely associated with the old feudal élite than their Hindu counterparts. The weakness of the Muslim bourgeoisie, whose development lagged behind that of the Hindu, Parsi and Sikh groups, gave the Muslim landlords an opportunity to oppose the Muslim to the Hindu educational movement, to channel it along communal lines and, at least in its early stage, to assume leadership of the communal movement.

The endurance of religious and caste prejudices, accentuated by the fact that in some areas, especially Bengal, religious distinctions coincided with social and class distinctions, hampered the formation of bourgeois national self-awareness. The fact that the Bombay and Bengal intellectuals who controlled the middle and lower levels of the government machinery were prominent in the Congress, stimulated the alliance of the rising Muslim bourgeoisie with feudal reaction. Even the Muslim bourgeoisie of Bombay, which was closely linked with the Parsis and at first participated in Congress activities, came round gradually to the communal standpoint.

The British colonialists took advantage of this and encouraged the alliance of the Muslim bourgeois educational movement with feudal reaction, which produced a common anti-Congress communal movement.

As soon as an organised national-liberation movement appeared in India, British political leaders and the colonial authorities gave prominence to the problem of the religious minorities and to Hindu-Muslim discord with the purpose of splitting the anti-imperialist movement."[14] An unveiled effort to oppose Muslims to Hindus began after Lord Frederick Temple Dufferin was appointed Governor-General of India (1884). While preparations were underway for the first session of the National Congress in Bombay in 1885, directly assisted by Allan Hume, a British politician, the selfsame Hume discussed with the Governor of the North-West provinces and other British officials the chances of provoking Muslim anti-Congress disorders.[15]

The Congress disappointed the British colonialists. They expected it to operate as a purely Hindu organisation. Instead, it proclaimed itself an all-Indian national party which, albeit timidly, criticised the British authorities and made some democratic demands. For this reason, the colonialists attempted to restrain the mounting political awareness of the Indians by keeping it within a religious communal framework.

Soon after the Congress was formed, a Hindu movement against "cow-slaughter" arose in Northern India to oppose the killing of cows and the consumption of beef by Muslims and Anglo-Indians. This provoked the first Hindu-Muslim riots. The movement arose as one of the trends for the purity of the faith and in defence of religious customs and rites, but later, due to British policy, it acquired an anti-Muslim tenor.

It was at this time (December 28, 1887) that Syed Ahmad Khan made his well-known speech at Lucknow, which, according to his contemporaries, exercised a tremendous influence on the educated people in Northern and Central India. He appealed to people of means, the middle classes and the nobility to be loyal to the British authorities and to rely on the latter's support and assistance in their work for social progress. It was the first time anyone stated so emphatically that he did not think the Muslims of India would gain anything from the country's liberation from British rule, and described the Congress as a Hindu organisation that would bring about Bengalese predominance in the country's political affairs. Self-government, he added, would result in outright Hindu dominance.[16]

The Lucknow speech was discussed in every intellectual Muslim home. All the provincial educational societies (except the one in

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[14] А. М. Дьяков, *Национальный вопрос и английский империализм в Индии*, Москва, 1948.

[15] A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, Lahore, 1948, p. 15.

[16] Syed Ahmad Khan said, "Now suppose that all the English were to leave India, then who would be rulers of India? Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations, the Mohammedan and the Hindu, could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable" (S. Sen, *The Birth of Pakistan*, Calcutta, 1955, p. 42). Also see *The Times*, London, January 16, 1888.

Bombay)—the National Muslim Association of Bengal, the Mohammedan Literary Society of Calcutta, the Anjuman-i Islamiya (Islam Society) of Madras, and a few others—opposed the Congress. Resolutions denouncing the Congress were adopted by Muslims in Lucknow, Allahabad, Lahore, Calcutta and other cities.

The periodicals of the more influential Muslim groups (published in English and Urdu), such as *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, *Mohammedan Observer*, *Muslim Herald*, and even *Rafik-i Hind*, which opposed Aligarh, launched an anti-Congress campaign.[17]

Soon after the founding of the Congress, Syed Ahmad Khan organised the first all-Indian anti-Congress organisation of Muslim landlords and bourgeois-landlord intellectuals—the United Friends of India Society. The purpose of this society, he wrote in 1888 to his English friend Graham, was to combat the political ideals and activities of the Congress.[18]

Also in 1888, Indian landlords, princes and officials organised the United India Patriotic Association which had a mixed membership of Muslims and Hindus. This was an arch-reactionary landlord group opposed to the Congress. Its avowed purpose was to support British colonial rule and the political forces inimical to the Congress. Similar aims were entertained by the Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India. As soon as the latter was established in 1893, Theodore Beck, the English principal of the Aligarh College, suggested expelling Hindus from this association because the movement against cow-slaughter they had begun was, as he put it, an immediate threat to Muslim interests.

Beck campaigned in *The Aligarh Institute Gazette* against the principle of democratic representation in the various Indian legislatures. "It is therefore necessary," Beck declared, "that Mussalmans and Englishmen should unite in opposing them (i. e., the Congress and the movement against cow-slaughter.— *Authors*) and that the establishment of democratic political institutions should be opposed as they are not suitable to this country."[19]

In 1890, a petition drawn up by Beck and bearing 50,000 signatures (chiefly those of Anglo-Indian officials and Muslim landlords), was submitted to British Parliament. Democratic institutions were unsuited to India, it said, because there were different communities inhabiting it.[20]

Beck's ideas that Muslims were imperilled by Hindu domination and that democratic institutions were unsuited to India, became the pivot of British propaganda in India and exercised a strong influence on the socio-political views of Syed Ahmad Khan.

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[17] *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, Aligarh, July 21, 1888; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League, Its History, Activities and Achievements*, Agra, 1954, p. 4.

[18] See A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, p. 16.

[19] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 1947, p. 105.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

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His contemporaries pointed out in just so many words that his anti-Hindu and anti-Congress sentiments were due to the influence of his British friends, chiefly Dufferin and Beck.[21]

Another major reason was Syed Ahmad Khan's resentment of the competition of the Bengal and Bombay bourgeoisie in private enterprise and the civil service.

Swayed by these factors, Syed Ahmad Khan lined up with Beck in the matter of democratic institutions for India, the principle of election and the Hindu-Muslim problem.

As for Syed Ahmad Khan's attitude to the Congress, it had always been dual to some extent. On the one hand, he declared that he did not support the Congress because he did not think India should have a country-wide organisation. He preferred political parties to be based on the religious principle. By saying so, Syed Ahmad Khan virtually acknowledged the all-Indian character of the Congress—but, on the other hand, he attacked the Congress for being a purely Hindu organisation.

One of the chief objections raised to the Congress by Syed Ahmad Khan was its opposition to the government. Earlier in his career, Syed Ahmad Khan may have said that British policy in India called for modification, but after the Congress was established he advocated unqualified loyalty to the British authorities.

Thus, Syed Ahmad Khan eventually became an opponent of the cause to which he had devoted the first half of his life. From separatism in the field of education he passed to separatism also in the political field. He turned from an advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity into an advocate of Hindu-Muslim discord, contending that the various castes and religious communities of India had no common national interests.[22]

Had a less popular Indian leader ventured to expound these views, his words would probably not have carried so much weight. But Syed Ahmad Khan had by then won the hearts of most of the rising bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intellectuals and many educated feudal groups of North-West India. He was also very popular among the Muslims of Bengal, Bombay, Hyderabad and Madras. People gave an ear to what he said, his opinion was respected. As a result, while all-Indian national organisations took strength, the religious communal movement also won a hold upon the minds.

The early Muslim organisations stimulated the activities and influence of the Muslim section of bourgeois-landlord intellectuals, still in its formative stage, and undermined the positions of the more prejudiced and fanatical mullahs and ulamas. This was unquestionably a positive development. They attracted all who believed Islam should be adapted to the changed conditions and the needs of India's capitalist development. It was no accident that Syed Ahmad Khan's followers included many members of the Ismailian Bohra and Khoja communities, which embraced most of the Muslim traders and capitalists. At the same time, owing to the above reasons, the Muslim educators of the late 19th century (excepting some Bombay groups) stood aloof from the all-Indian national-liberation movement, while being closely associated with the British colonialists. The communal form of Muslim educationalism encouraged frankly anti-Hindu and pro-British sentiments.

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[21] Cf., *Some Materials for a History of the Freedom Movement in India. Collected from Bombay Government Records*, Vol. 2, Bombay, 1958, p. 69. Further referred to as *Some Materials....*

[22] *Some Materials...*, p. 71.

Alongside the modern educational organisations there still existed in North-West India the "half-monastic and half-knightly" medieval Muslim secret societies. These cherished the traditions of the liberation struggle of 1857-1859. Although largely directed by mullahs and ulamas who represented the interests of the educated land-owning groups, these societies were drawn into the social flux that proceeded in Indian society in the last two or three decades of the 19th century.Like the Wahhabi societies of the 1840's and 50's they were invariably connected with the name of Waliullah Shah. In the early 1860's the followers of Waliullah Shah, who actively participated in the 1857-1859 uprising, formed in North-West India the so-called new front against foreign domination—the Naya Mahaz.[23] Members of this organisation established a new type of Muslim educational societies in various parts of that area, combining religious educationalism with anti-British propaganda. The largest of these societies was the Dar ul-Ulum[24] in Deoband, a place near Delhi, founded by Mohammad Kasim in 1867.[25]

Mohammad Kasim came from an impoverished feudal family and was brought up in much the same social environment as Syed Ahmad Khan. In fact, he partook of the fruits of Western culture much earlier than the latter, having finished the Delhi College before the 1857-1859 uprising. Yet it was the ulama-educated Syed Ahmad Khan who became an apologist of British rule, while Kasim, who received a Western education, participated in the great uprising, headed one of the insurgent centres and remained staunchly anti-British to the end.

He appealed for anti-British action and opposed political inertia, prejudice and ignorance among the Muslims, but the methods he advocated to combat them differed from Syed Ahmad Khan's. At the same time, however, Kasim sided with the classical

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[23] سوائح قاسم — دهلی — دوبنده — ص ٢٤٢ — ٢٢٣ (*Sewaih-i Kasim*), Vol. II, Delhi-Deoband, [s. a.], pp. 223-242.

[24] Dar ul-Ulum, Arabic "home of knowledge" (دار العلوم), a higher Muslim religious school.

[25] *Sewaih-i Kasim*, Vol. II, pp. 223-242.

Arab religious system of education. His hatred of foreign oppression was also projected to the English educational system and the European way of life, something that definitely narrowed his political mentality.

On the face of it, the Dar ul-Ulum in Deoband differed but little from the medieval Muslim madrasahs. The ulamas who taught in it were poor,and that seems to be the only difference.Mohammad Kasim laid down the rule that the Deoband ulamas were not to accept gifts of money or land from anyone, lest they expose themselves to political pressure by rich and influential benefactors. Like any other Muslim school, the Deoband Dar ul-Ulum taught the Quran and Sunnah, the fundamentals of Muslim theology, and Arabic and Persian philosophy and literature. But there was also political instruction. Its purpose was to combine general knowledge with religious education for the liberation of the country.[26]

Admission to the Dar ul-Ulum was not restricted by religious or property considerations. Many Hindu intellectuals took part in its work, as well as Muslim and Hindu artisans and merchants. Yet the Deoband group did not develop into a mass political centre and in no way resembled a modern political party. It was a secret, underground organisation of the teachers and students of the Dar ul-Ulum and the educated landed nobility. The religious restraints on educational efforts at the Dar ul-Ulum clashed with its political aims.[27]

The religious form of political work typical of such educationalists as Kasim and of some Indian bourgeois nationalists was used skilfully by the British authorities to foment religious discord and thus undermine national unity.

But the anti-British character of the religious societies that preserved the traditions of the 1857-1859 uprising created objective grounds for overcoming religious exclusiveness and unifying the efforts of the various castes and religions in the liberation movement. The Deoband centre gravitated towards the Congress and was closely associated with the radical wing of the Indian bourgeois nationalists on the eve of the First World War.

As we see, when the Muslim communal movement began, a section of the Muslim intellectuals was opposed to it even in its birth-place, North-West India, and was willing to co-operate with the all-Indian political organisations.

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[26] *Dar ul-Ulum* (an Urdu monthly); quoted from the MS of Mohammad Tayyob, *Mohtamim Dar ul-Ulum Deoband. History of Deoband*, Deoband, [s. a.], p.3 (Deoband collection of photostat copies).

[27] These contradictions came to the surface most tangibly in the relations between Mohammad Kasim and the Gujarati Swami Dayananda Saraswati, the prominent late 19th-century Hindu educator who founded the Arya Samaj (cf. *Новая история Индии*, Москва, 1961). Like Kasim, Saraswati censured British colonial rule. But his educationalism, too, was invested in a religious garb. As a result, he and Kasim were in opposite camps, and their energies were wasted on endless religious disputes.

In Maharashtra and, especially, in Bombay, the propertied Muslims stood aloof from the communal movement. Many of them participated in the early sessions of the Congress. While only two Muslims attended its first session, 254 of the 1,889 delegates to the third session were Muslims.[28]

The Muslim National Association of Bombay, founded by Aga Khan II in 1881, was a political body of Bombay businessmen, many of whom belonged to the Ismailian Khoja community and were closely associated at the time with the Parsis. After the Aga Khan's death in 1885, leadership in the Association was assumed by Badruddin Tyabji,a prominent Bombay lawyer and businessman.

The Bombay politicians went to great pains to win the Muslim educationalists of Hindustan and Bengal to their cause. At the fourth session of the Congress, Tyabji, who was its president, said: "So far as general political questions affecting the whole of India ... are concerned, I, for one, am utterly at a loss to understand why Mussalmans should not work shoulder to shoulder with their fellow-countrymen of other races and creeds, for the common benefit of all." [29]

The correspondence between Tyabji and Syed Ahmad Khan illustrates the general situation in which the Muslim communal movement came into being.[30]

But what were the fundamental differences that existed between the National Congress, then still far removed from the notion of mass struggle for self-government, and the ideologists of the Muslim communal movement? The Congress laid an accent on country-wide objectives (as conceived by the national bourgeoisie), while the Muslim leaders concentrated on relationships between the various religious communities and castes, and denied the existence of country-wide goals.

Whatever the subjective wishes of Syed Ahmad Khan, his ideology and his political activities brought grist to the British colonial mill. The communal trend of the Muslim political movement accorded, too, with the interests of the landlords, who,dreading any opposition to the British authorities, did not care to see the national bourgeoisie consolidate itself. But the religious communal and pro-British tendency of Syed Ahmad Khan's movement after the founding of the Congress did not wipe out all the positive results of his educational work.

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[28] B. P. Sitatamayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. I, Bombay, 1946-1947, pp. 44-67.

[29] H. Mukerjee, *India Struggles for Freedom*, Bombay, 1948, p. 84.

[30] *Some Materials...*, p. 71.

The Muslim merchants, civil servants and some of the minor landlords, politically dormant until then, owed their interest in social affairs to his urging. A generation of Muslim intellectuals was raised by the Aligarh College, many of whom later turned their backs on religious sectarianism and adopted an all-Indian standpoint.

Chapter II

MUSLIM LEAGUE AND THE MIDDLE STRATA

Emergence of the Muslim League

Colonial oppression coupled with survivals of feudalism had adverse effects on the formation of capitalist relations in India. One of these effects was the uneven development of the various religious communities and castes of the Indian bourgeoisie.[1]

The Muslim section of the Indian bourgeoisie gained increased economic and political weight in the first three decades of the 20th century. This coincided with the awakening to political affairs of the middle sections of Muslims, causing a split within the older upper-crust Muslim educational societies, and a new attitude on their part with regard to the all-Indian national-liberation movement. The early controversies among the moderate, pro-British Muslims, which dated back to Syed Ahmad Khan's lifetime, often assumed a religious complexion.

In the Punjab, for example, traders, money-lenders and landlords formed a new Muslim sect—the Ahmadiya, or Quadiani Movement (1889). Ahmad Quadiani, founder of the sect, was proclaimed the new Muslim prophet, and his followers set out to adapt Islam to the new socio-economic and political setting. While preaching the Muslim faith among people of other religions, mainly Christians and Hindus, they also sought to provide an ideological justification for the political co-operation of Muslims with the British. They upheld the view that *jihad*, the holy war against infidels, was contrary to Quran dogma. Members of the sect attested that this theory was the greatest service they performed for the British government.[2]

The ulamas and the early Muslim educationalists in the Punjab, who were associated with the Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam, a society for the promotion of Islam formed in the late 1890's, attacked the Ahmadiya movement for departing from orthodox Islam and supporting British colonial rule. The society, strongly influenced by Syed Ahmad Khan, was highly prominent in the Punjabi movement for social reforms and a modern educational system.

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[1] H. Mukerjee, *India Struggles for Freedom*, Bombay, 1948, p. 96; Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Calcutta, 1946, p. 418; В. И. Павлов, *Формирование индийской буржуазии*, Москва, 1958.

[2] A. Maudoodi, *The Quadiani Problem*, Karachi, 1956, pp. 25-28.

In Bombay, Muslim manufacturers who belonged to the Anjuman-i Islamiya continued to oppose the anti-Congress stand of the Aligarh centre and supported the moderate national demands of the Congress.[3]

Discord broke out within the Muslim Association of Calcutta in the closing decade of the 19th century, between the landlord faction, hostile to the Congress, and the Muslim intellectuals, connected with the minor landowners, who were inclined to back many of the Congress demands.

A new Muslim educational society, the Nadwat ul-Ulama, was founded in Lucknow in 1894. It was a patriotic body seeking to combine modern education with the national features of Indian culture, the heroic traditions of the past and the original purity of Islam. The society was founded by Nomani Shibli, a former teacher at the Aligarh College, a popular poet and one of the first writers of historical prose in Urdu.

In its early period, the society, whose leadership included no few anti-British ulamas, did not oppose Syed Ahmad Khan. In fact, it collaborated with the Aligarh group in some matters. But Theodore Beck's followers were quick to perceive the threat it constituted to their own movement. When the tide of revolution rose in India in 1905-1908, the Nadwat ul-Ulama took its stand with the bourgeois nationalists headed by the Congress. The academy and madrasah founded by the society, which combined the traditional Muslim system of education with the Western, won popularity among many of the orthodox Muslim families in North-West India.[4] They also exercised a strong influence on the younger generation of Muslim intellectuals.

The manoeuvres of Theodore Beck, the principal of the Aligarh College, and the support he had from Syed Ahmad Khan, also disgruntled some of the Aligarh people. Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Viqar-ul-Mulk and Altaf Husain Hali, one of the first Urdu prose writers and Syed Ahmad Khan's biographer, wrote an article attacking Syed Ahmad Khan's stand in favour of British policy, particularly the British military expeditions to the north-west frontier of India. However, Ahmad Khan's death prevented the appearance of the article in the Lahore press.[5]

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[3] For a detailed description, see *Новая история Индии*, Москва, 1961, гл. XIII.

[4] A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India*, Lahore, 1950, pp. 117-129.

[5] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 1947, p. 107.

The Muslim section of bourgeois intelligentsia in Northern India, which owed its formation largely to the early educational societies, could no longer stand aloof from the national movement and political life. The more progressive element was eager to co-operate with the Congress. The others, who were affected by the British "divide and rule" policy and the separatist notions of the landlords, advocated the establishment of an independent Muslim political party. The founding of such a party dates to 1905-1908, a period of high tide in India's movement for national liberation.

It was amidst the revolutionary events of that period that the peoples of India made their first steps towards conscious mass political struggle for national freedom and democratic rights. When Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Aurobindo Ghosh and other radical spokesmen of the Indian bourgeoisie entered the political field at the turn of the 20th century and the national-liberation movement showed more than just moderate constitutional opposition to the colonial authorities, the latter went to great pains to put Muslims against Hindus in the country's political life. They partitioned Bengal in 1905, with that ultimate purpose in view, supported the establishment of a Muslim communal party in 1906, and introduced separate electorates in 1909. The split caused by the British "divide and rule" policy and the religious background of many of the anti-imperialist actions of the time tended to weaken the Indian national-liberation movement.[6]

The partition of Bengal, economically most highly developed province of India with a nationally homogeneous population, was meant by the British colonialists to curb the national aspirations of the Bengal intellectuals. They expected East Bengal, the new province with a compact Muslim majority, to develop into a centre of so-called Muslim nationalism, inimical to the Congress and loyal to the British.

The Viceroy, Lord Curzon, a notorious enemy of the Indian liberation movement who dealt ruthlessly with every show of independent thinking, let alone political activity, did not bother to conceal the purpose behind the partition of Bengal. It was an undisguised move to split India's patriotic forces, and the public saw through its dangers at once. The Congress sponsored India's first nation-wide protest campaign. The movement embraced the urban poor, the artisans, shopkeepers, petty bourgeois intellectuals and, here and there, the peasants. It was led by the radical wing of the national bourgeoisie, predominantly Hindu. The partition was also opposed by most of the Hindu landlords.

While preparations to effect the partition were still underway, it was also opposed by many Muslim traders, money-lenders and landlords, to say nothing of the radical intellectuals, peasants and artisans. The East Bengal landlords, for one, were afraid that the authorities of the new province would raise the land tax.[7]

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[6] И. М. Рейснер, «Общественно-политическая деятельность Тилака в годы революционного подъема в Индии», *Национально-освободительное движение в Индии и деятельность Б. Г. Тилака*, Москва, 1958, стр. 568.

Additional measures were required to get the top section of the Muslim community to break the nation-wide movement of protest. The British government hastened to announce officially that taxes in the new province would remain the same.[8]

Lord Curzon toured Bengal. Addressing the Muslim landlords in Dacca at a lavishly appointed assemblage, he said in a lengthy speech that Bengal's partition would yield untold benefits to the Muslim community. The official and semi-official press invoked the partition scheme to protect Muslim interests from "Hindu pre-eminence."

The partition of Bengal, wrote the *Statesman*, was calculated "to foster in Eastern Bengal the growth of Mohammedan power, which it is hoped will have the effect of keeping in check the rapidly growing strength of the Hindu community."[9] Muslims brought from the United Provinces replaced many of the Hindu police officials and civil servants.[10]

The big feudal lords, notably the Nawab of Dacca,[11] assumed an anti-Hindu attitude after the Bengal Partition Bill was published. *The Aligarh Institute Gazette* welcomed the move.[12] Its support was prompted by its dread of the mass revolutionary movement, the first popular manifestations and the consolidation of the Indian bourgeoisie.

The Muslim upper crust countered the slogans of Swaraj and Swadeshi with Swajati ("own community"), urging purely Muslim commerce, purely Muslim industry, Muslim schools and Muslim business associations, etc.[13] To some extent, this slogan reflected the dissatisfaction of the rising Muslim section of the Bengal bourgeoisie over the prominence of the Marwaris in provincial business affairs. It put a religious construction on the contradictions between the various national groups of the Indian bourgeoisie, which stemmed from commercial and industrial competition and rivalry in admission to civil service.

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[7] Э. Н. Комаров, «Из истории национально-освободительного движения и общественной мысли в Бенгалии в конце XIX-начале XX в.», *Национально-освободительное движение в Индии и деятельность Б. Г. Тилака*, стр. 245.

[8] *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 163, London, 1906, Commons, p. 1088.

[9] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 111.

[10] *The Indian Review*, June 1906, p. 411.

[11] Nawab (نواب), from the Arabic "naib" (نائب), meaning "deputy ruler" or "vice-regent," the title of the rulers of several feudal states in Northern India; used before a proper name, it means "highness."

[12] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League, Its History, Activities and Achievements*, Agra, 1954, p. 30; *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, January 1, 1907.

[13] M. Minto, *India Morley and Minto, 1905-1910*, London, 1936, pp. 30-40; Э. Н. Комаров, «Из истории национально-освободительного движения и общественной мысли в Бенгалии в конце XIX-начале XX в.», стр. 266.

The Hindu flavouring of Tilakite nationalist propaganda was skilfully used by the British authorities to do damage by furthering the religious split in the nationalist movement.

Religious fervour gripped a large section of the Muslim intellectuals. Many of them, though previously ranged behind the Congress, departed from it and urged the establishment of a Muslim party. The Congress session in Benares in 1905 was attended by only 17 Muslim delegates, whereas previous sessions saw as many as 700.[14] Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in Bengal.

Only the most progressive of the Muslim intellectuals gave staunch support to Tilak's followers and participated in their actions. One of them was twenty-year-old Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958), subsequently a prominent Indian public leader, an advocate of Hindu-Muslim co-operation and Indian unity. Azad's outlook, like that of many other young Muslim radical intellectuals, was strongly influenced by Nomani Shibli and the Nadwat ul-Ulama.

When unrest broke out in Bengal over the partition scheme, Azad joined the Tilakites and entered a secret terrorist society.[15] It was one of the many secret societies that attracted the flower of Bengal's patriotic youth, testifying to the growing desire of the radicals of the so-called middle strata to embark on an active struggle against colonial oppression.[16]

The existing situation confronted Azad and the other progressives of the Muslim middle strata with two primary tasks—first, to dissipate the suspicions of the Tilakites, the bulk of whom were Hindus and who mistrusted the Muslim middle strata, and, second, to induce the middle strata, instructed by Syed Ahmad Khan and his followers in a spirit of loyalty to the British government, to embark on anti-British activities. Azad recalled later that they had not been easy tasks. But he succeeded in enlisting a fairly big group of Muslim students in Bengal and in organising underground patriotic groups in the North-West and Bombay.[17]

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[14] A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, Lahore, 1948, p. 17.

[15] "When Shyam Sunder Chakravarty introduced me to other revolutionaries," recalls Abul Kalam Azad, "and my new friends found that I was willing to join them, they were greatly surprised. At first they did not fully trust me and tried to keep me outside their inner councils. In course of time they realised their mistake and I gained their confidence" (M. A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom. An Autobiographical Narrative*, Bombay-Calcutta-Madras-New Delhi, 1959, p. 5).

[16] For details about the activities of the Bengal terrorist groups, see Э. Н. Комаров, «Из истории национально-освободительного движения и общественной мысли в Бенгалии в конце XIX-начале XX в.», стр. 239-241.

[17] M. A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom...*, pp. 4-5.

The designs of the imperialists, who hoped the partition of Bengal would split Indian society into two hostile religious camps and dampen the revolutionary movement, fell through. The Muslims, alerted to political affairs, strove to join hands with the Hindus in the struggle for liberation. "Be sure," wrote Viscount Morley, Secretary of State for India, to Viceroy Lord Minto, "that before long the Mohammedans will throw in their lot with the Congressmen against you." [18]

At this point, the colonial authorities coupled acts of brutal suppression with constitutional manoeuvring. A new bill was framed on India's legislative councils, in which Indians were to be so represented as to perpetuate the political opposition of the Hindu and Muslim communities. The British colonialists went out of their way, with the support of the Aligarh group, to draw the middle strata into the contest for Muslim communal privileges.

They cooked up an appeal for British protection against the alleged threat of Hindu domination, ostensibly drawn up by the Muslim community. This was done to divert the Muslims from the all-Indian liberation movement. The British made the most of the fact that the Muslim upper crust and middle strata yearned to have a political party of their own, and promoted an anti-Hindu party built along religious communal lines. The idea arose of having a Muslim deputation go to the Viceroy. The new principal of the Aligarh College, Archbold, undertook to see the matter through. The Government, wrote the future Muslim leader Maulana Mohammad Ali in a letter of December 10, 1906, profited from flattering the Muslims. Praise was heaped upon them by all concerned, and everybody spoke of the good reputation enjoyed by the Muslim College at Aligarh.[19]

In summer 1906, during examination time at the College, Archbold made a hasty trip to Simla, where he took up the matter of the Muslim deputation with the Viceroy's Secretary, Colonel Dunlop Smith. The two of them also discussed the address which the deputation was to hand to the Viceroy, containing the basic demands of the Muslim community. Archbold admitted later that even the leaders of the deputation were ignorant of many of the key details concerning the negotiations; but it was scarcely desirable from the standpoint of the British authorities to release the facts about the part played by the English in these developments. Archbold said, "in all these matters, I want to remain behind the screen...."[20]

In a letter to the secretary of the Aligarh College of August 10, 1906, Archbold announced the Viceroy's consent to receive the Muslim deputation and set forth his ideas about the contents of the proposed address. After the Muslims will have expressed their loyalty to the British Crown and thanked the authorities for the projected constitutional reforms, he wrote, they should express the apprehension that the principle of election to the legislative councils, if introduced, would prove detrimental to the interests of the Muslim minority. It should respectfully be suggested, he wrote, that nomination or representation by religion should be introduced to meet Muslim opinion. "We should also say," he concluded, "that in a country like India, due weight might be given to the views of Zamindars."[21]

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[18] Cf., R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 112.

[19] Cf., Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 34.

[20] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 107; see also Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 35.

But the Muslim leaders would not follow the British recommendations blindly. The address contained vague references to the Muslim desire that the constitutional rights of Indians should be extended. Contrary to Archbold's advice, the address did not put the principle of nomination instead of that of electoral representation. Furthermore, the authors of the address could not avoid mentioning the growing discontent in the country over British policy. "Recent events," they wrote, "have stirred up feelings, especially among the younger generation of Mohammedans, which might, in certain circumstances and under certain contingencies, easily pass beyond control of temperate counsel and sober guidance."[22]

The Muslim deputation to Simla, let alone the establishment of a political party by the Indian Muslims, was not purely an upshot of British intrigue. Neither was it purely an expression of the pro-British and anti-Hindu sentiments of the Muslim landlords. Feelings ran high against British colonial policy during Lord Curzon's administration also among the upper section of Muslim landlords and compradores. They were not content to extoll the British officialdom and set the Muslim community against the Hindu. They wanted palpable concessions. A section of the Muslim bourgeoisie took advantage of the address to the Viceroy and the founding of a Muslim party to exert pressure on the British administration in favour of its class interests. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Muslim deputation, though composed chiefly of members of the Aligarh group, also included people who had in the past opposed the pro-British, anti-Hindu stand of Syed Ahmad Khan.[23] It had the sympathy of such Bombay Muslims as Badruddin Tyabji.

Viceroy Minto received the deputation of seventy Muslims on October 1, 1906. The deputation was led by Aga Khan III (1877-1957), Imam of the Ismailians and head of the Khoja community, which extensively engaged in industry and commerce.

A mature political leader and lifelong apologist of colonial rule, the Aga Khan wrote in his memoirs that he, tutored as he was by

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[21] Quoted from *Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee*, Bombay, 1945, pp. 101-102.

[22] *Struggle for Independence 1857-1947*, Karachi, 1958, pp. 3-9.

[23] A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan...*, p. 95.

English masters in a spirit of profound loyalty to the British Crown, was dumbfounded by the crude and brutal policies of Lord Curzon. The wooing of the Indian intellectuals in the 1870's and 80's had given place during Curzon's administration to outright contempt. Even the Aga Khan's own family, "select" and on friendly terms with the Governor of Bombay, the head of the Bombay army garrison and many other officials, was affected by the general discontent.[24]

In these circumstances, with discontent spreading to the upper crust of India's Muslim community, the British manoeuvres had an obviously pernicious effect, for they succeeded in steering Muslim political efforts along communal lines. The Muslim political groups hoped the deputation to the Viceroy would exert pressure on the British authorities. Yet it was Archbold's reactionary proposal of representation by religion that won pride of place in the address and the future programme of the Indian Muslim political party on the contention that Muslim interests had to be safeguarded from the alleged menace of Hindu domination. This was a logical projection of the separatist attitude held by Syed Ahmad Khan and a major triumph for the British "divide and rule" policy.

At a reception given for the Muslim deputation, attended by numerous press correspondents and guests, the Viceroy said he understood the address to demand that in all the representative bodies, whatever they were, Muslims should be represented as a community. He described as perfectly justified the demand that representation should depend not on the number of Muslims, but on their political importance and their services to the British Crown.[25] In a private conversation with Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Lord Minto stressed that Muslim political activities should be aimed at achieving community representation, which he guaranteed in the projected reforms, so as to combat the growing political and economic influence of the Hindu community. The Viceroy pointed out that the British authorities pinned strong hopes on the good sense and loyalty of the Aligarh group.[26]

The Indian Councils Act of 1909 instituted separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims, thus formalising the policy of opposing the religious communities.

To split the patriotic forces, the British authorities encouraged the establishment of communal political parties. While the reforms were still in the preparatory stage, the British took a hand in the establishment, almost at one time (1906), of two communal parties—the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League.

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[24] *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, London, 1954, pp. 26-27.

[25] M. Minto, *India, Morley and Minto...*, pp. 45, 47.

[26] *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, April 22, 1908; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, pp. 39-40.

The efforts of the various Muslim leaders to form an all-Indian Muslim political party were a logical sequel to the Simla deputation and address.

The first to make the specific proposal for a Muslim political association was Nawab Salimullah of Dacca. He wanted the association to support the British administration, safeguard the interests of the Muslim community and combat the mounting influence of the Congress. He believed the association should concentrate on the Muslim youth, to minister to its wish for political activity and thereby prevent it from falling under the influence of the Congress.[27]

Salimullah's proposals were accepted with a few modifications at a conference of Muslim leaders who met in Dacca under the chairmanship of the prominent Aligarh figure, Viqar-ul-Mulk. The conference elected a provisional committee, named the new organisation the All-India Muslim League, and elected Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk as its joint secretaries.[28]

The first conference of the Muslim League opened in Karachi on December 29, 1907, presided by Adamjee Pirbhai, one of the first Muslim industrialists.[29] Delegates arrived from all the larger Indian Muslim groups. The Aligarh group was led by Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk, the initiators of the Muslim deputation to Simla. They were important Nawabs, coming from orthodox Muslim families, who began their careers in the British civil service in the United Provinces. Later, for a considerable time, they held honorary offices at the court of the Nizam of Hyderabad, where they were conferred titles.[30] They supported Syed Ahmad Khan's educational efforts and opposed ignorance and the despotism of the feudal lords. In doing so, they ran into the embittered resistance of the Nizam and his entourage, and were compelled to resign their offices, devoting themselves henceforth to the affairs of the Aligarh College. They shared leadership over the landlord section in the Muslim League with the Bengal Nawabs, and reflected in their public utterances the anxiety of the landlords in face of the consolidation of the Indian bourgeoisie.

Both were inimical to the radical activities of the Muslim middle strata, yet enjoyed considerable popularity among educated Muslims, notably for their firm stand against making Hindi the

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[27] *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, January 2, 1907.

[28] *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, January 1, 1907; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 41.

[29] Adamjee Pirbhai, prominent merchant and industrialist of the Ismailian Bohra community. At seventeen a petty trader in Bombay. Later established a tannery and became a prominent leather supplier for the Anglo-Indian army in Bombay and Madras. Shortly before the First World War he gained prominence in India's textile industry (В. И. Павлов, *Формирование индийской буржуазии*, стр. 185).

[30] A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan...*, pp. 81-117.

lingua franca of North-West India. Among Muslims of like mind they won the reputation of champions of Muslim community interests in disregard of their own tranquillity and comfort.[31]

Mohammad Shah Din, head of the reactionary Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India, was quite prominent in the establishment of the Muslim League. Many of its programme documents were contributed by Syed Husain Bilgrami, a connoisseur of the Arabic and the English languages and literatures. Numerous articles advocating the establishment of a Muslim party appeared in *The Aligarh Institute Gazette* and a few other periodicals.

All in all, the lead in founding the Muslim League belonged to the Muslim groups of landlords and intellectuals in the Punjab, Bengal, and the Central and United Provinces. There were also a few Muslim manufacturers, such as Adamjee Pirbhai, among its organisers. Mazharul Haq and Hasan Imam, two Muslim nationalists and Congress supporters, attended its first congress as observers. Tyabji, leader of the Bombay Muslims, welcomed the founding of the League.[32] But the Muslim section of the Bombay bourgeoisie did not at the time solidly follow the communal trend in Muslim political activities. Some members of the Muslim bourgeoisie of Bombay, however, did show a certain interest in a separate Muslim political organisation, which they hoped would back them in their competitive struggle against the other, economically stronger, bourgeois groups.

The Aga Khan was elected the first president of the League. In his capacity of the spiritual leader of the Ismailians he was eager to have the support of the British authorities and to maintain some of the feudal institutions that accorded privileges to the imam. At the same time, he was closely connected with the Muslim manufacturers of Bombay, most of whom belonged to the Khoja community. "I could never be solely an Indian nationalist," the Aga Khan related, "although from 1892 onwards and under the influence of wise and good men such as Sir Pherozshah Mehta and Mr. Badruddin Tyabji I took the standpoint of moderate Indian nationalism of the time."[33] But the influence exerted on him by the Aligarh politicians was just as strong as Tyabji's and considerably stronger in shaping his attitude towards the Congress. It was this that prompted the Aga Khan to take a hand in founding the Muslim League. He wrote in his memoirs that the urgency of founding the Muslim League was brought home to him after his visit to Aligarh in 1906. "By 1906 Mohsin-ul-Mulk and I, in common with other Muslim leaders, had come to the conclusion that our only hope lay along the lines of independent organisation and action and that we must secure independent political recognition from the British Government as a nation within the nation."[34]

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[31] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, pp. 45-47.

[32] H. Mukerjee, *India Struggles for Freedom*, p. 98.

[33] *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, p. 33.

As pointed out earlier, British officials had a considerable say in the establishment of the League and the framing of its original programme documents, though, naturally, they chose to remain in the shade. "The Mohammedan leaders are inspired by certain Anglo-Indian officials," wrote Ramsay MacDonald, "and these officials have pulled wires at Simla and in London, and of malice aforethought sowed discord between Hindu and Mohammedan communities by showing the Muslims special favour."[35]

Archbold was the "secret counsellor" of the Muslim politicians. Lal Bahadur, the Indian historian, notes rightly that there were two main factors that expedited the creation of the Muslim League: the wish of the Muslims to have their own political party, on the one hand, and the fear experienced by the British in the face of the mounting national sentiment in the country.[36]

The early League documents disclosed its pro-British landlord substance. The aspirations of the Muslim bourgeois groups, described earlier, came to the fore in its activities at a much later date. The resolution of the League's conference in Dacca defined the following goals:

"(a) To promote, among the Mussalmans of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of Government with regard to any of its measures.

"(b) To project and advance the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government.

"(c) To prevent the rise among the Mussalmans of India of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other afore-mentioned objects of the League."[37]

The programme and structure of the party took final shape at the League's second conference in Aligarh, March 1908, presided by Mohammad Shah Din.[38]

The programme contained the demands spelled out at the Dacca conference. In a letter to the president of the Dacca branch of the Muslim League the Aga Khan stressed that since the League recognised British rule essential for India in order to protect India's Muslims from internal anarchy and inimical alien domination—that is, domination by Hindus—and since it recognised that the British were the only authority under which India could develop towards peace and spiritual and intellectual progress, it was up to the Muslims to apply all their energy to furthering British prestige and instilling respect and affection for the British in the public mind.[39] The second conference of the League adopted a resolution welcoming the partition of Bengal and condemning the Swaraj and Swadeshi movements.[40]

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[35] Cf., R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. ! 6.

[36] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 31.

[37] *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, January 9, 1907; S. Sen, *The Birth of Pakistan*, Calcutta, 1955, p. 57.

[38] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 49.

The League's pro-British communal stand did not satisfy the aspirations of the Muslim masses and middle strata. It expressed the interests of the big landlords and compradores, who held commanding positions in its leadership. As concerns the Muslim industrialists, their connections with the industrialists of other, more developed religious groups and castes (especially the Parsi), were far more important to them than their competitive struggle. They were bent on consolidating the economic and political position of the bourgeoisie as a class, and inclined towards the all-Indian national-liberation movement. A few of them, having joined the Muslim League, exerted pressure on its landlord-compradore leadership in an effort to reverse the League's attitude towards the Congress. It was due to their influence that the League adopted the third point in its programme, opposing hostile acts against other religious communities and thus giving members of the Muslim League a certain amount of freedom to co-operate with Hindu and Parsi political leaders.

The conference endorsed the League Constitution, under which leadership was to be concentrated in the hands of a central committee of 40 provincial representatives. The central committee elected the president and two secretaries.[41] Aligarh was named the permanent seat of the Muslim League central committee, but by decision of the Delhi conference (December 1909-January 1910) it was moved to Lucknow.

A special committee was instituted in London in May 1908 under Amir Ali, a League leader, to promote among the British the principle of separate representation in the Indian legislative bodies.

In 1908-1910 the Muslim League set up its main provincial bodies. Most of these were headed by wealthy landlords and conservative Muslim intellectuals who were closely associated with them. The Punjab branch of the League, for example, was led by

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

[40] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 115.

[41] The first central committee had seven representatives from the Punjab, the United Provinces and East Bengal. Another seven representatives were from Western Bengal, combined with Bihar and Orissa. Bombay was represented by four members, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan by one each; Berar and the Central Provinces, Madras and the group of princely States by two each. The Aga Khan was confirmed in the office of President, and Syed Husain Bilgrami and Khwaja Mohammad Musa Khan were appointed secretaries (*The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, March 18, 1908; January 13, 1909; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, pp. 73-74).

Shah Din and Mian Mohammad Shafi, and the Eastern Bengal branch by Nazimuddin and Nawab Salimullah of Dacca. In the United Provinces leadership was held by Rajah Naushad Ali Khan, the biggest taluqdar of this region. The Nizam of Hyderabad and other Indian princes and landlords headed the League in the south of India. Only in Bombay, Bihar and Madras did members of the bourgeoisie have prominence in the League leadership.

Muslim Radicals on the Eve of the First World War

The middle strata of Muslims were greatly influenced by the rising revolutionary tide of 1905-1908, the broad participation of the masses in the liberation movement, and, last but not least, the inception of organised working-class struggle. The propaganda of British "beneficence" by the Muslim League leadership fell on increasingly barren soil. It was obvious that the British authorities had failed to isolate the Muslims of East Bengal from the mounting revolutionary movement. In 1911, they were compelled to repeal the partition of Bengal. The refusal of the Muslim upper crust to join the struggle for self-government imperilled the existence of the Muslim League. Small wonder that Nawab Salimullah, author of the original plan for the establishment of the League, lamented the reunification of Bengal as the end of his political career.

Shortly before the First World War the Muslim League began to gravitate leftwards.[42] It associated itself closely with the political activities of the radical Muslim intellectuals, who represented the interests of the Muslim section of India's middle strata. Newspapers and magazines, mostly in Urdu, were founded, differing from the older Urdu periodicals by their considerably greater circulation and, chiefly, their candidly anti-imperialist attitude.

Nomani Shibli was the originator of the new trend. He called on the Muslims through the *Muslim Gazette*, a new periodical established by Shibli's followers in Lucknow, to disavow religious exclusiveness with regard to all-Indian problems and to fight for India's freedom in concert with the other religious communities. Shibli urged the Muslim League to alter its attitude towards the National Congress. In his satirical articles and pamphlets he assaulted the pro-British standpoint of the Aligarh College, which he described as "a slavish mentality."[43]

But Shibli himself was not entirely free from religious prejudice and was strongly influenced by the antiquated feudal ideology.

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[42] S. Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, Bombay 1944, p. 10, H. Mukerjee, *India Struggles for Freedom*, pp. 102-03.

[43] A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan...*, p. 25.

He clothed his liberation ideas in the religious fabric of Pan-Islamic propaganda. Coming from him, the motto "Islam is in danger" had a liberative ring, since it was aimed against British rule in India and the incursions of the British imperialists upon the freedom of Muslims in other Eastern countries.[44]

He believed that the liberation struggle of the Indian Muslims should be headed by a Muslim religious society, such as the Nadwat ul-Ulama, rather than an all-Indian political party. But his efforts to merge religion and politics incensed some of the ulamas, and late in his life Shibli was obliged to resign from the office of chairman of the society.

However, in spite of his religious limitations, Shibli's propaganda of anti-British struggle had a beneficial effect. A generation of Muslim intellectuals was raised on his brilliant poetry, vibrant with patriotic sentiment. Shibli, who was in many ways closely connected with the old feudal society, was not the only one to express the ideology of the liberation movement in religious terms. Many other Indian intellectuals, even of bourgeois background, did likewise.

The progressive public thinking of the Muslim middle strata, which was taking shape at the time, largely assumed the form of Pan-Islamic propaganda. The Egyptian educators and the Young Turk movement exercised a strong influence on the emergence of Pan-Islamic views among India's Muslim intellectuals. Many Muslims connected with the National Congress, including their most prominent ideologist, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, fell under their spell in that period. Azad's tour of the Eastern countries in 1908 greatly affected his views.[45]

Al Hilal (*The Crescent*), a periodical founded by Azad in June 1912, soon became a popular organ of the new trend.

Abul Kalam Azad described *Al Hilal* as "a turning point in the history of Urdu journalism. It achieved unprecedented popularity within a short time. The public was attracted not only by the superior printing and production of the paper, but even more by the new note of strong nationalism preached by it. *Al Hilal* created a revolutionary stir among the masses."[46]

To be sure, Azad was inclined to exaggerate the revolutionary impact of his newspaper. Its bombastic style, overindulgence in

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[44] Later, Muslim reactionary groups gave this slogan an entirely different construction, proclaiming Hindu domination (Hindu raj) the chief danger to Islam.

[45] Contacts with the Arab and Turkish revolutionaries, Azad wrote, "confirmed my political beliefs.... I felt it necessary to create a new movement among Indian Mussalmans.... After my return, I thought for some time about my future programme of action. I came to the conclusion that we must build up public opinion, and for this a journal was essential" (M.A.K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom...*, p. 7).

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

Arabic and Persian turns of phrase and the religious colouring of patriotic propaganda often put it beyond the reach of the average urban reader. As for the villagers, the paper did not reach them at all. But its popularity among the Muslim intellectuals of Northern and Central India was indeed great.

Al Hilal did not directly oppose the separate electorates system, or the Muslim communal party. It focused its criticism upon the separatist attitude of the Aligarh group. "Aligarh movement," wrote Azad, "has paralysed the Muslims."[47]

The Aligarh leadership responded with a witch-hunt against *Al Hilal*. It went so far as to threaten to kill its editor. But that only added to *Al Hilal's* popularity.

The paper explained the damage done by the anti-Hindu attitude of some of the Muslim intellectuals and appealed for Hindu-Muslim unity in the common struggle against foreign oppression. It was candidly anti-imperialist, but like most of the patriotic newspapers of the time it clothed its liberative ideals in religious forms. It advocated a merger of politics and religion and conducted its nationalist propaganda from the angle of Pan-Islamism and religious revivalism. While calling on Muslims to back the all-Indian national-liberation movement, *Al Hilal* also openly admitted that, rather than expect too much from it, hope should be pinned primarily on the assistance of foreign Muslim states and united action by Muslims of all the Eastern countries.[48]

Al Hilal exerted a strong influence on the ideology of the budding Khilafat movement. Its views took root also among the students and teachers of the Aligarh College. Adherents to the new trend appeared among them. Zafar Ali Khan, who founded the Lahore newspaper, *Zamindar*, in 1911, Mohammad Ali, who launched the English-language *Comrade* in Calcutta at about the same time, and many other political figures who co-operated with the National Congress, came from the Aligarh College. Sajjad Zaheer observes rightly that *Al Hilal*, *Zamindar* and *Comrade* gave "a powerful impetus to these new radical trends."[49]

Unlike Azad, Mohammad Ali (1878-1931) sided with the movement for privileges for the Muslim community. Prior to the repeal of Bengal's partition, Mohammad Ali was not openly anti-British. He stood aloof from the Swaraj and Swadeshi campaigns of the National Congress, and attacked the pro-Congress newspapers, *Bengalee* and *Tribune*, for their hostile attitude towards the Muslim League. But his point of view changed when opposition mounted among the Muslim intellectuals. So did the views of his newspaper.

However, although the political activities of the radical section of Muslim intellectuals were couched in Pan-Islamic terms, limiting their political scope and diverting them from many important Indian domestic problems, their efforts before and during the First World War were beneficial.

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[47] Cf., A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan...*, p. 135.

[48] *Ibid.*, M. A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom...*, pp. 7-8.

[49] S. Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, p. 10.

Abul Kalam Azad, Zafar Ali Khan, Mohammad Ali and others associated at the time with the Congress, did much to draw the middle strata of Muslims into the anti-colonial political struggle, and their newspapers were instrumental in effecting the leftward swing of the Muslim League. The latter could no longer stand aloof from the political movement for Indian self-government.

In 1912, Syed Wazir Husain (father of Sajjad Zaheer, the popular Indian and Pakistani writer and political figure), secretary of the Muslim League, toured the country to ascertain the reception by the various Muslim groups of the draft of a new League constitution, which envisaged a reversal in the League's attitude to the movement for home rule.

The Council of the League, convened in Lucknow on December 31, 1912, was attended by Mohammad Ali and other radical intellectuals, who declared that most Muslims favoured self-government. The heated debate between the Muslim nationalists and the reactionaries resulted in the following compromise programme: (1) Indian loyalty to the British Crown; (2) protection and extension of the political rights and interests of the Indian Muslims; (3) friendship and co-operation between Muslims and other communities in India; (4) achievement, without prejudice to the above goals, of a form of self-government acceptable to India through a radical constitutional change of the system of administration, promotion of national unity, development of public opinion, and co-operation with other communities.[50]

The radical press attacked the project ferociously. Shibli went so far as to say that the term "acceptable," worked into the demand for self-government, was a word that concealed deception and constituted a talisman of continued slavery.[51]

But on the whole the project meant that the Muslim League leadership had somewhat relaxed its anti-Congress and separatist orientation. The plan was endorsed at the sixth session of the League, which was attended by representatives of the National Congress.

A struggle flared up for leadership in the League between the "loyalists" and the radical wing. The fight was especially bitter at the seventh League session in Agra, December 1913. Mohammad Ali, Zafar Ali Khan, Abul Kalam Azad and Saifuddin Kitchlew, the radicals, wanted the League to be a mass anti-imperialist political party of the Indian Muslims. They wanted it to attract more of the middle strata, and believed that self-government

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[50] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, pp. 90-91.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

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was achievable only through close co-operation of the Muslim League and the Congress.[52] Many of the Muslim radicals, such as Azad, Kitchlew, and others, were also members of the Congress and associated with its left wing. Under pressure of country-wide sentiments for national unity, the Aga Khan and his followers consented to negotiate with the Congress.

Mounting inter-imperialist contradictions and the involvement of big and small countries in world conflicts affected the situation in India. Muslim intellectuals followed the bourgeois developments in the Islamic countries of the Near and Middle East (the 1906-1911 revolution in Iran, the revolution of Young Turks, etc.). The rising Muslim bourgeoisie of India sided with the first unfolding upper-class bourgeois revolutions, but adopted Pan-Islamism with all its reactionary feudal implications, championing the prestige of the Turkish sultan as "the commander of the faithful." Turkey, at the time, claimed leadership of Islam and its domestic and foreign policy attracted the attention of Muslims in all countries of the Near and Middle East.

The counter-revolutionary coalition of the European powers against the Young Turk and Iran revolutions, the tacit support by Britain of the Italian imperialists in their efforts to seize the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, and the Balkan Wars in which the Indian Muslims backed Turkey, a Muslim country, stimulated the political activity of propertied Muslims in India.

Mass Muslim meetings swept the country in 1911-1913. They condemned the situation in the Balkans and prayed for a Turkish victory.[53] The movement in support of the Turkish Caliphate united the various social trends. The big landlords and merchants joined it, too, because they considered any weakening of the Ottoman Empire an infringement upon the traditional rights and privileges of the propertied classes of Muslims. They were far from the thought of associating the movement with the anti-imperialist struggle of the masses, and their opposition to Britain was very moderate. The radical Muslim intellectuals, on the other hand, gave an anti-imperialist content to the slogan, and to the Pan-Islamic movement as a whole. Their call for the Caliphate sounded as a call for the national liberation of Muslims.

The propertied section of the Indian Muslims organised a fund in aid of Turkey, to which the Aga Khan hastened to contribute more than £ 2,000. The students, including those of the Aligarh College, joined the collection campaign. The unrest in Aligarh alarmed the British authorities and the governor of the United Provinces paid a special visit to the town. Shaukat Ali, Mohammad

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[52] *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, January 7, 1914, pp. 9, 13.

[53] Detailed reports about the meetings in Patna, Bankipore, Lucknow, Benares, Amritsar, Kanpur, Dacca, Madras and Bombay appeared in the newspaper *Comrade*, October 14 and 28, and November 11, 13, 25, 1911.

Ali's elder brother, called on India's Muslims to form armed volunteer groups.[54]

The younger generation of Muslim intellectuals in North-West India were at the time closely associated with the Deoband Dar-ul-Ulum, and it soon became a centre of extremist underground Muslim politics. Preparations were underway for an armed uprising against the British colonial authorities in the north-west. The conspiracy was headed by Mahmud Hasan, who was in 1920 conferred the title of Sheikh ul-Hind (spiritual head of the Indian Muslims). Brought up on the fine traditions of the 1857-1859 uprising, he is said by his contemporaries to have inherited from his teachers—all veterans of that uprising—"a passionate desire to end British rule."[55]

Hasan and Abul Kalam Azad were close friends, and were intimately connected with the left wing of the National Congress, both Muslim and Hindu. During the war Hasan was highly popular among the extremist youth of Northern India.

Soon after the First World War broke out, Mahmud Hasan issued a call from Deoband for the unity of progressive Muslims in all countries to safeguard their freedom from the European powers, notably Britain. Protection of the sacred rights of the Turkish Caliph was proclaimed the religious basis of unity. The Deoband group plotted an anti-British uprising in India. Another centre of rebellion was in Sitan (North-West Frontier Province), the seat of a colony of Sayed Ahmad's and Shah Ismail's followers known in British sources as the Wahhabites.

Mahmud Hasan's closest assistant and one of the leading ideologists of the radical trend in the Indian Pan-Islamic movement, then still anti-imperialist in nature, was Ubaydullah Sindhi. He went to Afghanistan to negotiate with the Young Afghans and with Amir Habibullah. While in Afghanistan, he established an organisation of Indian emigrants, which he named a branch of the Indian National Congress, and contacted various Punjab underground terrorist societies, predominantly Hindu and Sikh, though counting some Muslims.

The branch, which had Muslim and Hindu members, formed a provisional Indian government in Kabul, designed to assume authority if the projected rising should succeed.

Mahmud Hasan set out on a tour of the East to obtain assistance from other Muslim states. In the meantime, Deoband sent emissaries to organise risings in various parts of India.

Secret meeting-houses were set up in Deoband, where, under cover of darkness, Mahmud Hasan met with members of the terrorist societies and Indians dissatisfied with British colonial rule.

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[54] *The Indian Review*, October 1912, pp. 833-837.

[55] احمد صاحب مدنی — نقش حیات (Ahmad Sahib Medini, *Naksh-i Hayat*, Vol. II, Delhi-Deoband, 1953, p. 131).

Since there were many Hindus and Sikhs among his visitors, the food offered to the guests was prepared separately, so that they could observe their customs and rites. Eventually, persecuted by the authorities, Mahmud Hasan had to emigrate to Mecca. The British, who had arrested Mahmud Hasan's secret messenger, impounded silk scrolls which contained a detailed plan of the projected uprising. Hence the wide-spread references to the "silk letters conspiracy."

The plan envisaged that the Indian Muslims should rise on a pre-arranged signal, supported by Pakhtun border tribes, Afghan regular army units, and other Muslim countries. If the uprising succeeded, India would be proclaimed a republic, with democratic rights for its population.[56]

Neither Mahmud Hasan and Ubaydullah Sindhi, nor any of the other "silk letters" conspirators had any close contacts with the masses. The immensity of their undertaking escaped them. Hence, the plan of the rising reflected the chief weaknesses of the Pan-Islamic trend among the progressive Muslim intellectuals—their disbelief in a mass anti-imperialist movement, reliance on a narrow circle of conspirators and dependence on outside assistance.

All this presaged certain failure. The conspirators were arrested, while Mahmud Hasan was exiled to Malta.

Mahmud Hasan's efforts were built upon the general discontent prevailing in the country and the rapidly spreading urge for action. In effect, they also gave a start to the Khilafat Movement, which involved large masses of people during the revolutionary upswing of 1918-1922.

As we see, the radical Muslims gave their activities a religious form as far back as the eve of the First World War.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Lucknow Pact

Shortly before the First World War, a period of great importance for the future of the Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), a successful lawyer and future leader of the movement for the establishment of Pakistan, joined the Muslim League.

Unlike most League leaders, Jinnah did not belong to an ancient feudal family. Neither did he succeed to the fame of any distinguished Muslim ulama. Son of a Kathiawar merchant of the Ismailian Khoja community, he was trained from childhood for a commercial and industrial career. But during his enrollment in a higher mission school in Karachi, which he joined after leaving the madrasah, he gave evidence of prodigious ability, and his father sent him to complete his education in London.

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[56] *Sedition Committee (Rowlett) Report, 1918*, London, 1919, pp. 173-179; Ahmad Sahib Medini, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 130-133.

It was in London where Jinnah's socio-political views developed. By the time he returned to India, his biographers testify, he was an Englishman rather than an Indian.[57]

Until 1906 Jinnah took no part in the country's political affairs and devoted himself entirely to his legal practice. He established himself in Bombay in 1897, one of the few Muslim lawyers there, and was soon well known among the city's businessmen. In 1906, by then an experienced lawyer, he first attended the National Congress session as secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji.

In the elections under the Indian Councils Act of 1909, Jinnah was elected member of the Bombay Legislative Council from the Bombay Muslim electorate (representing essentially Muslim merchants and millowners). From the first, he championed the interests mostly of the big Muslim merchants and millowners. His business connections and his marriage to the daughter of Dinshaw Petit, one of the city fathers, linked Jinnah with the Parsi community, which was very prominent in Bombay's business world.

Jinnah's outlook was strongly influenced by British liberals of the Morley type. Gokhale, too, was a close friend of Jinnah's, and the latter developed as a political leader in the spirit of modern bourgeois nationalism nurtured by the right-wing leadership of the National Congress, which he joined in 1906. Bal Gangadhar Tilak's radical programme, like that of other bourgeois democrats, went against the interests of the bourgeois groups with which Jinnah was associated.

His espousal of the Muslim League began after the revolutionary tide of 1906-1908 had been suppressed. The attitude of the Muslim big bourgeoisie, too, had changed on the eve of the war. The Muslim merchants, until then largely engaged in compradore commerce, began investing in industry. Two contradictory trends arose. On the one hand, the burgeoning Muslim bourgeois upper crust had a vested interest in consolidating the bourgeois class as a whole. On the other, the competitive struggle between the various bourgeois groups gained in intensity, often assuming the form of conflict between religious communities and castes.[58]

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[57] These and subsequent facts from Jinnah's biography are from: چودھری سردار محمد خان — حیات قائد اعضام (Choudhury Sardar Mohammad Khan, *Khayat-i Quaid-i azam*), Lahore, 1949; *Mohammad Ali Jinnah. An Ambassador of Unity. His Speeches and Writings, 1912-1917*, Madras, [s. a.]; Mohammad Ali Jinnah, *Frontier Speeches*, Bombay, 1947; M. H. Sayyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah (A Political Study)*, Lahore, 1953; H. Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan*, London, 1954; A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan...*, pp. 191-241.

[58] The development of Adamjee Pirbhai into a big industrialist, to which we referred above, was not an isolated case. People from the Ismailian Bohra and Khoja communities, such as members of the Rahimtoola, Currimbhoy and a few other families, gained considerable prominence in the business world on

A far-sighted leader of his class, Jinnah, unlike most of the other League leaders, was awake to the need for united action by the different political parties in the constitutional struggle against British omnipotence, for greater privileges to India's propertied classes. He worked zealously for agreement between the League and the Congress, and became known to the general public as the "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity." The very modest British reforms of 1909 did much to cement the Indian propertied classes, for they did not satisfy even the landlords, let alone the other sections of the population.

Jinnah attended his first session of the League in 1912. During the war, he rose to become one of its most influential leaders, while still an active member of the Congress. It was in the latter capacity that he headed the Indian delegation to Britain in 1914 and submitted to the British government the Conrgess proposals for inducting Indian members elected by the central and the provincial legislative assemblies into the London Council of the Secretary of State for India. The Congress, the Muslim League, and other political parties declared their support of Britain in the war.

On his return to India, Jinnah applied all his efforts to achieving an accord between the Muslim League and the National Congress. He obtained the consent of the Congress leadership and the Bombay League group to convene the League and Congress sessions simultaneously in Bombay, December 1915. The idea was accepted. The League session was attended by such prominent Congress members as Annie Besant, Sarojini Naidu and Mahatma Gandhi, who had then just come back from South Africa.

The contradictions between Jinnah's followers and the Aligarh group were exceptionally acute. Matters came to the point of a fist fight between the advocates and opponents of an accord with the Congress, and the police intervened. Ultimately, the gathering accepted Jinnah's proposal to set up a committee to draft the text of an agreement, and he was elected president of the coming session of the Muslim League. However, while urging a rapprochement with the Congress, Jinnah thought it best to contain the political activities of the middle strata within religious communal limits, and suggested that the agreement provide for the principle of special Muslim representation in the legislative bodies.

"As far as I understand," he said, "the demand for separate electorates is not a matter of policy, but a matter of necessity

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the eve of the First World War. In 1905, of the 259 Bombay taxpayers with an income of over Rs. 20,000, 59 were Muslims. In 915 the Bombay cotton industry numbered seven Muslim firms, which owned eleven mills. Currimbhoy launched a campaign at the time for a Bombay Millowners' Association. Like Rahimtoola, he was an active member of the Muslim League, and was eager to see it consolidated (В. И. Павлов, *Формирование индийской буржуазии*, стр. 180-181).

to the Muslims, who require to be roused from the coma and torpor into which they have fallen for so long. I would therefore appeal to my Hindu brethren that in the present state of position they should try to win the confidence and trust of the Muslims, who are, after all, in the minority in the country. If they are determined to have separate electorates, no resistance should be shown to their demands."[59]

For all this, the decisive factor in Jinnah's attitude at the time was his wish for the political unity of India's propertied classes.

In 1916, the League and the Congress concluded an agreement signed by Jinnah on behalf of the League, and by all Congress leaders. It was endorsed by the two parties at their respective sessions held simultaneously in Lucknow, and has come to be known as the Lucknow Pact. The Pact envisaged joint action by the Congress and the League for further constitutional reforms and dominion status. To begin with, the purpose of the two parties was to establish self-government bodies by direct elections, preferably on the territorial principle. They made the reservation, however, that it would be wise to keep the separate representation system for at least 10 years.[60]

The Lucknow Pact had its strong and weak points. Its acceptance of the principle of separate electorates was unquestionably negative. The British government could, on the strength of it, regard the Lucknow Pact as an agreement between the Hindu and Muslim religious communities, rather than between two political parties. As a result, the Congress was reduced to the status of a communal Hindu party. The reactionary landlord groups viewed the agreement in like manner. Many of them described the Lucknow Pact as a recognition of the exclusive rights held by the League to represent the "Muslim nation."[61] Various bourgeois nationalists and India's progressive historians have frequently called attention to this weak side of the agreement.

But at the time of the First World War and the post-war revolutionary tide that swept India under the direct impact of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, progressive Indians laid the accent on the Lucknow Pact's recognition of the need for joint action to achieve self-government. We may therefore conclude that the pact was a positive development in its day, that it furthered the resistance of the people of India to Britain's "divide and rule" policy, and drew broader sections of Muslims into the all-Indian national-liberation movement.

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[59] Cf.: H. Bolitho, *Jinnah...*, p. 65.

[60] The Pact specified the extent of Muslim representation in the various provincial legislatures: 50 per cent of the seats in the Punjab, 40 per cent in Bengal, $33^{1}/_{2}$ per cent in Bombay, 30 per cent in the United Provinces, 15 per cent in the Central Provinces, and 15 per cent in Madras (*The Indian Review*. January, 1947, p. 19).

[61] "By that Pact," wrote Mohammad Durrani, a prominent advocate of Pakistan, "the Congress acknowledged the fact that the Hindus and the Muslims were two separate nations, and while the Congress itself was the representative of the Hindus, the Muslim League represented the Muslim community" (Cf., R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 18).

The Muslim League and the Khilafat Movement

The early revolutionary actions of India's working class, prompted by the October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the Afghan War of Independence, exerted a strong influence on the Muslim bourgeois intellectuals. There were keener economic contradictions between the Indian bourgeoisie and the British imperialists, and this, too, added to the anti-British sentiment. The rank-and-file membership of the Muslim League rose up to the national-liberation movement. But the bourgeois and landlord group under Jinnah, which stood at the helm of the party, continued to co-operate solely with the moderate elements in the Congress leadership.

When the Montagu-Chelmsford Report appeared in 1919, some of the Moderates split away from the Congress. They feared the popular movement and preferred to co-operate with the colonial government. Congress leadership passed to those among the national bourgeoisie, who advocated mass struggle for self-government. Disapproving, the League leaders refrained from co-operation.[62]

While the Muslim League leadership drifted away from the Congress, the left wing of the League welcomed the non-co-operation campaign launched by the Congress in 1919. Yet many of the Muslim radicals, though they joined the national-liberation movement, continued to favour religious forms of struggle.

To counter Britain's intention of dismembering the Ottoman Empire, India's Muslims called for massive anti-British struggle to safeguard the prestige of the Turkish Caliph as the spiritual head of all Muslims. The Khilafat Movement of 1918-1922 appealed to the masses, and in that lies its basic difference from the earlier Indian Muslim activities.

A Khilafat Committee convened in November 1919 in Delhi.[63] By 1920 the Khilafat Movement had spread far and wide. In the circumstances, the old feudal forms of the movement conflicted acutely with its anti-imperialist trend. Local committees sprang up in all the provinces. They organised mass manifestations by students, artisans and peasants, and were highly influential among the middle strata of Muslims.

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[62] *Cf*.: *Новейшая история Индии*, Москва, 1959, стр. 67-70.

[63] *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, May 26, 1920; *The Indian Review*, November 1919, p. 784; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 138.

The well-known Khilafat Manifesto was issued in January 1920. It called on India's Muslims and the Muslim states to safeguard the prestige of the Turkish Sultan, and appealed to the Congress for support.

The National Congress welcomed the Khilafat Movement from the outset. The All-India Khilafat Conference and the League session held in 1919 at Amritsar, which coincided with the session of the Congress, were attended by Motilal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, Annie Besant and many other prominent Congress members. Speaking at the Khilafat Conference in Delhi, Gandhi suggested a campaign of non-co-operation.[64]

Abul Kalam Azad was released from prison at this time, and he immediately plunged into the work of organising a massive Khilafat Movement. He and the followers of Sheikh-ul-Hind founded the Jamaat ul-Ulama-i Hind, an anti-British society of Indian ulamas, which was conceived by its founders as a vehicle for religious ideas to promote the movement. Azad took great pains to implant among Muslims Gandhi's principles of non-violent civil disobedience to the British authorities. The Khilafat Committee approved the idea in May 1920, a few months before it was adopted by the Congress. A Hindu-Muslim unity conference convened in June 1920 and welcomed civil disobedience. It proclaimed the Khilafat Movement a part of the campaign.

Almost all of the prominent ulamas and the September 1920 session of the League in Calcutta welcomed the rapprochement between the Muslim League and the National Congress and the Muslims' participation in the civil disobedience campaign.

The left wing of the League was obviously gaining strength. But Jinnah's group of the bourgeoisie and landlords, which had shortly before called for co-operation with the Congress, rejected Gandhi's plan of non-violent non-co-operation. It also frowned upon the mass Khilafat campaign. The group disapproved of the Khilafat campaign largely because it was a mass movement. As a result, Jinnah resigned from the Congress in 1921.

At the League session in Calcutta, Jinnah attacked the Khilafat Movement and Gandhi's programme. He stated plainly in a letter to Gandhi that he would not support his programme because it set the masses in motion, which would lead to complete disorganisation and chaos.

"What the consequences of this may be, I shudder to contemplate," he wrote.[65]

Gandhi's way, Jinnah said at the session in Calcutta, was the wrong way. "Mine is the right way," he declared, "the constitutional way is the right way."[66] He was the only one, or almost the only one, at the 1920 session of the Congress to oppose the campaign of civil non co-operation.

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[64] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 140.

[65] Cf., H. Bolitho, *Jinnah...*, p. 84.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

It was at this point that the once "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity" began to change into an ideologist of Muslim separatism.

The Aligarh group, too, from the very outset assumed a hostile attitude towards the Khilafat Movement. It started a witch-hunt in its newspaper against Mohammad Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and the other Khilafat leaders,[67] but most of the Aligarh College students did not support it.

Most Muslim students joined the Khilafat Movement and the non-co-operation campaign. Khilafat Day, October 17, was marked throughout the country in 1919 and 1920 with mass anti-British demonstrations of students, office employees, petty traders and artisans. Gandhi wrote that October 17 would long be remembered as a great day in India's history. The mass demonstrations on that day passed without complications, evidencing the trust which their organisers enjoyed among the public. They were an impressive triumph for Satyagraha.[68]

The peasants, too, took an active part in the movement. However, in contrast to the urban sections of the population which responded in a way to Pan-Islamic slogans, they could not care less for the idea of protecting the Caliphate, and regarded the Khilafat slogans as a call to oppose British rule. Many of them believed that the word "Khilafat" came from "khilaf," an Urdu word meaning "against" or "opposed to," and eagerly joined the fight against the British authorities and, in places, against the local landlords.[69]

This prompted the Khilafat leaders to accentuate the religious forms of their movement. At the close of 1920 the Muslim ulamas issued a *fatwa*,[70] which proclaimed India to be "enemy land" (dar-ul-harb), and suggested that Muslims should move to the neighbouring Muslim countries.

The Pan-Islamic efforts of the Muslim intelligentsia were doomed to failure as before. After 1921 the Khilafat leaders abandoned their progressive political position and quickly lost influence among the radical Muslim intellectuals, to say nothing of the mass of the people.

Yet in 1919-1921 the Khilafat Movement undoubtedly played a beneficial role. It was part of the all-Indian national-liberation movement and encouraged the campaign of civil disobedience, thus facilitating the joint, mass-scale struggle of Hindus and Muslims.

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[67] *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*, May 26 and November 15, 1920, and November 25, 1921; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, pp. 42- 45.

[68] *Young India*, October 22, 9 9 (quoted from Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 54).

[69] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, London, 1953, p. 69.

[70] Fatwa (فتوى), from the Arabic أفتى "to make a decision," "to give advice,'' a ruling of the Muslim theologians concerning the rectitude of an act under the Shariat.

In July 1921, the All-India Khilafat Conference presided by Mohammad Ali, called on all Muslims to join the all-Indian campaign of non-co-operation and declared that service in the British army was a violation of Muslim law. After this, Mohammad Ali, S. Kitchlew, and many others, were arrested.

The rightist Muslim League elements made the most of the weakening of the left wing and soon seized undivided control of the party. The League session of 1921 voiced disapproval of the civil disobedience campaign in contrast to the Khilafat Conference and Jamaat ul-Ulama-i Hind. The League's influence waned rapidly among the radical Muslim bourgeois intellectuals. Many of its members, Abul Kalam Azad included, broke with the League. All Muslim Congress members resigned from the League, though in 1912-1921 they had played a prominent role in its work.

Having lost influence among the middle strata, the Muslim League once again became an upper-class organisation, and lacked influence even among the propertied Muslims. The communal character it assumed prevented it from developing into a mass political organisation.

Chapter III

BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL DEVICES AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE (1922-1937)

Muslim League Influence on the Wane

In 1921, after the post-war upswing of the anti-imperialist movement and the battles waged by workers and peasants reached their apex, the Muslim League returned to the path of religious sectarianism, which led up to its demand of an independent Pakistan.

The League veered rightwards during the reactionary offensive throughout India in 1923-1927 due to the change of heart among the Muslim big bourgeoisie, whose representatives were entrenched in the League leadership alongside the landlords. Competition between the various bourgeois groups increasingly affected their political views, and since this competition grew keener during the world economic crisis, the Muslim League leadership stood aloof from the vigorous national-liberation movement of 1929-1933 and, what was more, adopted a frankly hostile attitude to it. The Muslim League's refusal in 1921 to back the campaign of civil disobedience was the first serious violation of its agreement for united action with the Congress.

The mortal blow to League-Congress co-operation was delivered by the reactionary course of the British authorities and the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1923-1927, which they provoked. India's colonial rulers feared united action by the two parties, but what they feared most was the mass struggle of the working people, which transcended the religious barriers.

The Muslim landlords and compradores held reactionary views. The Muslim educators appealed for religious separatism. The British went out of their way to set Muslim against Hindu. But for all this, the efforts to produce a religious chasm did not succeed for a long time.

The few religious riots in the cities towards the close of the 19th century and before and during the First World War were local and sporadic, and did not cause any serious damage.

It was different in 1923-1927. Incitement of Hindu-Muslim clashes became part of reaction's general offensive. The British authorities fomented religious enmity among the peasants, artisans and workers. Religious unrest broke out in places where the revolutionary actions of the masses had been the strongest and where the British imperialists made the most of the fears roused by these actions among the Indian bourgeois leaders. The venom of Hindu-Muslim discord spread to the countryside. Riots caused reactionary demonstrations by religious fanatics throughout the country and new reprisals against workers, peasants, artisans and progressive intellectuals.

By steering the class actions into religious channels, the British authorities, helped by the local reactionaries, dealt the Indian patriots a blow in the back. This was so during the anti-imperialist Moplah rising in 1921, when religious differences between the Muslim peasants and the landlords and money-lenders, most of them Hindu, were accentuated by the authorities to suppress the unrest.

The religious strife provoked by the British in North-West Frontier Province and the Punjab was another attempt to steer mass dissatisfaction along Hindu-Muslim lines. Rajendra Prasad and Hakim Ajmal Khan, who obtained official permission to enter the Punjab, encountered obstruction from British officials when they tried to allay the intense religious feeling.[1] Similar facts are cited in the Congress report on the causes of religious unrest in Bombay.[2]

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[1] In a description of a conversation he had had with Multan's deputy commissioner, Rajendra Prasad writes, "We did not find him keen on restoring communal harmony" (R. Prasad, *Autobiography*, Bombay, 1957, p. 181).

[2] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, pp. 124-126.

The British authorities played an unsavoury part in the tragedy at Kohat, North-West Frontier Province, where 155 people were killed and wounded in two days of rioting. All in all, more than 5,000 people suffered harm in the religious riots that swept the country between 1923 and 1927, with 450 losing their lives. [3]

Some of the Indian bourgeois intellectuals feared the revolutionary actions of the working people. They saw to it that new religious forms of action should spread among the masses. The Khilafat Movement disappointed the Muslim big bourgeoisie and landlords for two reasons. Firstly, because it had encouraged the working people to political action, which they thought undesirable, and, secondly, because the Caliphate had gone out of existence and the religious grounds of the movement had disappeared.

At the close of 1921 and early in 1922 some Muslim leaders declared that nothing but religious motives could produce unity and improve the condition of the people. They averred that to this end people of other religions had to be converted to Islam, giving impetus to the Tabligh movement of Muslims. At about the same time the Hindu Mahasabha launched a campaign for converting Muslims to Hinduism (the Shudhi movement).

The Tabligh campaign was closely associated with the movement for renewing the Muslim faith and for a strong Muslim organisation (Tanzim). A fairly large section of intellectuals, including members of the civil disobedience campaign and the Khilafat movement, took part in the Shudhi and Tabligh campaigns.

Objectively speaking, these two campaigns, whatever the subjective wishes of the various campaigners, were deeply reactionary. They were so in form and also in content. They diverted the urban middle strata and the peasants from the anti-imperialist struggle and underlined the discord between the two religious communities. "That year the seed of distrust was sown, and it took root gradually," wrote Rajendra Prasad. "In the course of time a wide gulf came to separate the two communities. The British saw their chance and stepped in... By skilful manoeuvres they kept the fires of communal distrust burning." [4]

The division among the radical Indian intellectuals hampered the fight against religious separatism and the reactionary manoeuvres of the British imperialists, and this, in turn, brought Mohammad Ali Jinnah to prominence.

In his efforts to build up a strong Muslim party, M. A. Jinnah attached prime importance to the consolidation of the upper Muslim bourgeoisie. He had never been an advocate of mass forms in the national-liberation movement, and had never, until 1935, appealed to the Muslim working people. He spoke of the "mob" with mingled contempt and mistrust, and this lay behind his efforts to cement the alliance of the upper-crust bourgeoisie with the landlords. But great as his fear of mass action by the people may have been, it did not relieve the contradictions between the British monopolies and the Muslim big bourgeoisie, whose interests Jinnah represented and who wished a certain amount of political independence for India.

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[3] *Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, London, 1930, p. 27.

[4] R. Prasad, *Autobiography*, p. 142.

M. A. Jinnah favoured a constitutional movement for dominion status. This stand won popularity for his separatist communal programme among the Muslim bourgeois groups. The frankly pro-British views of the Aligarh leaders and the Aga Khan no longer appealed to the Muslim community, not even to its propertied section.

The political foundations of Jinnah's programme, worked out in 1923-1927, envisaged home rule within the framework of the British Empire, to be achieved *in a constitutional manner*, based on the recognition of *special Muslim privileges*. Jinnah's programme accorded with the interests of the Muslim big bourgeoisie, since it was a tool against the mounting political consciousness of the masses and helped its competitive struggle against other Indian bourgeois groups. Furthermore, it assisted the big bourgeoisie in angling concessions from the British imperialists.

To enhance his influence, M. A. Jinnah joined the campaign for Hindu-Muslim unity initiated by Mahatma Gandhi and the Muslim nationalists headed by Abul Kalam Azad. The Muslim League, convened in Lucknow in 1923, adopted Maulana Mohammad Ali's proposal for a new "national pact" with the Congress. An identical resolution was passed by the Congress in Delhi, presided by Abul Kalam Azad.

A conference of Hindu-Muslim unity was convened in 1925. M. A. Jinnah and his group took part. The conference deplored the Hindu-Muslim riots and appointed a special commission under Gandhi and Ajmal Khan to investigate their causes. It discussed the Tabligh and Shudhi movements, and decided not to obstruct the two campaigns, but, at the same time, to condemn and prohibit coercive conversions. The conference appealed to the population for greater religious tolerance, urging the Muslims to stop persecuting Hindus for celebrating their religious holidays with singing and dancing, and the Hindus to stop persecuting the Muslims for "cow slaughter." It asked Gandhi to stop the fast he undertook in protest against the Hindu-Muslim riots, and promoted mass meetings of Hindu-Muslim unity throughout the country. [5]

The meetings were attended by intellectuals, peasants and artisans. Under the impact of the rising revolutionary tide the number of Hindu-Muslim clashes was sharply reduced towards the close of the 1920's. But no far-reaching change occurred in the relations between the Muslim League and the Congress. In 1916, when their first agreement was signed, the League and the Congress banded together in the mass anti-imperialist movement. This time, the League leaders did their utmost to keep their members from joining the movement. Many Muslim nationalists resigned from the League for this reason. [6] But, on the other hand, most of the Muslim bourgeois, who had until then co-operated with the Congress, broke with it once and for all and embarked on religious sectarianism. Simultaneous membership in the Congress and the League, widespread during the Khilafat Movement, dwindled almost to nil.

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[5] R. Prasad, *Autobiography*, pp. 221-225; *India Divided*, pp. 127-130.

British Constitutional Manoeuvres and Jinnah's Fourteen Points

Grave differences arose within the Muslim League over its co-operation with the Congress after the British government appointed the Simon Commission to revise the Government of India Act. The Indian public resented the fact that no Indians were included in the commission. A mass campaign of protest was launched. In the circumstances, the various political groups had to make clear their standpoint concerning the future constitutional make-up of India.

In March 1927, the Muslim intellectuals who favoured a united movement for home rule, both those of the Congress and those of the League, stated at a conference in Delhi that they would accept the principle of general elections to central and provincial legislative bodies, as advocated by the Congress, on the following conditions: (1) establishment of Sind as a separate province; (2) provincial self-government for North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on an equal footing with the other provinces; (3) seats for Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal provincial legislative bodies proportionate in number to the Muslim population of these provinces; and, finally, not less than one-third of the seats for Muslims in the central legislatures. [7]

This document, known as the Delhi Manifesto, was drawn up by M. A. Jinnah and Maulana Mohammad Ali, and backed by all the leading Muslim groups. The Muslim League was prepared to disown the separate representation system on the terms set out in the Manifesto, and maintained this position until 1937.

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[6] Ali Imam, a member of the Muslim deputation to Lord Minto, declared that, though he had for some time supported separate representation, he arrived at the conclusion that it was "not only a negation of Indian nationalism, but also positively harmful to Muslims themselves" (R. Prasad, *India Divided*. p. 134).

[7] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 192.

The National Congress, which proclaimed India's complete independence as its principal purpose under the influence of its left wing in 1927, declared approval of the Delhi Manifesto. Dr. Ansari, who was President of the Congress and a prominent member of the Khilafat Movement, said in a presidential address, "The problem of Hindu-Muslim differences must be solved once and for all." [8] The Congress decided to convene an All Parties Conference to work out the fundamentals of a new constitution.

Bitter dissent broke out within the Muslim League when its leaders were called upon to define their attitude towards the Simon Commission, the Delhi Manifesto and the proposed All Parties Conference. A group under Mian Mohammad Shafi broke away from the League shortly before the Karachi session convened in December 1927. The Shafi group held a separate conference in Lahore. It was closely connected with the landlords and merchants of the Punjab, Sind and the United Provinces, while Jinnah represented the Muslim industrialists and merchants of Bombay. He also had the support of the businessmen of Madras and Bengal. [9]

The Muslim Conference headed by the Aga Khan, which had split away from the League back in 1916, the Shafi group and the provincial Muslim organisations of the Punjab, the United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, pledged co-operation with the British Commission. In the meantime, the League organisations in Bombay, Madras and Bengal (minus a few unimportant landlord groups) and the Khilafat Committee, which had by then evolved into an upper-class body, announced that they would boycott Simon. But the differences between these groups concerning the future political arrangement in India and the rights of the Muslim minority were not very great. The overwhelming majority favoured constitutional reforms, designed ultimately to achieve dominion status. The call for complete independence, raised by the masses, had the support only of the Khilafatists and of some Muslim nationalists who belonged to the Congress left wing. As for the extremist reactionary landlord groups, these believed even the demand for dominion status to be premature. [10]

The split within the Muslim League, which lasted all of two years, until a new campaign of civil disobedience began, was not at all indicative of any deep-going class distinctions. It concerned mainly tactical differences.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the far-sighted politician that he was, believed at the time that it was more desirable to work together with the moderate Congress leaders. He hoped thereby to exert pressure on the British government, but, mainly, to avert mass revolutionary actions in the country. He appealed to the Congress for concessions to the Muslim upper crust and did not mince words to say that otherwise there was a real danger of "revolution and civil war." [11]

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[8] Quoted from H. Mukerjee, *India Struggles for Freedom*, p. 134.

[9] *Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. VII, London, 1930, p. 224.

[10] *Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, pt. I, p. 131.

The Muslim League session supported the Congress decision to boycott the Simon Commission. It welcomed the projected All Parties Conference and the Delhi Manifesto of the Muslim nationalists. The provincial bodies of the League, the Khilafat Committee and the Muslim nationalists took part in the boycott of the Simon Commission. Many of the radical newspapers that had sprung up on the eve of the First World War resumed publication. New periodicals appeared in the various local languages and in Urdu. In many provinces, Muslim conferences were held, which adopted resolutions to work for a fully independent India. [12]

On the face of it, a favourable situation arose to achieve unity of action between the Muslim League and the Congress. But this unity never materialised. The attitude of the British political leaders and the British press, which harped on the Hindu-Muslim contradictions, had a lot to do with that.

Under pressure of the Hindu Mahasabha leaders who were then also members of the Congress, the Congress leadership violated its decision reached in Madras on the distribution of seats in the central legislative bodies and the legislatures of the Punjab and Bengal, and rejected the basic demands of the Delhi Manifesto.

The slogan of full independence, spelled out in the draft constitution framed by Motilal Nehru, was replaced by a demand for dominion status. This suited the Jinnah group, but incensed the democratic section of Muslims and prompted many of them to join the League. [13] Motilal Nehru's draft constitution envisaged reservation of seats for Muslims in the centre and in provinces with a Muslim minority. But instead of the one-third ratio set down in the Delhi Manifesto for the central legislature, Muslims were to get one-fourth of the seats and no additional seats were envisaged in provinces with a Muslim minority. [14]

Jinnah's amendments, urging the basic points of the Delhi Manifesto to be worked into the draft constitution (one-third representation in the central legislature and the distribution of Muslim seats according to Muslim adjustment, the statutory majority in Bengal and the Punjab, residuary powers in the provinces, the separation of Sind),[15] were turned down by the All Parties Conferences in both Lucknow (June 1928) and Calcutta (December 1928). "This is the parting of the ways,"[16] said Jinnah after the conference in Calcutta. He proved to be right. After this the ways of the Muslim League, which he headed, and the National Congress never converged.

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[11] Cf.: H. Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan*, London, 1954, p. 94.

[12] H. Mukerjee, *India Struggles for Freedom*, p. 135; *Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. IX, London, 1930, pp. 213-214.

[13] See H. Mukerjee, *India Struggles for Freedom*, p. 135.

[14] *Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee*, Bombay, 1945, p. 108.

The increased competitive struggle between the various groups of the bourgeoisie during and after the world economic crisis of 1929-1933 stimulated an urge for political consolidation among its Muslim section. The first step in this direction was made by the All Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi in January 1929, convened on the initiative of Mohammad Shafi and the ascendant young United Provinces political leader, Liaquat Ali Khan (1896-1951). The Aga Khan presided.[17] The decisions of this Conference formed the nucleus of Jinnah's Fourteen Points, submitted to the Round Table Conference of 1930.[18]

The first and second points in Jinnah's demands concerned the future political arrangement in India. They said that the form of the future constitution should be federal, with the residuary powers vested in the provinces, and that a uniform measure of autonomy should be granted to all provinces.

The third, fifth, sixth and seventh points argued the necessity of the separate electorates system whose revision at any subsequent date would require the consent of the Muslims, and provision of reliable constitutional guarantees that Muslim rights would not be affected.

The eighth point envisaged that solution of communal questions should be subject to the affirmative vote of at least three-quarters of the community concerned.

The fourth and thirteenth points provided for the reservation for Muslims of not less than one-third of the seats in the central government: "No cabinet, either central or provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim Ministers."

The ninth point referred to the establishment of Sind Province, which should be separated from the Bombay Presidency, and the tenth envisaged legislative bodies in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

The eleventh point provided for "giving Muslims an adequate hare along with the other Indians, in all the services of the State and in local self-governing bodies."

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[15] S. Sen, *The Birth of Pakistan*, Calcutta, 1955, p. 93.

[16] H. Bolitho, *Jinnah...*, p. 95.

[17] Some writers say Jinnah's group re-united with the other Muslim groups in 1929 (cf.: *Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee*, p. 108). But 1930, after the opening of the civil disobedience campaign, is the correct date.

[18] The Round Table Conference was convened in London to work out a Constitution for India.

The twelfth point demanded guarantees for the free development of the various national languages and the freedom of religion.

Last but not least, the final point confirmed that any change of the future constitution would require the consent of all the provinces and stated that no constitution would be acceptable to the Muslim community unless it satisfied all the above demands. [19]

Jinnah's Fourteen Points stimulated the Muslim communal movement. To begin with, they consolidated the Muslim upper crust, invigorated the Muslim League and its leadership, and served as a basis for the re-unification of the Jinnah group, the Shafi group and the other Muslim factions at the League session in Allahabad in December 1930. [20]

Secondly, some of these points benefited the middle section of Muslims in some of the national areas of India. The demands for autonomy of the provinces, the development of national languages, and the establishment of Sind as an independent province had previously been raised by provincial Muslim organisations, and the League thus came forward as the champion of the national interests of Muslims in the various areas.

Jinnah's Fourteen Points were backed by nearly all Muslim political groups and provincial organisations including those which had participated in the 1930 civil disobedience campaign. Only the Muslim Congress members headed by Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Ansari opposed Jinnah's programme out of hand. Prior to 1932 the Congress refused to consider Jinnah's programme, and, as a result, some Muslim provincial groups resigned from it.

In April 1931, a conference of Muslim Congress members gathered in Lucknow and adopted a resolution calling for general suffrage, abolition of the separate representation system, and guarantees of protection of the national languages and religious minorities. The conference backed the demands that Sind receive provincial status, the contemplated reforms in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, and the reservation of seats for minorities of less than 30 per cent of a province's population, with the right to have additional seats. But the attempts made by Muslim Congress members to reach an agreement with the League ended in failure.[21] The big Muslim bourgeois were bent on bolstering their own communal organisations as a counterweight to the Congress. This set the stage for alliance with the reactionary Muslim landlord groups. Jinnah's Fourteen Points were a basis for the consolidation of the Muslim upper crust, yet they contained a few demands of benefit to wider Muslim sections.

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[19] *Struggle for Independence*, 1857-1947, App. III, pp. 10-11.

[20] Mohammad Iqbal, the eminent Indian poet and philosopher, made the proposal at this session that provinces with a Muslim majority should form a separate political body within an Indian Federation (*Struggle for Independence*, 1857-1947, Karachi, 1958, App. IV, p. 16). However, the proposal, later developed into the plan for an independent Pakistan, was rejected at the time by the Muslim League.

Neither did the delegation of Indian Muslims to the Round Table Conference in London approve the plan of an Indian Muslim state submitted by Choudhury Rahmat Ali, a Bengal student at Cambridge University. The League qualified Rahmat Ali's plan as only a student's scheme which was chimerical and impracticable (S. Sen, *The Birth of Pakistan*, Calcutta, 1955, pp. 133-135). In 1930, the separatist ambitions of the big Muslim bourgeoisie did not go further than Jinnah's Fourteen Points.

However, at that time the League did not as yet work energetically to win influence among the masses and was a more or less exclusive party until the end of the 1930's. The middle strata of Muslims gravitated more towards the National Congress, while many representatives of the Muslim intellectuals and the foremost workers ranged themselves behind the Communist Party. In the rural areas with a Muslim majority, however, the left-wing forces were still very weak.

The British imperialists made the most of this weakness of the progressive parties and organisations, and the mounting reactionary tendencies in the political orientation of the Muslim big bourgeoisie.

There was a time when the Muslim educators, influenced by the British, placed the communal problem before the country-wide problems. The British "divide and rule" policy encouraged the spread of this reactionary standpoint, which logically culminated in Jinnah's programme. At first the British colonialists gave precedence to the Hindu-Muslim problem, and then went on to pronounce it insoluble. Jinnah's Fourteen Points were used by them to accentuate the prevailing religious differences, particularly at the time of the Round Table Conference.

By exploiting the religious communal differences and the communalist tendencies of specific Indian political leaders, the British government made the future constitutional pattern of India directly conditional on an accommodation of the so-called minority problem.

This enabled the British government to declare that it would not discuss India's home rule pending a final adjustment of the communal problem. The British negotiators supported and advertised the communalist separatism of the Muslim delegation, and opposed it to the demands of home rule.

They worked in a point granting guarantees to the Muslim community in the future constitution, into the resolution adopted at the concluding sitting of the first session, and laid an accent on the communal problem at the second session, taking advantage of the lack of understanding between the Indian delegates on the distribution of authority between the central and provincial governments to announce that full powers would, as before, belong to the Viceroy. In an effort to preclude further negotiations between the Indian political parties, the British government officially declared that the communal question would be settled legislatively. The "divide and rule" policy was thus employed to cement the position of British imperialism in India.

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[21] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, pp. 134-135.

In 1932, the British authorities issued the so-called Communal Award, which became part of the Government of India Act of 1935. In Bengal, Muslims obtained a considerable advantage over the Hindus, and in the Punjab over all the other communities—Hindus, Sikhs, and Anglo-Indians. In provinces with a Hindu majority Muslims were given more seats than their number warranted. Of the total 1,675 seats in the provincial ligislative assemblies, the general electorate received 808 seats, while the Muslim electorate received 482. [22]

The reactionary purport of the Communal Award was quite obvious, especially since the Muslim League leadership did not at the time rule out the possibility of settling the minorities problem by abolishing the separate electorates and the reservation for Muslims of seats in the central and local legislatures, as suggested in the 1927 Delhi Manifesto. Mohammad Shafi said so at the Round Table Conference. Jinnah, too, declared repeatedly, even after he had formulated his Fourteen Points, that he was prepared to seek agreement on the basis of the Delhi Manifesto. [23]

The British imperialists dreaded the possibility of an agreement between the Muslim bourgeoisie and the Congress leadership, and an adjustment of the minorities problem. They hastened to publish the Communal Award, thus going back on their assurances at the opening of the Round Table Conference that India's internal problems were a matter to be decided by the Indians themselves.

The British thus made another step towards opposing the religious communities legislatively and winning over the Muslim propertied upper crust. The Muslims among the big bourgeoisie were given grounds to expect that they may achieve their demands not through united struggle, in concert with the national bourgeoisie as a whole, but through the acquiescence of the British colonialists. This only strengthened the alliance of the Muslim Indian bourgeoisie with the big landlords and the British inperialists.

In the circumstances, all left-wing attempts to achieve an adjustment of the Hindu-Muslim problem before the new Government of India Act was published, failed.

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[22] *Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee*, p. 111.

[23] At a conference of Muslims in the United Provinces in 1931, Jinnah declared that he himself preferred an agreement based on general elections (*Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee*, p. 115).

The Muslim League backed the Communal Award and the fundamentals of the future constitution, but after the new Government of India Act was published in 1935 it reversed its attitude. It had not succeeded in rebuilding its influence among the middle strata of Muslims after 1921, and when its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, virtually abandoned party affairs and later, in 1930-1932, stayed in London, it ran aground.

The increased influence of the left wing in the Congress and the campaign of protest against the new constitution created a favourable opportunity for the unification of all the country's anti-imperialist forces.

The strengthening of the Communist Party of India, the founding of the All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Union) and the spread of the trade-union movement had an immediate impact on the Muslim masses, primarily the workers and petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and tended to draw varied sections of the population into the anti-imperialist struggle.

Jinnah was an experienced politician. He knew that if the left-wingers would fill the political vacuum obtaining among certain Muslim groups, the League would not have much of a chance to become an influential all-Indian party. An upper-class organisation devoid of mass support was unable to protect the interests of the Muslim bourgeoisie. All it could expect was such concessions from the imperialists as would fully respond to the interests of the latter. So Jinnah saw fit to change his tactics and to appeal to the Muslim masses.

For this reason the Muslim League refused at the session in Bombay, April 1936, to approve the constitution of 1935.[24] This ushered in a new period in its history, with the idea of political separatism conquering broad sections of the Muslim population and emerging as a full-fledged political movement.

Chapter IV

THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKISTAN

Muslim League Defeat in the 1937 Elections. Muslim Provincial Organisations

The Muslim League rejected the federal scheme proposed for India in the new constitution. Yet it wished to take advantage of the possibilities, however limited, offered for provincial self-government. It joined the election campaign for seats in the provincial legislative assemblies, and published an election manifesto on July 12, 1936. The manifesto was to create the impression that, firstly, the Muslim League programme for self-government and social reform was not different from the Congress programme and, secondly, that, unlike the Congress, the League was a true champion of the religious minorities.

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[24] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*. Vol. I, Bombay-London-New York, 1957, p. 384.

The League manifesto said that the policy in the field of social reforms should be the same as that of the Congress. Industrial development, improvement of living conditions in the villages and relief from agricultural debts, it went on to say, are all common goals. As for the political field, the manifesto added, no deep-going differences existed either.[1]

The League manifesto was backed by the Jamaat ul-Ulama-i Hind and the Muslim nationalists. Wherever the Congress did not nominate candidates of its own, it advised Muslims to vote for the League nominees. An agreement was reached to the effect that the Congress would not nominate candidates to oppose League candidates in the Muslim constituencies of the United Provinces.

The 1937 elections were thus the last of the all-Indian national campaigns in which the League and the Congress did not function as deliberately hostile parties.

At the same time, the League's election manifesto called for greater Muslim solidarity, economic and cultural unity and the development of Urdu as the national language of the Muslims. [2] The rights of Muslims in the Indian state after it has won self-government within the framework of the British Empire, a question first raised at the 1930 session of the Muslim League, reappeared in the discussions. The League favoured the administrative separation of the Muslim areas and Muslim cultural autonomy.

However, lacking mass support, the League leadership did not risk a frankly anti-Hindu stand in face of the mounting anti-imperialist movement and the consolidation of the Leftists.

During its 1936-1937 election campaign the League failed to reconquer the influence it had lost among the middle strata of Muslims after the defeat of the Khilafat movement. Neither was it supported by many of the bourgeois-landlord groups in provinces with a Muslim majority, such as Bengal, the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. None but the biggest landlords, the khans, nawabs and a few Muslim intellectuals banded with it in the Punjab and Bengal. [3] As before, Jinnah leaned for support chiefly on the wealthy Bombay merchants and industrialists, and the landlords and intellectuals in the United Provinces.

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[1] Cf.: R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, pt. II, Oxford, 1944, pp. 13-14.

[2] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League, Its History, Activities and Achievements*, Agra, 1954, p. 227; *The Indian Annual Register*, January-June 1936, Vol. I, p. 362. The Congress leadership, with just a few exceptions, favoured the development of Hindustani in its two literary forms—Urdu and Hindi.

The Unionists and Ahrars were the most influential Muslim parties in the Punjab. The Ahrars, [4] a religious body of Orthodox Sunnis, formed their organisation during the First World War with the avowed purpose of restoring the original purity of the Quran and working for "Muslim revival" against the Ahmadis and Shias, many of whom were pro-British Punjab landlords. It was not the Ahrars' religious reformism, but rather their political activities, which won them popularity. Until 1930 the Ahrars constituted an independent Congress group headed by Punjab intellectuals closely connected with minor zamindars and small-scale manufacturers (owners of *khadi* workshops, etc.). They worked actively in the Khilafat movement, and favoured mass struggle against British rule. [5]

In 1930, after the Congress rejected Jinnah's Fourteen Points, the Ahrars resigned and formed a party of their own. Although they favoured the separate electorates system, they gave continued support to the slogan of united Hindu-Muslim action for India's complete independence, and joined the 1930 campaign of civil disobedience led by the Congress. But they did not have a specific programme of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal demands, which caused them gradually to lose influence among the masses. [6]

For all this, the League's Punjab body did not appeal to the Muslims of that province who abandoned the Ahrar movement. It was the Leftist groups headed by the Communists who gained influence.

The British authorities and the reactionary landlord groups grew apprehensive. What they wanted was a political party that would, on the one hand, consolidate the landlords and, on the other, appeal to the peasants. The Unionists, who were no more than a parliamentary faction in the provincial assembly until 1935, served the purpose excellently in the 1936-1937 election campaign.

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[3] The League in Bengal was headed by the Nawab of Dacca. In the Punjab it was headed by Mohammad Iqbal, but command was securely held by the big landlords, such as Khan Mamdot and Daultana.

[4] *Ahrar*, a derivative from the Arabic *khurr* (حر), meaning "free", "independent", "liberal"; has the latter connotation in Urdu.

[5] The most prominent Ahrar leaders were Habibullah Rahman Ludhiani, Afzal Khan Choudhury, and Ataullah Shah Bokhari, all Khilafatists, who backed the Congress left wing until the mid-thirties.

[6] S. Ansari, *Pakistan. The Problem of India*, Lahore, 1945, p. 59; S. Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, Bombay, 1944, pp. 15-16.

The founder of the Unionist Party, Fazl Husain, was a prominent Lahore lawyer who, until 1922, had supported the moderate Congress leaders. In the 30's Fazl Husain managed to enlist the support of the provincial nobility, the bigger landlords, retired army officers, tax collectors and other civil servants. A large number of Muslim intellectuals and the communal upper crust in the villages flocked to his party. The Unionists demanded relief from usury, development of backward areas, and reduction of the property qualification in the elections from 25 to 10 rupees in land tax. [7] These slogans, the caste connections of landlords and peasant proprietors, and the economic dependence of the latter on the landlords, won the Unionist Party the support of a considerable section of peasant proprietors.

The Unionists did not assume their frankly pro-British attitude until Fazl Husain's death in 1936. On the contrary, they maintained a semblance of opposition. But under Husain's successor, Sikandar Hayat Khan, they enjoyed obvious British support.

Sikandar Hayat Khan, for years a civil servant in Bombay and assistant manager of the Reserve Bank of India, had always, even in his youth, steered clear of the national-liberation movement. While he was leader of the Unionists the reactionary forces in the Punjab consolidated their position. The Daultana-Mamdot landlord group joined his party, while the Muslim League lost much ground. [8] Only one of its nominees succeeded in the Punjab in the 1937 election, while the Unionists won 101 of the 167 seats in the provincial legislative assembly. [9]

The Punjab Leftists worked chiefly among the Hindu and Sikh workers, artisans and petty-bourgeois intellectuals. The provincial Congress body consisted largely of traders, moneylenders, small manufacturers and intellectuals — also mostly Hindu and Sikh. The Muslim nationalists were extremely weak. The reactionaries' victory in the 1937 elections did not, therefore, come as a surprise.

It was different in the other provinces with a Muslim majority. In North-West Frontier Province, for example, the Congress and the Red Shirts, who co-operated with it, took the upper hand. The Red Shirts, headed by the prominent Pakhtun nationalist, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were also known as the *Khuda-i Khidmatgar* (the Servants of God). They founded their organisation in 1930 to promote anti-imperialist actions and Pakhtun unity. This made them widely popular. Their units consisted chiefly of peasants and artisans, but the leadership was held securely by local intellectuals, who were closely associated with the small landlords and merchants. Here and there they also had the support of patriotically-minded tribal khans.

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[7] *Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. XVI, pt. I, London, 1930, pp. 150-154; S. Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, p. 79; S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, pp. 60-62.

[8] From Mohammad Iqbal's letter to Jinnah. Iqbal was then head of the League in the Punjab (*Struggle for Independence 1857-1947*, Karachi, 1958, pp. 38-39).

[9] S. Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, p. 79; S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, pp. 60-62.

The Red Shirts' leaders feared an outbreak of mass anti-feudal struggle among the peasants of the province and did not advance any concrete agrarian programme, confining themselves to the demand for lower land taxes. In spite of this, the bulk of the peasants and the middle strata in the towns of North-West Frontier Province were lined up quite solidly behind Abdul Ghaffar Khan. [10]

In Baluchistan the local nationalist organisation *Khadim-i Watan* (Servants of the Motherland), which collaborated with the Congress, commanded the greatest influence. The group consisted of small landlords, the top section of peasants and the Baluchi intellectuals. [11] The Muslim League had very few followers.

In Sind the elections were won by the so-called United Party, which was headed by nationalist bourgeois intellectuals and collaborated with the Congress. Its main demand was for Sind to be constituted as a separate province and for its population to receive democratic rights.

The Muslim League did not have a local organisation in Sind until 1938. The United Party won 22 of the 39 contested seats, but the British authorised Ghulam Husain's pro-British reactionary group to form the provincial government. There was an avalanche of protest. The United Party leaders, G. M. Sayed, Allah Bakhsh and Pir Ilahi Bakhsh, addressed massive peasant meetings, promising tax reductions and anti-usury laws. The campaign compelled Ghulam Husain's government to resign. [12]

But after a United Party and National Congress government came to power, the Sind nationalists broke up into factions and the contradictions between the various social groups assumed a religious complexion.

The relation of forces in Bengal at the time of the 1937 elections had the greatest bearing on the future of the Indian national-liberation movement and the Muslim communal trend. The left-wing element headed by the Communists enjoyed considerable influence among the workers, the petty-bourgeois Hindu intellectuals and the artisans. It also gained some influence among the peasants, but chiefly in the western, "Hindu" areas. The Congress was backed by most of the Bengal bourgeoisie, the local merchants, money-lenders, bankers and industrialists, all Hindu, and the bourgeois intellectuals, of whom some were Muslim nationalists. Furthermore, it had the support of the Hindu artisans and peasants in West Bengal. But its position was very weak in East Bengal among the Muslim peasants and jotadars (intermediaries with no right to land ownership).

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[10] Л. Р. Гордон, *Аграрные отношения в Северо-западной пограничной провинции Индии*, Москва, 1953, стр. 164-167; *Новейшая история Индии*, Москва, 1957, стр. 248-253; S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 59.

[11] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, pp. 58-59; R. Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 1947, p. 103.

[12] G. M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sind*, Karachi, 1949, pp. 5-13; R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 143.

The most popular party in this part of the province was the Krishak Praja, founded by Fazlul Haq and Nazimuddin, to represent the interests of the jotadars. The latter were bent on limiting the privileges of the major zamindars, who were chiefly Hindu. They were also opposed to the Hindu money-lenders not only because the money-lenders were a cause of grief, but because the jotadars were eager to gain control of intermediary commercial activities and credit operations among the peasants.

Muslim intellectuals were prominent in the Krishak Praja Party, which gravitated to the extreme right in its attitude to the anti-imperialist struggle, for its leadership was closely connected with the British authorities. But in the field of social reforms it was the only Muslim organisation to have a concrete agrarian programme, envisaging abolition of the permanent zamindari system, restrictions of large-scale landlord holdings, and relief from usury.[13] This attracted the bulk of the Muslim peasantry and enabled the party to divert peasant discontent from the jotadars, focussing it on Hindu-Muslim antagonisms, and thus to win the 1937 elections. The Muslim League won only 40 of the 117 Muslim seats.

As we see, the League was extremely weak in the Muslim provinces not only among the working people, but also among the propertied groups. Neither did the Congress wield any decisive influence there, with the notable exception of North-West Frontier Province.

In the rest of India, most of the Muslim electors supported the Congress. The League had a majority only in Bombay, where it won 20 of the 29 Muslim seats. In Bihar, the Central Provinces and Orissa, just as in North-West Frontier Province and Sind, none of its nominees succeeded.[14]

All in all, the Muslim League won 108 of the total of 482 Muslim seats in the provincial legislative assemblies, that is, less than 3 per cent of all the seats. Out of the 7,319,445 Muslim electors, only 321,772 voted for the League nominees.[15]

The election campaign, and the results of the elections, affected the further development of the Muslim communal movement. It brought home to the British imperialists that the Hindu-Muslim problem did not, in spite of their exertions, play a decisive part in the country's political life. The institution of separate electorates under the Government of India acts was insufficient to split the national-liberation movement. Other moves were called for. In the meantime, the League leadership, and Jinnah first and foremost, realised that new slogans and organisational forms were essential to unite the various provincial Muslim groups and to win the masses.

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[13] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, pp. 60-62.

[14] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 43.

[15] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 9; R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 143.

Muslim League Gains Mass Following

The idea of creating a Muslim state independent from the rest of India was first advanced at the Round Table Conference. The British seized on the plan, framed by Choudhury Rahmat Ali, a Cambridge University student, and financed his press campaign.[16]

Although the Muslim delegation to the Round Table Conference rejected Rahmat Ali's plan, the British parliamentary committee brought it up once more in 1933. After this, the problem of partitioning India kept recurring in Parliament dealings and the plans of the Conservative Party.[17] A theory of "two nations" — the Hindu and the Muslim—was brought to light as an ideological basis for India's division. Syed Ahmad Khan and Mohammad Iqbal were extensively quoted, and the latter subsequently came to be known as the ideologist of Pakistan. But the British imperialists took a far more reactionary stand than these prominent Muslim ideologists. At no time, not even in his late and most reactionary period, did Syed Ahmad Khan contemplate a political division of India along religious lines. As for Mohammad Iqbal, he proposed an autonomous Muslim state within a Federation of India.

The "two-nation" theory and the demand of autonomy for provinces with a Muslim majority within an Indian Federation formed the basis of the new Muslim League constitution, adopted at a session in Lucknow, October 1937, soon after the elections to the provincial legislatures. The League proclaimed as its main purpose the establishment of a fully independent Indian Federation consisting of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of Muslims and other minorities would be duly and effectively guaranteed by the constitution.[18] The League constitution envisaged a reduction of rent, relief from usury, guaranteed minimum wages for workers, and a few other democratic developments. The same session adopted the new League rules, which flung the doors of the Party open to petty-bourgeois intellectuals, peasants and artisans. Membership

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[16] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 7.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

[18] *Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed to Revise the Constitution and Rules of the All India Muslim League*, Lucknow, 1937.

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fees were reduced to two annas monthly.[19] The subcommittee which revised the constitution and rules noted on this score that it had acted on the insistent wish of Muslims, articulated during and after the recent elections, that the Muslim League should become a popular and democratic organisation and that membership be open to every Muslim, no matter how poor or lowly.[20]

The campaign to democratise the Muslim League implanted the idea of a "Muslim nation" in the masses and cemented the notion that areas with a Muslim majority were entitled to be autonomous. It paved the way for the slogan issued three years later for the creation of Pakistan.

The movement for the autonomy of the "Muslim nation" was accompanied by a campaign for the projection of the communal principle to the activities of chambers of commerce and industry, and similar organisations.[21] Impelled by these circumstances and by the urge to unite all forces hostile to the Congress, many local provincial organisations joined the Muslim League—including the Unionist Party of the Punjab and the Krishak Praja Samiti of Bengal. Coalition governments were formed in these provinces with League participation, headed by Fazlul Haq in Bengal and Sikandar Hayat Khan in the Punjab. A provincial Muslim League organisation was founded in North-West Frontier Province in 1937, and the following year in Sind, where its influence mounted rapidly.

The very first session of the League branch in Sind, presided by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, resolved to call for political self-determination for the Hindu and Muslim nations and for the division of India into federations of Hindu and Muslim states.[22]

The new Constitution and Rules enhanced League influence among the Muslim masses. Another factor adding to its influence was the aggravation of the Hindu-Muslim problem while the provincial Congress ministries, which were all too often Hinduist in complexion, were in power. The Congress ministries ignored the demands of the Muslim communal movement, thereby bringing grist to the League mill.

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[19] Shortly before the new constitution and rules were adopted, Mohammad Iqbal wrote to Jinnah: "The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it" (*Struggle for Independence 1857-1947*, App. V, p. 33).

[20] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 355; S. Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, p. 8.

[21] The campaign was launched in the thirties by members of the big Muslim bourgeoisie and gained considerably in the country's economic and political affairs during the Second World War. An All-India Muslim Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1932, and also chambers of commerce in Bihar, Bombay and Calcutta. It was their purpose, as set forth in the Muslim Chamber of Commerce of Bihar resolution, to promote Muslim agriculture, commerce and industrial ventures. An All-Indian Federation of Muslim Chambers of Commerce and Industry was established in 1942. Thus, the demand for Muslim autonomy was furnished an economic basis.

[22] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 11.

The Congress claimed to express the interests of all Muslims, yet recognised only Muslim Congress members as representative of Muslim opinion. Even in the United Provinces, where the League won nearly half the seats of the Muslim electorate, the Congress would not admit it to the government unless it disbanded the Muslim League Parliamentary Party and recognised the Congress programme.[23] Legislation permitting songs and dances in front of mosques, which outraged Muslim religious feelings, and prohibiting the killing of cows under pain of criminal prosecution, was introduced in provinces where the Congress formed its governments. The "Bande Mataram," a hymn in which patriotic appeals are clothed in Hinduistic form, was declared the national anthem.

To enhance its influence, the League also took advantage of the fact that many of the Congress ministries failed to take account of the national and linguistic make-up of the various areas under their authority. Although the Congress recognised that the Hindustani language had two literary forms, Urdu and Hindi, the language used besides English in the administration and the schools was Hindi. Muslim demands that Urdu be placed on a par with Hindi were ignored. The compulsory study of Hindi in schools and the refusal to introduce the Urdu language and Arabic and Persian literature, the groundwork of the traditional Muslim education, incensed the Muslim intellectuals.

In its campaign against the Congress, the League capitalised on the inconsistency shown by the Congress ministries in handling the agrarian problem and labour legislation. It posed as the "champion" of the Muslim peasants, and accused the Congress of opposing Hindus against Muslims and neglecting the needs of the latter.

"Even an economic measure, which is national elsewhere, assumes a communal complexion in this country," said the report of a special Inquiry Committee of the Muslim League. "...Discrimination has been made in the case of Muslim peasants and workers by the Congress and Socialist organisation. Agents of zamindars and capitalists have given communal colour to disputes that were purely economic. And once communal colour was given, the poor victims of oppression were deprived of all protection from the very organisations which boast of nationalism."[24] Similar charges were repeated time and again in various Muslim League resolutions and in the speeches of its political leaders.

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[23] At the time the ministries were formed, the Congress leaders said that there were "only two parties" in the country—"Congress and the British." Jinnah replied, "there is a third party... the Muslims," and added, "We are not going to be camp-followers of any party. We are ready to work as equal partners for the welfare of India" (H. Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan*, London, 1954, pp. 113-114).

[24] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. 1, Bombay-London-New York, 1957, p. 412.

But this stand did not prevent the Muslim League from steering the class actions of Muslim working people along religious lines. In the Punjab and Bengal, where the League was represented in the government, its agrarian bills accorded largely with landlord interests. Yet they did provide for certain improvements in the situation of the peasant upper strata and created illusions among peasants about the League's agrarian policy. Leftist influence in the liberation movement was weaker among the Muslim working people than among Hindus. This left the field open for League propaganda.[25]

The British colonialists, who feared the consolidation of the country's patriotic forces behind the Congress, went out of their way to obstruct the Congress ministries, and depended for support on the more reactionary groups of landlords and princes. They also exploited the leaderships of the various religious communal parties, such as the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the organisations of untouchables. It was, indeed, on the advice of the British that the Muslim League appointed a special Inquiry Committee in 1938 to "inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress provinces." The Committee, which had undisguised British support, fanned religious feeling, and its ultimate report was grossly biassed.[26]

The attempts made by the Congress to reach an understanding with the League yielded no results. Rajendra Prasad's proposal that Muslim complaints be examined by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court was turned down by the League, which demanded that the British authorities and the Viceroy intervene.[27]

The Congress campaign to establish contact with the Muslim masses, launched in 1938, was not very effective, because the key social problems, and the agrarian most of all, still hung fire. The League branded the campaign as a propaganda manoeuvre and contributed considerably to its failure.

The few Congress members still active in the Muslim League were expelled from it, although its constitution and rules did not prohibit simultaneous membership in other political parties. Such veteran Muslim leaders as Wazeer Khan and Yakub Khan were expelled for refusing to join the anti-Congress campaign and to accept Jinnah's line without reservation.[28]

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[25] The emergence of class awareness among Muslim working people was impeded, among other things, by the fact that in the Muslim areas most of the Communists and left-wing Socialists at the head of workers' and peasants' unions, were Hindus; in the Punjab many of them were Sikhs.

[26] The report nevertheless contained a good number of interesting facts and observations concerning the causes of Muslim discontent with the Congress ministries (*Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. I, p. 412).

[27] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 251.

The negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, on the one hand, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, on the other, concerning a new Congress-League pact, came to nothing. If such a pact were signed, Jinnah said, it should be qualified as an agreement between two religious communal parties—the Hindu and the Muslim. This was naturally unacceptable to the Congress, which was by no standards a communal party.[29] At a time when an anti-imperialist united front movement was spreading in the country, a demand of that sort accommodated Britain's "divide and rule" policy, and went against India's national interests.

The Muslim leaders knew the masses longed for unity. Therefore, at least in their utterances, they did not rule out the possibility of agreement between the two religious communities. They said that all they objected to was Congress leadership and Congress ministries.[30]

The internal weakness of the movement for an anti-imperialist united front, the inconsistencies of the Congress leadership in the struggle against colonial rule, and the inability of the Congress ministries to solve the basic social problems enabled the Muslim League to parade as a champion of freedom and social justice, and thus to enhance its prestige among India's Muslims before the outbreak of the Second World War.[31]

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[28] Wazeer Khan wrote to the President of the Muslim League on this score that he lamented the differences and strife to which the people were being urged. He was sure, he said, that the true interests of Indian Muslims required close unity with the Indian National Congress. Yakub Khan declared that he would devote himself to serving Islam and the Muslim community on the sound basis of harmony and co-operation between Muslims and all their compatriots (Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 246).

[29] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, pp. 153-155.

[30] Speaking at a Students' Federation meeting in Calcutta in 1938, Jinnah stated that the League fight was not against the Hindu community but against the Congress High Command (*Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. I, p. 412).

[31] Most of the progressive Indians and some of the more objective British investigators note that the National Congress lost influence among India's Muslims on the eve and during the Second World War. Historian W. C. Smith wrote, for example, that the reason for this simply was that the Congress was not offering Muslims "anything in which they were interested" (W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, London, 1943, p. 251). According to Spate, the blunders made by the Congress, the communal struggle for patronage, and resentment of the fact that a numerical majority controlled an increasingy greater share of the country's economy, fed Muslim separatism (O. H. K. Spate, *India and Pakistan*, London, 1960, p. 168).

The "Two-Nation" Theory and the Pakistan Slogan

At the time of the Second World War the movement for Pakistan became a thing of flesh and blood. It was British colonial policy that played the decisive part in its materialisation and development.[32]

British statesmen regarded the future constitutional scheme of India not in the context of its liberation from colonial status, although this was the demand of the bulk of all in the least influential Indian political parties, but from the standpoint of artificially fomented religious communal differences. They gave to understand that they thought the country's division on the religious principle to be "the only possible solution of the troubles of India."[33]

The Muslim leaders supported by the British imperialists, clamoured for autonomy and the subsequent secession of provinces with a Muslim majority, rather than concentrate on the all-Indian demand for independence. This naturally reduced India's national strength.

The resolution passed by the Working Committee of the Muslim League on September 17 and 18, 1939, rejected the prospect of any constitution envisaging a "federal objective" on the grounds that such a federation would "necessarily result in a majority community rule," and inferred that this was totally unsuited to a country "which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state."[34] The British authorities welcomed this point of view.

The Muslim League was given firm British assurances that the federal scheme of 1935 would be scrapped and no plan of India's constitutional make-up would be adopted without Muslim League consent. After this the League leaders agreed, following the resignation of Congress ministries, to form governments in North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Assam.[35] December 22, 1939, the day the Congress ministries resigned, was proclaimed "day of deliverance." This, coupled with anti-Congress actions in many of the provinces, fomented religious fanaticism.

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[32] The matter was first treated in Soviet Indology by A. M. Dyakov (А. М. Дьяков, *Национальный вопрос и английский империализм в Индии*, Москва, 1948.

[33] *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, Karachi, 1958, App. V, p. 35; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, pp. 202-203.

[34] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, pp. 488-490.

[35] The Congress ministries resigned by decision of the National Congress on October 22, 939, when a campaign of non-co-operation with the British authorities was launched to attain the demand of a responsible government and a constituent assembly for drawing up a new constitution (*Новейшая история Индии*, стр. 394-398).

Various plans for partitioning India were discussed openly in Muslim political quarters. Some fanatics went so far as to urge Islamisation of the country. The author of one such project wrote under the pen-name of "A Punjabee" that the establishment of an autonomous Muslim federation within a confederacy of India should be the first step towards a Muslim state embracing all India.[36]

Unlike the ideologists of Indian Pan-Islamism on the eve of the First World War, the advocates of the partition of India were, as a rule, strongly pro-British. They did not want full independence and urged that the Indian states of the future should remain part of the British Empire.

The "Punjabee's" plan was one of many projects of an Islam state advanced shortly before and early during the Second World War. Bent on winning popularity, the League leadership recalled the speeches of Mohammad Iqbal, whom it ignored in 1930, and exploited the name of that distinguished poet. Choudhury Rahmat Ali, once ridiculed, rose to prominence in the separatist movement. *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of Indianism*, a book he wrote in 1940, called for the establishment of three Muslim states—Pakistan,[37] Banglastan (Bengal) and Osmanistan (Hyderabad)—which were to form a federation.[38] The other projects, such as Syed Abdul Latif's and Sikandar Hayat Khan's, and those of the Aligarh University professors, differed from Rahmat Ali's plan and from each other, chiefly in that they designated different boundaries for the projected Muslim federation. Some authors proposed the inclusion in it only of provinces with an absolute Muslim majority (Abdul Latif's project), while others also included the adjacent areas with a Hindu majority (Aligarh scheme).[39]

Neither were they of a single mind concerning the future status of the projected Muslim federation. Some authors, like Iqbal, favoured autonomy within an all-Indian confederacy, while others stood for complete secession of the Muslim areas. The League leadership sided with the latter.

At its session in Lahore on March 20-23, 1940, the Muslim League proclaimed the basic purpose of the Indian Muslims to be India's division on the religious principle, and the establishment of an Islamic state, Pakistan.[40] This resolution went down in history as the Pakistan or Lahore Resolution.[41]

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[36] A Punjabee, *Confederacy of India*, Lahore, 1939.

[37] The name "Pakistan" was composed by Rahmat Ali from the initial letters of the Punjab, Afghani (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Sind and the last syllable in "Baluchistan."

[38] Ch. R. Ali, *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of Indianism*, 1940; *Pakistan. The Fatherland of the Pak Nation*, Cambridge, 1947.

[39] Syed Abdul Latif, *The Muslim Problem of India*, The Times of India Press, Bombay, 1939; Sikandar Hayat Khan, *Outline of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, Lahore, 1939; Syed Zufar Hasan and Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri, *The Problem of Indian Muslims and Its Solution*, Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1939; *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, pp. 444-470.

The ideological reasoning of this demand was given in a presidential address by Jinnah, who contended that the Indian Muslims were not a religious community, but a nation inhabiting a compact territory in the North-West and East of the country, and therefore possessing the right to self-determination.[42]

The Lahore Resolution declared the regional junction of geographically contiguous units with appropriate territorial adjustments as the only acceptable solution of the communal problem, which should be made the key principle of the future constitution in order that "the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."[43]

The Lahore Resolution thus outlined the basic principles of India's projected political order in accordance with the "two-nation theory." At its session in Madras, 1941, the Muslim League inscribed the "two-nation theory" in its constitution and rules as its official ideology. It also reinforced the authority of the League president, who was invested with complete control both over the party's internal affairs, and its political activities.[44]

Mohammad Ali Jinnah was thus virtually given unlimited authority over the movement for Pakistan. The Council of the Muslim League was reorganised.[45]

Appendices to the Pakistan Resolution envisaged the inclusion in Pakistan of North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam. The question of whether all these provinces would be made part of Pakistan without any adjustment of their frontiers, or after some of their districts were excluded, was to be settled by a referendum.[46]

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[40] The word "Pakistan" was not based here on Rahmat Ali's suggestion, but connoted "country of the pure"; *pak* (پاک) is the Urdu for "pure."

[41] For the full text, see *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, App. VI.

[42] "Mr. Jinnah's Presidential Address at the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim League, 1940, March 22," *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, pp. 440-443.

[43] *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, App. VI, p. 40.

[44] For details, see *The Constitution and Rules of the All-India Muslim League*, Lahore, January 1944, Section 4, p. 3.

[45] The Council members were distributed by provinces as follows: the Punjab—90 seats, Bengal—100, North-West Frontier Province—20, Sind—25, Baluchistan—5. Thus, future North-West Pakistan held 30 per cent of all seats (140), while East Pakistan held over 20 per cent (100). The rest of the seats were distributed as follows: United Provinces—75, Bombay—30, Bihar—30, Assam—25, Central Provinces and Berar—25, Madras—20, Delhi—15, Orissa—10, Ajmer—5 (S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 62).

[46] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 147.

There was no definite designation of the boundaries of the future Muslim state in either the Pakistan Resolution or its appendices. Furthermore, partition was contemplated solely for the provinces of British India. As regards the princely States with a predominantly Muslim population, according to Jinnah's official press statement, they were to decide for themselves whether or not to remain outside both Pakistan and India, and could maintain whatever relationship they pleased with Britain.[47]

Future relations between Pakistan and Britain were likewise only vaguely defined. A special appendix envisaged that the League and the Congress, provided the latter approved the Lahore Resolution, should together decide upon a joint course of action for the independence of India from foreign control.[48] Whether this implied complete independence or dominion status was unclear. Although the League had adopted a resolution calling for full independence, Jinnah's utterances gave the impression that Pakistan sought no more than dominion status.[49]

A few other problems too, were left unsettled, including the one about the nature of the future Muslim state, its relationship with India, and the rights of the minorities.[50]

Jinnah elucidated on this score at League sessions in Karachi and Delhi (1943) and in his negotiations with Gandhi (1944).

Jinnah's letters to Gandhi clarified Pakistan's frontiers and proclaimed for the first time officially that Pakistan would be an independent state with "a really democratic popular government" functioning "with the will and sanction of the entire body of the people in Pakistan, irrespective of caste, creed or colour."[51]

The Muslim League campaign for "direct actions," whose programme was framed in 1943, coupled with propaganda of Pakistan by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and other League leaders, created the illusion that the movement for an Islamic state was the best possible way of achieving independence and settling the contradictions between the Hindu and Muslim "nations."

The League's organ, *Dawn*, and the periodicals, text-books and lectures of Aligarh University were devoted to popularising the "two-nation theory" and the establishment of Pakistan. Writers and journalists who were members of the League started a special *Pakistani Literature Series* to make the new slogan popular.[52] The ulamas hastened to supply the scheme with a religious foundation. The *jihad* cry, which, coming from the followers of Waliullah Shah in the 19th century and later from the Khilafatists, had a distinctly anti-British ring, was now issued for a reactionary purpose. United India, even one free from colonial rule, was proclaimed "enemy country" (Dar ul-Harb), as long as Hindus were in power. In the circumstances, nothing but the establishment of Pakistan could prevent a civil war in India, since otherwise the Muslims were likely to start a holy war to convert India into "Islam country" (Dar ul-Islam).

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[47] R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 234.

[48] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 147.

[49] See Jinnah's interview in *News Chronicle*, London, 1944 (*Amrita Bazar Patrica*, March 4, 1944; R. Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 230).

[50] Dr. Latif wrote on this score to Jinnah that the Pakistan scheme "will neither establish Muslim states properly so called, nor get rid of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh problem, nor afford any security to the Muslim minorities in the proposed independent Hindu India...." (S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 122).

[51] *Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee*, Bombay, 1945, pp. 126-127.

The movement for a Muslim state also had an economic grounding. Pakistan was recommended to the Muslim bourgeois groups as deliverance from the competition of the big, predominantly Hindu, commercial and industrial firms.[53] A movement to form Muslim trading companies, banks and industrial enterprises captured Bombay's Muslim section of the business world. Competition between the various bourgeois groups increasingly acquired a religious colour. This was why the Pakistan idea enjoyed popularity from the very start among the Muslim intellectuals and the big bourgeoisie. As for the provinces with a Muslim majority, the success of the Pakistan movement there was due chiefly to the religious form of local class and national contradictions.

Communal Complexion of Bourgeois Nationalism. Sind, the Punjab and Bengal Support the Pakistan Scheme

The scheme of an independent Indian Muslim state fell on fertile soil and won mass support in provinces with a Muslim majority. Almost overnight, the Muslim League became the most influential political party there, excluding the North-West Frontier Province. The secret of its success lay in the fact that the small landowners, the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the Muslim intellectuals, who acted as a connecting link between the League leadership and the peasants and artisans, were attracted by the idea. The change of heart among these social groups was most striking in Sind.

Until 1938, the middle classes in the towns of Sind espoused the cause of the Congress and the United Party, closely connected with the Congress. As for the peasants, the bulk of whom were the much-abused *hari*, or share-croppers, they were far removed from the country's political affairs and entirely at the mercy of the landlords, who took advantage of their economic plight to pressure them politically. The Sind Hari Committee, a peasant organisation founded in 1938, had only just begun its activities and still lacked mass support although its slogan—the granting of occupancy tenants' rights to the *hari*—was very popular in the countryside.

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[52] *The Pakistani Literature Series*, Lahore, 1945; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, pp. 300-301.

[53] "The Pakistan idea sold fast with the Muslim community, particularly its middle class," writes B. K. Nanda. The Muslim class which had been left behind the Hindus for historical reasons «in the race for the plums of government service, trade and industry, was attracted by the idea of a Muslim state. In a competitive society anything which promised a short cut to success was welcome" (B. K. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi A Biography*, London, 1958, p. 412).

It was easy to clothe the social and national contradictions in Sind in a religious garb. Competition between the various bourgeois groups, too, had a religious and national colouring. While the peasants, most of the landlords, some of the artisans, merchants and manufacturers were Sindhi, and Muslim by religion, the money-lenders, many of the big merchants and the industrialists of Karachi were of other nationalities, and Hindu by religion. It was they who stood at the head of the provincial Congress organisation and wielded considerable power in the United Party.

The British authorities made the most of the social and national distinctions in Sind to further religious communal notions. This led up to an endless succession of provincial cabinets and foredoomed the activities of the United Party and the Sind People's Association, a radical body of Sindhi intellectuals founded in 1939.[54] The nationalist aspirations of the intelligentsia, the small landowners and the petty and middle, predominantly commercial, bourgeoisie, coupled with the wish of this bourgeoisie to extend its business activities, encountered formidable opposition from the Hindu groups of the big "alien" bourgeoisie,[55] which dominated in business, the government service, and even in the educational establishments of the province. But there was in Sind also a fairly influential section of the big bourgeoisie (Haroons, Currimbhoys and Allah Bakhshes), Muslim by religion and predominantly Sindhi by nationality, which had ambitions of restricting the business activities of the Hindu bourgeoisie.

In these circumstances, the various Sindhi social groups welcomed the establishment in their province of a branch of the Muslim League (October, 1938) and employed their popularity, won in the movement for Sind autonomy, to transform this branch into a mass organisation.[56]

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[54] G. M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sind*, pp. 54-55.

[55] Bourgeoisie unassociated with any of the East and West Pakistan national groups. As a rule, it has come from districts where the Muslims are a minority.

[56] Even papers opposed to the League, like the *Sind Observer*, admitted that the establishment of a provincial Muslim League organisation was enthusiastically welcomed by the Sind population. The gradual change in the political mood of the Sindhi nationalists is excellently described in the memoirs of G. M. Sayed, a veteran Sindhi political leader (G. M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sind*).

There were two conflicting trends in the activities of the League in Sind. On the one hand, as noted above, it was the first provincial organisation to advocate the self-determination of provinces with a Muslim majority and the establishment of a federation of autonomous Muslim states. It could thus direct the general urge for national self-determination along religious lines.

On the other hand, a strong left wing appeared in the League branch. The radicals attacked the leadership of the local Congress organisation, and at the same time co-operated with petty traders and artisans of Sindhi nationality who were Hindus. They appealed for joint action with the National Congress to further the cause of India's independence, participated in many all-Indian campaigns and maintained close ties with the Muslim Congress members until 1946. This was an indication of the patriotic, anti-colonial trend in the position of the Sindhi nationalists, which reflected the interests of the petty and middle bourgeoisie and the small landowners.

Before the League adopted the Pakistan Resolution, its Sind branch concentrated chiefly on forming its own government and on constitutional work in the provincial Legislative Assembly. But after 1940, its main purpose was to draw the masses into the Pakistan movement.[57] A special committee of the League was formed in Sind, presided by G. M. Sayed. Its members travelled from town to town and village to village, organising demonstrations, meetings and conferences.

The Muslim League won numerous followers among the peasants and the working men in the towns. "This was the first time in Sind that every nook and corner of it resounded with the fervent cry of Pakistan," observed G. M. Sayed.[58] The Sind League organisation was very mixed in its social make-up. On the one hand, there was the radical Sindhi intelligentsia, and, on the other, the landlords and the members of the big Muslim bourgeoisie. Sayed and his followers called for the complete independence of India and Pakistan, and for an improvement in the situation of the people.

When the campaign for the "democratisation" of the Muslim League began, Jinnah leaned for support in Sind on the left wing, hoping to use its influence for bolstering his own position. He enjoyed considerable popularity among the younger generation of Sindhi intellectuals.[59] On his recommendation G. M. Sayed —one of the Leftist leaders of the local nationalists—was elected president of the League in Sind, replacing Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, a landlord, who had held the post temporarily.

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[57] When Sayed met Jinnah on September 5, 1941, the latter advised the Sindhits nationalis "to go direct to the masses and try to reorganise and educate them" (G. M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sind*, p. 61).

[58] G. M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sind*, p. 76.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

But very soon Sayed's activities incensed the landlord group in the League. As the left wing grew more active, the attitude of the Muslim League central leadership began gradually to change. In the contest between the progressive and the reactionary elements in Sind, Jinnah sided more and more frequently with the latter. Sayed had to admit in a special memorandum that he was unable to carry through his radical programme and to prevent the jagirdars and zamindars from using the League to promote their selfish interests.[60]

Many of the radical Sindhi intellectuals, while still enthusiastic over the Pakistan scheme, condemned the provincial League branch for abandoning its promise of improving the lot of the people and relieving the peasants from the oppression of money-lenders and landlords "in the name of Muslim unity and solidarity and under the shadow of Pakistan."[61]

But at the time, even the most progressive Muslim intellectuals did not criticise either the League as such, as a religious communal organisation, or the Pakistan slogan, which was its ideological foundation; they criticised merely some of the League's groups and some of its political leaders.

Influenced by the Sindhi nationalists' pro-Pakistan propaganda, the masses persisted in their belief that the Pakistan path was a righteous one, and that it was the leaders and the organisations at the head of the movement that were wrong. This helped the British colonialists to split the national forces of the province, and in many ways induced the weakness of the democratic movement in Sind after the founding of Pakistan.

In the Punjab the growth of the Muslim League into a mass political organisation and the emergence of its left wing began somewhat later and proceeded in a less favourable environment than in Sind.

The leadership of the League's Punjab branch, one of the party's oldest provincial branches, was in the hands of the big landlords and the privileged section of the Muslim intellectuals. The Lahore Resolution did not detract from their hold on the local organisation. The Leftists in the Punjab League, most of them former Khilafatists, were not numerous, and their co-operation with the Unionist Party in 1937-1940, coupled with the expulsion of Congress members from the League, undermined their standing.[62]

After the Muslim group in the Unionist Party joined the League in 1937 and a coalition government was formed, the League's influence increased greatly among the small landowners and the peasant proprietors whom the Unionists won to their side by anti-usury propaganda. Using the Unionist Party as a pawn on the chess-board of Indian politics,[63] the League leaders cemented their position in the Punjab. The reactionary bloc did untold damage to the democratic movement and to the unity of the national forces.

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[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

[62] S. Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, pp. 20-23.

However, after the mass struggle for an independent Muslim state got under way, the alliance with a distinctly pro-British party was no longer advantageous and injured the prestige of the Muslim League in the Punjab.

The leaders of the Unionist Party, too, who had formed the provincial government in 1937 with British support, stopped flirting with the people and violated their parliamentary coalition with the League.[64] They did so because they dreaded a mass movement in any shape or form, even under the Pakistan slogan. The refusal of the Unionist leader, Khizr Hyat Khan, who was appointed Prime Minister to the Punjab by the British authorities, to heed the Muslim League parliamentary party, and his resultant expulsion from the League, served as the pretext for the League-Unionist break (March-April 1944).

The Punjab branch of the League campaigned for a League government and advanced a programme of extensive democratic demands. It formed special committees to draft agrarian reforms, envisaging tax reductions, annulment of debts to money-lenders, and relief for tenant farmers.

The Punjab's various social strata associated their own, quite divergent hopes with the Pakistan project. The landlords, eager to expand the scope of their commercial and banking activities, hoped to shake off the competition of Hindu money-lenders. The Muslim bureaucrats dreamt of ministerial portfolios. The Muslim section of the none-too-numerous Punjab big bourgeoisie[65] took advantage of the Pakistan movement to weaken the rival Hindu and Sikh firms.

The attitude of the Muslim section of the bourgeoisie and of the bourgeois intellectuals in the Punjab had a chauvinistically religious complexion from the very beginning, because they were bent on using the establishment of a Muslim state to expand their business sphere not in the Punjab alone, but also in the adjacent Muslim areas.[66] The sentiments of the Punjab bourgeoisie were not shaped by the attitude of its middle strata, as in Sind, but by a few influential bankers and industrialists, who advanced to prominence, alongside the landlords, in the Punjab branch of the Muslim League during the Second World War.

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[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 30-34.

[65] The bulk of the bourgeoisie, artisans and skilled workers in the Punjab were Hindu and Sikh, while the landlords and peasants in the Western Punjab were mostly Muslim.

[66] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 63.

Competition within different groups of workshop owners, shopkeepers and artisans even, also assumed a religious colouring.

The main weakness of the democratic movement in the Punjab lay in the fact that its leaders failed to expose the dangers implicit in a partition of the country on the religious principle. As a result, the movement fell under the influence of the Muslim League at the most critical period (1943-1946). The progressives regarded the establishment of Pakistan as a means to win independence and as a basis for the unification of the Punjab's democratic forces.[67]

The Pakistan movement in the Punjab assumed extreme reactionary forms. The League enlisted the most backward elements of the *lumpen-proletariat* into its volunteer detachments, and backed the reactionary activities of the Khaksars.[68]

The development of the Muslim League into a mass body in Bengal was furthered by two main factors: the religious direction of the anti-feudal peasant struggle, and the religious colouring of the bourgeois nationalism prevailing among the Muslim section of the Bengal bourgeoisie.

After the Krishak Praja Party joined the League, jotadar landlords rose to prominence in its leadership. They were out to curtail the big land-holdings of the zamindars, and managed to spearhead the peasant movement against only the Hindu zamindars, who comprised the larger section of East Bengal landlords. The election propaganda of the Krishak Praja in 1937 and of the Muslim League in 1945, and the bill restricting the zamindari system drawn up by the provincial League ministry, created the illusion that the establishment of Pakistan would automatically solve the peasant question.

The popularity of the provincial League branch was also greatly promoted by its propaganda during the 1943 famine.[69] The League

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[67] S. Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, pp. 27, 36-38.

[68] *Khaksar* (خاکسار), "dust-like," "of lowly birth," a pro-fascist paramilitary organisation founded in 1931 by Inayatullah Khan Mashriki. It professed to protect the rights of Muslims. The Khaksar detachments consisted largely of the *lumpen-proletarians* of Peshawar, Lahore and other cities in the north-west. The organisation was financed by Muslim landlords (*People's Age*, May 11, 1947; R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, pp. 11, 49-5).

[69] After the famine broke out in Bengal, the Muslim League discussed the food situation in the country. Its campaign for improving the situation of the masses and its attacks on black-market profiteering were religious in form, aimed exclusively against Hindu hoarders and money-lenders, at fomenting religious fanaticism in Bengal. The League's special resolution on means of livelihood, adopted in 1943, attacked the policy of the British authorities on the grounds

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urged a policy of fixed prices and participation of people's representatives in the distribution of food. The Congress, too, to say nothing of the Indian Communist Party, the trade unions and the Kisan Sabha, campaigned for aid to the famine-stricken. But the Muslim League paraded as the sole champion of Muslim working people against the "rapacious" Hindu profiteers. Although a great many Muslim merchants, including some associated with the League, profited by the famine, and although the main cause of the disaster lay in the country's colonial position, the League again managed to direct popular discontent against the Hindu moneylenders and merchants.

The objective basis for the League's mounting popularity among the Muslim middle bourgeoisie lay in the strengthening of the latter's economic positions on the eve of and during the Second World War, and in its ambition to expand its own enterprise.[70] This ambition was hampered by the domination of the non-Bengal groups of the Hindu big bourgeoisie over the economy of the province. Competition between the various bourgeois groups increasingly assumed religious forms.

New opportunities appeared during the Second World War to steer the tendency of the Bengal bourgeoisie for industral development along a religious path. The Swajati movement, which originated in 1905-1909, reached its logical culmination. Bourgeois nationalism appeared on the stage quite often in a religious garb.

Groups of the Muslim bourgeoisie in Bengal came to play an important part in the provincial League branch and were represented in Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy's government, formed after the 1945 elections. Some of the radical moves (release of political prisoners, lifting of the ban on a number of anti-British newspapers, etc.) did not prevent the Suhrawardy government from campaigning against the Hindus, using every possible excuse to fan religious fanaticism, and to condone anti-Hindu rioting.

All this expedited the partition of Bengal, the cradle of Indian bourgeois nationalism and one of the most developed national areas in India.

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that it led to corruption, black-market profiteering and exploitation. The resolution contained appeals for a sensible price policy, the appointment of food distributors from all the classes of the population, and participation of popular representatives, especially Muslim League representatives, besides officials and capitalists, in every stage of planning, procurement and distribution of food (S. Zaheer, *A Case for Congress-League Unity*, Bombay, 1944, App. IV, pp. 38-40). Adoption of these demands, criticism of the government's food policy and the profiteering of local capitalists enhanced League prestige among the masses.

[70] Even opponents of the Pakistan project admitted that in the Punjab and Bengal during the Second World War Muslims were rapidly "turning towards capitalistic ventures" (S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 94).

British Partition Scheme and League-Congress Negotiations During the Second World War

The British authorities welcomed the idea of Pakistan, and campaigned at the Round Table Conference for the partition of India, because they were bent on splitting the national forces of the country. But when the Pakistan movement became massive and a left wing emerged in it, the British withheld their unqualified support.

When the Muslim masses showed their increasing desire for liberation from colonial dependence, and the Leftists sought to settle the Hindu-Muslim problem, if only through autonomy for the Muslim areas, the British colonialists began to parade as champions of India's unity. Whenever the prospect of agreement arose between the League and the Congress, no matter on what terms, the British authorities always said it was unacceptable. How else to explain Britain's attitude towards the discussion of Rajagopalachari's proposal for a Congress-League agreement, made in 1942?

Rajagopalachari suggested that the final decision on whether or not the establishment of Pakistan was desirable, should be postponed until authority would pass to an Indian government and a referendum could be held in areas with a Muslim majority. The proposal was favourably received not only by the Muslim League rank-and-file, but also by some of its leaders. But the British authorities opposed the project.

British solicitude for the unity of India, Viceroy Linlithgow declared at the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce on December 17, 1942, had increased in proportion to the prospect of a Hindu-Muslim settlement on the basis of partition. [71] Similar utterances were made in the Commons and in India's Legislative Assembly. But they were hypocritical through and through, and even the leaders of the Pakistan movement realised it.

"The British," wrote Jinnah, "are not honest in their solicitude for the Muslims and whatever regard they show for the Muslims is in the interest of their traditional policy of "divide and rule." [72]

The attitude of the British authorities contributed greatly to the failure of the League-Congress negotiations of 1942.

The official *démarches* of the British Government concerning India's future political status were also meant to split the country's national forces. This is evidenced by the proposal spelled out by Stafford Cripps' Mission (March, 1942). [73]

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[71] S. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 65.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[73] For more details about Britain's policy in India during the Second World War, and about the Cripps Mission, see А. М. Дьяков, *Национальный вопрос и английский империализм в Индии* and *Новейшая история Индии*, стр. 410—411.

The Congress and the League rejected the Cripps proposal. The British imperialist politicians went to great pains to attribute the mission's failure solely to the differences among Indians over the Pakistan project. Yet the far more tangible reason was Britain's refusal to forthwith form a responsible government and grant India full independence after the war ended.

After the Cripps Mission fell through, the League and the Congress made repeated attempts to discuss Rajagopalachari's proposals. Many rank-and-file members of the League favoured the decision of the Conference of Muslim Nationalists of 1944, which appealed for a renewal of negotiations, recognition of the need to convene a Constituent Assembly to draw up a constitution, and of the right of parts of the federation to claim complete autonomy and the right to secession. A special conciliation committee was formed of representatives of different political parties to facilitate the renewal of negotiations between the Muslim League and the National Congress. [74]

Conscious of the general wish for joint action, Jinnah gave his consent to negotiate with the Congress. But the negotiations, which proceeded between Mahatma Gandhi and Jinnah by correspondence in October 1944, did not yield any results. Jinnah insisted on unqualified recognition of Pakistan, regardless of whether or not India's colonial status would be terminated, and refused to consider the Congress as a nation-wide organisation. It is only natural that Gandhi refused to consider India's division before the achievement of full independence. He also refused to recognise the Muslim League as the sole and sovereign representative of the Muslims. [75]

Prompted by Britain's colonial policy, the League demanded a solution of the Pakistan problem before India became independent. In the circumstances, the mass movement for Pakistan, headed by the Muslim League, disrupted the unity of the patriotic forces and was used by the British government to delay the solution of the main question—the termination of India's colonial status. This came to the surface at the Simla Conference, convened to discuss the plan submitted by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in July 1945.

The declaration of the British government, and the conference itself, were devoted primarily to the procedure of extending the Executive Council under the Viceroy of India, which was to be named an interim government. As a result, the British colonialists managed to evade replying to the basic question: the date when they would grant India complete independence. Instead, they paraded as arbiters in the debate between the Muslim League and the National Congress. The cumulative effect brought about still

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[74] A. Ansari, *Pakistan...*, p. 153.

[75] For details, see А. М. Дьяков, *Национальный вопрос и английский империализм в Индии*, стр. 257—264.

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sharper contradictions between the two parties. The League leadership insisted that their party be recognised as the sole representative Muslim organisation. They objected to endorsing Muslim Congress members in the future interim government and opposed the participation in the conference of the then president of the Congress, Abul Kalam Azad, a Muslim.

The Leftists from the Sind Muslim League (G. M. Sayed, Ali Mohammad Rashdi and others) opposed the attitude of the central leadership, and tried to prove the need for agreement with the Congress for joint pressure on Britain.[76] Jinnah attacked them bitterly, and refused to make concessions to the Congress.

The British imperialists encouraged the Muslim League stand. In a letter to Jinnah, Lord Wavell hinted quite broadly that, much as he regretted it, he was unable to give the desired guarantee to Muslims in India in view of the existing situation.[77]

All this speeded the breakdown of the Simla Conference — something its organisers had wished from the start.

After the Labour Government came to power in Britain, it made an official statement on India on September 19, 1945, which in the main repeated Cripps' proposals.

The Labour Government declared that elections to the provincial and central legislative assemblies would be held at the end of 1945 and early in 1946. The constituent body to work out a new constitution would be formed from their members.

The elections showed that the Leftist forces in the country had gained strength. Communists were elected to provincial legislative assemblies for the first time. The left wing of the Congress and the Congress Socialist Party also made a good advance. At the same time, the elections showed that the Muslim League had become the leading political party in all the provinces where Muslims were in the majority (excluding the North-West Frontier Province). This was a clear indication that the Pakistan idea was popular among India's Muslim population.

The League won more than 70 per cent of all the Muslim seats in the provincial legislative assemblies (420 out of 600). But it did not have an absolute majority, except in Bengal, where it formed the government.

The 1945-1946 elections reflected the alignment of the class forces in provinces with a Muslim majority. They indicated that the progressive organisations had little influence among the Muslim peasants, and that the National Congress had lost its hold on the middle strata of Muslims. The small owners and the middle strata of Muslim intellectuals in North-West India and Bengal mainly followed the League.

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[76] G. M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sind*, p. 137.

[77] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, pp. 562-563.

Shortly before the partition, a split loomed in the League's provincial organisations. While still warmly in favour of the Pakistan scheme, the middle strata of the intellectuals attacked the League leadership. The attitude of the Muslim bureaucrats, landlords and big industrialists did not satisfy the Muslim middle strata, who opposed the pro-British trend in the League leadership and stood for the complete independence of India and Pakistan. They also insisted on relief for peasants, and on general democratic freedoms. But the left wing of the League was weak, and its influence on the Party leadership ineffective.

The British imperialists took advantage of the more reactionary aspects in the Pakistan movement. They leaned for support on the extreme Rightist groups of the Muslim League and interfered brazenly to impede the work of the left wing, thus artificially sustaining the split of the country's national forces.

Chapter V

BRITISH "DIVIDE AND RULE" POLICY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PAKISTAN

India's national-liberation movement rose to flood tide in a world exultant over the victory of the anti-fascist coalition, in which the Soviet Union had been most prominent; the British imperialists were compelled to leave India. But the British government was determined to keep the country economically and politically dependent on Britain, and therefore dragged out the transfer of power, fostered the most reactionary schemes of partition, and abandoned the country in a condition which made normal relations between the two newly-created states practically impossible, thus setting the stage for imperialist intrigues.

Under the so-called Pethick Lawrence Plan (1946), India was granted dominion status after the Constituent Assembly drew up the new constitution. The constitution envisaged the country's partition into three zones: provinces with a predominantly Hindu population forming one zone, the Eastern provinces (Bengal and Assam) forming another, and the Western provinces (the Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province) the third. The zones, and the various provinces in them, were granted autonomy in the administration of all matters, save matters of defence, external relations, and communications, which were to be a Central Government responsibility.

In the provisional Indian government envisaged in the British proposals, 40 per cent of the seats were to go to Hindus nominated by the National Congress, 40 per cent to Muslims nominated by the

Muslim League, and 20 per cent to the Sikhs, "untouchables", Parsis and Christians. [1]

As we see, the scheme was very far removed from what the country's progressives had wished—the immediate granting of independence and nation-wide elections to a Constituent Assembly. In effect, it paved the way for India's partition and left the principles of partition and future relations between the country's various parts dangling in the air. This enabled the British imperialists to provoke fresh conflicts between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress.

For all this, since concrete measures were provided for in the plan to prepare for the termination of India's colonial status, the Muslim League and the National Congress saw fit, after protracted negotiations and exchanges, to accept it. The country-wide longing for independence spurred the Congress leadership on a search of ways and means for an agreement with the League. The Congress consented to autonomy for provinces with a Muslim majority and accepted the constitutional proposals made in April 1946 by Abul Kalam Azad.[2] Azad's proposals attacked the Pakistan scheme. He said the Muslims themselves would be the first to lose by it, but admitted the mass scale of the movement.

The Congress clung to its demand for full independence and country-wide elections to the Constituent Assembly, but accepted the British plan as the basis for preliminary agreement. [3]

The Muslim League, too, announced its consent to continue negotiations with the British government on the basis of the Pethick Lawrence proposals. Yet it deplored the refusal of the Lawrence mission to give unqualified recognition to the need for "a fully sovereign Pakistan." [4] The League resolution stressed that it accepted the British plan because it was eager to expedite a solution of the constitutional problem, to achieve independence and establish Pakistan.

"The Muslim League," said its decision of June 6, 1946, "is willing to co-operate with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme outlined by the mission in the hope that it would ultimately result in the establishment of completely sovereign Pakistan and in the consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations, Muslims and Hindus, and all the other peoples inhabiting the vast subcontinent." [5]

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[1] For more details about the post-war upswing of the national-liberation movement in India and the achievement of independence, see A. M. Дьяков, *Индия во время и после второй мировой войны* (*1939—1949*), Москва, 1952; *Новейшая история Индии*, Москва, 1959.

[2] *Pakistan X-Rayed*, Ed. by Ganpat Rai, Lahore [s. a.], pp. 89-110; M. A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom. An Autobiographical Narrative*, Bombay-Calcutta-Madras-New Delhi, 1949, pp. 138-151.

[3] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, Bombay-London-New York, 1957, pp. 591-593, 610-611.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 601.

Both the Congress and the League accepted the British proposals, which overlooked the key demand of immediate independence, because, among other things, India's capitalists and landlords were eager to consolidate their front in face of the mounting revolutionary movement. But in a way it was a progressive development, welcomed by the public as a long-awaited solution of Hindu-Muslim contradictions.

On the face of it, the hour had struck for the religious communal problem to be relegated to the background, and for the main problem, the termination of India's colonial status, to assume precedence. "The acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan by both Congress and Muslim League was a glorious event in the history of the freedom movement in India," wrote Abul Kalam Azad, then President of the National Congress. "It meant that the difficult question of Indian freedom had been settled by negotiation and agreement and not by the method of violence and conflict. It also seemed that communal difficulties had been finally left behind. Throughout the country there was a sense of jubilation and all the people were united in their demand for freedom. We rejoiced, but we did not know that our joy was premature and bitter disappointment awaited us." [6]

In less than a month after the first agreed decisions were adopted, the situation changed abruptly. It appeared on the surface that an unfortunate Congress statement to the press was to blame. But the true reasons for the differences between Hindus and Muslims went deeper, and were bound up with the fact that unity went against the aims of the British imperialists.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in June, 1946. Of the 389 deputies elected, 192 belonged to the Congress and 70 to the Muslim League. In the main, they represented the interests of the big bourgeoisie and the landlords. For all this, the British government was bent on restricting its authority.

In reply to a Congress statement that the Constituent Assembly should be a completely sovereign body, the Pethick Lawrence mission declared that its terms of reference would not extend to the minorities problem and the question of India's relations with Britain. Jawaharlal Nehru attacked this notion at a press conference on July 10, 1946. "We shall have no treaty," Nehru said, "if they seek to impose anything upon us, and we shall tear up any treaty they try to impose.... In regard to the Minorities it is our problem, and we shall no doubt succeed in solving it. We accept no outside interference in it—certainly not the British Government's interference in it — and therefore these two limiting factors to the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly are not accepted by us." [7]

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[5] *Ibid.*

[6] M. A.K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom...*, p. 151.

Nehru was asked at the press conference about possible modifications of the proposed constitutional scheme. He replied that the Congress had agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly, but did not consider itself committed to the scheme as a whole. This statement was used as a pretext by the British and the reactionary Indian press to spread the spurious charge that the Congress did not intend to recognise provincial autonomy. [8]

The reactionary papers did not print the interview in full. They quoted passages from it, and furnished them with biassed comments. The League leadership seized upon this pretext to resume its anti-Congress campaign.

On July 29, 1946, the League Council revised its previous decisions, rejected Pethick Lawrence's proposals, and announced "direct actions" to achieve Pakistan, charging Jinnah to draw up a programme.[9] The programme envisaged a boycott of the Constituent Assembly and set August 16 as "Direct Action Day."

The leaders of the Pakistan movement hoped to achieve two ends. To begin with, they hoped to force the British government into immediately declaring its agreement to an independent Muslim state. At the same time, by organising an anti-Hindu campaign and charging the Congress with partiality to Hindu interests, they wanted to press the Congress into consenting to a division of the country into two states. Due to the British policy of playing off religious communities against each other and to the provocative conduct of reactionary elements (both Muslim and Hindu) within India, this campaign caused bloody Hindu-Muslim riots. The British press and reactionary Indian elements whipped up religious frenzy throughout the land. Provincial communal organisations took up the cue. [10]

As a result, August 16, 1946, became, as Azad attests, "a black day in the history of India." [11] A deadly wave of riots swept the country. "The turn that events had taken made it almost impossible to expect a peaceful solution by agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League. This was one of the greatest tragedies of Indian history," [12] Azad wrote.

But it was impossible, despite the provocations, to keep the people of India in colonial bondage any longer. The revolutionary struggle for independence and a flood tide of strikes and antifeudal peasant actions in 1946 and 1947 forced the hand of the British government.[13] It was compelled to speed the inauguration of Provisional Indian Government, to widen its authority and, at long last, to grant the country independence. But it made the most of its "divide and rule" policy to split the national forces and to transfer power to the Indians on most unpropitious terms.

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[7] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, pp. 612-613.

[8] *Ibid.*; M.A.K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom...*, pp. 154-155.

[9] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, pp. 620-621.

[10] For further details, see M. A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom.*

[11] M. A.K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom...*, p. 159.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

The Provisional Government of India was formed in August 1946 under Jawaharlal Nehru, and was at once immensely popular. The Muslim League leadership boycotted it, but succeeded only in alienating its own provincial organisations. On October 15, 1946, Jinnah had to agree to join the government. The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, was eager to have him do so. The British colonialists had good reason to fear that a government headed by Nehru would carry through an independent external and internal policy. They hoped to weaken the government from within, and depended on the League leadership in this respect.

Liaquat Ali Khan, Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghasanfar Ali Khan and Jogendra Nath Mamdal were inducted into the government at Jinnah's proposal.[14] Such influential members of the League Council as Khwaja Nazimuddin, head of the Bengal League branch, and Nawab Ismail Khan, head of the United Provinces League, were left out in the cold. Yet they had been absolutely certain of government appointments, and their followers, too, had eagerly waited for the announcement of new government members. They had prepared speeches for the occasion, and garlands of flowers.[15]

Jinnah's choice, a bombshell for most of the League leaders, was prompted by a set of reasons. Firstly, he wanted to weaken the provincial organisations. Secondly, he did not wish to see the Bengal group elevated in the League leadership. The fact that he nominated Mamdal, a Hindu, indicated that he wished the League to create the semblance of being a national organisation of North-West India and Bengal.

Though it joined the government, the Muslim League persisted in its boycott of the Constituent Assembly. This was motivated by procedural differences with the Congress, which were, indeed, quite weighty for the future political arrangement in India. The procedure of drafting and endorsing the constitution, as envisaged in Pethick Lawrence's proposals, was very elaborate and left loopholes for arbitrary intepretation. This added to the difficulties of reaching agreed decisions. Paragraph 19 caused the greatest dissent, because it concerned the grouping of the provinces.

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[13] See *Новейшая история Индии*, стр. 447-462.

[14] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, pp. 654-655.

[15] M. A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom...*, pp. 164-165.

The National Congress interpreted the proposals as giving every *province* the right to decide for itself to which zone it would belong, and to express its attitude towards the new constitution. The Muslim League, on the other hand, considered that the grouping of provinces into zones, and their future political order, should be decided by deputies of every *zone* by a simple majority vote. If its interpretation had been adopted, North-West Frontier Province and Assam, which bitterly opposed inclusion into the Muslim autonomous zones, would be installed in it forcibly, for the idea of a referendum, which may have rectified the situation, had been shelved indefinitely. It may be added that the British authorities fell in with the Muslim League interpretation.

The country's progressives objected to any coercive grouping of provinces, and the Congress could not, naturally, accept this principle. The attitude of the Muslim League thus drove the Constituent Assembly into a blind alley.

The national-liberation struggle of the people of India, which had by 1947 spread from British India to the Indian States, loomed as a serious threat to Britain. Any further maintenance of India's colonial status held seeds of fresh revolutionary outbursts. This was the reason why Prime Minister Clement Attlee officially declared in the House of Commons on February 20, 1947, that Britain would begin transferring power to the Indians not later than June 1948. If no constitution acceptable to all groups of the population will have been worked out by that time, he said, authority would be transferred to the existing provincial governments. Lord Mountbatten was appointed the new Viceroy.

Both the Congress and the League approved Attlee's statement in substance.

The Pakistan movement entered a new stage. British agents saw to it that pro-Pakistan manifestations were accompaneid by fresh Hindu-Muslim killings, most frequent at the time in the Punjab. Mass demonstrations were held in Lahore, Multan, Attock and other cities against the Unionist Party provincial government, which proposed to keep the Punjab a part of India. The League's Punjab body took advantage of the reactionary policies of the local Unionist landlords and money-lenders to intensify its demagogic propaganda in behalf of the Muslim peasants, proclaiming the Sikh landlords and Hindu money-lenders their sole enemies.[16] The anti-Hindu riots were particularly savage in the villages.

India's progressives rallied to combat the rabble-rousing provocations. The railwaymen's trade unions headed by Mirza Ibrahim stood in the forefront of the fight. The railwaymen held a one-day protest strike. Patriotic elements in Lahore set up "Aman Committees" (Committees of Peace). But the situation had gone out of control. Not even in the cities could riots be prevented. The Punjab governor and police persecuted the Aman Committees and encouraged the Muslim League volunteer squads and the squads of Rashtriya Sevak Sangh, a Hindu organisation. Pro-Pakistan disorders also broke out in the Anglo-Indian Army and Punjab police units.

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[16] *People's Age*, March 23 and 30, 1947.

The Pakistan movement in Sind grew in intensity too. The Progressive Party, which had earlier opposed the grouping of provinces because the Punjab would inevitably have dominated the northwest zone, backed the League demand for the undelayed establishment of Pakistan after Attlee made his announcement of February 20, 1947. It was swayed largely by Jinnah's assurances that in Pakistan every province would have complete autonomy. The programme of democratic demands framed by G. M. Sayed, the Progressive Party leader, attracted fresh followers from among the Sind peasants and urban middle strata to the Pakistan movement.

In the meantime, a campaign was mounting in Bengal for the inclusion in Pakistan not only of the eastern, Muslim-populated part of the province, but also of its western part. The League went to great pains to organise mass campaigns in Assam, where the Muslims were in the minority, and in North-West Frontier Province, where the Red Shirts, who were closely connected with the Congress, held power. To add to the number of Muslims in Assam, the League sponsored the migration there of Muslim Bengalis. When the Assam provincial government obstructed this migration, the League proclaimed Islam in peril and embarked on a campaign of civil disobedience.[17]

A tense situation also arose in the Pakhtun border regions. Pakhtun nationalism, which emerged during the Afghans' struggle for liberation, was intensely democratic. Its proponents, from the very beginning, were not only patriotic landlords, tribal chiefs and members of the burgeoning bourgeoisie, but the peasant masses and rank-and-file tribesmen. That was partly why the Pakhtun nationalist movement never acquired a religious complexion and was always part of the general Indian anti-imperialist struggle. But before and during the Second World War many Pakhtun nationalists lost faith in the National Congress. The blame for this lies heavily on the provincial Congress government headed by Khan Sahib, brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and a Red Shirts leader. The hopes of the middle strata of the Pakhtun intellectuals were frustrated: the best government jobs, as before, went to Punjabis and immigrants from other Indian national areas, chiefly Hindu. The hopes of the peasants that the tax burden and debts would be mitigated, were also frustrated. In place of the moratorium on debts promised in the election campaign, a law was adopted to register money-lenders and henceforth keep the annual interest down to 6 per cent. The Tenancy Act envisaged a reduction only for a small section of occupancy tenants.[18] Peasant manifestations for lower rents in kind were suppressed. The Peasant Union (Kisan Jirga) and the first trade unions of Pakhtun workers were persecuted. The Red Shirt leaders championed the cause of the landlords against their rank-and-file membership. The punitive expeditions against anti-British tribes during Khan Sahib's government and the dread which the khans had of the anti-feudal movement caused the influence of the Red Shirts in the tribal areas to dwindle rapidly.

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[17] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League, Its History, Activities and Achievements*, Agra, 1954, pp. 325-326.

The Muslim League, which established its branch in North-West Frontier Province as late as 1937, gained a firm foothold there. Its leadership was in the hands of landlords, khans of the border tribes, and the big merchants and contractors closely connected with British trading firms and the British authorities. Muhabad Khan and Kooli Khan, the Nawabs of Hoti, Teri and Tank, whose very names, according to Zaheer, were abhorred by every self-respecting Pakhtun for having helped the British to oppose the Red Shirts for all of 20 years, were among the provincial League leaders.[19] Abdul Latif, one of the main military contractors, Shah Passand, who recruited Pakhtuns to the army and police, Abdul Qaium Khan and a few other local bureaucrats also held positions of influence.

League propaganda for an independent Pakistan and its assurances that provinces in Pakistan would have full autonomy attracted many petty landlords and members of the urban middle strata, especially from among former Red Shirts. They gravitated towards the Pakistan movement and the sole reason why they did not join the provincial League branch was its pro-British attitude.

A few of the patriotic-minded fakirs, mullahs and maliks, who had earlier led the tribal anti-British manifestations and then advocated an independent Pakhtunistan, sided with the Pakistan scheme in the spring and summer of 1947. The maliks and khans exploited tribal prejudice and the patriarchal relations between the tribal chiefs and tribesmen, to advance the Pakistan slogan in the tribal territories. It gained a mass following. The Pakhtun national-liberation movement was in peril of a split.

The leaders of the local League branch demanded the dissolution of the provincial legislative assembly and urged new elections, nation-wide voting even, on the question of whether or not the province should be included in Pakistan. They claimed that the voting would dispel Khan Sahib's illusions and convince him that his Red Shirts would vote against India.[20]

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[18] W. Barton, *India's North-West Frontier*, London, 1939, pp. 183-186.

[19] *People's Age*, May 11, 1947.

[20] From Abdur Rab Nishtar's speech at a mass meeting in Shahee Bag, Peshawar (*Dawn*, December 27, 1946; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League...*, p. 326).

The British authorities did their utmost to incite Hindu-Muslim clashes. The Muslim League issued a call to its volunteers to assault Hindus. In reply, the local Congress branch and the Red Shirt organisation enlisted squads of "Young Pakhtuns," who renounced the non-violence outlook.

Hindu-Muslim massacres swept the province. The police sided with the rioters. The Congress noted in a report on the situation in North-West Frontier Province that Governor Caroe had soiled his hands by pulling strings in the bloody holocaust. In the spring of 1947 events went to the length of armed clashes between Red Shirts and League volunteers, who patrolled the streets in Peshawar. [21] Abdul Ghaffar Khan wrote that he suspected a monstrous conspiracy behind the riots. They were not attributable to love of God and Islam, he wrote, nor to the people's love of their country, but to the deeds of Britain's friends who did not wish their masters to leave India. [22]

The attitude of the British government and the situation in the provinces with a Muslim majority compelled the National Congress to consent to the Pakistan scheme.

The statement containing the final decision of the British government regarding "the method of transfer of power," known as the Indian Independence Act, was published on June 3, 1947. Under this act, India was divided into two parts—the Hindu state of Hindustan (India) and the Islamic state of Pakistan, both with dominion status. Whether North-West Frontier Province and Assam's Sylhet district would join India or Pakistan was to be decided by a referendum; in the case of Sind, this was to be decided by voting in the Sind legislative assembly. Whether the Punjab and Bengal would join one of the dominions integrally or be divided, was also to be decided by vote in the legislative assemblies of the two provinces. The voting was to be separate—by deputies of districts with Muslim and with Hindu majority. If one of the two groups of deputies favoured partition, the provinces would be divided.

The princely states were allowed to decide for themselves whether they wished to join either one of the dominions, or preserve their former relationship with Britain. The status of the Pakhtun tribal border areas was to be determined by negotiation between tribal representatives and the government of the dominion to which North-West Frontier Province would go after India and Pakistan were established. [23]

The sovereign rights of India and Pakistan were thus curtailed by dominion status, but since the Indian Independence Act envisaged the termination of India's colonial status, on the one hand, and the establishment of Pakistan, on the other, it was endorsed with reservations by both the National Congress and the Muslim League.

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[21] *People's Age*, May 11, 1947.

[22] *Modern Review*, May 1947, p. 340.

[23] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, vol. II, pp. 670-675; 692-697.

The Muslim League insisted that all of Bengal and the Punjab go to Pakistan. But the religious approach to India's partition, objectively favourable to the British, was sure to lead to a split of the people of Bengal and the Punjab. It did. The legislative assemblies of the two provinces, in which the Hindu deputies voted for partition, split them.

The demarcation of the frontier between India and Pakistan was completed by mid-August.

In July 1947 all eyes were fixed on the situation in North-West Frontier Province. In a broadcast address on June 3, 1947, Jinnah appealed to the Muslim League leaders and all Muslims "to organise our people to face the referendum with hope and courage." [24] But developments took an unexpected turn, and League hopes of a favourable outcome dwindled.

The Pakhtun nationalists regarded the approval by the Congress of the Indian Independence Act as a betrayal of their national interests. They inferred from it that the Red Shirts had been abandoned to the tender mercies of their enemies, the British authorities and the Muslim League leaders. At a *jirga* (assembly) in Bannu on June 22, 1947, they called for the establishment of an independent Pakhtun state, Pakhtunistan (or Pathanistan) [25] and urged a referendum to settle the issue. The Government of Afghanistan, which set forth its views in a special note to the British government, backed their demand. [26]

India's public opinion was inclined to support the Pakhtun drive for national liberation. Speaking to the Viceroy, Gandhi said he could not countenance India's partition if the Muslim League did not settle the future of the Pakhtuns by peaceful negotiations with the Red Shirts. There were many supporters of an understanding between the Red Shirts and the League within the League branch of North-West Frontier Province. Jinnah had no alternative but to negotiate with Abdul Ghaffar Khan. But, prompted by the British, the League rejected the Pakhtun demands. The British authorities, too, refused to include the question of Pakhtunistan in the referendum. The Red Shirts declared a boycott.

The referendum, which took place July 6-16, 1947, violated the most elementary democratic rules. Only those who had suffrage under the 1935 constitution (i. e., 15 per cent of the population of North-West Frontier Province) were qualified to participate.

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[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 683-684.

[25] طلوع افغان (*Tulyu-i Afghan*), June 24, July 2, 1947.

[26] *Tulyu-i Afghan*, July 16, 1947.

Of the total 573,000 electors only 293,000 cast their vote, with 289,000, or 49 per cent of the total electorate, voting in favour of Pakistan.[27]

Conscious of the implications of the referendum, Abdul Ghaffar Khan renewed his talks with Jinnah and declared the consent of the Red Shirts to become part of Pakistan, provided Pakhtunistan was granted full provincial autonomy. His demand accorded in spirit with the Lahore Resolution, but the Muslim League turned it down. A split ensued among the Pakhtun nationalists. One section, headed by Khan Sahib, banded with the League after Pakistan was formed, while the other, headed by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, remained true to its patriotic cause and opposed the League government.

Similar undemocratic conditions obtained during the holding of the Assam referendum, through which Sylhet district became part of Pakistan.

The question of Baluchistan was settled still more simply. The province was included in Pakistan on the strength of a basically unrepresentative *jirga* of tribal khans, who were all to a man followers of the League.

The disgracefully undemocratic partition procedure provoked wholesale Hindu-Muslim massacres.

The shameful part played in the matter by the British imperialists came to the surface most strikingly in the matter of the Anglo-Indian army. The Indian Independence Act did not fix dates for the withdrawal of British troops from the newly established dominions.[28] As for the Indian troops, Pakistan was to get one-fourth of their numerical strength and one-fourth of the equipment. The Muslim units were to go to Pakistan, and Hindu and Sikh units to India. The carving up of the armed forces was begun at once, in spite of vehement protests by Indian progressives. This fanned the flames of communal discord. The soldiers, whose conduct was condoned by their British officers, joined in the bloody rioting that swept the Punjab and Bengal. "When after August 15," wrote Azad, "the blood of innocent men and women flowed on both sides of the frontier, the Army remained passive spectators. What is worse, in some cases military men even joined in the strife."[29]

The procedure of India's partition was accompanied by vociferous reactionary agitation for a mass exodus of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan, and of Muslims from India. No sooner were the festive inaugural speeches concluded at the Constituent Assem-

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[27] V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, London, 1957, pp. 388-389.

[28] *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, p. 698.

[29] M. A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom...*, p. 202.

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bly of the newly-founded Islamic state,[30] than reports streamed in of wholesale massacres, demolished town blocks and gutted villages. Entire streets were destroyed in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Amritsar and other Punjab cities. There were riots and killings in Delhi, the United Provinces and Bihar, in the States of Rajputana and in Hyderabad. Something like half a million people were killed in the Punjab alone. The wounded and those who lost hearth and home, added up to over 12 million.

Britain's "divide and rule" policy, which took advantage of the most reactionary aspects of the Muslim and Hindu communal movement caused the division of India into two states to assume forms most painful for the general population. This was an inevitable consequence of the colonial policy of playing off different religions and castes against each other, of dividing entire peoples, and of destroying their historically moulded economic, political and cultural integrity. Compelled to abandon India, the British colonialists did everything they could to complicate the work of establishing and developing normal relations between the newly constituted states—Pakistan and the Union of India.

But for all this, imperialist policies were unable to check the irreversible dissolution of the colonial system and the emergence of new independent states.

The winning of political independence by the peoples of India and Pakistan had immense historic impact. New prospects opened for them of social, economic, political and cultural development.

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[30] Pakistan was inaugurated on August 14, 1947, a day before the inauguration of India. At the proposal of the Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was appointed its first Governor-General.

PART TWO

PAKISTAN 1947-1950

Chapter VI

THE GRIM HERITAGE OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD

In 1947, when India was partitioned, the frontier dividing the new Dominions—Pakistan and the Indian Union was fixed without regard to the national or ethnical composition of the population of the various regions; nor was any attention paid to existing economic and cultural links or to territorial coherence.

The only point taken into consideration was the religious denomination of the inhabitants. Since the Muslims formed a compact majority only in the north-west and north-east of British India, Pakistan was constituted by uniting two areas situated at the far corners of the subcontinent and separated from one another by a stretch of Indian territory of no less than 1,500 km. These isolated regions, subsequently called West Pakistan and East Pakistan were not held together by any historical, economic, ethnical or cultural bonds. Although the settlement of the religious and communal problem was the alleged aim of the partition of India, it did not lead either to the solution of this problem or to the creation of a homogeneous Muslim state, for millions of Hindus still live in Pakistan, and especially in its eastern part. According to the 1951 Census, 14.1 per cent of the population of Pakistan were Hindus, and in East Pakistan even 23.2 per cent.[1] On the other hand, more than 30 million Muslims still remain in the Indian Union.

At the same time the establishment of a state based on religious principles led to the dismemberment of the two biggest nationalities—the Bengalis and Punjabis—each of them being divided between the two Dominions in such a way that the majority of the Bengalis and Punjabis were incorporated into Pakistan, while the rest (approximately 30 per cent) remained in India.

Pakistan comprised: in the west, the North-West Frontier Province with the tribal areas, Sind, British Baluchistan, the western part of the Punjab [2] and the States of Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat, Kharan, Makran, Las-Bela, Chitral, Dir, Swat, Amb, and Phulra; in the east, the greater part of the former province of Bengal [3] and the Sylhet district of Assam.

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[1] *Census of Pakistan*, 1951, Vol. I, Karachi, 1951, Table 6, pp. 6-2.

In all, Pakistan received 23 per cent of the territory and 19 per cent of the population of colonial India.

The total area of the Muslim state created in 1947 amounts to approximately 947,700 sq. km, [4] and according to the 1951 data it had a population of 75,842,000. The western part of the country comprises 806,500 square km, i. e., 85.1 per cent of the territory of Pakistan, and the eastern part 141,200 square km. Although the area of East Pakistan is considerably smaller than that of West Pakistan, its population is larger; in 1951 it had 42,063,000 inhabitants, or 55.5 per cent of the whole population of the country, while the population of West Pakistan came to 33,779,000. [5]

West and East Pakistan also differ as regards the national composition of the inhabitants. A distinguishing feature of East Pakistan is the homogeneity of its population as far as nationality is concerned, for 98 per cent of its inhabitants are Bengalis, a people with an ancient culture, who are proud of their history and literature, love their language and value their national traditions. The few existing national minorities live in the border regions of East Pakistan and chiefly belong to the Assamese-Burmese group. Their total number does not exceed 250,000. [6] The population of West Pakistan, however, consists of four principal ethnic groups: Punjabis (according to the 1951 Census, 20.8 million), Pakhtuns (5 million), Sindhis (3.9 million) and Baluchis (approximately one million). [7] Each of these nationalities has its own language and inhabits a sizable geographical region—the Punjab, Pakhtunistan, Sind and Baluchistan—which shows that the population of each of these areas has in the course of its historical development achieved linguistic and cultural unity.

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[2] The following administrative units of the Punjab became part of West Pakistan: the entire Rawalpindi and Multan divisions; the Sialkot, Gujranwala and Sheikhpur districts of the Lahore division; and parts of Lahore and Gurudaspur districts.

[3] The following parts of Bengal have been included in East Pakistan: the Chittagong and Dacca divisions; the Bogra, Rajshahi, Pabna and Rangur districts of the Rajshahi division; certain parts of the Dinajpur, Nadia, Jessore, Jalpaiguri, Malda and Khulna districts of the Presidency division.

[4] The data relating to the area of Pakistan are only approximate, since a complete survey of the territory has not been carried out.

[5] According to estimates made in 1956, Pakistan had a population of 83,440,000, comprising 37,100,000 inhabitants of West Pakistan and 46,340,000 of East Pakistan (*Ansari's Industrial Directory of Pakistan, 1957*, Karachi 1958, pp. 1, 84). According to preliminary data of the 1961 Census, the population of the country reached 93,8 million, including 43 million in West Pakistan and 50,8 million in the Eastern province (*Dawn*, Karachi, March 4, 1961).

[6] *Census of Pakistan*, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 7-3, 7-4, Table 7.

[7] *Ibid.*

The two parts of Pakistan differ not only in regard to the size of their territory and the national composition and numerical strength of the population but also with respect to their physical conditions.

As the geographer O. H. K. Spate records, West Pakistan is a country of contrasts; it contains lofty mountains and vast steppes, waterless deserts and fertile valleys. A considerable part of the country is occupied by mountains and semi-deserts; the climate is hot and arid with considerable daily and seasonal fluctuations of temperature. As a rule, farming cannot be carried on without artificial irrigation of the land.

East Pakistan is a marshy delta covered by alluvial deposits, so low-lying that it would be almost wholly submerged if the water level of the Bay of Bengal, which washes its shores, were to rise by one or two metres. This plain is traversed by two great rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, and their numerous tributaries; only in the extreme south-east of the province does the ground rise forming the not very high Chittagong and Lushai Hills. While West Pakistan suffers from lack of water, the problem in East Pakistan is its over-abundance. The climate in the latter is hot and moist with an annual rainfall of 1,500 to 4,000 mm. The heat and moisture make it possible to gather two to three harvests a year, provided the crops are properly tended.

Pakistan inherited from the British rulers of India a backward colonial economy. In 1948-1949 (Pakistan's first complete fiscal year) the average income per head of the population in Pakistan was no more than 230.4 rupees, [8] or one-twenty-third of the per capita income in the USA, which shows the backwardness of the country and the extremely low productivity of labour in the principal spheres of production. Even during the colonial period a very low level of economic development distinguished the territories that subsequently formed Pakistan. As a result of the partition Pakistan received only eight towns which had, according to the 1941 Census, a population of more than 100,000 each; these are Lahore, Karachi, Dacca, Hyderabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, Sialkot and Peshawar. 95.2 per cent of the inhabitants of East Pakistan and 85.2 per cent of the inhabitants of the western part of the country lived in the countryside. Pakistan received only 9.6 per cent of the total number of industrial enterprises of the subcontinent (1,414 out of a total of 14,677); 5.3 per cent of the existing electric capacity (72,700 kw out of a total of 1,375,000 kw); 6.5 per cent of the industrial workers (206,100 compared to a total of 3,141,800 workers); and 10 per cent of the known mineral deposits of India.[9]

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[8] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, August 14, 1950; Junuary 19, 1954; *Pakistan Trade*, Karachi, May 1953, p. 15. Until 1959, the fiscal year in Pakistan began on the first of April. After the coup d'état of 1958, the government decided that the fiscal year was henceforth to start on July 1.

A considerable part of the industrial enterprises—41.2 per cent—were small-scale establishments for the primary processing of agricultural raw material, which used primitive techniques and operated only for a few months each year. Pakistan had only twenty odd textile mills and food and tobacco-processing enterprises, and approximately thirty small electrical engineering and railway workshops. These enterprises were mainly concentrated in Karachi and the big towns of the West Punjab.

Only 335 of the 1,414 industrial enterprises which Pakistan received were situated in the eastern part of the country; they were chiefly seasonal establishments for the primary processing of agricultural raw materials. Not a single railway workshop, not one engineering or chemical factory exised in East Pakistan; this province, with a population of 42 million, had only one cement works. [10] The machinery of the industrial enterprises was obsolete, not very efficient and largely worn out; manual labour was widely used. In 1948-1949 Pakistan exported 39 million rupees worth of finished articles, or 4.4 per cent of its total export which amounted to 920 million rupees. [11] During the first years of Pakistan's existence less than one per cent of its national income was derived from the manufacturing and mining industries.[12]

Many of the industrial establishments situated in Pakistan belonged to Indian monopolists such as Tata, Birla and Dalmia. [13]

The economy of Pakistan was dominated by foreign, chiefly British, monopolies; in 1950 their capital investments were estimated at 1,000 million rupees. [14] Two British enterprises, the Burma Oil Company and the Attock Oil Company, owned most of the oil industry of the country. The monopoly rights to work the coal mines and to extract chemical raw materials were held by Powell Duffryn and Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. The extraction and export of chromite was also monopolised by British capital. One could easily give many more similar examples.

The few industrial enterprises, mostly small ones, which belonged to local Pakistani capitalists were tied to British standards and depended on the import of British machinery and spare parts.

British monopolies held dominating positions in the credit and financial system of Pakistan as well as in foreign trade,[15] sea and river transport and various other important branches of the national economy, such as the tea plantations of East Pakistan. 90 per cent of the banking capital of Pakistan was in the hands of British banks, such as Lloyd's and Grindlay's Bank.[16] Roberts, Gill and Co., the Imperial Tobacco Company and other British firms controlled over 80 per cent of Pakistan's import.[17] Many local Pakistani firms were tied to the network of British managing agencies then functioning in the country. The insurance business was also dominated by British capital.

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[9] For details, see O. H. K. Spate, *India and Pakistan*, London, 1954, p. 346; S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1951, pp. 263-264.

[10] Nafis Ahmad, *An Economic Geography of East Pakistan*, London, 1958, pp. 211-212.

[11] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, pp. 343-344.

[12] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950.

[13] *Five Years of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1952, pp. 57-67.

[14] А. А. Змеев, *Пакистан. Экономика и внешняя торговля*, Москва, 1956, стр. 9.

The system of imperial preferences, as a result of which the dominion not only lost millions of rupees[18] but was also prevented from protecting its national industry against the competition of British commodities, which continued to be imported under preferential tariffs, helped the British monopolies to maintain their leading position in the economy of Pakistan. Pakistan's holdings of sterling in London and the organisation of currency control within the sterling area, of which Pakistan was a member, restricted the country's opportunities of developing economic relations with states outside the sterling area, and helped to uphold British influence.[19]

The predominance of the British monopolies in the economy of Pakistan not only brought them huge profits and made it possible to preserve conditions in which non-equivalents were exchanged between Pakistan and Great Britain to the detriment of the former, but also enabled the British monopolies to influence the dominion's economic development in a direction favourable to themselves, preserving it as an agrarian and raw material appendage of the former metropolitan country.

The petty industrial enterprises which existed in Pakistan after the partition were quite unable to satisfy even the most elementary requirements of the country for industrial commodities; the bulk of them had therefore to be imported from abroad.[20] Production of means of production was virtually non-existent and hardly any of the known mineral resources of the country were being extracted. The production of electric power and the output of coal and oil were quite insignificant,[21] which meant that industry, in so far as it existed, did not possess its own fuel and electric power basis. Pakistan had, therefore, to import from abroad all the industrial machinery it required, spare parts, fuel, lubricating oils, and many kinds of industrial raw materials and manufactured goods. Even in 1950-1951, three years after the establishment of Pakistan, its industrial enterprises could only meet 18-20 per cent of the demand for yarn, less than 3 per cent of the demand for cast iron and steel, and 15-20 per cent of the demand for oil products.[22]

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[15] Although 90 per cent of Pakistan's foreign commerce was sea-borne (not to speak of communications between East and West Pakistan, since no railway line linking the two parts existed before 1955), the bulk of the commodities was carried in British vessels, for after the partition the whole mercantile marine of Pakistan consisted of two steamships with a total displacement of 33,000 tons (S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, p. 460).

[16] *Внешняя торговля*, Москва, 1951, № 7, стр. 9.

[17] *The Manifesto of the Punjab Committee of the Communist Party of Pakistan*. Lahore, 1950, p. 14 (in Urdu). The Pakistani economist S. M. Akhtar wrote that all international clearing banks in Pakistan were foreign banks, and that they handled a considerable part of the country's commercial operations, and in particular foreign trade transactions (S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, p. 551).

[18] The economists J. Russell Andrus and Aziz F. Mohammad have pointed out that as a result of the system of imperial preferences, Pakistan suffered a loss of approximately Rs 10 000 000 per annum (see J. R. Andrus and A. F. Mohammad, *The Economy of Pakistan*, London, 1958, p. 281).

[19] For details, see В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, Москва, 1958, стр. 144-146.

The transport system which Pakistan inherited from the period of British rule did not ensure efficient communication between different regions even within each of the two wings of the country. Forty per cent of the railway lines of Pakistan were built by the British for military and strategic purposes and did not justify the expenditure required for their maintenance; a considerable part of the high roads, too, were constructed for strategic reasons, and were economically of little avail.[23] The network of railway lines and paved and earth roads was not sufficient for the requirements of the country, considering its size and the density of its population. The rolling-stock of the railways was worn out, and in 1947 there were only 25,400 motor cars in the country.

From the first days of its existence, the new state was faced with the complicated problem of maintaining constant communications between its western and eastern parts, which absorbed a considerable amount of resources and energy. The solution of this problem, as that of many other issues, was made even more difficult by the tension between Pakistan and India, which had arisen during the partition process and was further heightened by the imperialist monopolies.

The economic position of the country was adversely affected by the necessity of having to alot tens of millions of rupees annually from its meagre budget for transfer to Great Britain as payment for the irrigation system and the railways which had become Pakistan's property after partition. These payments exceeded 55 million rupees per annum, 40 million being repayment of the principal, and 15 million interest on the debt.[24]

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[20] *Three Years of Pakistan*, Karachi, [s. a.], pp. 35-36.

[21] In 1950, 170,000 tons of oil and 381,000 tons of coal were extracted in Pakistan, and less than 200 million kwh of electric power was produced; the existing electric power-stations had a capacity of 81,000 kw.

[22] See, for example, *Industry of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1951, pp. 200-201.

[23] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, p. 455.

The overwhelming majority (75 per cent) of the gainfully employed population was engaged in agriculture, which provided the bulk of the national income, e. g., 11,700 million rupees of a total of 16,860 million rupees in 1948-1949. But agriculture, the principal branch of Pakistan's economy, was in the grip of a profound and protracted crisis, brought about by two centuries of colonial rule, which impeded the development of the country's productive forces and preserved survivals of pre-capitalist relations in this sphere of production. The land was cultivated by primitive methods and the amount of agricultural machinery employed was quite negligible. Cattle-breeding, which played an important role in the economic life of West Pakistan, was conducted in an extensive way. Erosion and salinisation of the soil and the bogging up of land increased from year to year and became a real danger to agriculture.[25]

The yield of rice, wheat, barley, cotton, sugar cane and other important crops in Pakistan was among the lowest in the world and the grain output was steadily falling; in 1952-1953 it was 9 per cent lower than in 1948-1949.[26] As a result, the country experienced a constant shortage of food, which grew into a real famine when a harvest failure or a natural calamity occured. At the same time a considerable amount of land belonging to semi-feudal landlords, which was fit for cultivation, remained untilled.

The development of the productive forces in Pakistan's agriculture was hampered by the existing system of agrarian relations. A characteristic feature of these relations was the combination of big landed property in the hands of a tiny group of semi-feudal landlords, who dominated the countryside, with petty and even minute peasant holdings. West Pakistan's 6,060 big landlords possessed more land than its 3.3 million peasant households.[27] More than half of the land in this part of the country was cultivated by tenants at will, who had no legal right whatsoever to the land. The land holdings of these tenants were as a rule so small that it was impossible to farm them efficiently.

Eighty per cent of the land in East Pakistan was concentrated in the hands of the landlords and the middlemen who collected the rent.[28] A third of the rural population were share-croppers most of whom had no legal title to the plot they cultivated. Half the peasants of East Pakistan tilled tiny allotments, consisting of less than 0,8 hectares each.

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[24] فیروزالدین منصور — کسان اور آبیانا — لاہور — ١٩٥١ (Firozuddin Mansur, *Kisan aur Abiana*, Lahore, 1951, pp. 14-16).

[25] *Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee Report*, [s. a.], pp. 12-13.

[26] А. А. Змеев, *Пакистан. Экономика и внешняя торговля*, стр. 106.

[27] *Report of the Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan, January 1959*, Lahore, 1959, pp. 13-15. A considerable part of the land which was in the hands of landlords was the property of the jagirdars, a privileged group of landowners who were freed of the duty of paying taxes to the state. In Sind alone, 124 of the biggest jagirdars owned 1.1 million acres of land.

The principal means used by the landlords to exploit the peasants of Pakistan were the semi-feudal system of tenure combined with the practice of advancing seed, agricultural implements and draught animals on usurious terms, which reduced the peasant to personal dependence on the landlord. Millions of unprotected tenants, who tilled diminutive plots of land, which did not belong to them, were compelled to hand over not only their surplus product but also a considerable part of the necessary product to a tiny handful of absentee landlords and parasitical rent-collecting middlemen, who played no positive part whatever in production. The rent which the landlord extracted often amounted to 60—70 per cent of the gross product obtained by the tenant from the land he tilled. Sometimes the landlord's share was even as high as 90 per cent of the harvest.[29]

In addition to the rent, the landlord extracted numerous special payments from the peasant using various pretexts for imposing them, such as the marriage or divorce of the peasant, a delay in the rent payment, or a death or marriage in the landlord's family.[30] The size and type of these exactions depended on the customs prevailing in a particular locality. "The tenants were practically slaves of the money-lending landlords who exploited them thoroughly," wrote S. M. Akhtar, the Pakistani economist, in 1951.[31]

The semi-feudal landlords who received fabulous incomes were not interested in developing the productive forces in Pakistan's agriculture. As to the poverty-stricken peasants, they had neither the means nor the possibility to introduce any kind of agricultural improvement.

The system of agrarian relations obtaining in the country was, therefore, a serious obstacle blocking the road towards Pakistan's economic progress.

The dismemberment of India had an adverse effect on the position of the country, because many regions which for centuries had been single economic and cultural units were as a result divided between the two dominions. Old, established economic relations between territories incorporated in Pakistan and the Indian Union were made difficult, and in some cases forcibly severed by parti-

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[28] In some cases as many as 50 of these parasitical middlemen stood between the peasant and the owner of the land. *Economy of Pakistan (1950)*, p. 68.

[29] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, p. 79.

[30] امروز (*Imroze*), Lahore, March 11, 1957; *The Pakistan Times*, January 24, 1950.

[31] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1951, p. 135.

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tion, thereby disrupting the division of labour that had grown up between these regions in the course of their historical development.

Many of the areas included in Pakistan produced agricultural raw materials and food-stuffs which before partition were processed and used in regions that now lay within the boundaries of the Indian Union. For example, cotton produced in Sind and the West Punjab went to the cotton mills of Bombay, Kanpur and Ahmadabad; while the jute and tobacco grown in East Bengal [32] were in the main worked up in the industrial enterprises of Calcutta. On the other hand, the territories comprised in Pakistan formerly received coal, electric power, iron, steel, and many other industrial commodities from areas lying within the Indian Union, while at the same time, various parts of India depended on food-stuffs produced in regions which had been included in Pakistan. [33] Before partition the village poor from East Bengal, Sind, the West Punjab and other provinces of Pakistan used to find seasonal work in big industrial centres like Bombay and Calcutta. In short, "there was no part of economic life in India which was not in one way or another interlinked with that in Pakistan and vice versa." [34]

As a result of India's dismemberment these traditional links were broken, and many complex problems and acute difficulties arose in the economic development of Pakistan. Among these were, for example, the questions of how to process and sell the agricultural raw materials produced in the country (jute, cotton, tobacco, tea, sugar cane, etc.); how to obtain the necessary materials for the handicrafts and domestic industries and how to market their products.

Deprived of electric power from India, many of Pakistan's industrial enterprises had to be closed down. In 1947, work was carried on only in 27 and 23 per cent respectively of the factories which in 1946 operated in the Lahore and Sialkot districts of the West Punjab. The number of industrial workers employed in these districts, compared to 1946, had dropped by 73 and 90 per cent respectively, and industrial output had shrunk to a mere 37 per cent in Lahore district and 7 per cent in Sialkot district. [35] The productive capacity of the industrial enterprises situated in

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[32] In 1947-48 the area under jute was over 2 million acres, by 1953-54 it had fallen to 760,000 acres as a result of difficulties in processing and selling jute. (Nafis Ahmad, *An Economic Geography of East Pakistan*, pp. 118, 175).

[33] Before partition the territories which were subsequently incorporated in Pakistan grew 33.7 per cent of the rice and 40.8 per cent of the wheat produced in British India. Sind alone could annually export about 200,000 tons of rice (Nafis Ahmad, *The Basis of Pakistan*, Calcutta, 1947, pp. 99-100); the total grain surplus of West Pakistan amounted to 650,000-850,000 tons (C. N. Vakil, *Economic Consequences of Divided India*, Bombay, 1950, p. 30).

[34] C. N. Vakil, *Economic Consequences of Divided India*, p. 355.

[35] A. A. Anwar, *Effects of Partition on Industries in the Border Districts of Lahore and Sialkot*, Lahore, 1953, pp. III-IV.

Pakistan was even in 1950 far from being fully utilised as the following examples demonstrate: only 15 per cent of the available capacity of re-rolling mills was used, 20 per cent of that of sugar refineries and 50 per cent of the capacity of the textile industry. [36]

Agriculture experienced serious difficulties as a result of the splitting up of irrigation systems designed as single unity; the Upper Chenab and Upper Jhelum canals, for example, and the Ravi river system were bisected by state frontiers. A number of important irrigation works were destroyed during the partition period, and many arid regions in West Pakistan, where 11 million acres were irrigated by water systems situated in the borderlands, were deprived of their normal water supply. The area under irrigation was reduced by 14 per cent. In some parts the land was abandoned and lay fallow because the Hindu agriculturists who had cultivated it emigrated to the Indian Union.

The dissection of the irrigation system of the Surma River led to serious water shortages in many regions of East Pakistan, and extensive tracts of rich arable land were abandoned. Even in 1952-1953—five to six years after partition—a total of 8.6 million acres of land still lay uncultivated in Pakistan. [37]

Great damage was done to the domestic industries and handicrafts. [38] Industries producing sports equipment, surgical and musical instruments, wicker-work and rubber goods, knives and hardware, and various tools and implements underwent a severe crisis in Sialkot, Lahore, Gujranwala, Wazirabad, and various other towns.

Since many skilled workers, technicians and intellectuals, who were mostly non-Muslims, left Pakistan, all spheres of the economy experienced an acute deficiency of trained personnel. [39] Pakistan's cultural backwardness—the result of its colonial past—the absence of a sufficient number of higher and specialised teaching establishments, and the shortage of teachers, schools, text-books and equipment prevented a rapid solution of these problems. According to official data, only 7 per cent of Pakistan's population could read and write in 1948. [40]

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[36] *Economy of Pakistan* (*1950*), pp. 108, 115-118, 128.

[37] *The Pakistan Times*, March, 1, 3, 13 and 18, 1953; August 14 and 22, 1954.

[38] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, p. 269.

[39] Sajid Husain, *Pakistan Economics*, Karachi, 1950, p. 65.

[40] Farhat-Ullah Khan, Ali Arshad, *West Pakistan in Maps and Statistics*, Lahore, 1948, p. 5.—The North-West Frontier Province with a population of five million had only 56 elementary and 10 secondary schools of various types at the time of partition (*Three Years of Pakistan*, p. 140). In 1950, 1,159 modern elementary schools existed for a population of 42 million in East Pakistan with 8,819 elementary schools in West Pakistan. The whole country had no more than 108 schools and four colleges providing vocational training.

Pakistan's difficulties were aggravated by the stream of Muslim refugees from India. By 1951 their number exceeded 7.2 million; 6.5 million flowed into West Pakistan and 0.7 million went to East Pakistan. [41] The refugee problem became particularly acute in the western part of the country: the refugees made up 26.1 per cent of the population in the West Punjab, 55 per cent in Karachi, 49 per cent in Multan, and 43 per cent in Lahore. [42] The settlements of the refugees, who mostly took up their abode on the outskirts of big towns, were conglomerations of miserable huts built of reeds, bits of plywood, dacking and old tins, amidst a sea of dirt which threatened to swallow them up. Thousands of refugees having no means of building even such a hut squatted in the streets of the towns.

The millions of refugees who flooded the country increased the land hunger and unemployment which already existed. Enormous resources were required to provide them with accommodation and work and, so far, their predicament has not been solved.

A number of complicated problems which arose in the course of India's partition developed into major disputes between Pakistan and the Indian Union. The following principal issues were involved: demarcation of the frontiers between the two states; the refugee question, which primarily revolved around the property of persons who had migrated from one country to the other; the religious minorities remaining in each of the two dominions; the distribution of water from the rivers in the border regions and the irrigation systems; financial questions, and in particular the share of the national debt of undivided India that Pakistan was to shoulder; and the question to which of the two dominions Kashmir, Junagarch and Hyderabad were to accede.

As a result of interference by British colonialists and US monopolists, who endeavoured in every possible way to aggravate Indo-Pakistani relations, these problems remained for many years unsolved, complicating and straining the relations between the two dominions. The most bitter dispute arose over the Kashmir question.

Kashmir, which was one of the largest States of India with an area of approximately 211,000 sq. kilometres and more than four million inhabitants, is of great strategic importance, because it lies at the spot where Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, China and India meet. British and U. S. monopolists, therefore, tried to find a solution that would allow them to maintain their influence in this area and enable them to utilise the territory and resources of Kashmir for their purposes. Their policy was also affected by rivalries within the imperialist camp.

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[41] *Census of Pakistan*, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 29-31.

[42] *Census of Pakistan*, 1951, Vol. V, Karachi, 1951, p. 75, Table 2.

India and Pakistan on the other hand endeavoured to solve the Kashmir issue in accordance with their interests.

The ruling circles of Pakistan, who sought to secure Kashmir's accession to their dominion, used as an argument the fact that the overwhelming majority of Kashmir's population were Muslims (77.1 per cent, according to the 1941 figures). This circumstance was in the eyes of the rulers of Pakistan no less important than the favourable strategic position of Kashmir and its mineral and economic resources. They feared that the incorporation of this state in the Indian Union would undermine the very foundations on which Pakistan was established, and therefore create an undesirable precedent.

As to the leaders of the Kashmir national movement, most of them were for union with India, some factions, however, came out in favour of joining Pakistan and certain nationalist groups wanted Kashmir to become a separate state.

According to the Indian Independence Act of 1947 the rulers of the Indian States had the right to decide whether to join one of the two dominions or to maintain their former relations with Great Britain, i. e. to remain vassals of the British crown.

By the autumn of 1947 it was clear that Hari Singh, the Maharajah of Kashmir, did not intend to accede to Pakistan [43]. It was at this time that the arrival of Hindu refugees from the Punjab caused anti-Muslim riots in Jammu, the south-western part of Kashmir, which had a predominantly Hindu population. This in turn precipitated the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen from the Pakhtun tribal areas and the North-West Frontier Province.

The Pakhtun detachments that crossed the Kashmir border on October 22, 1947, were commanded by Akbar Khan, a major-general of the Pakistan army. [44] His staff included British and American military personnel. [45] On October 24, 1947, in Punch, a town in the western part of the state which had been captured by the invading forces, "Azad Kashmir" ("Free Kashmir") was proclaimed and a "government" of the occupied region formed. It was headed by Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, one of the leaders of the

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[43] Hari Singh's opposition to the incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan was due, on the one hand, to his close economic relations with Indian monopoly capital and, on the other, to his dissatisfaction with the anti-Hindu, pro-Muslim regime which had been established in Pakistan (the Maharaja and the ruling Dogra clique of Kashmir were Hindus).

[44] For details about the role which Britain, the USA and the Pakistani authorities played in preparing and carrying into effect the armed invasion of Kashmir, see З. Петруничева, «Национально-освободительное движение в княжестве Кашмир», *Ученые записки института востоковедения АН СССР*, т. I, М.— Л., 1950.

[45] *The New York Times*, January 29, 1948.

Muslim Conference of Jammu and Kashmir—the organisation of the Muslim community in this state.[46]

On the same day the Maharaja of Kashmir asked the Indian government for help, and declared that he wished to accede to the Indian Union. On October 26, 1947, Kashmir formally joined India, and Indian army units were sent by air to Kashmir. Pakistani detachments advancing on Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, had by that time already been brought to a stop by the inhabitants of the Vale of Kashmir, who rose in defence of their homes under the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, a national democratic party.

The agreement by which Kashmir joined the Indian Union was not recognised by the ruling circles of Pakistan although it contained a special point stipulating that a general referendum on the question of accession was to be held in Kashmir after its soil was cleared of foreign (i. e., Pakistani) military units.[47] An armed conflict began between Pakistan and India, which lasted for over a year.[48]

For the Western imperialists the conflict was very advantageous, for it weakened the young states and prevented them from consolidating their independence. It enabled the colonialists to play off each one of the contending sides against the other and to interfere in the internal affairs of both Pakistan and India. The conflict undoubtedly played also into the hands of reactionary elements in Pakistan and India for it enabled them to fan the religious fanaticism of backward sections of the population and, by concentrating the attention of the broad masses on religious and communal issues, prevented them from waging a united struggle for the democratic reorganisation of the country.

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The partition of India and the creation of Pakistan as an independent Muslim state did not lead to the destruction of the bureaucratic administrative machinery which had been set up by the British during the colonial period. This colonial administrative apparatus was now made to serve the interests of the ruling strata of Pakistan consisting of bourgeois and landlords.

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[46] Further details can be found in Ю. В. Ганковский, «Азад Кашмир. К истории кашмирского вопроса», in *Краткие сообщения Института народов Азии АН СССР*, вып. LI, Москва, 1961.

[47] In February 1954, the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir passed a resolution confirming the accession of the state to the Indian Union.

[48] Only towards the close of 1948 did Pakistan and India, through the mediation of a specially set up United Nations Commission, reach an agreement providing for the cessation of hostilities on January 1, 1949.

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Pakistan's constitutional system was based on the unpopular Government of India Act introduced by the British colonialists in 1935, which had been supplemented by certain clauses of the Indian Independence Act of 1947.

The administrative apparatus of the country was headed by the Governor-General, who "had full authority over the civil administration and the armed forces. By his own order he could amend the existing constitution and promulgate laws that would be beyond the effective power of review of any court." [49] He was also President of the country's legislature, the so-called Constituent Assembly.

Pakistan's Constituent Assembly consisted of deputies who represented the territories which formed the new dominion elected in 1946 to the Constituent Assembly of undivided India by the provincial Legislative Assemblies on the basis of one seat for one million inhabitants. [50]

It met for the first time on August 10, 1947. The Assembly had been brought into existence in an undemocratic way and had virtually no authority. The small opposition group was powerless and the inviolability of the deputies was largely ignored by the government. For instance, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the well-known Pakhtun leader, spent almost six years in prison during the life of the Constituent Assembly (1947-1954), of which he was a member. The legislation passed by the Constituent Assembly was mainly concerned with minor matters and questions of procedure, supplementing and amending particular clauses of the Government of India Act of 1935.

Hundreds of leading posts in the army and the civil service continued to be held by Englishmen, [51] for example, the Governor of the West Punjab, the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the commanders of the various arms of the Service in Pakistan were British.

Pakistan inherited from the British colonialists an administrative division of the country which was designed to impede India's social and economic progress, to hamper the national Unification of the peoples of the country and to increase their fragmentation, and which completely disregarded the fact that certain national regions constituted an economic and cultural whole. For instance, the territory inhabited by the Pakhtuns was split up

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[49] K. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, London, 1957, p. 20.

[50] Eight of the deputies elected to the Constituent Assembly of India in 1946 — including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the veteran leader of the India national-liberation movement who opposed the dismemberment of India, refused to take their seats in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

[51] *The Second Year, Pakistan 1948-1949*, Lahore, [s. a.], pp. 96, 211, 232; P. Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, London, 1958, p. 228.

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between several districts of the North-West Frontier Province, the States of Dir and Swat, the tribal area and the north-east districts of the province of Baluchistan. The national territory of the Sindhis, Baluchis and Punjabis was similarly cut up by fossilised administrative and feudal barriers.

The feudal rulers of "the States... that have acceded to Pakistan have perfect sovereign powers except Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications—subjects which are vested in the Centre."[52] Despite certain differences in the level of their economic development, all these States were relics of the past where lawlessness, poverty and ignorance continued to flourish, where the population lacked even elementary democratic rights, and where no elected government bodies or institutions of local government existed. In many of the States, for instance Chital, slavery was still virtually in existence. A democratic paper, *The Pakistan Times*, wrote that medieval methods were used to suppress the people in the States, and that medieval systems of taxation and tax-collection were still prevalent there.[53] The rulers of the States maintained their own armed detachments, with whose aid they not only robbed their own subjects but also waged war against one another for disputed border lands.[54]

The preservation of the States, comprising 43 per cent of the area of West Pakistan and 10 per cent of its population, which were hotbeds of feudal oppression and political reaction, seriously impeded Pakistan's economic and social progress.

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The partition of India on a religious basis and the creation of Pakistan did not settle a single one of the major contradictions of the colonial era. It did not abolish the economic domination of the monopolies of the imperialist powers or root out the survivals of pre-capitalist relations of production which these monopolies strove to preserve; nor did it solve the agrarian problem, the national question or even the religious and communal differences.

Pakistan inherited from the British raj a backward colonial economy. The country had no developed industry. Agriculture was experiencing a serious crisis, brought about by the fact that in Pakistan's agrarian system survivals of pre-capitalist relations of production were particularly strong. This crisis manifested itself in a continuous reduction in the cultivated area, decreasing crop yields, a chronic shortage of food-stuffs and the permanent danger

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[52] Farhat-Ullah Khan, Ali Arshad, *West Pakistan...*, p. 13.
[53] *The Pakistan Times*, March 10, 1950.
[54] *The Pakistan Times*, January 24, 1950.

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of famine. British monopolies retained dominating positions in a number of the principal branches of the country's economy. Although Pakistan was politically independent it remained an agrarian and raw material appendage of the Western powers and served as a market for their industrial products.

It is true that, when Pakistan was created, capitalism had already become the predominant social and economic system in the more advanced areas of the provinces which constituted the new dominion, but as a result of the uneven development of capitalist relations and the tenacity of the feudal survivals the economy of the country as a whole was a heterogeneous and multiform structure. This made it possible to combine the capitalist exploitation of the great mass of the people—the working class and the peasantry—with feudal and semi-feudal forms of exploitation, thereby condemning the people of Pakistan to poverty and depriving them of all civil rights.

Pakistan's economy was adversely affected by the consequences of the splitting up of India into two dominions, for huge sums had to be earmarked to make good the damage caused by the fierce clashes between Hindus and Muslims which were provoked by imperialist agents, to resettle millions of refugees and find work for them, to repair the communication system, and the canal and irrigation network which had been damaged and in some places completely destroyed, and so on.

The fact that the British colonialists retained a strong hold on the economy, administration and the armed forces of the country, the tenacity of the feudal survivals in the economic system and social life, and the general economic and cultural backwardness of Pakistan demanded the immediate introduction of a series of radical economic, administrative and political measures designed to consolidate the political independence which Pakistan had received, to overcome the social and economic backwardness, and help create an independent economy thereby ensuring that Pakistan attained full national sovereignty.

This was clear not only to the members of radical and national-democratic organisations but also to the more far-seeing representatives of the ruling classes.

"The whole structure of our economic and political life requires a simultaneous reform if not a radical overhauling," wrote S. M. Akhtar, a leading Pakistani economist, in 1951.[55] The ways, methods, forms and the speed of such a reconstruction were the subject of an intense struggle, which became the pivot on which the political life of Pakistan turned from the very first days of its independence.

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[55] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1951, p. 49.

Chapter VII

THE BIG LANDLORDS AND THE UPPER BOURGEOISIE OF WEST PAKISTAN RULE THE COUNTRY

When the British colonialists left India they handed over state power in Pakistan to the leadership of the Muslim League, the party of the bourgeoisie and the big landlords. Basking in the glory which the victory in the struggle for an independent Muslim State had brought it, the League was, at that time, the most influential political party in Pakistan. Among its followers were not only the landlords and the big bourgeoisie but also the middle and lower strata of the divided and weak national bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the peasantry and even the working class. The parties and organisations remaining in opposition did not play any important part in the political life of the country, they were small and, as a rule, represented the interests of the Hindus and other religious and communal minorities. The progressive proletarian and peasant organisations were weakened and disorganised by partition and the emigration of many leaders and active members of the working class and peasant movement.[1]

Not a single political party or public organisation could in the period following partition compete with the power and influence of the Muslim League. Its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Father of Pakistan and Great Leader (Quaid-i-Azam) as he was called, was the first Governor-General of Pakistan and enjoyed enormous authority among all social strata of the population.

Up to 1954 the Muslim League, in fact, completely dominated the political life of the country and the chief ministerial posts in the centre and in the provinces were held by its representatives. It also had an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly of Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan (August 1947-October 1951), expressed the real state of affairs when he said, "I have always considered myself as the Prime Minister of the League. I never regarded myself as the Prime Minister chosen by the members of the Constituent Assembly."[2]

The Leadership of the Muslim League was in the hands of big semi-feudal landlords from West Pakistan—principally Punjabis and a few Sindhis—and rich Muslim entrepreneurs, mostly businessmen who had after partition migrated from India to Pakistan. The members of these two social groups were closely bound together by both community of interests and personal ties.

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[1] M. Afzal, *Trade Union Movement in Pakistan*, in: *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, August 14, 1950 (Supplement).—M. Afzal is a prominent leader of the labour movement of Pakistan and was for many years General Secretary of the progressive Pakistan Trade Union Federation.

[2] *Dawn*, Karachi, October 9, 1950.

The leaders of various right-wing Muslim religious organisations exerted a considerable influence on the policy of the League. K. Callard, a well-known Canadian author, who visited Pakistan several times and has acquired a good knowledge of its political life, writes, "Jagirdars and zamindars, pirs and mirs, makhdooms, khans and nawabs retain vast political influence. A glance through the lists of members of legislative assemblies (of Pakistan's provinces.—Yu.V.G.) shows how many such hereditary leaders or their near relatives are active in political life."[3]

The rich landlords and the big Muslim bourgeoisie also kept a firm hold on the control levers of the government machinery of Pakistan. The big landlords from the West Punjab—Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Daultana, Syed Ahmad Nawab Shah Gardezi, and Iftikhar Husain Khan Mamdot—and a few of the biggest landlords from Sind, such as Mohammad Ayub Khuhro and Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, had not only seats in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and the legislative assemblies of the provinces but were also ministers of the central and provincial governments. They shared power with descendants of the landed aristocracy;[4] members of rich and distinguished Muslim families from India; leaders of the Muslim League who had migrated to Pakistan after partition, like Liaquat Ali Khan, Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar and S. A. Azam; and representatives of the big Muslim bourgeoisie. "In fact a small, well defined group of men monopolised political office throughout the country and transferred from one field to another as occasion seemed to warrant.... A group of about twenty individuals made all important political and government decisions at every level,"[5] writes K. Callard.

From the outset, the political course pursued by the ruling circles of Pakistan aimed at the greatest possible consolidation of the position of the semi-feudal landlords and the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan in all spheres of the country's economic and political life. The alluring promises given to the Muslim working people on the eve of partition were forgotten; even the mere mentioning of these promises was now declared a crime. In the West Punjab, for example, an act was passed in 1950 under which "a tenant can be ejected if he is guilty of reading out at a public or private meeting the Punjab Muslim League Manifesto of 1944, in which land reforms have been vehemently advocated."[6]

The big landlords used the political power they monopolised first and foremost as a means of safeguarding the existing system of agrarian relations, especially in the western part of the country, and defending it against any changes, for it provided them with huge incomes at the expense of the exploited millions of peasants, who were poverty-stricken and deprived of all rights, and allowed them to exercise a decisive influence in all spheres of social life. Not only the system of landownership and land tenure, which had been developed during the period of British rule, remained unchanged, but even the numerous illegal exactions the landlords imposed on the peasants were not touched.

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[3] K. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, London, 1957, p. 50.

[4] Samin Khan, *An Introduction to Basic Democracy*, Karachi, 1960, p. 40.

[5] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, pp. 25-26.

[6] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950 (Supplement).

Only after the anti-feudal peasant movement began to spread across the country, at the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950, did the ruling classes take some steps to abolish certain agrarian laws and land taxes inherited from colonial India which were regarded with the greatest wrath by the peasants and the progressive sections of the population of Pakistan.

The upper bourgeoisie who shared the power with the big landlords were, in the main, "aliens" in the sense that many of them were not of the same origin as the peoples inhabiting the country. The key positions were held by businessmen who settled in Karachi and big towns of the West Punjab only after the partition of India, among them A. Adamjee, Habib Rahimtoola, Chinoy, Valibhai, H. K. Dada, M. M. Ispahani, A. Dawood, H. Ibrahim, H. Ali Mohammad, M. Bashir, B. M. Idris, A. S. A. Shakur, A. Salam and A. L. Rashdi. They hailed from Bombay, Kathiawar, Delhi and other parts of India, which had not been incorporated in Pakistan because the bulk of their population were Hindus. This "alien" section of the big bourgeoisie was composed of diverse ethnic elements; many of the small and large nationalities inhabiting the Indian subcontinent were represented in it. Closely associated with this "alien" bourgeoisie was a small but influential group of Muslim businessmen from the West Punjab which included such figures as Sardar Mumtaz Ali Khan, Sheikh M. Allah Bakhsh and Sheikh M. Ismail.[7]

Most of the business activities of the big bourgeoisie of Pakistan were conducted in the sphere of finance and commerce and were primarily concerned with foreign trade, where they collaborated closely with foreign, mainly British, firms; they were also engaged in speculative operations in the home market.

This was not only due to the desire to obtain as large a profit as possible in the shortest time but also to their inadequate knowledge of industrial production, lack of experience and know-how, and the desire to avoid the risk involved in the building of industrial enterprises. The West Pakistani economist, Sajid Hussain, declared in 1950, "It is true that our capitalist class is not highly developed and lacks enterprise. Easy profit in commerce and trade has made capital shy and is responsible for the hesitancy of private capital in coming forward for investment in industries."[8]

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[7] *Ansari's Trade Directory of Pakistan and Who's Who*, Karachi, 1953-1958. For a description of their business activities, see: В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, Москва, 1958, стр. 94-102.

The fact that West Pakistan businessmen did not always dispose of sufficiently large amounts of free capital, which modern industry demands, and that they were unable to obtain long-term credits for the building of industrial enterprises also had an adverse effect. Because of "the lack or total absence of facilities for industrial credit due to the unwillingness of banks in advancing long-term loans, much of the required capital for industrialisation is not forthcoming,"[9] writes Sajid Hussain. Even in those instances when members of the West Pakistan big bourgeoisie took a hand in industry, they usually acted as agents to foreign firms during the first years of Pakistan's existence.[10]

This was due to the general economic weakness of the young state, which compelled the government and the business circles to seek foreign help in order to overcome the economic difficulties, and the fact that foreign monopolies maintained their strong positions in many spheres of the economy. Particularly important was the circumstance that foreign banks were the dominant force in the country's credit and financial system,[11] and especially in the financing of foreign trade transactions, in which the big bourgeois of West Pakistan acted as intermediaries.[12]

These characteristic features marking the business activity of the big bourgeoisie caused the latter to take little interest in the development of the home market, and to adopt an attitude towards the basic economic and political problems facing Pakistan in the first years after independence, which differed only in detail from the attitude of the big landlords of West Pakistan.

The big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan as well as the landlords favoured an economic policy which would provide them with the best opportunity to enrich themselves quickly and safely while placing the main burden of repairing the damage caused by partition on the shoulders of the broad masses of the population. The big bourgeoisie and the semi-feudal landlords sought to strengthen their own economic position by restricting the business activities of the middle and lower strata of the national bourgeoisie that had arisen from among the various nationalities inhabiting Pakistan. The big bourgeoisie tried to bring about a situation in the country which would tend to inflate prices and be propitious for commercial and financial speculations that promised substantial gains at the expense of the masses.

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[8] Sajid Hussain, *Pakistan Economics*, Karachi, 1950, p. 200; see also W. Godfrey, *Pakistan. Economic and Commercial Conditions in Pakistan*, London, 1951, p. 87. *Investment in Pakistan*, Washington, 1954, p. 6.

[9] Sajid Hussain, *Pakistan Economics*, p. 220.

[10] In 1948-1950 many factories in West Pakistan specialised in the assembly of machines and various types of equipment from parts imported from abroad.

[11] The data for September 30, 1953, show that transport obtained 95.7 per cent (!) of its capital requirements from foreign banks; public services, 88.2 per cent; the building industry, 73.4 per cent; agriculture, forestry and fishing, 26 per cent; and the manufacturing industry, 25 per cent.

[12] According to the returns of September 30, 1953, the trading companies of Pakistan received 67 per cent of their loans from foreign, mainly British, banks.

The independence Pakistan received was used by the upper middle class to lay its hands on the levers of the state machinery that controlled those sections of the country's economy which it considered important.

The Pakistan Chamber of Commerce, whose 600 members represented the interests of the leading commercial and industrial companies, was given the right to elect the management of the principal government and semi-government bodies in charge of Pakistan's economy, including that of the Central Sales Tax Committee and the Import and Export Advisory Council. According to the official Year Book, the Pakistan Chamber of Commerce "advises Government on the formulation of policy in regard to important measures like Amendment to Income Tax Rules, Estate Duty Bill, fixation of Annual Tariff Rules, Import Trade Policy and National Standards Organisation."[13] In 1950, an Import and Export Advisory Council of the Cabinet was set up consisting of 29 representatives of the country's biggest companies.

Forty-nine per cent of the shares of the State Bank of Pakistan, which started to operate on July 1, 1948, were distributed among the biggest businessmen and the leading commercial and industrial companies; these were, moreover, given the right to elect three directors of the central board of administration and a considerable number of members of the local administrations of the Bank in Karachi, Lahore and Dacca.[14] The big bourgeoisie was also represented on the management of the economic development corporations set up by the government, and occupied a number of leading positions in the central and provincial ministries concerned with economic matters.

Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola and Al-Haj M. A. H. Ispahani,[15] rich Pakistani businessmen, were appointed diplomatic representatives in London and Washington, the capitals of the leading capitalist states, for the ruling circles of Pakistan attached the greatest importance to the development of economic relations with these powers. All this enabled the big bourgeoisie of Pakistan to exert a strong direct influence on government policy in regard to questions of economic development.

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[13] *The Second Year. Pakistan 1948-1949*, Lahore, [s. a.], p. 169.

[14] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1951, pp. 525-527.

[15] Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola was a director of fourteen of the largest commercial and industrial companies of Pakistan, a former President of the Bombay Provincial Muslim Chamber of Commerce and Vice-President of the Federation of Muslim Chambers of Trade and Industry in India. Al-Haj M. A. H. Ispahani was a director of Ispahani Ltd. and of other companies (*The First Year. Pakistan 14 Aug. 1947-14 Aug. 1948*, Karachi, 1948, pp. 170, 172).

The tax policy of the government was to a large extent determined by the interests of the upper bourgeoisie. From 1950-1951 onwards, the super-profit tax was levied only on incomes exceeding 250,000 rupees per annum (up to then it was levied on all incomes of over 150,000 rupees); the super-profit tax was, moreover, reduced from 10.5 to 9 annas in the rupee. Taxes imposed on small industrial enterprises and the cottage industries were, at the same time, considerably raised. Excise receipts went up sharply.[16] Many types of handicraft production were disastrously affected by the growing tax burden. Craftsmen and petty bourgeois were ruined in increasing numbers, unemployment was rising and the purchasing power of the masses of the population falling.[17]

The government policy of regulating foreign trade, and in particular the system of licences for the import and export of the principal commodities, introduced soon after the establishment of Pakistan, helped the West Pakistani big bourgeoisie to consolidate its economic position.[18]

Because of the acute shortage of consumer goods, the Muslim League government relaxed import restrictions in August 1948. The result was that imports went up sharply, increasing from 115.5 million rupees in the first half of 1948 to 310.5 million rupees in the second half of that year.[19] Since the bulk of the commodities imported into Pakistan were handled by so-called authorised importers, that is, the big businessmen of West Pakistan connected with British firms, it was they who derived the greatest benefit from the changes in the import policy.

At the same time, the system of licences controlled by the Central Government became a means of restricting the commercial activities of the national bourgeoisie of the various peoples inhabiting Pakistan in the interests of the big West Pakistani bourgeoisie. Almost all the licences were issued to the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan, while as a rule none were granted to the national bourgeoisie.[20] Under these conditions, imported commodities, as well as the import licences, became the objects of wild speculations, which enriched the big merchants and ruined the small traders and industrialists. The profits of the big importers and wholesale merchants did therefore by no means decrease but on the contrary grew even more,[21] when in October 1949 the Muslim League government introduced stricter import controls, in view of the devaluation of the pound sterling which Great Britain had carried out in September 1949 and the deficit of Pakistan's balance of payments.[22]

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[16] W. Godfrey, *Pakistan. Economic and Commercial Conditions in Pakistan*, p. 42; Sajid Hussain, *Pakistan Economics*, pp. 152-153, 155, 161.

[17] *The Pakistan Times*, January 15 and 20, February 13, 1950.

[18] For further details, see С. А. Кузьмин, *Экономическое развитие Пакистана и внешний рынок*, Москва, 1960, стр. 51-58; W. Godfrey, *Pakistan. Economic and Commercial Conditions in Pakistan*, pp. 22-24.

[19] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, pp. 347-348.

[20] The small industrialists and traders of Pakhtunistan complained that the numerous applications for import licences made by businessmen and merchants from this province were not given due attention in Karachi and that they were treated like step-children (*The Pakistan Times*, April 1, 1950). The small traders and entrepreneurs of Mardan in the North-West Frontier Province

After the big bourgeoisie and the members of the landlord class connected with it assumed power, they tried to squeeze out their foreign competitors, and in the first place the British.

Although the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan had relations of long standing with the British monopolies, it resented many aspects of their business activities since they restricted its income. It tried to reduce the share of the profits which the British companies received and to increase its own. Shortly after the creation of Pakistan, laws were passed designed to limit the activities of the foreign companies.

Because the upper bourgeoisie of West Pakistan had a special interest in business connected with the sphere of finance and commerce, the first measures limiting foreign companies dealt precisely with this field. As early as 1948, the government introduced a law which placed the activities of foreign commercial banks and their branches under the control of the State Bank of Pakistan.[23] The purpose of this law was to restrict the business activities of foreign capital and to create a favourable environment enabling the wealthiest members of the propertied classes of Pakistan to invest their capital in banking and finance. The special privileges enjoyed by British companies engaged in the mining of minerals on the territory of Pakistan were withdrawn in 1949. Early in 1950 the government created a special tariffs commission to draw up proposals for protectionist duties and other measures that were to be introduced to safeguard the industry of Pakistan. A little later, the preferential terms granted to British insurance companies placing them on the same footing as indigenous insurance societies, were abolished.

The result of these and a number of similar measures enabled the West Pakistan big bourgeoisie, already in the first years of

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pointed out that the government's import policy placed obstacles and difficulties in their way and that they were suffering serious losses in consequence (*The Pakistan Times*, May 18, 1950). One could easily give many more similar examples.

[21] *The Pakistan Times*, August 27, 1950.

[22] Pakistan's balance of payments deficit reached 805 million rupees in two years (between July 1, 1948 and June 30, 1950); in 1949-1950 it amounted to 349.7 million rupees.

[23] W. Godfrey, *Pakistan. Economic and Commercial Conditions in Pakistan*, p. 59.

Pakistan's existence, to strengthen its position, to push back the foreign competitors in the sphere of finance and commerce—a sphere that was not only important but which also brought in the greatest gains—and to create the preconditions necessary for expanding its activities in the industrial field. The policy of the government of Pakistan to finance and encourage the industrial enterprises of the big bourgeoisie and the rich landlords, worked in the same direction. Already the fundamental principles formulated in the government's industrial policy statement of April 2, 1948,[24] laid down that Pakistani businessmen had the right to acquire at least 51 per cent of the shares in enterprises set up by foreign companies in the following branches of industry: cement, cotton spinning and weaving, fish canning, glass and ceramics, mining, food, leather and so on.

In February 1949, an act was passed providing for the setting up of the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation with a share capital of 30 million rupees; 51 per cent of the Corporation's shares were taken over by the government. During the first two years of its work the Corporation sanctioned loans worth over 12 million rupees, which were granted to a number of companies functioning in the light industry of Pakistan.[25]

According to the Development of Industries (Federal Control) Act of 1949, 27 principal branches of industry were brought under the direct control of the government of Pakistan which was also responsible for providing the means for the building of new enterprises in these branches and working out their production plans.[26] Following the establishment of the State Bank and various government corporations, direct government participation in the building of new industrial enterprises was an important step towards the creation of a public sector in the economy of Pakistan. The public sector could come into being only after the country ceased to be a colony and the Pakistani bourgeoisie began to aspire to economic independence.

The public sector comprised the state-owned railways, the telephone and telegraph systems, the irrigation network, and industrial enterprises which began to be built during these years and were financed by the central and provincial governments. But the relative size of the public sector in the economy of Pakistan was extremely small, especially during the first years of its existence.

According to the Six-Year Plan for the economic development of Pakistan, which was adopted in 1950, 2,600 million rupees were to be invested in the national economy.[27] The fulfilment of the plan depended to a considerable extent on foreign firms, since they were to provide 47 per cent of the capital required. The Colombo Plan was also expected to assist in the financing of the Six-Year Plan of Pakistan. In apportioning capital investments, agriculture, which was allotted 32 per cent of the total, and transport—20 per cent—received special attention. Nineteen per cent of the available capital was to be invested in industry and 11 per cent was assigned for health and education.[28]

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[24] The full text of the industrial policy statement can be found in W. Godfrey, *Pakistan. Economic and Commercial Conditions in Pakistan*, pp. 161-166.

[25] See S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, p. 286.

[26] *Problems of Economic Reform and Development in Pakistan, Pakistan Paper No. 1*, Karachi, 1950, pp. 9-10.

The opening up of new land and the building of irrigation works were the principal tasks in the sphere of agriculture. The main projects were the irrigation system in the Thal desert, designed to irrigate 1.2 million acres and the Ghulam Mohammad system, which was to irrigate 2.7 million acres in West Pakistan; and the Ganges-Kobadak Project for the irrigation of 250,000 acres in East Pakistan.[29] The central government provided 50 per cent of the capital required for the building of the irrigation projects. The remaining 50 per cent were supplied by the provincial governments which made use of various kinds of "aid" from the West. Some of the schemes relied almost entirely on loans from foreign states, and above all from the USA.[30] These credits were not always forthcoming when, and in the amounts, required, thereby disrupting the planned progress of the work. As regards the plans for the mechanisation of agriculture, they could not have brought about any substantial improvement even if they had been fully carried through. It is sufficient to say that the plan for the mechanisation of agriculture in East Pakistan stipulated for the import of a total of 100 tractors per annum.[31]

The greatest attention in the industrial sphere was given to cotton and jute enterprises. The plan envisaged the building of 11 cotton mills with a capacity of 25,000 spindles each, and of seven jute mills. The government provided up to 51 per cent of the total amount to be invested in industry, while private capital, as a rule, supplied no less than 49 per cent.[32]

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[27] In 1953, the aggregate investments were increased to 5,640 million rupees; of this over 4,000 million rupees, or 72 per cent of the total, was allocated to the public sector and approximately 1,400 million rupees, or 28 per cent, to the private sector (*Investment in Pakistan*, pp. 37-38; *Pakistan Trade*, Karachi, April 1950, pp. 20-21).

[28] *Investment in Pakistan*, pp. 37-38; *Pakistan Trade*, February 1956, pp.16-17; April 1956, p. 20.

[29] *Pakistan Trade*, April 1956, pp. 21-23.

[30] For example, the project for the mechanisation of agriculture in the Punjab was to be financed by a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the plan for the mechanisation of agriculture in East Pakistan relied on funds to be granted by the Ford Foundation (*Sixth Year Pakistan*, 1953, Karachi, pp. 61, 95-96).

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

But during the first years after the adoption of the Plan the funds which were earmarked by the government for industrial development were quite inadequate.[33] The financial magnates of Pakistan were still very reluctant to invest their capital in the building of factories, and foreign firms were not in a great hurry either to finance industrial enterprises in Pakistan. The imperialist states, on the other hand, granted loans to Pakistan on conditions which made it difficult to utilise them for industrial development.

To stimulate the construction of industrial enterprises, a Two-Year Plan for the development of those industries that were considered most important for the country's economy was adopted by the government in 1951, but in the beginning it had little effect. Up to 1952 when the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation [34] began to function, there was no fundamental improvement in the development of the cotton and jute industry, let alone the other industrial branches.[35]

But the basic contradictions inherent both in the business activity of the big bourgeoisie and in the public sector, which was set up in the country, were apparent even during the first years. It is true the development of state capitalism did not limit private enterprise in any way or lead to conflicts between the public sector and the private sector. New industrial establishments were built with the financial assistance granted by the state through its corporations, and, as a rule, these enterprises were subsequently handed over to private industrialists.[36]

The public sector exerted a beneficial influence in so far as it was conducive to the economic development of Pakistan, helped to weaken the competition of foreign firms and furthered private capital investments in industry. In this respect it encountered the opposition of the imperialist states.

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[33] To carry the Plan into effect, the government spent 411 million rupees in 1951-1952; of this, 82 million were allocated to agriculture, 164 million to transport, and only 26 million to the building of industrial enterprises. These, as well as the preceding figures for 1948-1952, are based on the exchange rate of the rupee before the devaluation (*Pakistan Trade*, February 1956, p. 17; September 1956, pp. 33-34).

[34] Ispahani, Ghulam Faruk and other leading industrialists were associated with the administration of the Corporation. Its aim was to attract private capital for the building of industrial establishments and to finance the development of the public sector. During the first years of its existence the funds of the Corporation amounted to 650 million rupees and consisted of government allocations (300 million rupees), private investments (250 million), foreign "aid" (50 million), and a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (50 million rupees). *Pakistan Trade*, September 1956, pp. 33-34; *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1954.

[35] While between 1948 and 1949 the production of yarn rose from 2,800 tons to 6,100 tons and that of fabrics from 80,100,000 metres to 97,000,000 metres; between 1950 and 1953 the output of yarn increased more than eightfold (from 6,100 tons to 53,600 tons) and that of fabrics more than twofold (from 97,000,000 metres to 228,000,000 metres). In 1950, there was not a single jute mill operating in the country, while in 1953 Pakistan produced 50,100 tons of jute (*Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1955*, Karachi, [s. a.], p. 32).

[36] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 56-128.

Since, however, the policy of state capitalism was above all designed to serve the interests of the big bourgeoisie, which seeks to obtain the largest possible profit on the invested capital, it was not conducive to the creation of a heavy industry in Pakistan, and gave rise to conditions which disrupted the further development of the public sector. Factors contributing to this trend were the handing over of state enterprises to private companies, the investment of government funds primarily in the light industry and the dependence on foreign credits. All this reflected the dual attitude towards economic and political issues that was so characteristic of the upper middle class of Pakistan.

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Although there were no disagreements in the leadership of the Muslim League regarding the basic questions of the country's development, this by no means indicated the absence of acute contradictions between its various sections. Nor did it prevent the flaring up of fights around separate questions, or the existence of rivalry and hostility within the leadership.

The course and nature of the internal political clashes were influenced by such diverse factors as the contradictory economic interests of the different strata of landlords and the big bourgeoisie associated with them; the struggle for power; the attempts of one or other of the political cliques to get hold of a tasty morsel from the state cake; and the hereditary feuds (*huni bair*) carried on by feudal families and groups sometimes for several generations, which were a relic from the colonial period.

Intrigues of the imperialist monopolies also played an important part. They fanned, and sometimes artificially created, conflicts between various factions in the hope of using them for their own purposes.

Personal rivalries of unscrupulous and ambitious politicians, who did not disdain any means in the struggle for power and success, aggravated the situation both in the centre and in the provinces. The absence of firm democratic traditions, the inability of public opinion to exert a decisive influence, and a certain weakness and disunity in the democratic movement resulted in an unstable domestic position.

During the first months after Pakistan's establishment the fight of the various factions within the ruling camp did not appear openly. This was mainly due to the following reasons. First, the chaos and the enormous difficulties experienced by the country—the issue then was the very existence of Pakistan—compelled the ruling circles to preserve at least a semblance of unity. Second, the disposition of the social and political forces in the country had at that time not yet clarified itself. And finally, Mohammad Ali Jinnah's authority and influence were so great and he had concentrated such enormous power in his hands that any opposition against him was doomed to failure.

Jinnah's death in September 1948 deprived the ruling group of the Muslim League of their acknowledged leader. Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's closest companion-in-arms, remained Prime Minister and became the principal statesman in Pakistan. The offices of Governor-General and President of the Constituent Assembly, which the *Quaid-i-Azam* had held, were handed over to members of the East-Pakistan faction within the Muslim League leadership; Khwaja Nazimuddin, a Bengali, became Governor-General. He was an influential leader of the Muslim League in East Pakistan and until then Chief Minister of that province. The new Governor-General was a member of the distinguished feudal family of the Nawabs of Dacca that had for several generations played an active part in the Muslim movement heading its orthodox wing on the extreme right.[37] Khwaja Nazimuddin was closely connected with the Muslim landowners in East Pakistan and with the leading circles of the orthodox Muslim divines.

A personal friend of the new Governor-General, Tazimuddin Khan—also a Bengali—became President of the Constituent Assembly on December 14, 1948. Until then he had been Deputy President of the Assembly.

The East Pakistan faction within the Muslim League leadership thus strengthened its position after the death of M. A. Jinnah. It was also represented in the central government, where Khwaja Shahabuddin, the younger brother of Khwaja Nazimuddin, was Minister of the Interior, Information and Communications; and the Bengali Fazlur Rahman, Minister of Education and Industry.

A factor which contributed to the rising influence of this faction was the inability shown by the group headed by Liaquat Ali Khan to cope with the basic problems facing Pakistan at that time, namely, how to consolidate the economic position of the country, to solve the refugee problem, to reorganise the agrarian system and to reform the state and administrative structures.

But the group of Liaquat Ali Khan, representing the interests of the Punjabi landlords and the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan, was not inclined to permit the Bengali leaders substantially to strengthen their power and influence. In autumn 1950, therefore, Liaquat Ali Khan sought to change the constitution of the Muslim League which had been adopted in 1948 and according to which no member of the League could be elected to a party office if he was a member of the central or a provincial government. That his efforts were successful was due to the fact that the representatives of West Pakistan had a majority in the Council of the Muslim League: 260 members out of a total membership of 440.[38] Having succeeded in altering the constitution of the League, Liaquat Ali Khan secured his election as the League's President in October 1950. Since he was already chairman of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, his election to the presidential office enabled him to render the influence of the Bengali leaders ineffective and to control the work of the Constituent Assembly, where the Muslim League had an absolute majority. Questions were submitted to the Constituent Assembly for consideration only after the Muslim League parliamentary group had reached a decision upon them. The latter, moreover, conducted its deliberations behind closed doors, outside the control of public opinion. It was therefore impossible to get any legislative act through the Constituent Assembly if Liaquat Ali Khan and his group opposed it.

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[37] Khwaja Nazimuddin (born in 1894) was educated in Aligarh and Cambridge; before the partition he occupied high posts in the colonial administration. From 1929 to 1934 he was Minister of Education in Bengal, from 1937 to 1941 a member of the Executive Council of the province and Minister of the Interior. During the decade 1937-1947 he was a member of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League (*The Second Year, Pakistan 1948-1949*, Lahore, [s. a.], p. 13).

Liaquat Ali Khan and the circles supporting him had also to contend with growing opposition in the provinces, where the leading politicians, who mainly represented the interests of the local landowners, objected to interference from the centre. They were apprehensive of the rapidly increasing power and influence wielded by the West Punjabi landlords and the big "alien" bourgeoisie.

The opposition in Sind became apparent already during the lifetime of M. A. Jinnah. It was headed by the biggest landowner of Sind and Chief Minister of the province, Mohammad Ayub Khuhro,[39] who used his official status for personal enrichment and, in addition, countenanced corruption, bribery and nepotism. Since he was supported by a considerable part of the local landlords he felt that his position was firm and he was bold enough to oppose M. A. Jinnah on the question of the separation of Karachi from Sind and its transformation into a special federal capital area. For this action Khuhro was dismissed. An investigation of his conduct was instituted, as a result of which in April 1948 he was debarred from holding any government office for three years.[40] The political opponent of Khuhro, Pir Ilahi Bakhsh, who was supported by the centre, became Chief Minister of Sind.

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[38] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 40.

[39] Mohammad Ayub Khuhro (born in 190') participated actively in the movement advocating the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency in the 1930's and was one of the leaders of the Muslim League in Sind on the eve of partition. During the Second World War he was a minister in the provincial government of Sind.

[40] *The Pakistan Times*, November 21, 1949; May 4, 1950.

To strengthen his influence in Sind even more, Liaquat Ali Khan appointed a prominent Punjabi lawyer, Din Mohammad, governor of the province in October 1948. But the resistance of the local landowners and politicians to the intervention of the central government continued. Matters were complicated by the fight of various cliques of Sindhi landowners for power and influence, the leaders of the largest of these cliques being Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, Jousuf Abdullah Haroon and Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur. This led to an extremely unstable political situation in the province. During the first three years of Pakistan's existence six ministries followed one another. The influence exerted by Khuhro, who in December 1948 succeeded in securing his election to the office of President of the provincial organisation of the Muslim League, undoubtedly contributed to the political instability in Sind.[41] He thus remained the principal figure in the local political arena, and was able to influence government affairs in his personal interests and in those of the faction of landowners supporting him.

The people of Sind knew well that the government crisis in their province was due to personal aspirations and not to political principles, wrote the democratic *Pakistan Times* in 1950, and the writer went on to describe the situation in Sind in the following terms: "Ministerships are bought and sold like black-market goods; Cabinets are made and unmade like stock-exchange deals; Prime Ministers come and go like visitors to a house of ill fame."[42]

During the first years of Pakistan's existence the fight between the centre and the local politicians who headed the provincial branches of the League was not so noticeable in East Pakistan, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan as it was in Sind. But the endeavours of the central government and the circles supporting it to expand their power and authority at the expense of the local leaders caused dissatisfaction in these provinces too.

The struggle between various factions within the local leadership of the Muslim League in the West Punjab and the rivalries of different landlord cliques headed by the biggest landowners of the Punjab—Iftikhar Husain, Khan of Mamdot, Chief Minister of the province, and Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Daultana, the President of the League's provincial organisation, who was supported by the centre—led to an acute political crisis, which was solved by the intervention of Liaquat Ali Khan in favour of Daultana. In January 1949, the government of Mamdot was dismissed and the Constituent Assembly of the Punjab dissolved.

The reins of power were handed over to the Governor, Francis

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[41] *Dawn*, December 6, 1948.

[42] *The Pakistan Times*, January 22, 1950; May 10, 1950.

Mudy, who occupied this post till July 1949, when he was succeeded by Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.[43] Governor's rule in the West Punjab lasted for over two years, until April 1951. Having been defeated in the struggle for power in the West Punjab, the Khan of Mamdot left the Muslim League and, together with a group of followers, founded an opposition party, the Jinnah Muslim League, as a preparation for the fight with his political opponents during the forthcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly of the province.

In 1949 the central government piloted the Public and Representatives Offices (Disqualification) Act,[44] usually called PRODA, through the Constituent Assembly and was thus enabled to dismiss any person of whom it disapproved from government service and remove him from the political arena. This act gave the centre the right to refer to the courts or to a special tribunal charges of maladministration or misconduct in public office laid against a minister, politician or civil servant by any five persons or by a provincial Governor.

If the court reached a verdict of "guilty," the centre could disqualify the politician from holding public office for a period of not more than ten years.[45]

In evaluating the internecine war waged in the ruling camp of Pakistan from 1947 to 1950, one may say that the contradictions which formed the basis of this struggle had in those years not reached their greatest intensity, and even that the contradictions themselves were not yet clearly revealed. The time for the reappraisal of values was still to come.

Chapter VIII

SITUATION OF THE WORKING CLASS AND THE SEMI-PROLETARIANS. REVOLUTIONARY AND REFORMIST FORCES CONTEST LEADERSHIP OF LABOUR MOVEMENT

The colonial legacy and the policies of the ruling bloc of landlords and big bourgeoisie robbed the people of Pakistan of the fruits of independence. The Islamic state did not give them the promised democratic freedoms that may have facilitated their fight for better living conditions, as in neighbouring India. The consequences of partition and the attendant economic upheaval struck painfully at the working people—the working class, peasantry, and the urban semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements.

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[43] *Three Years of Pakistan*, Karachi, [s. a.], p. 172. The legal basis for the introduction of Governor's rule in the provinces of Pakistan was Section 92*A* of the Government of India Act of 1935, which empowered the central government, through the Governor, to assume the functions of any provincial body, except the Supreme Court. Section 92 *A*, the influence of which was constantly felt by every provincial politician (cf. K. Callard, *Pakistan. . .*, p. 161), was to play an important role in the political life of the country and we will later on encounter it many times. After the second Constituent Assembly adopted the constitution of Pakistan in March 1956, Article 193, which gave the President the right to proclaim a state of emergency in the provinces, played a similar part.

[44] *Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949.*

[45] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 103. In 1951, there was only one minister in the provincial government of Sind who had not been the subject of a PRODA investigation (*Dawn*, November 30, 1951).

The number of proletarians and semi-proletarians topped the six million mark. Most of them were village artisans or workers employed in small-scale industries (all in all, about 4 million people). Agricultural labourers added up to 1,686,000 (1951 Census). The vanguard of the Pakistan working people, the industrial workers, was quite small. Not more than 11 per cent of the gainfully employed population, some 722,000, were employed in large-scale industries, building, transport, and mining. Some 70 per cent of the factory workers, of whom there were 179,000 in 1950, were employed in the food and textile industries. Nearly 80 per cent of the factory, mining and transport workers were in West Pakistan, while East Pakistan accounted for 64 per cent of the farm labourers and 85 per cent of the workers employed in small-scale industry.[1]

In the first few years after independence it was the artisans and workers of the small-scale industries who were in the worst predicament.

Shortages in raw materials and electric power, and supplementary taxes, continuously levied on small-scale industries and on sales of handicraft articles, ruined hundreds of khadi workshops making hand-woven cloth, ironware, crockery, etc. Many of them ran to waste because their Hindu owners had migrated to India. Nearly half the hand looms stood idle. Hundreds of thousands of artisans and workers of small-scale industry became destitute. Those who had migrated from India had neither work nor home.[2]

The army of unemployed artisans grew continuously and pressed down the earnings, already low, of those employed. The average annual income of an artisan—in 1950-1951 it was 523 rupees—was lower than incomes in other brackets, that of agricultural labourers included.[3] The ruined artisans joined the army of unskilled workers and unemployed. Unemployment became a national calamity.

The break-up of traditional economic connections reflected painfully on the situation of the working people. After India's partition, people from North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab and East Bengal could no longer obtain employment in Bombay, Calcutta and other Indian cities. Instead, they swarmed into the few industrial centres of Pakistan—Karachi, Lahore, Dacca, Narayanganj and Chittagong.[4]

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[1] *Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1955*, Karachi, 1956, p. 182; *Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, Karachi, 1954, p. 3.

[2] Many workshops imported yarn from India. Due to exchange difficulties imports were reduced, while yarn prices soared (*Pakistan Observer*, Karachi, November 29, 1959; for more details, see В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, Москва, 1958, стр. 119).

[3] *Living Standards in Pakistan*, Kyoto, 1954, p. 20.

The partition deranged the work of the railways, and unemployment among railwaymen mounted. In 1947-1950 thousands of railwaymen were flung into the street. Pakistan's Finance Minister announced officially in 1950 that "there are more than 2,000 workers in the railway who are redundant."[5] Mohammad Afzal, a progressive Pakistan trade unionist, indicated that the number of unemployed and under-employed, including unsettled refugees in the camps, totalled millions.[6]

Pakistan statistics did not reveal the true number of unemployed industrial workers. Suffice it to say, however, that the number of people registered at labour exchanges rose from 13,000 in 1947 to 21,000 in 1951;[7] these, as was officially recorded, comprised but a negligible portion of the country's unemployed.

The country's industries were, basically, of a very low standard, and unable to absorb the jobless.[8] About a third of the factory workers did seasonal work and were semi-unemployed most of the year. In 1950, the seasonal workers made up over 30 per cent of the industrial labour force. Yet Pakistan was very short of skilled workers. Many of them (Hindus and Sikhs) had migrated to India, and in 1948 skilled workers accounted for no more than 17 per cent of the Pakistan proletariat.[9]

Growth of the relative agrarian over-population and the attendant growth of the permanent industrial army of unemployed kept down the miserably low wages. This, in turn, impeded industrial training and sustained the disproportion between skilled and unskilled labour.

The shortage of skilled labour caused industrialists in Karachi, Lahore and a few other cities to raise the wages of the skilled workers. As a result, the average annual industrial wage rose 20 per cent, from 710 to 853 rupees between 1948 and 1950, although the wages of unskilled workers remained essentially the same. The average figures concealed the yawning gap between the incomes of skilled and unskilled workers, and in the different industries and industrial centres.[10]

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[4] For more details, see Л. Р. Гордон-Полонская, «Положение рабочего класса Пакистана», *Пакистан. История и экономика*, Москва, 1959, стр. 62-67.

[5] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, August 14, 1950 (Supplement, p. 8).

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1955*, p. 182.

[8] Between 1947 and 1951 the number of factories increased very slowly, from 1,386 to 1,515; and the numerical strength of the industrial proletariat, from 172,500 to 179,000 (*Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, p. 3; *Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1955*, pp. 38, 183).

[9] *Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, p. 4; *Economy of Pakistan (1950)*, Karachi, 1951, p. 126; *The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960*, Vol. II, Karachi, 1956, p. 463.

Real wages depended mostly on the cost of living. The first year after the establishment of Pakistan the cost of living of factory and office workers climbed disastrously. No improvement was observed in the following years in East Pakistan, while in the industrial centres of West Pakistan the cost of living dropped somewhat between 1948 and 1951. In 1951 the cost-of-living index was 99 in Karachi, 92 in Lahore, 79 in Sialkot, and 102 in Narayanganj, East Pakistan.[11] Thus, real wages of skilled workers in West Pakistan increased somewhat, while those of unskilled workers remained essentially the same, and dropped somewhat in East Pakistan.

The income of the highest-paid workers amounted to a minimum subsistence wage. That of the other workers was quite considerably below the minimum. In 1950, this minimum amounted to 100 rupees 8 annas a month, of which 97 per cent was spent on food and housing (if housing was provided by the employers).[12] The average monthly income of skilled textile workers amounted to Rs. 120-180, that of mechanics Rs. 150-175, railway workers Rs. 60-80, and miners Rs. 45-70.[13] Out of these sums the workers paid an income tax and various official and semi-official duties to the treasury (Islam dues, Kashmir fund, refugee fund, municipal and postage dues, etc.). All in all, taxes often consumed as much as 30 per cent of the income. Any additional outlays—for a wedding, medical treatment, or funeral—drove even the relatively highly-paid workers to the money-lender. As for the unskilled worker, whose monthly wage rarely exceeded 20 to 30 rupees, he was unable in any circumstances to earn the necessary minimum.[14]

It follows that labour-power, as before, was sold much below its value. Many permanently employed workers, let alone the seasonal workers, were compelled to leave their families behind in the villages. In 1950, for example, 32 per cent of the workers in West Pakistan retained their bonds with the countryside, and in East Pakistan, 43.8 per cent.[15] If the worker brought his family

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[10] The average monthly wage of a skilled textile worker in 1948-1949 was Rs. 120 to 180, while an unskilled worker earned not more than Rs. 60. In 1950, the average annual worker's income in Karachi was Rs. 1143.7, in the Punjab 817.5, Sind 644.7, North-West Frontier Province 574.2, and Rs. 706.1 in East Pakistan (*Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, pp. 24-25; *Economy of Pakistan, 1950*, p. 133).

[11] April 1948-March 1949=100. The May 1947 index was 397 of the 1939 index for the whole of Pakistan, and the August 1948 index was 468 (*Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, pp. 44-54).

[12] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950 (Supplement).

[13] *Economy of Pakistan (1950)*, p. 133.

[14] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950 (Supplement).

[15] *Pakistan Labour Gazette*, No. 1, 1959, p. 5.

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with him to town, his wife and children, too, had to seek employment. Yet this expedient did not provide the unskilled worker with the necessities either. The family had to reduce its diet, did not taste meat, butter and milk for years, and could not afford to send its children to school.

Housing was exorbitantly expensive. Rent for a wretched privately let hovel was as high as 10-14 rupees a month. State-operated and private enterprises furnished housing to less than half of their workers. But even this housing, which, like the privately let, did not for the most part have electric lighting, plumbing, and not so much as a conveniently placed well, cost the worker 3-8 rupees a month.[16] Many workers, let alone the unemployed, were compelled to live in the open air. In 1950 there were more than 25,000 such homeless families in Pakistan's capital, Karachi, alone.

Crowded, unsanitary housing caused continuous epidemics. Child mortality nearly doubled from 1947 to 1950. Some 65 per cent of the workers' children had tuberculosis, and about 90 per cent had rickets. More than 200,000 died annually from t.b., and more than 125,000 from malaria. Dr. Malik, the Health Minister, admitted that the high disease incidence and mortality were caused by chronic undernourishment and bad housing.[17]

Labour safety devices were unknown at the factories. The incidence of industrial injuries rose steadily.[18] The labour laws of colonial India, which enforced a high level of exploitation (a nine-hour working day at perennial enterprises and a ten-hour working day at seasonal enterprises and mines), were left unchanged. No overtime was paid at the mines, and workers were not entitled to days off or vacations.[19] Even the few restraints on exploitation legislatively enacted in colonial India under the pressure of the heroic struggle of the proletariat, were neglected in Pakistan. A ten or twelve-hour working day became a routine, and in spite of a ban, child labour was extensively employed. Arbitrary deductions and fines curtailed the miserable wages. Capitalist exploitation was coupled with various forms of feudal oppression. The industrialists employed the services of contractors. Nearly all the factories had a sizable number of contracted workers.[20]

Labour conditions at plantations in East Bengal and in the Sylhet District of Assam, most of them owned by British interests,

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[16] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950 (Supplement).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] In 1948, factories registered 1,476 accidents. The figure for 1949 was 1,854 (*Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1952*, Karachi, 1952, p. 112).

[19] Labour conditions at factories were governed by the 1934 Factory Act and the 1945 Amendments, at mines by the 1923 Act and the 1946 Amendments (*Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, pp. 79-90; M. Shafi, *Labour Code of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1953, pp. 3-35, 63-85, 169-171).

[20] *The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960*, Vol. II, pp. 471-472; *Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. V, 1957, pp. 594-595.

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were insufferable. Plantation labourers, who numbered 80,000-85,000 in 1948-1950, did not have the benefit of labour legislation. Contracted workers were, in effect, bondsmen of the contractors and planters. Not only they, but their children too, were forbidden to seek part-time earnings elsewhere. Truck gardens and dwarf allotments of paddy fields granted to the workers were no more than an additional means of chaining them to the plantation.[21]

On the pretext that the Islamic state would itself see to the welfare of the working people, the Pakistan government from the first restricted the right of the proletariat to strike. Under the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act workers were to submit written notices of strikes to the management and government officials six weeks in advance. Otherwise the strike was ruled illegal. Government officials and industrial tribunals were empowered to settle labour conflicts. Prison terms ranging from one to six months were the penalty for "illegal strikes" and violations of tribunal decisions.[22]

The factory owners' offensive on workers' rights was facilitated by the strong influence that Islam propaganda exerted on the working class in the first few post-partition years.

All this affected the nature of the labour movement. The low concentration of workers at individual factories, isolation of the small industrial enterprises, the weakness and scarceness of permanent skilled labour, continuous migration and the large percentage of seasonal workers hindered efforts to improve the organisation of the Pakistan proletariat. The fact that, in one form or another, workers did not break their ties with the countryside and that their ranks were continuously swelled by peasants and artisans, who clung to their religious prejudices and petty-bourgeois illusions, promoted the ideas of "Islamic socialism" among Pakistan middle strata and industrial workers and hindered the development of their class consciousness.

In the cities, excluding Lahore, the working-class and trade-union movement was at a lower level than in the industrial centres of India. The trade unions were hard hit by the migration to India of their former leaders and most active members, predominantly Hindu and Sikh. Those that stayed in Pakistan (chiefly in Eastern Bengal) had, due to rabid anti-Hindu propaganda, essentially lost influence among the Muslim workers. Anti-Hindu propaganda was also employed against the Pakistan Communists, of whom many were of Hindu or Sikh background. The Communists worked in extremely adverse conditions.

The Communist Party of Pakistan was formed in 1948 from those organisations of the Communist Party of India which had prior to 1947 operated in provinces that became part of Pakistan.

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[21] *The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960*, Vol. II, p. 471; for more details, see Л. Р. Гордон-Полонская, «Положение рабочего класса Пакистана», *Пакистан. История и экономика*, стр. 67-74.

[22] M. Shafi, *Labour Code of Pakistan*, pp. 334-349.

Sajjad Zaheer, born in 1905, a prominent liberation leader, distinguished writer and founder of the Indian Progressive Writers Association (1935), became the first General Secretary of the Pakistan Communist Party.

The Communists of the Punjab managed to maintain a strong organisation after partition. Most of them were intellectuals and students of Lahore University. Communists also stood at the head of the North-West Railway workers, the workers of the Maghalpur Railway Workshops, the textile workers, and the oil workers of Attock Oil Co.[23] The respective trade unions had been founded during the war. Mirza Ibrahim and Mohammad Afzal, West Pakistan labour leaders, note that in the first months after partition many of the trade unions had, in effect, to be organised anew. About one-third of the workers migrated to India, while refugees from India, who took their place, were isolated from the rest of the workers and kept aloof from organised militant actions for fear of losing their jobs. The Muslim League leaders, government officials and industrialists took advantage of their plight and encouraged exclusive trade unions for refugee workers with the object of splitting the trade-union movement.[24]

In its early months, Pakistan had no working-class manifestations to speak of. But the lull was temporary. Mass actions broke out in Lahore at the close of 1947. The Communist-led trade-union body of the Maghalpur Railway Workshops organised a demonstration of 15,000 workers on December 2, 1947, to remind the government of its promise to combat profiteering, the black market, and to institute price control. The railway workers were supported by the trade unions of carters, laundrymen, postal employees and progressive writers. A day of labour demands was organised throughout the Punjab and Sind on January 31 and February 1, 1948. Four thousand textile workers went on strike in Lyallpur in April 1948, and 3,000 in Okara in October.

The labour movement was on the upgrade in all the industrial centres of Pakistan, excluding those of North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. In 1947-1948, East Pakistan had the bigger number of strikes—69, involving more than 40,500 workers and a loss of 130,000 working days. In 1949, the textile workers of West Pakistan came to the forefront. Strikers numbered 44,500, of whom 21,500 were employed in the textile industry. The following figures give a fair idea about the strike movement in 1947-1950.[25]

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[23] *People's Age*, Bombay, May 30, 1948; *Eastern World*, London, 1952, Vol. VI, No. 10.

[24] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950 (Supplement).

[25] S. Hussain, *Pakistan Economics*, Karachi, 1950, p. 101; *Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1952*, Karachi, 1952, pp. 64-66.

	Number of strikes	Number of strikers	Number of working days lost
1947	24	14,206	16,989
1948	57	36,231	135,580
1949	72	44,582	101,723
1950	32	16,836	83,164

The growth of the strike movement continued until 1950. The movement shrank somewhat in 1950 due to a temporary drop in the cost of living and the rise, albeit negligible, in the wages of some brackets of workers. But the main factor was the weakness of the movement and the policy of the ruling classes. Due to the British policy of opposing Muslims to Hindus, and to the partition of the country and the attendant wholesale massacres, the Leftists, headed by the Communists, were at a disadvantage. The Muslim League, on the other hand, had enhanced its prestige among working Muslims during the Pakistan movement, and its local organisations had learned to work among the masses. The Leftists, therefore, had to cope with a strong and experienced adversary, who, moreover, controlled the machinery of state.

The ruling classes espied a menace to their domination in the revolutionary trade unions, and sought to steer the workers' urge for organisational unity along reformist lines. The Muslim League contended that the Islamic state was supra-class. It brandished the slogan of "peace in industry," and encouraged the establishment of loyal trade unions. The government supported the reformist West Pakistan Federation of Labour, organised late in 1947 at a conference of 22 reformist trade unions representing about 50,000 workers. The West Pakistan Federation of Labour, headed by Oumar Din and M. A. Khan, was joined by the Karachi Port Workers' Union headed by M. A. Khatib. At about the same time A. M. Malik, the prominent reformist trade-unionist and politician, then a member of the Muslim League, founded the East Pakistan Federation of Labour.[26]

Both these federations were recognised by the industrialists. They co-operated with the Muslim League, which they described as the sole representative of the country's national interests. But as time went on and opposition to the government grew, the leaders of the West Pakistan and, especially, the East Pakistan federations attacked the government's labour policy, and departed from the League line.

In West Pakistan, the Federation of Labour also co-operated with the Socialist Party, founded in 1948 and led by Mohammad Yusuf. The Socialist Party had its roots among certain groups of the Muslim intelligentsia in West Pakistan. It published an Urdu weekly, *The Socialist*. Radical Muslim intellectuals, backed by Mubarak Saghar, who was secretary of the Party, joined it, and it was under their influence that the constitution and rules of the Party contained such progressive demands as the withdrawal of Pakistan from the British Commonwealth, nationalisation of the basic means of production and the organisation of working people along class principles. The Socialist Party proclaimed as its ultimate goal the initiation of socialist transformations by peaceful means. Its activities showed, however, that for the sake of "peaceful means" it was prepared to forego its aims and was far more inclined to co-operate with the Muslim League than with the Communist Party.

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[26] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950 (Supplement); *Eastern World*, 1952, No. 12, p. 25; *Report of the United Kingdom Industrial Mission to Pakistan, 1950*, London, 1950, p. 58.

Revolutionary trade unions emerged and operated in far less favourable circumstances than the reformist ones.

On January 14, 1948, at a conference in Lahore of 50 representatives headed by Communists and other revolutionary leaders of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province trade unions, a resolution was passed to create the Pakistan Trade Union Federation. The conference appealed to the workers to join trade unions irrespective of their political views, nationality or religion, and to base their organisations on the professional principle, or, wherever this was impracticable, on the territorial principle. The resolution was welcomed by a few big Karachi trade unions and the East Pakistan Trade Union Federation, founded at about the same time.[27] The Pakistan Trade Union Federation joined the World Federation of Trade Unions.

The leaders of the reformist trade unions refused to co-operate with it. The government would not recognise it, and the industrialists persecuted its members. Although the Communist Party and the Pakistan Trade Union Federation were not officially outlawed, the government extensively applied the provisions of the so-called Safety Act to their leading members. A warrant for the arrest of Sajjad Zaheer, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Pakistan, was issued several times between 1947 and 1950. Mirza Ibrahim, chairman of the Trade Union Federation and a popular working-class leader, was arrested three times and spent about a year in prison. Most of the other leaders of the Trade Union Federation were also jailed. Many of them were officially banned from trade-union and political activities. Leaders and members of revolutionary trade unions were dismissed from their jobs and legal charges were framed against them.

But, defying the persecutions, the Communists persevered in their efforts to organise Pakistan's working class. Political slogans were advanced on their initiative by the workers during their economic strikes, and there were meetings and demonstrations of protest against Pakistan's foreign policy (e. g., the protest demonstrations of Attock Oil Co. workers, the workers' meetings in Karachi, etc.). In January 1950, Lenin Memorial Day was observed in many cities.[28]

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[27] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950 (Supplement). باکستان میں مزدور تہریک— لاهور— ۱۹۵۰ (*Pakistan men mazdur tahrik*), Lahore, 1950, pp. 49-51.

The Communist Party of Pakistan published a few fundamental documents in 1950 and 1951, such as its Programme, its election manifesto (for the elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly), and a statement on the peace struggle of the peoples of Pakistan. The Communists called on the working people to promote the following demands: withdrawal of Pakistan from the British Commonwealth, a united front to combat the country's dependence on the imperialists and to promote democratisation, establishment of national industries, confiscation of foreign interests and nationalisation of the key industries, workers' control at factories, improvement of living and working conditions (eight-hour working day, guaranteed minimum wage, better housing, etc.), effective agrarian reform, confiscation of landlord estates without compensation and distribution of the confiscated land among the peasants.

But due to the difficult environment, the Communists lacked a mass organisation to translate this programme into reality. By 1950 they headed a few big trade unions and some peasant bodies in the Punjab and Sind. But in the other West Pakistan provinces they were considerably weaker, and in East Pakistan their influence was confined chiefly to the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

The favourable opportunities for the spread of reformism in the labour movement, coupled with the prevailing government policies and the offensive on democratic freedoms, curtailed the scope for legal activities by Communists and other revolutionary trade-union leaders. The split in the trade-union movement persisted and the struggle between its reformist and revolutionary trends grew more intense. Nearly every industrial branch, and every factory even, had trade-union locals belonging to different centres.

According to Mohammad Afzal, in 1950 the Trade Union Federation had a membership of 67 trade unions, representing about 80,000 workers. That same year, the International Labour Organisation announced that the reformist Federation of Labour had 320,000 members.[29]

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[28] *Crossroads*, Bombay, March 3, 1950; *The Pakistan Times*, December 8, 9, 1949, and January 16, 24, 1950.

[29] This figure is doubtlessly exaggerated, because, according to official Pakistan statistics, only 140,000 trade-union members were registered in the country in 1950, this being less than 20 per cent of all the factory, transport and plantation workers. The railwaymen, of whom 30-40 per cent were members of trade unions, were the best organised, and the plantation workers the least organised (*Industry and Labour*, Geneva, 1951, Vol. V, No. 4, pp. 129—130; *Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, pp. 35-37).

The growth of the reformist trade unions resulted, among other things, in greater unity among their central organisations. In September 1950, at a conference in Karachi, the East Pakistan and West Pakistan Federations of Labour merged in the All-Pakistan Confederation of Labour. M. A. Khatib was appointed President, and Faiz Ahmad, Secretary. The Confederation co-operated with the Asian Federation of Labour and was recognised by the International Labour Organisation as the sole representative body of the Pakistan workers.

The policy of Pakistan's ruling classes had in more ways than one favoured the reformist leaders in their struggle against revolutionary elements for control over the labour movement. They maintained their grip for quite some time after 1950.

Chapter IX

THE SITUATION OF THE PEASANTS, THE PEASANT MOVEMENT AND AGRARIAN LEGISLATION

When the Muslim peasants of the Punjab, Sind and Bengal joined the Pakistan movement they did so in the belief that the prospective Muslim state would settle all their social problems.

The illusion was sustained by the fact that most of the moneylenders and many of the landlords, who were Hindu and Sikh, migrated to India, leaving Muslim tenants in command of their dwarf allotments for a time, dealing directly with government officials. There were no big peasant manifestations in the latter half of 1947 and early 1948 (save in a few Hindu villages of East Bengal). But after the autumn of 1948, the illusions gradually faded.

The big Punjab and Sind landlords, more prominent in the government than the big bourgeoisie, sought to use their political power to strengthen their position and continue their offensive on peasant rights. Having become the ruling party, the Muslim League showed little haste to keep its election promises.

The land and water taxes were as high as under the British. What is more, in some districts they were higher. In the Punjab, for example, the water tax was increased 40 per cent in 1949. Furthermore, the government levied a new impost for the benefit of refugees in the shape of a 12.5 per cent increase on the land and water taxes.[1] The tax increase was followed by an increase in rents. Rent arrears caused the peasants untold misery, wrote Nabin Sarkar, a leader of the East Pakistan Peasant Union. "Torture," he said, "is a universal punishment. Innumerable Muslims had their beards cut off, were dragged by their ears, kicked, beaten with shoes until they became unconscious."[2] No laws were passed until 1950 to combat, if only officially, the abuse of landlords and tax collectors.

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[1] فیروز الدین منصور ـ کسان اور آبیانا ـ لاہور ـ ۱۹۵۱ء (Firoz ud-din Mansur, *Kisan aur abiana*, Lahore, 1951, pp. 11-12); نیا ہندوستان (*Naya Hindustan*), Delhi, February 8, 1953.

Landlords increased their holdings considerably after independence. They were given state land (in particular, newly irrigated land in the West Punjab and Sind), and also seized land abandoned by Hindus and Sikhs, who moved to India. They also seized plots allotted by the government to Muslim refugees from India. According to O. H. K. Spate, land abandoned by Hindus totalled 6,700,000 acres in the West Punjab alone.[3] According to Minister for Refugee Rehabilitation Syed Miran Mohammad Shah of the Sind provincial government, in Sind Hindus abandoned 1,345,000 acres of agricultural land.[4] Most of this land, intended originally for distribution to destitute refugees from India, was seized by the leading West Pakistan landlords. In Sind alone, the landlords took possession of about 800,000 acres earlier owned by Hindus.[5]

Peasants who were owners or occupancy tenants in India, were entitled to receive one acre per person in perpetuity from the government fund. Those who did not earlier have proprietary rights, nor the right of occupancy, were not granted any land, but were allowed to rent it as share-croppers.[6]

Resettled landlords were granted up to 250 acres of land, provided they paid the ordinary land tax. The partial re-allotment of landed estates, caused by the migration of Hindus and Muslims, worsened the situation of the tillers. Even government newspapers wrote about the corruption rife among officials distributing government land. The same plot of land was often allotted to several claimants at once. Litigations dragged on for years, and often culminated in violent clashes between peasants and ruffians hired by the landlords.[7]

However, landlords in Pakistan, just as in colonial India, added to their holdings chiefly by appropriating the holdings of peasants, small owners and occupancy tenants, who suffered ruin on a disastrous scale during and after the Second World War.

In East Pakistan the percentage of land worked by occupancy tenants shrank from 66-73 per cent of the arable in 1947 to 50-51 per cent in 1950. By the beginning of 1950 about 80 per cent of the land was held by landlords.

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[2] *Crossroads*, Bombay, September 1, 1950.

[3] O.H.K. Spate, *India and Pakistan*, London, 1960, p. 119.

[4] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, March 6, 1950.

[5] *The Pakistan Times*, October 10, 1953.

[6] امروز (*Imroze*), Lahore, November 24, 1954.

[7] *The Pakistan Times*, June 2, 1953; *Imroze*, November 23, 1954.

In Sind, where the overwhelming majority of peasants lost their proprietary rights and the right of occupancy before the Second World War, the percentage of land in the possession of peasants shrank from six to two. Landlords were in possession of more than 90 per cent of the land.

Even in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, where a considerable number of peasants owned land, the landlords held more than 70 per cent and about 60 per cent of the arable, respectively.[8]

Huge estates of over 10-15 thousand acres, on the one hand, and dwarf peasant holdings (hardly ever bigger than 2 acres in East Pakistan and 4 acres in West Pakistan), on the other hand, were typical for the Pakistan countryside. The small parcelled holdings could not provide a livelihood for the peasant families. Official sources admitted this. The bulk of the Pakistan peasants were thus classed as poor.

The landlords combined expropriation of small land holdings and abolition of the right of occupancy with an assault on the rights of peasants who, although legally not occupancy tenants, enjoyed a certain amount of independence and worked their plots from generation to generation, provided they paid their rents dutifully until the expiration of their leasehold.

In 1948-1950 the tenants in Pakistan, especially in its Western part, suffered what was in effect a second coercive expropriation of rights. They were driven off their plots without notice, often before they had gathered the harvest, while the thus vacated plots were promptly registered as the "private" land of the landlord.[9] "Justice" was meted out by ruffians in the pay of the landlords. Government officials and the police usually looked on indifferently, or sided with the landlords.

Choudhury Iqbal Chima, Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League, admitted that tenant evictions left thousands of Punjab peasant families destitute, on the brink of death from starvation.[10]

The wholesale evictions of tenants assumed disastrous proportions. The government had no choice but to issue a law to restrict them—the Protection and Restoration of Tenancy Rights Act. But the law was framed and adopted by people against whom it was to operate. It is only natural, therefore, that the restrictions were more illusory than real. It was quite legal to forcibly vacate tenant land with the object of expanding capitalist-type farming with agricultural machines. As for tenants of government land and the tenants of evacuee property, the law did not apply to them at all. Last but not least, even in the case of obvious violations of the law, the tenant required a special judgement of the court and the tax-collector to retain his tenancy, yet both the court and the tax officials generally favoured the landlords.[11] The evicted tenants were often replaced by share-croppers on still stiffer terms.

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[8] For more details on land ownership and land tenure in Pakistan in 1947-1950, see Л. Р. Гордон-Полонская, «Пакистан», *Аграрные отношения в странах Востока*, Москва, 1958.

[9] "Private" land was known as *khas* (خاص). The landlord had absolute title to it and could sell or transfer it to any person of his choice. The share-cropper, whom he gave use of the land, was dependent on the landlord and was not legally considered a tenant. As for other land in the possession of the landlord, not qualified as *khas*, his rights to it were restricted by the state. He could not dispose of it as he wished, but had the right to receive rent for it.

[10] *Crossroads*, March 3, 1950.

In the first few years after independence the number of unemployed labourers in the countryside increased steeply, and although many landlords were inclined to put their farms on a capitalist footing—as indicated, among other things, by their efforts to extend "private" holdings—they were impelled, first of all, to make use of the existing situation. Pakistan economists note that the landlords were obviously eager to have their land worked by share-croppers rather than agricultural labourers.[12] The share-cropping system was the easier way of raising rents. Landlords shifted the bulk of the tax burden on to the immediate producers, whom they exploited not only as landlords, but also as money-lenders and buyers of their produce. The tenants' average annual income, which was Rs. 624 in 1950, was lower than the average wage of Rs. 654 paid to agricultural labourers.[13] The share-cropper earned even less than the tenant!

Under the *batai* [14] rent system, which prevailed in West Pakistan, and the *borga* and *adhi* [15] systems in East Pakistan, the landlord's share of the crop was officially 50 per cent, but the seed was deducted from the peasant's share, and the latter paid the water tax, a part of the land tax, and a fee for using the landlord's draft animals.

The harvest was usually divided on the landlord's threshing floor, and, in effect, the share-croppers rarely received more than one-third of the harvest. Even the straw after the harvesting was carted to the landlord's barn. The landlord also acted as money-lender, providing money and seed to the share-cropper at a very high interest. It was almost impossible for the share-cropper to obtain a loan elsewhere. Prosperous peasants usually preferred to deal with owners of land, and professional money-lenders, too, loaned money chiefly against land securities. All this doubled the share-cropper's dependence on the landlord.

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[11] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1950.

[12] J. R. Andrus and A. F. Mohammad, *The Economy of Pakistan*, London, 1958, p. 432.

[13] *Living Standards in Pakistan. Pakistan Data Paper*, No. 2, Kyoto, 1954, p. 20.

[14] *Batai*, the Urdu for "halving of the harvest." The term is used to denote share-cropping rent in kind. The share-croppers of West Pakistan accounted for 40 per cent of the rural working population, and cultivated more than 63 per cent of the arable.

[15] *Adhi*, "half"; *borga*, the Bengal for "share," "part"; the two terms are used to denote different forms of produce rent. The borgadars and adhiars made up 50. 1 per cent of the rural working population, according to the 1951 Pakistan Census.

The average plot leased by share-croppers was much smaller than the average holding of the landed peasant and occupancy tenant. For most of the year share-croppers were semi-unemployed, and had to seek additional earnings on the side. The share-croppers in Sind, known as *hari*, were the worst off. Their number kept growing continuously, and amounted to over 2,000,000, that is, to over two-thirds of the peasants of Sind, in 1947-1948.[16] The *hari* had no right to occupancy tenure or life tenure and could be evicted at any time. Conversely, they were legally prosecuted for abandoning the tenancy and moving to a new master. In addition to the landlord's "official" share, which usually amounted to two-thirds of the harvest, the *hari* paid various illegal exactions (*abwabs*) and had to perform all kinds of unpaid services (*begar*). The *hari* were deep in debt and utterly dependent on their landlords.

A tacit agreement existed among the Sind landlords, whereby a *hari* who had not paid his debts and had abandoned his plot was denied land and employment on any other estate. The landlord's word was law in the village, and "justice" was meted out by the landlord's "police," which terrorised the neighbourhood.

Rent in services, known as *nankar*,[17] was widespread in East Pakistan. The *nankar* peasant was allotted a dwarf plot to "feed" his family. In return, he had to perform unpaid services on the landlord's "private" land. The daily assignment was so high that, in effect, all the members of the *nankar's* family had to pitch in, while the *nankar's* own plot, mostly too small to provide a livelihood for his family over the year, was poorly tended, which reduced its yield. Corporal punishment was common for not turning up to work for the landlord, and additional assignments were given to make up for missed time.[18]

Peasants—small proprietors and occupancy tenants—were also strongly dependent on the landlords. This was largely due to the fact that the landlords and the rural upper crust controlled village shop-keeping and money-lending to a far greater degree than during the colonial period. Their control had increased after the migration to India of most of the professional money-lenders, who were predominantly Hindu.[19]

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[16] *People's Age*, Bombay, July 20, 1947; *The Pakistan Times*, February 11, 1950, and November 20, 1953.

[17] *Nankar*, literally, "work for bread." In the 18th century the term denoted tax-free land granted to feudal lords for services rendered. The income it yielded was entirely at the disposal of the feudal lord. In the latter half of the 19th century *nankar* connoted a system of services and, specifically, the tenant himself, and the plot he was allowed to work in return for services.

[18] *Crossroads*, September 1, 1950.

Co-operatives were not, essentially, widespread in the Pakistan countryside at that time.

The Muslim shopkeepers and landlords who took the place of the Hindu money-lenders used "even more mischievous methods to deceive and fleece the cultivators."[20] This dependence on the landlords, the intermediary system which prevailed in the village markets, the bad state of roads and the high sales tax added to the plight of the small peasant proprietors.

Very few of the peasants succeeded in ascending to the bracket of prosperous peasants (at that time the rich peasant farms accounted for no more than 5-7 per cent of all farms).

Both the landlord estates and richer peasant farms were run mostly on semi-feudal lines. Farm machinery was scarce, fertilisers were scorned, and farm animals neglected.[21]

In spite of this, hired labour was increasingly employed in Pakistan's agriculture. The area cultivated by agricultural labourers nearly doubled in East Pakistan between 1947 and 1950 (from 8 to 16 per cent of the total arable).[22] According to the 1951 census, agricultural labourers amounted to somewhat more than 14 per cent of the gainfully employed rural population.[23] In West Pakistan the percentage of agricultural labourers was considerably lower.[24]

All in all, there were some 1,650,000 landless agricultural labourers in Pakistan, according to the Census, this accounting for something like 10 per cent of the gainfully employed rural population. In addition, about 659,000 tenants hired themselves out for a considerable part of the year. [25]

According to Professor Darling, an expert on the Punjab countryside, who represented the International Labour Organisation, farm labourers were unable to earn a livelihood, which in 1950 was estimated at Rs. 384 (in East Pakistan). In the first few years after Pakistan's establishment the real wages of agricultural labourers did not increase.[26]

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[19] In the Punjab, 16.2 per cent of all loans were given to peasants in 1951 by landowners, and 63.2 per cent by so-called relatives and friends, chiefly prosperous peasants (*The Report of the Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee, 1951-1952*, Karachi, p. 77).

[20] *The Pakistan Times*, December 8, 1955.

[21] From 1947 to 1951 the number of tractors in Pakistan increased from 500 to 2,000, most of which were used on state-owned land and model farms (*The Report of the Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee, 1951-1952*, p. 10).

[22] *Census of Pakistan, 1951*, Vol. III, Table 14.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] In Baluchistan, landless agricultural labourers constituted 10.8 per cent of the gainfully employed rural population. The percentage for North-West Frontier Province was 5.2, for Sind 2.7, and for the Punjab 1 per cent (J. R. Andrus and A. F. Mohammad, *The Economy of Pakistan*, p. 430).

[25] *Census of Pakistan, 1951*, Vol. I, Table 14; J. R. Andrus and A. F. Mohammad, *The Economy of Pakistan*, p. 429.

The casual labourers, who earned from 6-8 annas to 2-4 rupees a day, plus food during harvest time, were the worst off. The food they received usually consisted of a few maize cakes sprinkled with cayenne pepper, and some whey. They did not have regular employment more than 5-6 months in the year, and were semi-unemployed the rest of the time.[27]

Most agricultural labourers belonged to low Muslim castes (the Gulam and Maimullah in East Pakistan and the rural Kamin servants in West Pakistan). The Pakistan leaders held forth fondly about the democracy of the Muslims, who, they claimed, made no caste distinctions. But the Muslim castes existed *de facto*, and affected the social standing of the various groups of Pakistan peasants. A peasant of the upper agricultural Muslim castes (such as the Sayed, Mian, Jat, Gujar, Terar, etc.) would not establish family ties with a Kamin, Gulam or Maimullah.[28]

The so-called non-agricultural castes had great difficulty in acquiring land. In order to rent land, they had to accept the worst terms.

Religious and caste distinctions impeded the class organisation of peasants and enabled the Muslim League to maintain its influence in the countryside in the early years after liberation. This influence spread mostly to small peasant proprietors and occupancy tenants. The share-croppers and other tenants at will, in the meantime, who suffered most from the painful consequences of the partition of India and the League's pro-landlord policies, rose to an active struggle for their rights in 1948-1950. Their manifestations were mostly spontaneous. But in Sind and in some regions of East Pakistan the anti-feudal movement was headed by Leftists.

The outbreak of the tenants' struggle in East Bengal (the *tebhag* movement) coincided in time with the upswing of the Pakistan movement of 1946-1947.[29] Bent on attracting the peasant masses, the Muslim League promised to enforce the demand of the share-croppers, who did not want to give up more than one-third of their harvest to the landlord. This is why, after Pakistan was formed, the prosperous peasants, most of whom had heritable land and, in addition, rented plots from landlords on the share-cropping basis, opposed the struggle and advocated constitutional efforts. Landlords who were League members vaguely promised agrarian reforms and launched a ferocious attack on the local peasant union, the Kisan Samiti, which headed the movement. The League made the most of the fact that almost all the leaders, and most of the members of this union, were Hindus, and accused it of subversion in India's favour.

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[26] J.R. Andrus and A.F. Mohammad, *The Economy of Pakistan*, p. 437.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 434-437; *Enterprise*, Karachi, February 14, 1959.

[28] Inayatullah, "Caste Palti and Faction in the Life of a Punjab Village," *Sociologue*, Berlin, 1958, Jg. 8, Hf. 2, pp. 170-180; Inayatullah, "Democracy in Rural Communities in Pakistan," *Sociologue*, Berlin, 1959, Jg. 9, Hf. 1, p. 36; M.W. Smith, "The Misal. A Structural Village Group of India and Pakistan," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 54, 1952, No. 1, pp. 41-57; M. W. Smith, "Village Notes from Bengal," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 48, 1946, No. 4, Pt. 1.

[29] *Tebhag*, Bengali for "one-third." Share-croppers demanded that the rent they paid to landlords and rich peasants should not exceed one-third of the harvest. [For details, see А. М. Дьяков, *Индия во время и после второй мировой войны (1939-1949)*, Москва, 1952, стр. 99-101].

The arrival in East Pakistan of the first wave of Muslim refugees was exploited to provoke Hindu-Muslim clashes in the villages, which had only recently been seats of united anti-feudal manifestations by Hindus and Muslims.

The landlords and prosperous peasants took advantage of caste connections to exercise an influence on the villagers. As a result, most of the Muslim peasants abandoned the movement. But the near-destitute Muslim tenants of the low castes and the Hindu untouchables gave the Kisan Samiti continued support. Peasant unrest broke out again, under Communist leadership, in autumn 1948 in Mymensingh, Jessore, Khulna and a few other districts of East Pakistan. The first to rise were the peasants of Jessore District. The provincial authorities issued warrants for the arrest of 86 Communists and Kisan Samiti leaders. Punitive police units, volunteer Muslim League groups and gangs of *lumpen-proletarians* armed by the landlords, were dispatched to Jessore District.[30]

But the events in Jessore were only a prologue. The *nankar* tenants of Sylhet District rose at about the same time. The village of Haldirpal was the centre of the movement. Peasants refused to work in the landlord's fields, demanded abolition of the *nankar* system, wanted cash for their labour, and insisted on recognition of their hereditary right to the plots they received from the landlords. The movement was so well organised that the provincial government was compelled to recognise the *nankar* demands and to appoint a special commission to inquire into their situation. But, simultaneously, a special punitive police raid was carried out in Sylhet. The policemen sacked the dwellings and made away with the wretched belongings and crops. Many *nankars* were savagely beaten, many were wounded, and some killed.[31]

Public opinion in East Bengal was incensed. A conference of the East Bengal Students Federation, which convened in Mymensingh, and the League of Democratic Youth, which convened in Rajshahi, passed special resolutions demanding abolition of landlord property rights and relief for the peasants. Landlords, assisted by the police, responded with a terror campaign.

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[30] *People's Age*, August 15 and September 5, 1948

[31] *People's Age*, August 15, 1948.

The anti-feudal peasant movement, however, grew in scope. The Kisan Samiti issued the call for the abolition of landlord property rights without compensation. Rebel detachments of peasants, counting about 2,000 men, were organised. Groups of Garos, Hajangs, and Dalovs (semi-tribal peoples living near the borders of Assam and speaking scriptless languages), who were influenced by the Bengali Communists, formed the nucleus of this rebel force. The insurgents captured 400 villages in the fertile parts of Mymensingh District near the Assam border, which produced most of Pakistan's jute. Large tracts of land seized from the landlords were distributed among the land-hungry and landless peasants of the low Muslim castes, and among the untouchables. The sharecroppers gave the landlords no more than the "legal" third of the harvest, and in places refused to pay them anything at all. Peasant proprietors stopped paying taxes to the government. The rebel peasant districts existed for nearly two years.[32]

But even in the heart of the peasant movement a large section of Muslim peasants shied away from active struggle. The peasant union led by the Communists had a far lesser influence on them than on the Hindu peasants. The rebel units, both in 1950 and in 1948, consisted of tribal groups and Hindu peasants. The unions of agricultural labourers, which headed the farm strikes in the Khulna and Tipperah districts in 1949-1950, also consisted chiefly of untouchables. Wherever Muslims joined the movement, they formed their own locals. The rural and district peasant unions were organised on a religious basis. This made it easier for the authorities to oppose Muslims to Hindus, and to split the movement.[33] As we see, the seeds sown by the Muslim League in 1946-1947 continued to bear fruit.

At the end of 1949 and early in 1950 incitement of anti-Hindu manifestations was so widespread that Hindus moved wholesale to India. The migration from Bengal was far greater than after the partition of the province in 1947.[34] Religious distinctions and prejudices were used by the government and the landlords to crush the rebel centres in East Pakistan. But they took the events in Bengal as a serious warning. The most far-sighted of the political leaders, including some landlords, realised the need for agrarian reforms.

In the latter half of 1948 peasant unrest broke out also in West Pakistan. Peasant unions, which had existed prior to the establishment of Pakistan, such as the Kisan Sabha of the Punjab, Kisan Jirga in the Pakhtun border areas and the Sind Hari Committee, strove to assume leadership of the movement and win influence among the peasants.

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[32] *Crossroads*, March 17, April 28, 1950.

[33] J. R. Andrus and A. F. Mohammad, *The Economy of Pakistan*, p. 438.

[34] *Bombay Chronicle*, March 24, 1950; *Crossroads*, March 17, 1950.

In contrast to the situation in East Pakistan there were many progressive Muslim intellectuals at the head of these unions. But they worked chiefly among Muslims of the low castes, the sharecroppers and the agricultural labourers. Their demand was that tenants should not be driven off the land, that tenants-at-will should be granted heritable tenure, and that the landlords' share should be restricted to one-third of the harvest.

In the spring of 1948 the Kisan Jirga embarked on a mass campaign for the harvest to be divided on the tenant's threshing floor, for the banning of *begar* and the dissolution of the armed landlord gangs. The movement was joined by peasants who were members of the Red Shirts and the Muslim League. The Kisan Jirga was outlawed and thousands of its members were arrested. This reduced the movement somewhat.[35] But unrest among the tenants did not cease in the province until the first agrarian bills were published.

The movement against eviction of tenants and restriction of the landlord's share of the harvest spread also to many Punjab villages. In some of the districts Communist-led peasant unions campaigned against the increase in the water tax and called for effective government measures to safeguard peasant crops from landslips, floods and soil salinisation, which had assumed disastrous proportions. A special day of protest was held in Lyallpur on January 25, 1949.[36] The Punjab peasant unions also remonstrated vehemently against government reprisals.

The first peasant conference in West Pakistan took place in the autumn of 1949. It demanded a stop to the eviction of tenants, insisted that the tenant's share of the harvest be not less than two-thirds, called for the abolition of landlord ownership without compensation and for the transfer of the rights of land ownership to the tillers. The West Pakistan Kisan Sabha drew up a memorandum to this effect, and submitted it in January 1950 to the Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, and the Governor of the Western Punjab, Abdur Rab Nishtar.[37]

Large district peasant conferences took place all over the Punjab in January and February. They were attended by representatives of the Communist Party, the Trade Union Federation, the Democratic Students League, the Progressive Writers Association, and peasant unions of other provinces.[38]

Eviction of tenants had assumed such disastrously vast proportions that many of the reformist organisations, such as the West Pakistan Socialist Party, the Federation of Labour, and even some district bodies of the Muslim League, were compelled to take action.

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[35] *People's Age*, August 15, 1948.

[36] *The Pakistan Times*, December 12, 1949; *Crossroads*, March 12, 1950.

[37] *The Pakistan Times*, January 15, 1949; also see А. М. Дьяков, *Индия во время и после второй мировой войны*, стр. 3.

[38] *The Pakistan Times*, April 9, 1950; *Crossroads*, March 24, 1950.

The most influential peasant union in West Pakistan was the Sind Hari Committee, led by Communists and other progressives. Hari strikes broke out in the district of Sukkur, Shikarpur, Hyderabad and Karachi in 1949-1950. The *hari* demanded a stop to evictions and insisted on protected rights of tenure. On January 15, 1950, a day of protest was held against the jagirdari and zamindari systems.[39]

The conference of the Hari Committee, held in Dadu in March 1950, urged the abolition of the jagirdari and zamindari systems without compensation and issued the slogan, "all land to the tillers." By this time the Hari Committee had nearly 40,000 members, that is, more than one-fifth of the *hari* in the province. The Dadu conference was attended by 200 delegates and by representatives of workers' trade unions, the League of Democratic Youth, the Progressive Writers Association, and peasant bodies of other provinces. Hundreds of peasants from neighbouring villages flocked to the opening session. The conference passed resolutions calling for the abolition of the jagirdari system and allotment of land to peasants without compensation, establishment of a democratic regime, withdrawal of Pakistan from the British Commonwealth, and passed a resolution censuring the pro-imperialist policy of the government; it also called for contacts with the Soviet Union.[40]

The activities of the Sind Hari Committee roused the alarm of the Muslim League. It helped Rightist leaders to organise a reformist Sind Hari Federation, which had 74 locals in the 3,400 villages of the province in the early 1950's.[41] The Federation's basic demand was improvement of the situation for the *hari*, provided that the existing system of land ownership remain. Even this reformist effort struck terror into the big landlords of the province, and Federation members were exposed to brutal attacks by landlord hirelings.

However, nothing but reforms could terminate the mounting peasant discontent. Many officials urged agrarian reforms "to save Islam from the Communist onslaught." The wish of the less privileged section of landlords to restrict the big estates also served to expedite the reforms.

The first agrarian laws were published in 1950. One of these, the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Bill, which provided for the acquisition of rent-receiving interests by the State, envisaged the purchase of all landlord estates (excluding *khas*) by the state and the abolition of all intermediary privileges, the abolition of intermediary tenure and conversion of former ryots (hereditary tenants) into proprietors paying taxes to the government.

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[39] *Crossroads*, January 27, March 3, 1950.

[40] *Crossroads*, March 24, 1950; *The Pakistan Times*, March 11, 1950.

[41] J. R. Andrus and A. F. Mohammad, *Economy of Pakistan*, pp. 437-438.

The limit for private holdings was set at 30 acres. This could be more if the landlord had a productive farm and cultivated his land with machinery. The burden of compensating the landowners was fixed on the peasants, who were to buy the surplus "private holdings" purchased by the state. The conversion of occupancy tenants into hereditary owners involved a considerable increase in the rates of rent.[42] The reform, as such, was likely to encourage landlord farming to assume a capitalist pattern and, hence, to improve the situation of some sections of the peasantry. But, as we shall see, nobody was in a hurry to implement the reforms. After the Act was published, the authorities quickly bought the estates of the big Hindu zamindars who had moved to India. In other respects, things remained as before.

A tenancy act was also adopted in North-West Frontier Province, and was a reform project in the Punjab. They were much alike.

An attempt was made for the first time in these provinces to draw a line between the landlord's *khas* land and other land, which occupancy tenants who cultivated it were legally entitled to acquire on paying the due compensation. The landlord was entitled to not more than 40 per cent of the harvest gathered in by the share-cropper.[43]

The ceiling for private land holdings in the Punjab was set at 50 acres of irrigated land and 25 acres of non-irrigated land. However, if the farm was highly productive and cultivated by agricultural labourers with machinery, this ceiling was raised at the discretion of the government.

The Punjab Tenancy Act entered into force as late as 1952, while in North-West Frontier Province reforms were effected in 1950. In the early 1950's, 241,831 occupancy tenants of the total 248,009 bought the plots they cultivated, and entered into full possession.[44] The situation of the tenants improved, at least in the legal sense. But the percentage of occupancy tenants among the total peasant proprietors was negligible.

Agrarian reforms were also passed in Sind in 1950. A small section of the more prosperous *hari*, who had worked a plot of not less than four acres during not less than three years, was granted hereditary rights of tenancy.[45] But the qualifications provided for in the act enabled the landlord to deprive the *hari* of hereditary rights if and when he expanded his capitalist farm, provided he employed machines and hired labour. The landlord could also deprive a *hari* of his title for "defaults." As we see, the act was thus robbed of its teeth.

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[42]. For the full text of the Act, see S. M. Akhtar, *Economy of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1951, pp. 257-261; for details about the land reforms in Pakistan, see В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*; Л. Р. Гордон-Полонская, «Пакистан», *Аграрные отношения в странах Востока*, Москва, 1958.

[43] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 25.

[44] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1951, p. 85.

[45] *Economy of Pakistan (1950)*, pp. 45-46.

The agrarian legislation passed in 1950 officially prohibited *abwabs* (illegal and unauthorised exactions) and free personal service in addition to the rent payable by tenants. The landlords, as a rule, ignored this ban. But the fact that tenants had won the right to appeal to courts of law for protection, was, indeed, evidence of a certain improvement in their legal position since the colonial period.

To sum up, the 1950 agrarian acts, even if carried through, could not have improved the situation of the bulk of the peasants. The benefits went solely to a small, more prosperous section of the peasants.

The plight of the bulk of the peasant proprietors and occupancy tenants, to say nothing of the share-croppers and agricultural labourers, did not improve. Yet the acts gave rise to fresh illusions and enabled the reactionaries to split the peasant movement, which gradually decreased due to the various pressures on the democratic forces.

Chapter X

THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT. THE FIRST OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE FORMED

It has been stated already that the territorial magnates and the "alien" upper bourgeoisie of West Pakistan used their monopoly of power to infringe upon the economic interests of the national bourgeoisie of East Pakistan and of the smaller provinces in the western wing of the country—Sind, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province inhabited by Pakhtuns.

The ruling circles gave priority to the development of Karachi and the West Punjab, that is, to the areas where the economic interests of the Punjabi landlords and the big "alien" bourgeoisie were mainly concentrated. The greater part of the state allocations for economic development were spent in these two regions, and favourable conditions for the utilisation of the loans were created there. For example, of the loans which the central government granted to the provinces to finance development projects in 1948-1949, the West Punjab received 41.6 per cent, or 50 million rupees out of a total of 120 million, and in 1949-1950 its share rose to 49.5 per cent. In two years alone the West Punjab was given loans amounting to 100 million rupees. East Pakistan, with a population more than double that of the West Punjab, received 82.1 million rupees during the same period; Sind, 25 million, and the North-West Frontier Province, 14.2 million rupees, while Baluchistan did not get a single anna.[1]

The bulk of the foreign currency obtained from the sale of jute which was grown in East Pakistan, was also used to finance the economic development of the West Punjab and Karachi.[2] East Pakistan and the smaller units were deprived of the revenue from a number of taxes and duties collected on their territory, since these funds were placed at the disposal of the centre shortly after the establishment of Pakistan.[3] The preference shown to the West Punjab and Karachi was at variance with economic expediency and the task of developing the economy of the country as a whole, for it increased the uneven economic development of the various regions of Pakistan.

The big "alien" bourgeoisie, which had the benefit of direct support from the state, pressed back the bourgeoisie of the separate national regions in the principal economic spheres.

After the big bourgeoisie had in combination with several British companies monopolised foreign commerce and taken hold of the connections between West and East Pakistan, it began to reach out for control over the home market. An important means to achieving this goal was the system of foreign trade licences described earlier, which was ruining the small industrialists and traders. The small and medium bourgeoisie resented the obstacles placed in the way of its development by the big "alien" bourgeoisie and the commercial and money-lending methods of exploitation to which it was subjected by big capital. Because of the particular way in which Pakistan was brought into being and developed, the contradictions between the higher forms of capital (mainly represented by big capital connected with the foreign monopolies) and the lower forms of capitalist enterprise (developing primarily in the national regions) already in the first years of the country's existence took the form of clashes between the lower and medium strata of the national bourgeoisie, consisting of Bengalis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis and Baluchis, on the one hand, and the big bourgeoisie, the bulk of which was composed of "aliens," on the other. In this struggle the latter group was supported by its allies, the big landowners of West Pakistan, first and foremost of the Punjab, and by the monopolies of the imperialist states.

The business activity of the national bourgeoisie was hampered not only by the competition of the "alien" bourgeoisie and foreign capital, but was also adversely affected by the narrowness of the home market. The lower and middle strata of the national bourgeoisie therefore wished to expand the home market by abolishing the antiquated feudal survivals and the artificial government and administrative barriers inherited from the colonial epoch. These strata of the national middle class, which were not linked by common economic interests to the foreign monopolies and were, moreover, suffering from the fact that the latter dominated the country's economy, desired to protect the home market against foreign competition and were interested in Pakistan's industrialisation and in its achieving economic independence.

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[1] W. Godfrey, *Pakistan. Economic and Commercial Conditions in Pakistan*, London, 1951, p. 65.

[2] Further information can be found in Ю. В. Ганковский, В. Н. Москаленко, *Политическое положение в Пакистане*, Москва, 1960, стр. 24-26.

[3] Sajid Hussain, *Pakistan Economics*, Karachi, 1950, p. 151.—*The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, December 18, 1949, records the discontent which this policy caused in the various national regions of the country.

This was the reason why the national bourgeoisie put forward a radical economic and political programme designed to create the necessary conditions for Pakistan's independent development. Since this programme reflected the general democratic demands of the peoples of Pakistan, the national bourgeoisie succeeded in attracting wide sections of the working population of East Pakistan and the smaller units of the western part of the country to its banners. Thanks to its democratic nature, the programme also found support in the West Punjab, especially among the progressive intellectuals, the organised proletariat and parts of the peasants and handicraftsmen, who were suffering from the domination of the feudal landlords, the big bourgeoisie and the foreign monopolies.

The partition of India, which was accompanied by sanguinary clashes and passionately chauvinistic, religious and communal agitation conducted by reactionary organisations, strained the religious feelings of Pakistan's population to the utmost. The national question, which before partition had played an important part in the social and political life of the peoples inhabiting the territories included in Pakistan, was pushed into the background. Another reason for this was the fact that the lower and medium layers of the Muslim national bourgeoisie temporarily received certain advantages as a result of the emigration of the Hindu merchants, money-lenders and industrialists. But they could not consolidate these advantages, for the place of their Hindu competitors was soon occupied by the "alien" big bourgeoisie and the indigenous semi-feudal Muslim landlords, who were only too willing to invest their free capital in financial and banking operations. The discrimination which the petty and medium national bourgeoisie (the so-called middle class) of East Pakistan and the smaller units of West Pakistan encountered in the principal economic spheres and in social and economic life, and the neglect displayed by the ruling circles towards the language and culture of the individual nationalities of Pakistan, were bound to engender protests and to make the national question one of the most complex and acute political problems of the country.

The ruling circles saw in the national movements a threat to their own interests. The "two-nation theory" and pan-Islamic agitation were widely used by them to paralyse these movements. Since they denied that the peoples inhabiting Pakistan possessed specific national features, they regarded the whole population of the country as a single nation, and wanted to impose Urdu as the "national language," which was to become the sole state language.[4]

The ruling circles hoped thereby to bind together East and West Pakistan, to weaken existing ties between the Bengalis of East and West Bengal and to strike a blow at the national movements of the Bengalis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis and Baluchis. But the attempt to impose Urdu as the sole state language on a country in which the peoples had for many years waged a struggle for self-determination, where individual nationalities had already come into being and where written languages with a rich literature existed, was bound to call forth the resistance of the different nationalities and lead to the intensification of the national question. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan, therefore, a bitter struggle flared up in the country around the question of the state language.

According to the Census of 1951, Urdu was the mother tongue of 2.4 million inhabitants, or 3.3 per cent of the country's population. The bulk of these were immigrants from India who had chiefly settled in the West Punjab (1.07 million) and Karachi (565,000). Urdu was the mother tongue of only 268,000 inhabitants of East Pakistan, or 0.63 per cent of the people living in this part of the country.[5] There was a slightly larger proportion of persons who could understand and speak Urdu; in 1951 in the whole of Pakistan 5.4 million inhabitants, or 7.3 per cent, spoke Urdu. But in the eastern part of the country only 1.1 per cent of the population, or 463,000 persons, knew Urdu, while 98 per cent of the inhabitants spoke Bengali.[6]

The figures cited show convincingly that Urdu was not the national language of any of the peoples of Pakistan, and that only an insignificant number of Pakistanis knew Urdu. The attempt to make Urdu the only state language was, even for this reason alone, bound to lead to complications.

Apart from the Muslim nobility, the big Muslim businessmen (who used Urdu as the *lingua franca*), a section of the Punjabi Muslim intelligentsia educated in the tradition of the Aligarh College, and the Muslim immigrants from the United and Central Provinces of former British India, whose mother tongue was Urdu there were no social strata or groups in Pakistan who came forward in support of Urdu as the sole state language of the country.

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[4] Some representatives of the pan-Islamic circles demanded that Arabic should be declared the state language of Pakistan (cf., for example, H. M. Martin, *National Language of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1954, p. 373; P. Adami, "Can Arabic Be Introduced as Pakistani National Language?", *Islamic Review*, Woking, July 1950, pp. 39-40).

[5] *Census of Pakistan, 1951*, Vol. I, Karachi, 1951, p. 7!, Table 7, p. 7-4.

[6] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Table 7-*A*, pp. 7-6, 7-7.

Differences regarding the state language assumed particularly sharp forms in East Pakistan. As early as February 1948, the Bengali D. N. Datta, a member of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, tabled an amendment permitting the use of Bengali in the Assembly in addition to Urdu and English. In his reply Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, said, "Pakistan is a Muslim State and it must have as its *lingua franca* the language of the Muslim nation.... It is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language."[7]

The discrimination against Bengali, which was the mother tongue of the majority of the population of Pakistan, offended the national feelings of the Bengalis.

People in East Pakistan came forward in defence of their mother tongue; there were meetings and mass demonstrations of the intelligentsia, the students and civil servants. Clashes occurred between the demonstrators and the police.[8] The situation became so tense that M. A. Jinnah himself had to intervene, and towards the end of March 1948 he went to Dacca to speak at public meetings. Stressing that "there could be only one *lingua franca* for Pakistan and that language should be Urdu," he declared: "...Ultimately, it is for you, the people of this province, to decide what shall be the language of your province. But let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language.... But as I have said, it will come in time."[9] In his political study of Pakistan Keith Callard has pointed out that "some of the advocates of the superior merits of Urdu managed to convey the impression that the defence of Bengali was both un-Islamic and opposed to the interests of national unity."[10] Nevertheless, the people of East Pakistan continued their struggle for the recognition of Bengali as a state language. Groups of students toured the province calling upon the peasants to defend their mother tongue. As a result of these propaganda tours thousands of peasants all over East Pakistan joined the fight for the recognition of their language.

The national feelings of the Bengalis were also offended by the dominant position which the representatives of West Pakistan, chiefly Punjabis, occupied in the civil administration and the armed forces, although 55 per cent of Pakistan's population lived in the eastern wing of the country. According to official figures, in 1950-1951 out of a total of 2,618 federal officials only 113, that is a mere 4.3 per cent, came from East Pakistan.[11] Another grievance of the Bengalis was that in regard to the allocation of budgetary and other resources West Pakistan was always given preferential treatment at the expense of East Pakistan, and that the central government regarded the eastern part of the country mainly as a source of revenue and showed no interest in its development. At the beginning of 1948 the representatives of East Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly demanded equality for Bengalis in the armed forces and the civil administration. In reply the government declared, "we must kill this provincialism for all times."[12]

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[7] This passage is quoted from K. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, London, 1957, p. 182.

[8] *People's Age*, Bombay, March 28, 1948.

[9] *Chronology of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1957, p. 35; H. Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan*, Oxford, 1956, pp. 16-17.—Similar statements were made by the leaders of Pakistan later on as well (*The Pakistan Times*, December 20, 1949).

[10] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 181.

The policy of the ruling circles caused indignation in the eastern part of the country. Even the leaders of the provincial organisation of the Muslim League expressed their resentment. One of them, Nurul Amin, in a speech delivered in the provincial Legislative Assembly in 1949, urged that the fight against discrimination be continued until the demands of the province were met.[13]

Bengalis remonstrated against the draft constitution which was being prepared in various committees of the Constituent Assembly, where landowners from West Pakistan, mostly Punjabis, were the leading force, because it legalised and therefore maintained the dependent position of East Pakistan. They pointed out that East Pakistan, despite its preponderance in point of the numerical strength of the population, was to have a minority of seats in the planned central legislative bodies. The conviction grew in East Pakistan that the Constituent Assembly was preparing a constitution which would turn East Bengal into a colony of West Pakistan.[14]

In opposition to these plans, the Bengali nationalists advanced a programme of struggle against the discrimination displayed towards East Pakistan in economic and political matters. They called for the recognition of Bengali alongside of Urdu as one of the state languages, the introduction of bourgeois-democratic reforms in East Pakistan, and the granting of far-reaching provincial autonomy to the eastern wing of the country. This programme largely corresponded to the common national interests of the Bengalis in Pakistan. Defence, foreign policy and finance were, in the opinion of the Bengali nationalists, the only subjects that ought to be left under the jurisdiction of the central government.

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[11] *The Pakistan Times*, February 7 and 8, 1956.

[12] The statement was made by Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, in the Constituent Assembly on March 2, 1948 (The quotation is taken from K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 174).

[13] *Hindustan Standard*, March 20, 1949.

[14] A Bengali politician, Nur Ahmad, voiced this opinion in a speech he delivered in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on November 21, 1950 (cf.: K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 92).

Speaking in the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan on March 18, 1949, Nurul Amin declared: "The provinces must be allowed to enjoy the full autonomous position, must be as free from the Central Government as it is thought practical."[15] In view of the approaching local elections, the parliamentary party of the East Pakistan Muslim League had to take into account the attitude of the broad masses of the population in the province, and all its members supported these demands in December 1949.[16]

To weaken the national movement of the Bengalis, the ruling circles of Pakistan, although not renouncing repressive police measures, decided—with the aid of local religious and communal organisations of the extreme right—to resort to provocations designed to fan hatred against the Bengali Hindus who lived in the province, hoping thereby to split the growing national movement.

The provocations led to sanguinary clashes, in the course of which a number of persons lost their lives. Members of the police took part in these provocations, looting Hindu villages, attacking and killing peaceful peasants.[17]

Inhabitants of West Pakistan too were fighting against national discrimination and defending their mother tongues against the forcible introduction of Urdu. The strongest resistance to the imposition of Urdu was offered in Sind. Dr. Abdul Haq, the leader of the Anjuman-i Tarraqqi-i Urdu (Society for the Development of Urdu), said about Sind: "...It is very unfortunate that now that Pakistan has been achieved, Urdu is discarded in this province (in West Pakistan.—*Author* more than anywhere else."[18] This was due to the relatively high level of national consciousness which the Sindhis had attained and to the fact that already at the close of the 19th century contemporary Sindhi prose and poetry were developing and journalism was coming into being. By the time Pakistan was created, books, as well as many newspapers and journals, were being published in their mother tongue in the regions inhabited by Sindhis. According to the Census of 1951, there were approximately 317,000 persons in Sind who could read and write Sindhi, this means that there were five times more literate Sindhis than Pakhtuns, Punjabis or Baluchis.[19]

The people of Sind felt insulted by the discrimination shown towards their mother tongue. Even the local civil servants did not assist in any way in the propaganda campaign for Urdu or in the use of this language in the provincial administrative bodies.[20]

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

[16] *The Pakistan Times*, December 21, 1949.

[17] Cf., the statements by Jatindra Nath Bhadra, Niren Dev and Purendra Sen Gupta, members of the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly, in November 1949 (*The Pakistan Times*, November 20, 1949).

[18] *The Pakistan Times*, February 27, 1950.

[19] *Census of Pakistan*, 1951, Vol. I, Table 8, pp. 8-6, 9-7; Vol. IV, Table 7, F. R. 7-1.

The national feelings of the Sindhis were also injured when, on July 23, 1948, the Governor-General of Pakistan ordered the separation of Karachi and the surrounding districts from the administrative control of Sind and the transformation of this city, which the Sindhis regarded as their national capital[21] and which was the residence of their provincial government, into a separate federal area under the jurisdiction of the central government. This meant also a considerable financial loss for Sind, since "through the acquisition of Karachi by the centre Sind was deprived of its most highly productive area from the point of view of revenue-yielding capacity...."[22]

One can get an idea of the magnitude of the loss incurred by Sind from the fact that the committee which was set up after the separation of Karachi to determine the amount of compensation to be paid to Sind for the transfer of the city fixed it at 600 to 800 million rupees.[23] The severance of Karachi from Sind led to a considerable chronic budgetary deficit in the province. The provincial government demanded that the central government should make good this deficit.[24]

The separation of Karachi affected the interests of the whole population of Sind, and "the decision to shift the Sind capital from federal Karachi to Hyderabad met with the understandably heated (and unprecedentedly unanimous) opposition of Sindhi legislators."[25] Even the big local landlords who headed the provincial Muslim League were opposed to the transfer of Karachi. Its President, M. A. Khuhro, officially protested against the separation of Karachi. The Working Committee of the Sind Muslim League declared that despite the transformation of Karachi into a special federal area, it regarded the city as part of Sind and would continue to work there.[26] Mass demonstrations and protest meetings against the separation of Karachi were held throughout the province.

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[20] *The Pakistan Times*, February 27, 1950.

[21] А. М. Дьяков, *Индия во время и после второй мировой войны* (1939-1949), Москва, 1952, стр. 218-220.

[22] S. M. Akhtar, *Distribution of Revenue Resources between the Centre and Provinces*, Lahore, (195—), p. 12.

[23] *The Pakistan Times*, April 1, 1950.— S. M. Akhtar has pointed out that Sind was only partially indemnified for the loss it suffered as a result of the transfer of Karachi to federal jurisdiction (S. M. Akhtar, *Distribution of Revenue Resources...*, p. 12). According to Sajid Hussain, Sind received only 6 million rupees in 1949-1950 as compensation for the loss of Karachi (Sajid Hussain, *Pakistan Economics*, p. 159).

[24] The demand was made by J. A. Haroon, the Chief Minister of Sind, in a speech delivered in the provincial Legislative Assembly (*The Pakistan Times*, March 12, 1950).

[25] O.H.K. Spate, *India and Pakistan*, London, 1960, p. 462.

[26] *The Pakistan Times*, February 3, 1950.

The fight for national self-determination of the Pakhtu-speaking regions and for the creation of Pakhtunistan, which the Pakhtuns had already begun before the partition of India, continued in the territories inhabited by them.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdus Samad Achakzai, the leaders of the Pakhtun national movement, set up the People's Party—subsequently renamed the People's Organisation of Pakistan—in the beginning of 1948. This party led the struggle for the granting of autonomy to the various peoples of Pakistan. It held that only defence, foreign trade and transport and communications should remain in the hands of the central government.[27] The Pakhtun democratic mass organisations and the trade unions which existed in the North-West Frontier Province supported the activities of the People's Party.

The Pakhtun national-democratic organisations demanded not only the abolition of administrative barriers which were a survival from the period of the British raj, and the fusion of all territories inhabited by Pakhtuns into a united Pakhtunistan, but advocated the restriction of landlord property rights, the democratisation of the country's political system, the liquidation of the Pakhtun States,[28] and equality for Pakhtuns in all spheres of the political, economic and cultural life of Pakistan. Leaflets advancing the idea of Pakhtunistan, written in Pakhtu, were distributed in mosques and other public places.[29]

In an effort to suppress the national movement of the Pakhtuns, the authorities resorted to mass repressions, and arrested many peasant and trade-union leaders and also the leaders of the bourgeois and landlord wing of the movement, including Abdul Ghaffar Khan.[30] According to the Pakhtu press, published in India, as many as 12,000 persons were arrested.[31] They were kept in jail together with criminal offenders and were neither permitted to receive visitors nor to correspond with the outside world.[32]

The repressions dealt a heavy blow at the Pakhtun national movement in the administrative districts of the North-West Frontier Province. The Pakhtun tribal areas became the principal arena of the fight for Pakhtunistan. So-called regional governments of Pakhtunistan were organised there (in Tirah, Waziristan and the northern parts of Baluchistan inhabited by Pakhtuns) in 1949-1950, which directed the local national movement. One of the leaders of the tribal areas, Maulana Haji Nur Dal from Tirah, headed the movement. Clashes took place between the Pakhtun nationalists and the armed forces of Pakistan,[33] and Pakhtun villages were bombed by Pakistani aircraft.[34]

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[27] *People's Age*, July 6, 1948; *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, March 14, 1948.

[28] *The Pakistan Times*, December 27, 1949; January 27, March 20, October 17, 1950.

[29] *The Pakistan Times*, April 1, 1950.

[30] *The Pakistan Times*, June 18, 1950.

[31] *Pakhtoonistan*, October 20, 1950, Vol. VI, No. 8, p. 11.

[32] *The Pakistan Times*, November 22, 1949; February 22, 1950.

A national movement also arose in Baluchistan during the same period. The Baluchi national organisations (Watan and others) not only called for the administrative unification of all territories inhabited by Baluchis and full provincial autonomy, but also demanded that the economic and cultural backwardness of the Baluchis be overcome and the feudal survivals in the agrarian system and the administrative organisation of Baluchistan be abolished.[35] Voices were being raised requesting that there should be no more discrimination against Baluchis when nominations to official positions were being made. *The Pakistan Times* wrote, "the Central Secretariat at Karachi, the local police force, the army and the militia—the doors of all these are almost shut to Baluchistanis," and deplored that although, following the creation of Pakistan, "they thought that the despotic rule by a handful of officers would soon be over," their "hopes were dashed to pieces."[36]

The repressive measures to which the authorities had recourse in order to stifle the discontent proved of no avail.

Despite the relatively wide range of the national movement between 1947 and 1950, it did not yet attain the extent and the strong organisation which subsequently became its characteristic features, especially during the time immediately preceding the establishment of military dictatorship in the country.

Not only was there, during the period under review, a lack of liaison between the national movements which were developing in various national regions of the country, but even the activities of different units within one region were not sufficiently co-ordinated.

Apart from the Red Shirts in the North-West Frontier Province, the national-democratic parties and organisations existing at that time had a very small membership and were not sufficiently closely connected with the masses. The actions of the national movements were, therefore, often spontaneous and unorganised.

The fact that the strata associated with commerce and money-lending and with the landlord class predominated within the Bengali bourgeoisie and that the industrial Bengali bourgeoisie was extremely weak, affected the nature of the national movement in Bengal.[37]

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[33] Mian Manzoolul Haque, *Around Khyber*, Karachi, 1951, pp. 19-20.

[34] *Pakhtoonistan*, August 1950, Vol. VI, No. 3, pp. 16- 7.

[35] *The Pakistan Times*, July 10, 1950; October 21, 1950.

[36] *The Pakistan Times*, August 9, 1950.

[37] On the historical preconditions which called forth these specific traits of the Bengali national bourgeoisie, see В. И. Павлов, *Формирование индийской буржуазии*, Москва, 1958, стр. 265-279.

The fear caused among the landlords and the privileged section of landed proprietors in Sind, Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan by the growing unrest in the countryside and the desire of the landowners in the smaller units to enlist the aid of the central government against "their" peasants, strongly influenced the national movement in these regions.

Other factors which left their mark upon the nature and scope of the national movement during these years were the extremely low level of organisation among the working people—the proletariat and the peasants—and among the democratic strata; the stronghold which feudal and religious survivals retained on the thinking of the popular masses; the relative weakness and small size of the national bourgeoisie.

Only several years later, after these objective difficulties had been partially overcome, was the national movement of Pakistan able to reach a higher stage of development.

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The fact that the leadership of the Muslim League was incapable of solving the urgent problems which complicated the economic and political situation in the country gradually dispelled the illusions held by the masses in regard to the ruling party. Moreover, owing to the development of capitalist relations in the country, the class and political demarcations became more distinct. In consequence, the peasants, the lower and medium strata of the national bourgeoisie and the radical intelligentsia, who supported the Muslim League on the eve of the partition of India, began, towards the close of the period under review, gradually to turn away from the League.

To stop this trend the right-wing leaders of the Muslim League stepped up their religious and communal agitation, and in particular invoked the spectre of "Hindu imperialism" as a sort of bugbear; they were helped in this by the unrestrained chauvinistic propaganda which reactionary Hindu organisations like the Hindu Mahasabha were carrying on in India during those years. The ruling circles of Pakistan, at the same time, launched a series of operations against democratic organisations and politicians who demanded that the promises which the Muslim League made to the people before the establishment of Pakistan should be put into practice. Democrats were arrested without any charges being brought against them, they were kept in prison together with criminal offenders and deprived of the barest necessities.[38]

Laws promulgated by the British were widely used in the fight against democrats. For example, in 1949, Maulana Abdul Hamid

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[38] *The Pakistan Times*, March 4 and 9, 1950.

Bhashani, a well-known public figure of East Pakistan, was arrested and kept in prison for about a year on the basis of a law issued in 1946, because he organised a demonstration in defence of the democratic rights of the Bengalis during a visit of Liaquat Ali Khan to the province. Laws introduced in the beginning of the 19th century relating to preventive detention were still in force in Pakistan.[39] The freedom of the press was restricted by the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act of 1931, on the basis of which in 1949, in Karachi alone, four newspapers were banned for periods ranging from three months to one year and pre-censorship was imposed on another three newspapers.[40]

The anti-democratic laws introduced by the colonialists were supplemented by numerous public safety acts; twelve of these were issued between 1947 and 1950. They were in most cases promulgated by the provincial Governors under Section 92*A* of the Government of India Act of 1935 and gave the police the right to arrest any progressive politician without a warrant and detain him for an unlimited period. Millions of refugees fom India, that is the most poverty-stricken section of the population, were deprived of all civil rights.[41] Protests against these actions were made in all parts of the country, they were widely reported in the democratic newspapers of that period and their reverberations can be seen in the records of the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

The growing dissatisfaction of the broad masses of the population with the policy of the ruling sections caused them to break away from the Muslim League and to form democratic parties and organisations which opposed the right-wing leadership of the Muslim League. Within the Muslim League itself the struggle became more intense and certain discontented politicians, who either left the League or were expelled, formed their own political parties.

Maulana Bhashani, a prominent East Pakistani politician who has already been mentioned (he was up to 1947 President of the Assam Muslim League), broke in 1949 with the Muslim League and, with a group of followers, formed an opposition party, the Awami Muslim League (the People's Muslim League). It comprised the radical petty bourgeoisie of Bengal which was dissatisfiedwith the conservative policy pursued by the right-wing leadership of the Muslim League. Although the Awami Muslim League still adhered to the communalistic principles and accepted as members only Muslims, the setting up of this party, which demanded the introduction of democratic reforms in the country, was an important step towards the liberation of the popular masses of East Pakistan from the ideological and political influence of the Muslim League.

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[39] A. Gledhill, *Pakistan. The Development of Its Laws and Constitution*, London, 1957, p. 234.

[40] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 272.

[41] The Citizenship Act, which granted Pakistan citizenship to refugees from India, was passed by the Constituent Assembly only on April 7, 1952 (*Chronology of Pakistan*, p. 78).

The Awami Muslim League found supporters in the western part of the country as well where several branches were soon founded. Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, one of the leaders of the Bengal Muslim League from 1936 to 1947 and the last Chief Minister of the province before partition, played an important role in the leadership of the Awami Muslim League in West Pakistan from the outset. Following partition Suhrawardy remained in India, but in December 1947, he moved to Karachi. Very soon after joining the Awami Muslim League, he became the leader of its right wing.

The branch of the Awami Muslim League in the North-West Frontier Province was headed by a well-known public figure, Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif, who had been expelled from the Muslim League; and the branch in Sind, by Pir Ilahi Bakhsh, former Chief Minister of the province.

Another opposition party came into being in 1950. On January 17, 1950, the Muslim League expelled two prominent leaders of its left wing, Mian Iftikharuddin and Shaukat Hayat Khan, because they criticised the anti-democratic actions of the government, which restricted civil liberties, and spoke in the Constituent Assembly for the rights of the people in the States of West Pakistan, infringed upon by their feudal rulers.[42] A few months later the two politicians, who were joined by Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid and Khwaja Mohammad Afzal — three prominent officials of the Punjab Muslim League who had left the League because they disagreed with the reactionary policy of the leadership — founded the democratic Azad Pakistan Party (Free Pakistan Party) in Lahore. In its Manifesto, adopted on November 10, 1950, the party put forward a far-reaching programme for the social, political and administrative reorganisation of the country.

The Azad Pakistan Party demanded civil liberties for the people, the repeal of all anti-democratic laws, the dissolution of the unrepresentative Constituent Assembly and the holding of general elections for a new Assembly that was to prepare a democratic constitution. The constitution should give full autonomy to the provinces of Pakistan and grant the citizens the basic liberties and rights, including the right to work and education, medical services and social security, freedom of conscience and speech and freedom of association and assembly. Another demand of the

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[42] *The Pakistan Times*, January 18 and 19, 1950.

Azad Pakistan Party was the removal of all foreign officers and officials from the armed forces and state institutions. The party's programme also included the following points: the introduction of measures designed to improve the economic position of the refugees, the peasants, the working class, the craftsmen and the small traders; the elimination of all feudal relics, the abolition of the jagirdari agrarian system and the abrogation of the princely States; Pakistan's withdrawal from the British Commonwealth; and the proclamation of a sovereign, independent republic pursuing an independent foreign policy of friendship with all countries.[43]

Because of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal nature of their programmes the left-wing opposition parties met with approval and growing support from wide sections of the people.

By increasing police repressions the Muslim League government sought to prevent the growth of the left-wing forces. The offices of the democratic parties and of affiliated organisations, such as the Progressive Writers Association and the Trade Union Federation, were raided. In reply to the repressions the progressive forces united and, on December 10, 1950, formed the All-Pakistan Union for the Defence of Civil Liberties. Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif was elected president of the new organisation. Mahmud Ali Kasuri became general secretary of the Union. Its executive committee, which included Firozuddin Mansoor and Faiz Ahmad Faiz, consisted of 17 democrats who represented all the provinces of Pakistan.

The anti-democratic course followed by the ruling circles thus encountered a slowly but continuously growing opposition. The reluctance of the governing clique to take this opposition into consideration led to a political crisis and to the decline of the Muslim League's prestige and influence, a decline which could not be stopped by either the arrests of democratic leaders or the breaking up of popular demonstrations demanding immediate democratic reforms.

Chapter XI

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGH POLICY

In order to consolidate its independence, to overcome its cultural backwardness and to create a highly developed national economy at the earliest possible date Pakistan, like all countries which had thrown off the fetters of colonialism, needed the establishment of a firm and lasting peace throughout the world, the development of friendly economic and cultural relations with all countries that did not involve any political or military obligations, and the solution of outstanding international problems without recourse to national or racial discrimination of any sort.

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[43] The full text of the manifesto of the Azad Pakistan Party can be found in *The Pakistan Times*, November 11, 1950.

Pakistan's objective need for a firm universal peace and the desire of its population to establish friendly relations with the peoples of other countries were to a certain extent taken into account by the leaders of the young state. On September 30, 1947, when Pakistan became a member of the United Nations, Choudhury Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, head of the Pakistani delegation, said in his address, "On behalf of my Government, I beg to convey to the United Nations the assurance that Pakistan will do all that lies in its power to bring about better understanding between nations and make the utmost contribution of which it is capable towards securing and maintaining lasting peace."[1]

The Muslim League government declared that it would pursue an independent foreign policy and would not join any military bloc.

The difficult economic situation of the country and the dissatisfaction which the dominant position of the foreign monopolies caused among certain groups of the Pakistani bourgeoisie, and even among a section of the landlords, induced the ruling circles of Pakistan to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with the socialist countries, in the hope that this would strengthen it economically and politically. Pakistan and the USSR exchanged diplomatic representatives holding the rank of ambassador. The Soviet Union sent approximately 120,000 tons of grain to Pakistan, helping to ease the difficulties in the supply of food-stuffs which the latter experienced. In 1948-1949 the trade turnover between the USSR and Pakistan exceeded 71 million rupees, with a balance of 17.2 million in favour of Pakistan. Assessing the outlook for Soviet-Pakistani commercial relations, Sajid Hussain, the Pakistan economist, wrote in 1950, "There are great possibilities of developing happy economic relations because Russia is prepared to supply Pakistan its essential needs and Pakistan is prepared to supply Russia its surplus raw materials."[2]

There were also favourable prospects for the development of cultural relations between the two countries. Cultural exchanges, beneficial to both countries, were initiated by a delegation of Soviet writers who visited Pakistan. Pakistan was developing mutually advantageous economic relations also with other socialist states.

Regarding the first results of Pakistan's relations with the socialist countries, Altaf Husain, editor of the semi-official paper

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[1] *The First Year*, Karachi (1948), p. 14.

[2] Sajid Hussain, *Pakistan Economics*, Karachi, 1950, p. 135.

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Dawn and president of the Pakistani Conference of Newspaper Editors, declared on December 16, 1949, that Pakistanis believed that Islam and Communism could be good neighbours and allies, developing and prospering side by side for the sake of peace and progress throughout the world; the globe was sufficiently big for both systems.[3]

A number of diplomatic actions undertaken by Pakistan in the international arena during these years show that its ruling circles had to take note of the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist attitude of its people. Pakistan objected against the return of the former Italian colonies to Italy and demanded that they be placed under the control of the United Nations. It protested against the incorporation of South-West Africa into the Union of South Africa. It supported the struggle for freedom and independence which the Indonesian people carried on against the Dutch aggressors, sent a goodwill mission to Indonesia (October 12, 1948) and on December 24, 1948, placed a ban on all flights of Dutch aircraft over the territory of Pakistan.

These steps, as well as the establishment of diplomatic relations with the socialist countries, helped to strengthen the international standing of the young state, and by the end of the third year of its independent existence Pakistan was recognised by over 30 countries.[4]

At the same time, however, contrary forces were also influencing the foreign policy of Pakistan and were responsible for its departure from the principles of non-participation in military blocs announced in autumn 1947.

The principal factors which already during those years tended to push Pakistan towards the system of military alignments headed by the Western imperialist powers, were the class character of the bloc in power which consisted of big landlords and the upper bourgeoisie closely associated with the foreign monopolies; a certain weakness and disunity of the country, which compelled the ruling circles to seek assistance abroad; the pan-Islamic tendencies and the desire to play the leading part in the Muslim world; the desire to secure foreign military and diplomatic support in solving the disagreements with India and Afghanistan; and, finally, the intrigues of the imperialist circles seeking to maintain and to strengthen their positions in Pakistan and endeavouring to use the country as a bridgehead against the socialist countries in Asia.

The interest which the Western imperialist monopolies, and above all the USA, displayed towards Pakistan during the period under review was mainly due to the favourable strategic position of the country and its rich mineral and human resources. This induced the imperialist powers, from the very inception of Pakistan, although their attention was at that time principally focussed on the Far East, to make every effort to secure Pakistan's adherence to the system of military blocs. With this purpose in view they played on the contradictions which existed between Pakistan, on the one hand, and India and Afghanistan, on the other, and at the same time tried to put pressure on the governments of India and Afghanistan.

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[3] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, December 17, 1949.

[4] *Three Years of Pakistan*, Karachi, [s. a.], pp. 2-3.

Not only the conflict which arose over the Kashmir question, but other issues too strained the relations between India and Pakistan.

At the time of the partition of India, the Muslim rulers of Junagarh and Manavadar, two small States on the Kathiawar Peninsula, declared their accession to Pakistan despite the geographical position of the States which were completely surrounded by Indian territory. The great majority of the population of these princely States, consisting of Hindus, protested against these decisions. The conflict between the rulers and the people grew and developed into a popular uprising. Because of these disturbances Indian troops were in October 1947 moved into Manavadar, and in November of the same year into Junagarh.

Pakistan protested against these actions of the Indian government.

In January 1948 it raised the question of the accession of these States in the Security Council. A plebiscite, which was held early in 1948, showed that the population of both States wished to join India, but the government of Pakistan did not recognise the validity of the referendum, and in January 1949 declared through its spokesman Liaquat Ali Khan that it considered India's actions unlawful. Subsequently the question of accession of these States was several times raised by Pakistan.[5]

The demarcation of the frontiers between Pakistan and India also caused tension between the two countries. A special tribunal was set up in 1949 and its decisions were published in February of the following year. India, however, did not fully accept the recommendations of the tribunal, and a considerable section of the border between East Pakistan and the Indian state of Assam remained unsettled.[6]

Democratic sections of the population in both Pakistan and India, perturbed by the hostile relations which continued to exist between their states, persistently demanded that the two governments should settle the differences by means of direct talks without any mediation on interference on the part of the imperialist powers. In September 1949, the Indian government took the first step in this direction when it invited Pakistan to sign an agreement renouncing the use of war as a means of solving their mutual differences.

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[5] See, for example, *Dawn*, Karachi, January 20, 1957.

[6] For further details, see Nafis Ahmad, *The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal 1949-1950*, in *Geographical Review*, New York, 1953, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 329-337.

Negotiations through diplomatic channels went on for over a year but no agreement was reached, for Pakistan laid down as a preliminary condition that all issues dividing the two states should be submitted to the International Court of Justice, where the Western imperialists had the deciding vote.

Direct negotiations between the governments of India and Pakistan, which were carried on in December 1948, January and April 1949 and April and May 1950, led to agreement on certain specific questions, such as the rights of religious minorities and railway communication, but the basic issues — the problems of Kashmir, refugee property, and the canal waters dispute — remained unsolved.[7]

The strained political relations obtaining between the two states were bound to affect their economic intercourse too. This was made use of by the imperialist monopolies whose interference disorganised trade between India and Pakistan and turned the economic relations of the two states into a constant source of acute complications.[8]

Following the devaluation of the pound sterling, the Indian government devalued the rupee in autumn 1949, but on the instigation of the USA monopolies Pakistan refused to lower the value of the Pakistan rupee. The result was that the prices of industrial raw materials, i. e., cotton and jute which India imported from Pakistan, rose, while the prices of Indian industrial commodities bought by Pakistan fell. Thereupon India reduced its purchases of Pakistani raw materials, and Pakistan its purchases of Indian commodities;[9] by the beginning of 1950 the commercial and financial relations between the two states had almost completely ceased, which increased Pakistan's economic dependence on the Western countries.

Western imperialist circles also took advantage of the tension which existed between Pakistan and, another of its neighbours, Afghanistan, mainly caused by the Pakhtun problem.[10] The Afghan government did not raise any territorial claims upon Pakistan, but in 1947 and 1948 it repeatedly requested the Pakistani authorities to desist from repressive measures against those who were active in the Pakhtun national movement and to grant the Pakhtuns the right to self-determination and allow them freely to decide their future. These requests were rejected by the Muslim League government.

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[7] For further details of Pakistani-Indian relations between 1947 and 1950, see В. П. Нихамин, *Очерки внешней политики Индии, 1947-1957 гг.*; J. B. Das Gupta, *Indo-Pakistan Relations* (*1947-1955*), Amsterdam, 1958.

[8] В. П. Нихамин, *Очерки внешней политики Индии...*, стр. 66.

[9] С. М. Мельман, *Экономика Индии и политика английского империализма*, Москва, 1951, стр. 249.

[10] Afghanistan did not recognise the results of the referendum held in the North-West Frontier Province on the question of whether the territories inhabited by Pakhtuns were to join Pakistan. The Afghan press stressed the undemocratic nature of the referendum and the absence of conditions enabling the Pakhtuns

The imperialists, who strove to strengthen their positions both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, intensified the Pakistano-Afghan contradictions and at the same time offered to mediate between the two parties to help them to solve the Pakhtun problem. They intended to isolate the Pakhtun tribes in the border region from the Pakhtuns in the administrative districts of the North-West Frontier Province by recognising the lawfulness of the latter's inclusion in Pakistan, in the hope that a "Pakhtunistan" created in accordance with these plans, which was to comprise only the tribal areas, was bound to become a bone of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan and to remain under the control of the Western imperialist circles.[11]

Although the imperialist monopolies of Great Britain and the USA acted unitedly in their effort to tie Pakistan to the military alliances of the Western powers, this did not prevent them from waging a fierce competitive struggle for influence in the country. Considering that Pakistan was from the military point of view a very important springboard, the imperialist circles of the USA endeavoured to push aside their British partners in order to establish their own sway.

To achieve this, they made use of both the anti-British feeling, which was strong in Pakistan, and the antagonism existing between the different sections of the propertied classes in the country. Thus, the USA approved of the agrarian reforms which were to be carried through in East Pakistan, since they weakened the privileged section of the local landlords who had been for many generations closely associated with the British.

The United States, as against Great Britain, claimed to be in favour of Pakistan's industrialisation, seeking thereby to gain the goodwill of those strata of the Pakistani bourgeoisie which were interested in the industrial development of the country. In autumn 1947, the American press carried reports about the possible participation of American companies in the opening up of the mineral wealth of the country and the building of ports, oil

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to express their wishes freely. (*Islah*, Kabul, July 6, December 21 and 24, 1947).—Because of this Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations. For further details, see Р. Т. Ахрамович, *Афганистан после второй мировой войны*, Москва, 1961.

[11] Л. Р. Гордон, *Национально-освободительная борьба афганцев Пакистана*, Москва, 1950 (рукопись канд. диссертации).

pipelines and irrigation systems in Pakistan. The possibilities of granting concessions for the extraction of oil in the western part of the country to US monopolies were examined. At the beginning of 1948, a group of American geologists arrived in Pakistan to explore its mineral resources. The American G. Hansen was appointed chairman of the Chittagong Port Trust, a Pakistani government organisation in charge of the biggest port in East Bengal.

The USA utilised in its own interest the financial and commercial difficulties which Pakistan encountered following its refusal to devalue the rupee. American monopolies managed to secure a number of profitable commercial deals, in several of which, moreover, the Pakistan rupee was given a value below its usual exchange rate. All this enabled the American monopolies to push back the British in the export of hides, skins, oil seeds and jute from Pakistan. At the same time the USA slightly increased the import of American manufactured commodities into Pakistan. These activities of the American monopolies encountered British opposition. In this struggle Great Britain used the old positions which it still maintained from the period of its colonial rule, including the so-called sterling debts and the system of imperial preferences.[12]

The principal means employed by the USA to penetrate into Pakistan during those years, therefore, were channels which for one reason or another Great Britain could neither block nor use itself. The most important of these was economic "aid." The advance of the American monopolies into Pakistan, disguised as aid, was to a considerable degree furthered by the policy of the Muslim League government, which endeavoured to solve the economic difficulties experienced by the country not by strictly limiting the unproductive expenditure of the propertied classes, but by reducing still further the already low living standard of the working people, and by attracting foreign capital. In his opening address delivered on September 8, 1949, at the meeting of the Pakistani Council of Industries, Liaquat Ali Khan called upon foreign businessmen to invest their capital in the economy of Pakistan. Similar appeals were repeatedly made by him later as well. A mission of American industrial experts and a group of US senators arrived in Pakistan in the autumn of the same year. In February 1950 a mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was controlled by US monopolists, visited Karachi. In August 1950 the government of Pakistan asked the International Bank for a loan of 750 million rupees.[13]

On December 10, 1949, in an effort to strengthen the American position in Pakistan, President Truman invited Liaquat Ali Khan to visit the USA. This visit took place in May 1950. During his stay in the United States Liaquat Ali Khan tried to secure American economic "aid" for Pakistan and to obtain arms and military supplies; he also sought to enlist the support of the USA in regard to the disputes with India. The result of this visit was a US-Pakistani agreement on the purchase of American military equipment, signed in December 1950. It was the first step which Pakistan took towards joining the system of military blocs.

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[12] For further details, see С.А. Кузьмин, „К вопросу об империалистических противоречиях в Пакистане", *Советское востоковедение*, 1958, No. 3, стр. 74-82

[13] *Chronology of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1957, p. 56.

To increase their influence in Pakistan, the ruling circles of the USA made the most of the pan-Islamic aspirations of Pakistan's leaders. With this aim in view the USA actively supported the convocation of Muslim conferences which were to prepare the ground for the creation of a bloc of Muslim states under the ægis of the imperialist powers, directed against the peace-loving and socialist countries. The Muslim League played an active part in organising these conferences, hoping thereby to strengthen its prestige in the Muslim world and to take the helm in the Muslim bloc which was to be set up.

The first All-Muslim conference was held in Karachi in 1949. Soon after, an International Islamic Committee was established in the same city. Subsequently, Choudhury Khaliquazzaman, who was at that time President of the Muslim League of Pakistan, proposed the creation of Islamistan, that is, a confederation of Muslim states.[14] The propaganda for Islamistan was supported by the bourgeois press in the United States and Great Britain. The International Islamic Economic Conferences—the first was held in Karachi in 1949 and the second in Teheran in 1950—pursued the same object, namely, the creation of a bloc of Muslim countries. The first of these conferences decided to set up an International Islamic Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The distinctive mark of these conferences was the desire to establish closer relations with specialised international organisation that served as channels for the political and economic influence of the American monopolies.

However, the officials in charge of the US foreign policy, assisted by the ruling clique of Pakistan, tried in vain to set up an Islamistan dependent on the imperialist camp. Their plan was wrecked above all by the peoples of the Muslim countries, who realised the true nature of the proposed bloc and stood up against it. The fight of the American and British monopolies for dominating positions in the proposed bloc contributed to its failure and so did the fact that the governments of several Muslim states repudiated the pretensions of Pakistan's governing clique to the leadership of the Muslim world.

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[14] *Islamic Review*, Woking, December 1949.

The dependence of the ruling circles of Pakistan on the Western powers was during the period under review also demonstrated by their attitude towards a number of international problems. In June 1950 the government of Pakistan backed American aggression in Korea, and in October of the same year it supported the provocative resolution that was adopted by the pro-imperialist majority in the United Nations, sanctioning the crossing of the frontier of the Korean People's Republic by the armies of the interventionists. Speaking on this subject, Liaquat Ali Khan declared in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on October 11, 1950 that the 38th parallel "has never been recognised by the General Assembly as a permanent boundary line." He went on to assert that "the only logical course... open to the United Nations, was to bring the whole of Korea under UN control." [15]

The Leaders of Pakistan attempted to play the part of the friendly intermediary in Asia to the advantage of the Western powers, particularly in the conflicts which arose between Great Britain and several countries in the Near and Middle East, e. g., Egypt and Iran, where the British imperialists endeavoured to consolidate their shaky positions. But these attempts merely undermined the prestige of Pakistan and tended to reduce its influence in the Muslim world, especially because of the anti-imperialist views prevalent in a number of Arab states. [16]

Democratic public opinion in Pakistan opposed the increasing influence of the imperialist circles on the foreign policy of the country. On the initiative of the Pakistan Trade Union Federation, the Progressive Writers Association, the Democratic Federation of Women and other mass organisations, Peace Committees were set up in all important centres of the country, which went into action energetically, exposing the plots of the imperialist warmongers. [17] The population of Pakistan expressed their sympathy with the Korean people and condemned American intervention in Korea and the foreign policy of the Muslim League at numerous meetings. [18] During the debate on foreign affairs in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Shaukat Hayat Khan pointed out that "not less than 99 per cent of the newspapers clearly indicated their disapproval of the policy of the Pakistan Government with regard to Korea." [19]

The movement for a policy of positive neutralism and friendship with all countries was growing in Pakistan.

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[15] *The Pakistan Times*, October 12, 1950.

[16] P. Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, London, 1958, p. 229.

[17] *The Pakistan Times*, August, 1, 4, 5, 1950.

[18] *Ibid.*, August 11, 12, 1950.

[19] *Ibid.*, October 12, 1950.

PART THREE

PAKISTAN 1951-1955

Chapter XII

THE FIGHT OVER THE NEW CONSTITUTION. THE ANTI-AHMADIYA MOVEMENT

Economic Difficulties of 1951-1953

The intrinsic contradictions of Pakistan's economic and political development did not rise to the surface with full force in the first few years after partition (1947-1950). Neither did the undemocratic nature of the policies pushed through by the governing Muslim League. The early period stood apart from the subsequent years: unity prevailed in the governing bloc, at least on the face of it. The opposition parties were very weak, while the influence commanded by the Muslim League over the masses was still great. But in 1951 the antagonisms within the ruling camp burst to the surface in the country's political affairs and the opposition parties gradually gained a massive foothold.

In 1951-1953 Pakistan experienced grave economic difficulties, from which stemmed the mounting political contradictions, growing popular discontent, the scrimmage within the governing camp, and the first political crisis in the country's history.

The food problem was the keenest of the difficulties. The natural annual accession of the Pakistan population was fairly high, while food production did not increase substantially due to the general stagnation of farming. As a matter of fact, in 1951-1953 food output had a distinct tendency to drop. [1] The decrease in food-grain production was due largely to the crop failures of 1950-1951 and 1951-1952 and to reduction in the water supply in the main food-growing regions of West Pakistan owing to the derangement of the Indus irrigation system after the partition. [2]

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[1] The aggregate wheat output decreased from 3,950,000 tons in 1950-51 to 2,438,000 tons in 1952-53. The respective figures for bajra were 385,000 and 270,000, for jowar 243,000 and 209,000, maize 384,000 and 375,000, oats 144,000 and 112,000, gram 791,000 and 370,000 and rice 8,195,000 and 8,147,000 tons (*Statistical Bulletin*, Karachi, August, December 1953).

[2] The water supply in the Indus area dropped an average 10 per cent from 1951-52 to 1952-53, 30 per cent in the Bari area, and 39 per cent in the Sutlej area (*Sixth Year of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1953, p. 12).

In 1951-1952 and 1952-1953 famine broke out in some of the areas and food prices increased three- to fourfold.[3] Grain profiteering and the black market assumed the proportions of a national disaster.

In July 1952, a conference of representatives of provinces and States convened in Karachi to discuss the food problem, and a committee was formed to promote food production. However, since the agrarian problem hung fire, its results were disappointing. In 1951-1952 and 1952-1953 the average annual food shortages amounted to 1,250,000 tons.

Unable to mitigate the situation with their own resources, the ruling classes turned to the expedient of increasing grain imports. The average annual grain imports between 1947 and 1952 amounted to 112,400 tons. In 1952 they mounted to 322,900 tons, and to as much as 1,189,300 tons in 1953.[4]

Food imports complicated the financial problem. The acute drop in the prices of Pakistan industrial crops in foreign markets, due to the end of the boom after the Korean war, was another cause and a no less prominent one, of the budget difficulties and the balance of payments deficit in 1951-1953. Jute prices dropped 50 per cent and cotton prices 40 per cent between 1951-1952 and 1953-1954. As a result, revenue from jute and cotton exports shrank almost to half, while their physical volume continued to grow steadily.[5] Pakistan's losses, incurred from non-equivalent exchange, climbed from 301 million rupees in 1952-1953 to 526 million in 1953-1954.[6]

The cotton and jute sales problem could easily have been resolved by extending economic relations with countries of the socialist camp. The Pakistan governing groups, however, sought to combat the difficulties by expanding economic contacts with the United States. Trade with the socialist countries was negligible, as before.[7]

Advances in industrial production, whose index more than trebled between 1950 and 1953, did not improve the economic situation to any marked extent. They chiefly concerned the light industries, and the people paid for them dearly. The government introduced a protectionist policy and curtailed imports of consumer goods, while raising prices on locally-produced wares. Industrial development depended mostly on foreign "assistance", which added largely to Pakistan's financial dependence on the imperialist powers.[8]

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[3] *Sixth Year of Pakistan*, pp. 12-14.

[4] For details about Pakistan's food problem, see В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, Москва, 1958, стр. 48; С. А. Кузьмин, *Экономическое развитие Пакистана и внешний рынок*, Москва, 1960, стр. 18.

[5] Cotton exports increased from 196,000 tons in 1951-52 to 213,000 tons in 1953-54, while those of jute increased accordingly from 872,000 to 932,000 tons. In terms of cash, however, cotton export decreased from Rs. 777,500,000 to 497,300,000 and those of jute from Rs. 996,000,000 to 556,000,000 (*Statistical Bulletin*, August 1953, pp. 473-474; August 1955, p. 842).

[6] See С. А. Кузьмин, *Экономическое развитие Пакистана и внешний рынок*, стр. 28.

[7] *Statistical Bulletin*, August 1953, August 1955.

The financial and food difficulties assumed such vast proportions by 1953 that Pakistan's politicians and the press were compelled to admit an economic crisis.

The "Rawalpindi Conspiracy" and the Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan

The discontent of the country's democratic forces over the policies of the ruling bloc spread to increasingly greater sections of the population. The strike movement increased again, due to the rise of the cost of living in many of the big cities after the temporary drop of 1950. In 1951, 64 strikes involving 22,800 workers took place in Pakistan. In 1952 the figures increased to 95 and 28,000, respectively. More than half the strikes occurred in East Pakistan, while in West Pakistan the workers of Karachi stood in the forefront.[9]

But it was not until 1954 that the labour movement attained the scale of 1948-1949. This was due to the prevailing split in the trade-union movement and to the arrests of the finest working-class leaders — Communists and progressive trade unionists.

In 1951-1952, US trade unionists began to take an interest in the Pakistan trade-union movement. Dick Deverall, Representative-in-Asia of the American Federation of Labour, visited the country in 1952 and called on the Pakistan trade unions to seek settlements of labour conflicts by negotiation with the management, and to adopt the US and West European collective bargaining as a model.[10]

There were no joint manifestations by workers of different trade-union centres, no solidarity strikes and no political strikes of any importance until the summer of 1953. The anti-feudal unrest in 1951-1953 bore only a remote resemblance to the peasant movement of 1948-1950 in East Bengal.

As noted earlier, the enforcement of the early tenancy acts gave rise to illusions among the small peasant proprietors and occupancy tenants. It was the share-croppers and agricultural labourers who benefited the least from these acts. Heritable rights of tenancy for share-croppers became the chief demand of the peasant unions. The Sind Hari Committee was the most influential among them. It was highly active among tenants and headed organised peasant manifestations demanding the abolition of the zamindari and jagirdari systems without compensation. Occupancy tenure for the *hari* was another of their demands.

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[8] Pakistan's industrial development is described at greater length in Chapter XVI.

[9] In 1952, East Pakistan accounted for 12,300 of the total 28,000 strikers, while Karachi accounted for 10,600 (*Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, Karachi, [s. a.], p. 41).

[10] *Pakistan Labour Year Book, 1954*, p. 40.

The emergence of class consciousness among working people, and the class struggle itself, proceeded in a very difficult environment. The difficulties left over by the colonial regime, and those caused by the anti-democratic policy of the Muslim League, persisted throughout 1951-1953. The wave of wholesale arrests which struck the Communist movement in 1951, impeded the efforts of the revolutionary forces to gain leadership over the working-class and peasant movements. Reformist tendencies were very strong in the industrial trade unions, and in the peasant unions.

Yet working people began to take a greater part at that point in the general democratic movement, which rose to marked prominence in the country's political affairs. The bourgeois and landlord parties opposed to the Muslim League began appealing to the masses too. The contradictions within the governing camp, which developed unnoticeably in Jinnah's lifetime and in the early years of Liaquat Ali Khan's premiership, burst to the surface in 1951-1953.

The struggle between the various bourgeois and landlord groups also had a distinct bearing on the position of the League. Its provincial organisations in East Pakistan, in Sind, and even in the Punjab, criticised the central leadership. The discontent also spread to the army officers. Apart from their purely personal ambitions and claims to ministerial portfolios, the opposition was prompted by more serious considerations. Many members of the big bourgeoisie were incensed by the predominance of the British monopolies in the country's economy. They were eager to extend the sphere of application for their own capital, to create their own light industry, and objected to the country's fulfilling its outstanding colonial obligations to Britain. While opposing Pakistan's dependence on Britain, they sought close connections with the United States and counted on aid from the US monopolies.

In 1951-1953 Anglo-American rivalry in Pakistan exerted a strong influence on both the external and internal policy of its governing classes.

The opposition to Liaquat Ali Khan's cabinet, which materialised within the government camp in 1951 and went down in history as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy,[11] was headed by General Akbar

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[11] Most of the members of the opposition were arrested at Rawalpindi.

Khan. He represented the interests of the young officers who were dissatisfied with the dominance of the British in the Pakistan army, the corruption of British military officials and the failure of the British to live up to their arms delivery undertakings[12]. The opposition to the government by officers who were strongly influenced by the democratic movement seriously alarmed the ruling bloc and the imperialist circles supporting it. Liaquat Ali Khan rightly feared that in conditions of the mounting democratic movement political opposition could bring about the fall of his cabinet.

On March 9, 1951, he issued an order for the arrest of Akbar Khan and eleven other officers, whom he accused of conspiring "to create commotion in the country by violent means and to subvert the loyalty of Pakistan defence forces."[13]

At the same time reactionary elements in and outside Pakistan did everything in their power to picture the Pakistan Communists as the secret moving spirits and organisers of the "conspiracy" and, using this as a pretext, to crush the growing democratic movement.

Sajjad Zaheer, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Pakistan, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, the famous poet and editor of the opposition *Pakistan Times*, and Mohammad Husain Ata, a prominent trade-unionist, were put on trial on trumped-up charges.[14] By decision of the Constituent Assembly the case was turned over to a special tribunal and heard *in camera*, without a jury, in a Hyderabad prison (Sind). Members of the tribunal, as well as all the witnesses, were warned that action would be brought against them in a military court if they divulged the materials of the prosecution.[15]

The Muslim League leadership took advantage of the situation to pounce on the leaders of the progressive movement, who had no relation whatsoever to the Rawalpindi case.

Though the defendants were denied the right to have a defense counsel and summon witnesses, the charge of high treason levelled against Sajjad Zaheer, Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Mohammad Husain Ata could not be proved[16].

It was also very difficult to establish the degree of guilt devolving upon the members of the military opposition.[17]

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[12] *Chronology of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1957, p. 69.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Crossroads*, New Delhi, January 11, 1953.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Crossroads*, November 14, 1951; January 11, March 23, 1953.

[17] Since the trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy was held behind closed doors, the range of available sources is limited to brief information given in Pakistan official handbooks and to very scanty reports in both the Indian and Pakistan press.

The eleven Pakistan officers were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to seven years, while General Akbar Khan was sentenced to exile for 12 years. The sentences were unusually mild for officers who had committed high treason, and unusually hard if they were to be regarded as persons guilty of nothing but political opposition to the government, customary in bourgeois countries.[18]

At the same time, making the most of the trial proceeding behind closed doors, the Muslim League leaders sentenced Sajjad Zaheer, Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Mohammad Husain Ata to four years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of 500 rupees or one years's rigorous imprisonment in default, for "breaking public peace" (under section 121-A, PPC).

Many trade-unionists accused of political opposition were arrested and fined. It was announced that any trade union making public statements of a political nature would be dissolved. To avoid arrest and safeguard their organisations, many independent radical trade-union groups were compelled to announce officially that, like the All-Pakistan Confederation of Labour, they were merely working to improve the economic situation of the working class, and that they had no relation to politics.[19]

From the point of view of the governing group, the "Rawalpindi Conspiracy" case was a total success. The democratic forces were left without their finest leaders, and persons opposed to Liaquat Ali Khan were removed from the army.

But political opposition was not confined to a few generals and officers. Opposition parties won influence over fairly broad sections of the population, as illustrated, among other things, by the elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1951.

In spite of the anti-democratic electoral system inherited from the colonial period, the Muslim League polled only 52 per cent of the votes and gained 143 of the 194 seats. The Jinnah Awami Muslim League, an opposition party, polled 18.3 per cent of the votes and gained 29 seats.[20] The Azad Pakistan Party polled two per cent of the votes and won one seat. In Lahore, the opposition won 6 of the 12 seats.[21]

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[18] *Crossroads*, September 14, 1951, January 11, 1953.

[19] *Pakistan Labour Year Book*, 1954, p. 39.

[20] The Jinnah Awami Muslim League was established in January 1951 when two political bodies, the Awami Muslim League led by H. S. Suhrawardy and Maulana A. H. Bhashani, amalgamated with the Jinnah Muslim League headed by I. H. K. Mamdot and Mian Iftikhar Husain Khan. The amalgamation was prompted by the wish of the respective leaders to join efforts in combatting the Muslim League.

[21] K. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, London, 1957, p. 55; *Dawn*. Karachi, April 12, 1951; *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, April 11-13, 1951.

The outcome of the elections alarmed the Muslim League leadership. It showed once again that Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's successor and the "architect of Pakistan," did not have as strong a hold on the country as he would wish.

In spite of the temporary dismissal of anti-British officers from leading posts in the army, the "Rawalpindi Conspiracy" tended to discredit Britain among the ruling groups. Liaquat Ali Khan was conscious of this and tried to reinforce his position by reshaping his formerly pro-British foreign policy. Pakistani statesmen paid a visit to the United States in the summer of 1951, soon after the members of the army opposition were put on trial, to establish closer contacts between the two countries. But this about-face, which displeased Great Britain, Liaquat Ali Khan's old friend and protector, proved of no avail.

On October 16, 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated at Rawalpindi by a follower of the Jamaat-i Islami, an Afghan by the name of Said Akbar. [22] After Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan was the most influential and experienced leader of the Muslim League. His assassination was a painful loss to Pakistan's ruling classes. None of their nominees, who succeeded him, were able to maintain themselves in power for more than one or two years. On the day of Liaquat Ali Khan's funeral, ex-Governor-General Khwaja Nazimuddin was appointed head of the new government, and Ghulam Mohammad was made Governor-General.[23]

The investigation of Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination dragged out for over a year. The evidence, like the documents of the "Rawalpindi Conspiracy," was not made public. However, information that leaked into the press indicated that both the British and American secret services were implicated. It also indicated that the fanatical mullahs and ulamas were involved in the assassination. They were outraged by Liaquat Ali Khan's attitude at the time of the drafting of the Pakistan Constitution.

Political Strife Over the Constitution Project

Unlike neighbouring India, where the Constitution of the independent Republic came into force in 1950, Pakistan was until 1956 governed by legislation passed during the colonial period. The discussion of the drafts of a Pakistan Constitution began as late as 1950.

Acute political conflicts broke out in the course of the drawing up and discussion of the constitution projects. Progressives called for a constitution that would ensure the country's sovereignty, create objective conditions for its independent economic development, and guarantee the democratic rights of all citizens.[24] Mian Iftikharuddin, leader of the opposition and head of the Azad Pakistan Party, was their spokesman in the Constituent Assembly. The parliamentary faction of the Pakistan National Congress, which largely represented the interests of the Hindu minority, attacked the various drafts of the constitution as well. But the opposition did not command a decisive vote. A strong majority in the Constituent Assembly, formed on an undemocratic basis, was held by the Muslim League, the ruling party.

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[22] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 21.

[23] *Chronology of Pakistan*, p. 75.

Yet the League itself was not united on many issues of the future constitutional arrangement. The interests of the various groups within the governing classes conflicted when the original proposals of the Basic Principles Committee [25] were submitted in an Interim Report to the Constituent Assembly in September 1950.

The basic principles spelled out in these proposals were founded on Liaquat Ali Khan's resolution on the nature of the Pakistan state and the basic civil rights. [26] They envisaged a secular democratic republic, federal in structure, granting complete autonomy to the constituent administrative units and guaranteeing every Muslim equal opportunities to live his life in accordance with the injunctions of Islam. All citizens would be guaranteed "fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality." [27]

In themselves, many of these principles conformed to the wishes of the bulk of the population to make Pakistan, newly relieved of its colonial status, an independent democratic state. At the same time, they were all religiously slanted, ministering to the religious prejudices rife among the masses and promoting the theory of the supra-class nature of a state based on the injunctions of the Quran, a theory advanced earlier by the Muslim League to enhance its influence prior to the establishment of Pakistan.

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[24] Cf., *The Pakistan Times*, September, October 1950; امروز (*Imroze*), October 1952, January-February 1953; نیا ہندوستان (*Naya Hindustan*), January-February 1953.

[25] The Basic Principles Committee was formed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949 of 25 deputies, headed by Assembly President Tazimuddin Khan. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was Vice-Chairman, and most of its other members were ministers of either the central or provincial governments. Throughout its existence (1950-1954) only one Muslim member of the opposition and three members of the religious minorities took part. The Committee had three subcommittees: one handling the federal and provincial arrangements, another handling matters concerning the electoral system, and the third handling legal matters (*Report of the Basic Principles Committee*, Karachi, 1952, pp. 1-11).

[26] The so-called Objective Resolution on the principles of the future constitution was submitted by Liaquat Ali Khan and adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1949.

[27] *Report of the Basic Principles Committee*, p. 1.

But when the makers of the constitution began to mould these definitive principles into a concrete constitutional scheme, they could not help betraying their true goals, which were far removed from the country's national interests. In all matters concerning the participation of citizens in the administration of the state and the functions of the legislative and executive bodies, the proposals of the Basic Principles Committee essentially duplicated the provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935. Speaking about the proposed constitution, an opposition member of the Constituent Assembly remarked caustically, "So far as this Constitution is concerned, if Mr. Churchill had been the Leader of this House (which God forbid), he would have drawn up just such a constitution." [28]

Many Muslim League members even described the implications of the Interim Report as undemocratic and reactionary. [29]

The greatest differences within the League's parliamentary faction arose over the distribution of seats among provinces in the future legislative bodies, and over the terms of reference of the central and provincial governments, and the state language.

The East Pakistan deputies, discontented with the domination of the Punjab landlords and the big "alien" bourgeoisie, levelled strong criticism at the report of the Basic Principles Committee. They had ample grounds for dissatisfaction. According to the proposed draft, East Pakistan with more than half of the country's population would not have the corresponding number of seats in the central legislative bodies, and its parliamentary faction in the Constituent Assembly would be no more than a minority group.

Urdu, a language foreign to the Bengalis—one of the best developed nations of the subcontinent—was to be Pakistan's sole state language.

As a result, many of the East Pakistan deputies to the Constituent Assembly supported the demands of the left-wing opposition.

There was also a right-wing opposition to the draft constitution, headed by leaders of various Muslim religious organisations. The mullahs and ulamas were incensed by its secular nature. They contended that it had departed from the injunctions of Islam, and called for the establishment of a theocratic Muslim state. Their sermons were popular among the people. The mullahs and ulamas went to the villages, the town quarters of artisans, and to the schools, where they related in a simple and intelligible manner, in the vernacular, that the Quran maintained the universal equality of all people before Allah, championed equitable distribution of social benefits, and that for this reason its dogma should serve as a basis for the new constitution.

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[28] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 92.

[29] *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan*, Debates, Vol. VIII, p. 181; K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 90.

Their message reached the hearts of the Muslims and enabled the preachers to steer the popular discontent into religious channels. The propaganda of their reactionary views was far more skilful and consistent than that of the Pakistan politicians, who favoured a democracy along European lines. The mullahs and ulamas argued that since the religious principle had been instrumental in the formation of Pakistan, the latter's political system had naturally to be governed by religious precepts.

The upper crust of the Muslim divines was bent on assuming control over Pakistan's machinery of state. Its intervention in domestic and foreign policy and its struggle for power, the so-called mullaism,[30] gravely imperilled the country's normal political life in 1951-1953, and raised an additional obstacle to its development.

The ulamas appealed quite effectively to the religious prejudices of the masses, accusing their political opponents of departing from the injunctions of Islam and the commandments of Jinnah.

Sharp criticism from Left and Right compelled the Constituent Assembly to reject the Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee, and to instruct the newly formed Special Committee to consider the various constitutional drafts and the proposals of the socio-political and religious communal organisations.

Thirty-three distinguished Pakistani ulamas gathered in Karachi to work out the new constitution of an Islamic republic. In its first three months, the Special Committee received more than a thousand drafts and amendments from various ulamas and religious communal organisations. Abul Ala Maudoodi, leader of the Jamaat-i Islami, alone submitted three different drafts of the constitution.[31] All of them made political affairs subject to the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah, and assigned the decisive vote in the deliberation of political problems to a council of ulamas. Some ulamas clamoured for a theocratic state, to be headed by the most revered and pious leader of the Muslim divines.

But most members of the Committee opposed theocratic power emphatically. Liaquat Ali Khan referred openly to the perils of mullaism. In the election to the Punjab Legislative Assembly, the Muslim League followed Liaquat Ali Khan's suggestion and opposed the Rightist religious-communal parties. Liaquat Ali Khan also backed the supporters of European bourgeois freedoms and the granting of equal rights and suffrage to women. His wife was one of the first to take off the veil, and founded the All-Pakistan Women's Association.

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[30] Cf., Fareed S. Jafri, "Pakistan. Growth of an Ideology," *Pakistan Standard Sunday Magazine*, February 13, 1955, p. 1.

[31] A. Maudoodi, *The Quadiani Problem*, Karachi, 1956, pp. 4-5.

During his trip to the United States, where he went with his wife in defiance of the ancient Muslim custom, Liaquat Ali Khan declared he would not let Pakistan become a theocratic state and would work for a constitution along Western lines.[32] These utterances sealed his fate. The leading Muslim ulamas joined the elements discontented with Liaquat Ali Khan's foreign policy, and found an assassin amidst their most fanatical followers.

The new Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, seemed to conform perfectly to the wishes of the Muslim mullahs and ulamas. He was a veteran politician, known for his piety; he performed all the rituals of worship, read passages from the Quran every morning and evening, observed the Ramadan and, as every devout Muslim should, made the *hadj*, or pilgrimage, to Mecca. His wife never lifted the veil. He, too, never put on Western clothes and required the members of his family to observe all Muslim customs and rites. He could be expected to make concessions to the Muslim ulamas, and his first steps as Prime Minister bore out this opinion. An understanding was reached through his intercession between members of the Basic Principles Committee and a board of ulamas (Talima-at-i Islamia). In August 1952 the Basic Principles Committee finally approved the draft of the Pakistan constitution.[33]

The 1949 resolution served as its preamble, comprising some principles of bourgeois democracy and the so-called Islamic equality. A special provision assured state concern for the welfare of "the man in the street." But in fact the draft did not contain a trace of true democracy.

Separate representation, a disgraceful survival of the colonial past, was retained for elections to the federal bicameral parliament and the provincial bodies. The distribution of seats in the central legislative body, suggested in 1950, was also retained, giving an advantage to the Punjab bourgeois and landlord group over the other national groups, and especially over the Bengalis. Urdu was declared the sole state language. The head of state was to be elected by the Federal Parliament, and his terms of reference were extremely broad, as before.

The new proposals, like the old, provided for the sanctity of private property, including the vast landed estates and the property of the foreign monopolies in Pakistan. Many of Pakistan's commitments to Britain were reaffirmed, though they had come down from the colonial period. Pakistan remained within the British Commonwealth.

Publication of the draft evoked protests from various public and political organisations, and many individuals. The report roused objections among all educated sections of the nation, wrote the *Pakistan Standard*.[34] The Communist Party, and the Azad Pakistan criticised it sharply in the opposition press.

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[32] *Pakistan Standard Sunday Magazine*, February 13, 1955, p. 1.
[33] *Report of the Basic Principles Committee*, p. (i).

The strongest objections were roused by the separate electorates system.[35] The progressives called for an immediate general electioni to a new Constituent Assembly and the prompt adoption of a constitution. But as before, the Constituent Assembly turned a deaf ear to these demands.

The makers of the Constitution ignored the views of the country's democratic forces, while making concessions to the Rightist opposition The Pakistan state was to be named an Islamic republic, and the head of the state had to be a Muslim. By Nazimuddin's consent, a clause was included, granting mullahs and ulamas the official privilege of interceding in the work of the legislative organs: "The Head of the State should constitute, for a period of five years, a Board consisting of not more than five persons well versed in Islamic Laws.... When a Bill is discussed in a House of the Federal Legislature, if any Muslim member raises an objection, at any stage of the discussion, that the Bill or any provision thereof is in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 3, the Chairman of the House should record that objection."[36] Thereafter, the Bill was to be returned to the legislature for reconsideration in line with the judgement of the Board.

But, though eager to reach an understanding with the orthodox ulamas, Khwaja Nazimuddin was not inclined to surrender full powers to them. A reservation was made that the judgement of the Board was not obligatory to the National Assembly.[37]

Many important government offices were held under Nazimuddin by members of the Ahmadiya sect, who were ideological adversaries of the orthodox ulamas.

The Prime Minister was between two fires. The advocates of a constitution along Western lines were displeased by his concessions to the mullahs and ulamas, and the latter insisted that the concessions were too few. The pious Prime Minister was accused of heresy.

Religious dissent added to the troubles of a country racked by economic and foreign policy difficulties, and national and class contradictions. In spring 1953, quite unexpectedly it would seem, the entire combination of internal and external contradictions assumed a markedly religious complexion.

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[34] *Pakistan Standard Sunday Magazine*, February 13, 1955, p. 3.

[35] For details, see В. Н. Москаленко, «Политическая обстановка и проблема всеобщих выборов в Пакистане», *Пакистан. История и экономика*, Москва, 1959, стр. 202-203.

[36] *Report of the Basic Principles Committee*, p. 4. Paragraph 3 reads, "No Legislature should enact any law which is repugnant to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah" (*ibid.*).

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

Anti-Ahmadiya Agitation and Outbreak of a Political Crisis

The movement against the Nazimuddin government started by the religious communal parties took advantage of the general discontent and developed into mass actions against the Ahmadiya sect. It has gone down in history as the anti-Ahmadiya agitation. The anti-government campaign was headed by the Ahrars and the Jamaat-i Islami society, which strove to give it a religious complexion. They called for the revival of the original purity of Quran dogma, above all the thesis about the exclusiveness and finality of Mohammad's prophecies, which the Ahmadiyas, or Quadianis, who worshipped Ahmad Quadiani as the new prophet and Mohammad's successor, denied.[38] *Khatm-i nabuwat* (the last prophecy) was the motto of the Ahrars and the Jamaat-i Islami.

The Ahmadiyas were accused of trying to create a state within a state, to convert orthodox Muslims to their faith, and employ the Pakistan machinery of state for their own sectarian ends.

There were ample grounds for these charges. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan the Ahmadiya sect became highly militant. In 1948, through its Caliph, Mullah Bashir ud-Din, it announced the *tabligh*, a campaign for the conversion of Pakistan's people, including the orthodox Sunnites, to its faith. Ahmadiya areas were to be founded within Pakistan to further the campaign, and Baluchistan was to be the first such area. It was planned to complete the campaign by 1952. The Ahmadiya leaders, and *Al Fazl*, an Ahmadiya publication, said in just so many words that Pakistan's state machine should be used in the interests of the sect.[39]

The Ahmadiyas were highly active in 1952. They held many important offices, including the Cabinet post of Foreign Minister (Zafrullah Khan). The Ahmadiya top section, which consisted of Muslim bureaucrats, big landlords and merchants of West Pakistan, did not stint promises of social improvement. Its programme documents referred to social justice, voluntary taxation of the rich to help the poor, and establishment of goodwill and understanding between the various classes.[40]

The Ahmadiya merchants and industrialists sought to use their sectarian organisation to promote their business. They enjoyed communal credits, and their programme documents encouraged the investment of sect funds, voluntarily contributed by its members, in commerce and industry.[41]

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[38] After the partition of India, the Ahmadiyas shifted their activities to West Pakistan.

[39] A. Maudoodi, *The Quadiani Problem*, pp. 20-21; *Report of the Court of Inquiry of Pakistan*, [s. l.], 1953, pp. 199-201; Burney, *The Quadiani Movement*, [s. l.], 1955, p. 90.

[40] Bashir ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, *The New World Order of Islam. Tahrik-i jadid*, Quadian, 1945, p. 90.

The hostile bourgeois and landlord groups regarded the advancement of the Ahmadiyas as a threat to their own rights and privileges. In 1952-1953, therefore, the problem of combatting religious heresy forged to the forefront. But the religious cloak could not entirely cover and conceal the mundane ambitions and interests of its wearers. The Quadiani community, wrote Maudoodi, opposed the Muslims as an independent group in government service, trade, industry and agriculture.[42] That, indeed, was what troubled Maudoodi and his followers most.

Inter-imperialist rivalries, too, were a fairly prominent element in the anti-Ahmadiya disturbances. The Jamaat-i Islami, which then favoured closer bonds between Pakistan and the United States, for example, blamed the Ahmadiyas for their old-time connections with Britain. One of the chief charges made by the Ahmadiyas' opponents against the founders and leaders of the Ahmadiya movement was their allegiance to the British, said the Chief Justice of Rawalpindi during the court proceedings in relation to the anti-Ahmadiya agitation.[43] The anti-Ahmadiya movement reflected the irritation of some of Pakistan's big bourgeoisie which gravitated towards the United States, over the maintenance of the old ties with Britain. The United States, too, applied its efforts to eliminate pro-British elements from the government, and to replace them with more amenable politicians.[44] Speaking at the Constituent Assembly, Khwaja Nazimuddin declared that "the anti-Ahmadiya agitation is a political movement actuated by power-politics."[45]

But whatever the underlying motives of the organisers of the anti-Ahmadiya agitation—motives largely unknown to the public—the charges of corruption and pro-British sentiment which they levelled at the Ahmadiya bureaucracy met with general approval. Economic difficulties and the continuously mounting discontent over the government's policies created fertile soil for unrest.

The support extended by the religious communal bodies to some of the progressive public actions in Pakistan in 1952 and 1953 (the biggest of which was the protest campaign against the massacre of a students' demonstration in Karachi in January 1953)[46] won them considerable popularity. But the leaders of the Ahrars and the Jamaat-i Islami did not want the progressive political organisations to head the campaign of protest against the reactionary policies of the government, for they feared that it would develop into a mass struggle for general democratic and class goals. So they hastened to take the initiative to restrict the movement to religious forms and to steer it not against the ruling camp as a whole, but against just some of its groups.

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[41] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[42] A. Maudoodi, *The Quadiani Problem*, p. 17.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[44] The trial revealed that Jamaat-i Islami was financed by US agents. Witnesses refused to give their names publicly, fearing international complications.

[45] *Chronology of Pakistan*, pp. 94, 95.

[46] For details, see В. Н. Москаленко, «Молодежное движение в Пакистане», *Краткие сообщения Института народов Азии АН СССР*, Москва, выпуск XIII, 1961, стр. 111.

In early 1953, during the discussion of the draft constitution, the Ahrars and the Jamaat-i Islami demanded that the government: (1) officially proclaim the Ahmadiyas a sect and a religious minority, so they would not get more than one seat in the future Legislative Assembly, (2) remove Zafrullah Khan from the office of Foreign Minister because of his Ahmadiya connections, and (3) dismiss all other Ahmadiyas from government offices.[47] These demands were political and reflected the struggle within the ruling camp between various bourgeois and landlord groups. Khwaja Nazimuddin, too, was accused of belonging to the Ahmadiya community.

In February 1953, an all-Pakistan conference of Muslim religious-communal parties formed the so-called Action Committee on the suggestion of the Ahrars to combat the Ahmadiyas, and announced a mass civil disobedience campaign in West Pakistan.[48] The campaign was supported by many of the opposition papers. The sermons of the Ahrar leader, Ataullah Shah Bokhari, who was considered one of Pakistan's best speakers, were very popular.

The leaders of the anti-Ahmadiya movement succeeded in winning the artisans, a section of workers employed at small-scale industrial establishments, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and the students of West Pakistan, and particularly of the Punjab. Mass anti-government *hartals* were held in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Multan, Sialkot and many other towns. Demonstrators raided government institutions, obstructed the postal and telegraph services, damaged railway tracks, stopped trains and buses, set up pickets, but in most cases simply destroyed and plundered shops, warehouses and offices owned by Ahmadiyas.[49]

The anti-Ahmadiya agitation was a kind of outlet for popular discontent. The situation in Lahore was especially tense, for the "direct actions" launched on March 2 by the All-Muslim Parties Convention against the Ahmadiyas upset peace and order, and business. Martial law was enforced in Lahore on March 6.[50] But the more widespread the anti-Ahmadiya agitation became, the clearer it was that the religious forms imposed on the anti-government movement were having a negative effect. The movement was joined by the *lumpen-proletarians*, of whom the bulk of the volunteer Ahrar detachments were composed. This injected an element of anarchy into the anti-government campaign.

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[47] A. Maudoodi, *The Quadiani Problem*, p. 3; Burney, *The Quadiani Movement*, p. 90.

[48] *Chronology of Pakistan*, pp. 92-93; *The Pakistan Times*, March 3, 1953.

[49] *The Pakistan Times*, March 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 20, 1953.

[50] *Chronology of Pakistan*, pp. 93-94.

Here and there bloody clashes occurred between religious fanatics, and there were wholesale anti-Ahmadiya riots. It was the masses who suffered most from these riots and from the disruption of normal business.

Due to the religious craze fanned by the communal parties an atmosphere of extreme mistrust arose in the workers' and artisans' quarters, and among the intelligentsia. This impeded the joint struggle of the working people and progressives against the domestic and foreign policies of the governing classes. Most of the progressive parties and organisations called on Pakistan's citizens to stay out of the religious disorders, while they continued to bitterly criticise the policy of the government.[51]

The Nazimuddin Cabinet made desperate efforts to stabilise the situation and retain power. It announced a new trade policy providing for greater imports of machinery to develop the national industries, banned grain exports by private persons and established price controls.[52] Furthermore, it announced that it would carry through in the Punjab the land reform planned by the late Liaquat Ali Khan's government.

The Ahrari and Jamaat-i Islami leaders were arrested and tried. M. M. Daultana, Prime Minister of the Punjab, was accused of condoning religious disturbances, and removed from office. A new provincial government was formed on April 3 under Malik Firoz Khan Noon.[53] But the government made the most of the situation to pounce on the country's democratic forces.

After martial law was proclaimed in Lahore, 597 people were arrested there, many of whom had no relation at all to the religious disturbances, but were suspected of working for the anti-government parties.[54]

But the days of the Nazimuddin government were running out. The country's progressives opposed his reactionary domestic and foreign policy and demanded his dismissal.

The Muslim League rulers, said opposition leader Mian Iftikharuddin during the Parliament debate on budget, "were responsible for creating civil war condition in the country. According to him, the reason for this crisis was Pakistan's submission to the decisions of the Commonwealth and selling away of national interest to Britain."[55]

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[51] *The Pakistan Times*, March 6, 1953.

[52] *Chronology of Pakistan*, p. 92. The new trade policy was announced on February 3, 1953. The government decided to allow barter transactions against "exportable commodities, particularty cotton," with any country. Imports against cotton and other exportable items were restricted to essential goods, like machinery, iron and steel, chemicals, drugs and medicines (for details, see С. А. Кузьмин, *Экономическое развитие Пакистана и внешний рынок*, стр. 52; Kuzmin erroneously refers the opening of the new import procedures to 1952).

[53] *The Pakistan Times*, March 20, 1953; *Chronology of Pakistan*, p. 96.

[54] *The Pakistan Times*, March 10, 1953.

On April 17, 1953, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed the Cabinet on the grounds that "the Cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country."[56] Nazimuddin's resignation was expedited by the cool reaction of the US State Department to his plea for wheat to prevent famine. The Ghulam Mohammad group, hostile to Nazimuddin, did not disguise its eagerness to alter Pakistan's pro-British foreign policy, and to establish closer links with the United States.

Mohammad Ali Bogra was selected to form a new cabinet. He was Pakistan's ex-Ambassador to the United States and an American favourite.[57]

The only thing that distinguished Mohammad Ali Bogra's government from that of Nazimuddin was its frankly pro-American course. None of the left-wing opposition leaders were included in the government, while six ministers of the previous cabinet retained offices.

The All-Pakistan Council of the Muslim League approved the Governor-General's move and backed the newly appointed Prime Minister. On September 21, 1953, Mohammad Ali Bogra was elected leader of the Muslim League Party in the Constituent Assembly, and was made President of the League on October 17.[58]

Mohammad Ali Bogra backed the reactionary draft constitution framed under his predecessors and had it passed by the Constituent Assembly. He suggested a new distribution of seats between East and West Pakistan in the central legislative body. His "formula" envisaged more seats (165 of 300) for East Bengal in the upper House, and, correspondingly, fewer seats in the lower, so that parity would be retained at joint sittings of the two Houses.[59] In addition, a series of fresh concessions was made to the right-wing opposition. On November 14, 1953, the Constituent Assembly approved the draft constitution as a whole.

The situation in the country remained tense. The actions of the working class in the summer of 1953 were better organised than before, and more mature in nature. There was a drift towards joint action by the various trade-union centres. A united front of workers belonging to 65 different trade unions was established in Karachi.

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[55] *The Pakistan Times*, March 19, 1953.

[56] *Chronology of Pakistan*, p. 96.

[57] *The Times*, London, October 22, 1954.

[58] *Chronology of Pakistan*, pp. 106-107.

[59] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 180; *New Age*, New Delhi, October 25, 1953.

The first solidarity strike in Pakistan's history was held on June 8 by 20,000 Karachi workers in support of striking tramway workers.[60] The number of strikes increased from 32 in 1950 to 86 in 1953, and the number of strikers mounted accordingly from 16,800 to 33,800. Over the same period the number of registered trade-union members increased from 393,000 to 424,500.[61] The workers made not only economic, but also political demands.

The political line of the new government failed to win the support of the masses. The progressive movement against the reactionary rule of the Muslim League leadership, begun at the time of Liaquat Ali Khan's government, grew more and more massive. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1953 mass meetings of workers in Karachi, Lahore and other big towns of West Pakistan backed the tenants' demands for occupancy rights, protested against the anti-democratic draft constitution and opposed the government's foreign policy.[62]

But the scope of the democratic movement was far greater in East Pakistan. The events that occurred there during the elections to the provincial Legislative Assembly in 1954, shook the pillars of the reactionary governing bloc.

Chapter XIII

THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN

The ruling bloc experienced an especially acute political crisis in East Pakistan, where the authority of the Muslim League was by the beginning of 1954 completely undermined. This was due to a number of reasons.

Owing to the inability of the ruling circles to solve the agrarian problem, East Pakistan suffered from a chronic deficiency of foodstuffs, and as a result of the poor harvest in 1952-1953 this deficiency developed into a real famine. Moreover, after a short-lived boom in connection with the Korean War, a sharp drop in the prices of agricultural raw materials produced in East Pakistan took place in 1953-1954 accompanied by a shortage of industrial commodities caused by the rupture of the traditional economic links with India and the fact that the governing group was principally interested in the development of commercial and financial relations with the Western countries.

Jute sown by peasants without the authorities' permission was destroyed.[1] The peasants, who formed the bulk of the population of the province, incurred a reduction in their income.

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[60] *New Age*, October 25, 1963.

[61] *Pakistan Labour Gazette*, 1957, No. 4, pp. 586-587.

[62] *Crossroads*, March 1, 5, 1953; *New Age*, October 25, 1953.

[1] *Dawn*, Karachi, July 13, 1953.

The shortage of food and industrial goods was utilised by West Pakistani merchants and local Marwaris, the kings of the black market, for speculations on the home market often carried on with the connivance and the support of the authorities. This led to a rise in the cost of living index in East Pakistan and worsened the conditions of the peasants, the craftsmen and the working class.[2]

Local handicraft production was undermined by the competition of industrial commodities that were either produced in East Pakistan in factories built by West Pakistani merchants, or imported both from abroad and, in ever increasing quantities, from West Pakistan. The weavers were in a particularly difficult position. As a result of the government's import policy there was a considerable rise in the price of yarn, and a lack of dye-stuff. The craftsman who was forced to buy his raw material on the black market had to pay 25-50 per cent more for it than the West Pakistan entrepreneur who owned the weaving mills. The crisis in the hand-loom weaving industry came to a head in 1953, when the volume of hand-woven cloth was almost 20 per cent smaller than in 1952, and large numbers of craftsmen were ruined.[3]

The relative agricultural surplus population, the stream of refugees from India amounting to hundreds of thousands and the masses of ruined craftsmen and small businessmen swelled the army of the unemployed. An increasing percentage of the population emigrated to India.

But the Muslim League government paid no attention to the difficult position obtaining in the province. To cover its huge and constantly growing military and administrative expenditure, it increased the rates of taxes and duties collected there, and at the same time also appropriated to itself that part of the tax revenue which was formerly allocated to the local budget.[4]

In accordance with its policy of developing first and foremost the western parts of the country, the central government continued to discriminate in economic and financial matters against East Pakistan. As a result of the export of agricultural raw materials produced by the local peasants, the province, despite its backwardness and poverty, was able to show continuously a large favourable foreign trade balance, which from 1948 to 1953 amounted to 2,900 million rupees.[5] The surplus was used to offset the chronically unfavourable trade balance of West Pakistan, which exported less than East Pakistan but absorbed no less than 70 per cent of the total imports of Pakistan each year.

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[2] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, August 14, 1953; *New Age*, New Delhi, March 28, 1954.— The magazine *Pacific Affairs* has pointed out that the cost of living in East Pakistan was always higher than in the western wing mainly because of speculative operations carried on by non-Bengalis (*Pacific Affairs*, Richmond, June 1955).

[3] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, Москва, 1958, стр. 117.

[4] S. M. Akhtar, *Distribution of Revenue Resources between the Centre and Provinces*, Lahore, [s. a.], p. 11.

The foreign currency which the export of East Pakistan's raw materials brought in was expended on the industrial development of West Pakistan. At least 300 million rupees were, according to the calculations of Pakistani economists, annually extracted from East Pakistan and used to develop the western regions.[6]

In its commodity exchange with West Pakistan, East Pakistan had a permanently unfavourable balance of trade, which added up to Rs. 909 million between 1948 and 1953.[7] Exports from West Pakistan to the eastern province exceeded imports from there by 167 million rupees in the nine months of 1953-1954 alone.

The Muslim League government thus used both foreign and regional trade as a means of switching a considerable part of the national income of East Pakistan to the development of the western wing of the country. East Pakistan was allotted only Rs. 250 million, or 22.1 per cent, of the Rs. 1,130 million which the central government earmarked for the financing of development projects between 1948 and 1951.[8] While the central government granted West Pakistan Rs. 10,000 million between 1948 and 1955, it assigned only Rs. 1,260 million to East Pakistan during the same period.[9]

The principal industrial enterprises built by the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation were situated in West Pakistan, and 80 per cent of foreign imports connected with the industrialisation went there.[10] And even when industrial enterprises were set up in East Bengal—for example, jute mills—they enabled big West Pakistani capital,[11] which endeavoured to export jute products in order to earn as much foreign currency as possible, to exploit the raw material resources of East Pakistan.[12]

Between 1947 and 1954, 155 new industrial enterprises were set up in East Pakistan bringing their total number from 335 to 490. They employed approximately 130,000 workers in 1954, chiefly in the following industries: jute (44,000 workers), cotton (16,000), leather (10,000), and tea (24,600).[13]

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[5] Calculated on the basis of figures printed in the *Statistical Bulletin*, Karachi, February 1959.

[6] *The Pakistan Times*, February 7 and 8, 1956.

[7] *Statistical Bulletin*, February 1959.

[8] *Five Years of Pakistan, 1947-1952*, Karachi, 1953, p. 78.

[9] *Dawn*, January 9, 1956.

[10] *The Pakistan Times*, February 7 and 8, 1956.

[11] By the middle of 1955 no less than 180 million rupees were invested in the jute industry. Approximately 47 per cent of the total was provided by the central government through the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, the remainder of the capital belonged to leading West Pakistani merchants, such as Adamjee and Ispahani.

[12] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 138.

The preference given to West Pakistan was also reflected in the allocation of funds for agricultural development. West Pakistan received 79.6 per cent of the Rs. 966,670,000 which were distributed for this purpose by the central and provincial governments during the first six years of Pakistan's existence.

Of the loans sanctioned by the central government between 1948 and 1953, the western province was allotted Rs. 329,300,000 of which it used Rs. 277,700,000, or 83.9 per cent. An allocation of Rs. 164,100,000 was made to East Pakistan during the same period, but only Rs. 82,000,000 or 49.9 per cent was used. The loans were only partially utilised because the development plans were not carried out fully, and in particular because it was impossible to obtain the necessary machinery. As the figures show, West Pakistan not only received priority as regards the granting of loans, but had also better opportunities to make use of them.[14]

East Pakistan, which remained a backward agricultural area, thus became a source of raw material and foreign currency for the western regions of the country and a market where the industrial commodities produced in Karachi and the industrial centres of the Punjab were sold.[15]

As the ruling bourgeois and landlord groups feared that the monopoly of power which they held since the first days of Pakistan's existence might be undermined if the economic and political positions of the Bengali national bourgeoisie were to be strengthened, they impeded in every way the economic advance of the latter. The West Pakistani businessmen, who enjoyed the direct support of the state, which subsidised them and granted them loans, land and tax relief, penetrated the economy of East Pakistan and seized the most advantageous economic spheres, everywhere restricting and ousting the Bengali national bourgeoisie. The latter had only a small foothold in the industrial field: they owned merely a few small cotton mills, several jute presses, which operated only part of the year, and a number of rice-husking mills, knitted-goods factories, weaving mills and leather factories. The big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan and a few British and Marwari firms also occupied the key positions in the commercial and financial sphere, where they controlled East Pakistan's import trade and economic relations between the two wings of the country.[16]

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[13] Nafis Ahmad, *An Economic Geography of East Pakistan*, London, 1958, p. 212.

[14] It should be pointed out that the "favours" were not equally distributed throughout West Pakistan. The lion's share went to the Punjab and Karachi, that is, to those regions which had become foci of the business activity of the big bourgeoisie, and to those sections of the Punjabi landlords that were gradually investing their huge capital accumulations in the industrial sphere. Of the Rs. 277,700,000, for instance, which West Pakistan received for agricultural development, Rs. 226,500,000 were allotted to the Punjab; while Sind only received Rs. 6,000,000; the North-West Frontier Province, Rs. 45,200,000; and Baluchistan, not a single anna.

[15] While commodities produced abroad amounted to 41 per cent of the total trade turnover between the provinces in 1951, their share dropped to 6.4 per cent in 1954 and to 2.7 per cent in 1957 (Ф. А. Тринич, *Восточный Пакистан*, Москва, 1959, стр. 204-205).

There was continual discrimination against the members of the Bengali national bourgeoisie and intelligentsia when appointments were made to the civil service. All the higher positions and the bulk of the other posts were invariably occupied by West Pakistanis, chiefly Punjabis. Even foreign observers noticed the arrogant attitude of the Punjabi officials in East Pakistan, and one of them remarked that to get an appointment in East Pakistan seemed to the Punjabis to be as bad as being sent to the darkest parts of Africa and that their superciliousness was a real threat to the stability of Pakistan.[17] A Bengali deputy, Ataur Rahman Khan, said in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, "...The leaders of the Muslim League thought that we were a subject race and they belonged to the race of conquerors."[18]

When individual Bengali leaders who had won high prestige in the province were appointed to important state posts, it merely helped to tie East Pakistan firmer to the western wing, and thus strengthened the position of the ruling bloc of bourgeois and landlords in the eastern part of the country. These Bengali leaders were, according to Keith Callard who knew the political situation in Pakistan well, the captives of the West Pakistan group that called the tune in the government.[19]

Discrimination against Bengalis occurred even in private enterprises owned by businessmen from West Pakistan. There the employees who came from the western wing usually received a salary which was two to three times higher than that of their Bengali colleagues.

Discrimination against the Bengali language also continued and caused growing resentment among the population of East Pakistan. After the Basic Principles Committee had declared that Urdu should be the only state language and this proposal was supported by Khwaja Nazimuddin, students held a mass demonstration in Dacca on February 21, 1952. They were dispersed by the police, who opened fire, killing 26 persons and wounding 400.[20] This massacre aggravated the situation even further. The Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan passed a resolution requesting the central government to recognise Bengali as one of the state languages.[21] When, however, the question was debated in the Constituent Assembly in April 1952, no decision was taken.

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[16] А. А. Змеев, *Пакистан, Экономика и внешняя торговля*, Москва, 1956, стр. 70; В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 131.

[17] *Manchester Guardian*, January 7, 8 and 10, 1955.

[18] The quotation is taken from K. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, London, 1957, pp. 172-173.

[19] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 173.

[20] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1954.

The policy of economic and national discrimination against East Bengal which the central government pursued, not only hindered the elimination of the after-effects of colonialism and impeded social and economic progress, but also created an extremely unstable and tense political situation. Members of the local propertied classes were, under the circumstances, very reluctant to invest their capital and profits in industry, preferring to convert them into gold, foreign currency and other valuables which they considered more stable. On the other hand, Hindu proprietors—landlords, merchants and manufacturers, to whom before partition approximately 88 per cent of the immovable property in East Pakistan belonged, were afraid of losing their capital and began to transfer it to India.

During the five-year period, 1949-1950 to 1953-1954, East Pakistan was consequently deprived of no less than £ 300 million; in addition it lost annually approximately £ 40 million as a result of gold, foreign currency and commodities (jute and rice) being smuggled away to India.[22]

East Pakistan thus lost a considerable part of its national income not only because its population was exploited by the ruling bloc consisting of big bourgeois and landlords from West Pakistan, but also because it was denuded of its national income by members of the top strata of the propertied classes of East Pakistan who transferred their capital and their earnings to India.

There was a growing desire among the democratic sections of the population of East Pakistan to change existing conditions and to achieve equality in all spheres of economic and political life. The Muslim League was to an increasing extent losing its mass basis, it had alienated not only the working class, the peasantry, the radical intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie of the province, but also part of the Muslim landlords. The rising number of opposition parties and of various other political organisations and their increased prestige and influence was a visible sign of this process, as was the growing confusion and factional conflict within the League itself.

The main opposition party which came out against the Muslim

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[21] *Dawn*, February 23, 1952.

[22] *The Times*, London, December 29 and 30, 1954; further details can be found in В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 134-136.

League was the Jinnah Awami Muslim League.[23] In December, 1952, the Awami League under the leadership of Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy held a convention at which a manifesto was adopted containing an exposition of the party's programme. Certain principles of the programme were designed to secure mass support for the party.

Among the declared aims of the party were: reduction of taxes, and limitation of landed property to not more than 250 acres of irrigated land, with the provision that the surplus be taken over by the state and the owner compensated for it. Surtax payments by persons with high incomes, industrialisation of the country, fight against corruption, democratisation of the political system and dissolution of the unrepresentative Constituent Assembly were also envisaged. The publication of the manifesto raised the prestige of the Awami League and caused liberal and democratic politicians in opposition to join the organisation. By the beginning of 1953 the Awami League had branches in all provinces of the country. The popularity of the party was to a great extent also due to the fact that its leaders criticised the foreign policy of the Muslim League government, called upon Pakistan to leave the British Commonwealth[24] and pursue an independent foreign policy, and demanded the creation of a neutral bloc of Muslim states in Asia and the ending of the war in Korea.

The programme of the Awami League found the broadest response in East Pakistan. Radical Muslim intellectuals, members of the national bourgeoisie, peasants, workers and owners of small and middle-size land holdings dissatisfied with the home and foreign policy of the Muslim League joined the Awami League. The latter received strong support from the progressive Youth League of East Pakistan, which was headed by M. Imadullah, an outstanding leader of the youth and student movement of the province.[25]

The growing membership of the Awami League also exerted an influence on its programme. In summer 1953, the leaders of the Awami League of East Pakistan in a series of public speeches advocated radical agrarian reforms and the nationalisation of the principal branches of industry[26] A right-wing group of landlords headed by Mamdot opposed these radical demands and was expelled from the party.[27] Even after the expulsion of Mamdot and his followers, a strong right wing under Suhrawardy continued to exist within the leadership of the Awami League, but a democratic group led by Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani exercised a decisive influence in the East Pakistan Awami League. The policy of this group chiefly reflected the interests of the Bengali national bourgeoisie.

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[23] On the initiative of the East Pakistan leaders of the Jinnah Awami Muslim League it was decided in 1955 to drop the word "Muslim" from the name of the party, to admit non-Muslims as members, and henceforth to call the organisation Awami (People's) League. Although we deal below with the period 1951-1954, we shall call the Jinnah Awami Muslim League for short the Awami League.

[24] *Eastern World*, London, 1952, Vol. VI, No. 10.

[25] Further details regarding the activities of the Youth League of Pakistan can be found in В. Н. Москаленко, «Молодежное движение в Пакистане (1947-1958 гг.)», in *Краткие сообщения Института народов Азии АН СССР*, Москва, выпуск XLII, 1961.

[26] *The Pakistan Times*, July 24, 1953.

In January 1953 a progressive democratic party, the Ganatantri Dal (Democratic Party), was formed by representatives of the radical intelligentsia in East Pakistan. Its leader was Mahmud Ali, one of the left-wing politicians of the province. The Ganatantri Dal declared its determination to transform Pakistan into a democratic federative republic, to secure full autonomy and equality for East Pakistan, to abolish landlord property, and to develop the national industry; it advocated, moreover, Pakistan's withdrawal from the British Commonwealth and an independent neutral foreign policy. The party rejected the separatist religious and communal principles of organisation and opened its ranks to both Muslims and non-Muslims. The Ganatantri Dal soon became one of the most popular and influential organisations of the progressive intelligentsia of East Pakistan.

Not only the national bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the working class and the peasantry of East Pakistan were dissatisfied with the policy of the Muslim League government but also the local liberal landlords. The recognised leader of the latter was Fazlul Haq, one of the oldest politicians of Bengal, who enjoyed great influence in the political circles of East Pakistan as a sponsor of the Lahore Resolution of 1940. His work as head of the coalition government of Bengal in 1937, when he stood for the introduction of limited reforms likely to improve the position of the upper crust of the peasantry, had also won him popularity in the Bengal countryside.

In summer 1953, Fazlul Haq set up a political party, which proclaimed as its main aim the achievement of full autonomy for the provinces constituting Pakistan in accordance with the principles of the Lahore Resolution of 1940.[28] The constituent conference of the new organisation, which was called the Krishak Sramik (Peasants and Workers) Party, was held in Dacca on July 26, 1953. Fazlul Haq was elected chairman of the party and empowered to nominate the members of its working committee. It was announced that the party was not to be organised along religious and communal lines and that it advocated the re-establishment of civil liberties and the liberation of political prisoners.

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[27] All the members of the Mamdot clique that were expelled from the Awami League in November 1953 joined the Muslim League.

[28] *Dawn*, July 30, 1953.

Fazlul Haq published the programme of the Krishak Sramik Party, which consisted of 12 points, on July 29, 1953. The main demands of the programme were full autonomy for East Pakistan based on the Lahore Resolution of 1940, recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of the country, immediate release of political prisoners, and separation of judicial from executive power.[29] Several points couched in rather vague terms, which could be understood to mean that the party intended to improve the position of the broad masses of the population in the province if and when it came to power, were included in the programme, such as national planning of labour; revision of the education system in East Pakistan; improvement of agricultural methods; industrialisation of the country and defence of minority rights. The Krishak Sramik leaders probably hoped that by inserting these points in the programme they would obtain a mass basis for their party in the province and secure popular support in the forthcoming elections to the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan.

In contradistinction to the Awami League, which held strong positions in the western wing of the country, the Ganatantri Dal and the Krishak Sramik Party were not only set up in East Pakistan but continued to be confined to this province. It is true that in order to improve its political standing in the country, the leadership of the Krishak Sramik Party tried in July 1955 to organise a branch in Karachi, which was to operate under the name of the Kisan Mazdoor Party (Peasants and Workers Party).[30] But the attempt failed and the Krishak Sramik Party remained an East Pakistan organisation, which defended the interests of the local liberal landlords and the upper bourgeoisie.

Realising the precariousness of their position in East Pakistan, the leaders of the Muslim League did everything they could to avoid or at least postpone the day when their influence and their reputation would have to pass the test of the ballot-box. The elections to the district council of Dacca in March 1950, when the Muslim League lost 50 per cent of the Muslim seats, already showed how dangerous an encounter with the electorate was. To avoid elections to the provincial Legislative Assembly in 1951, the leadership of the Muslim League secured a decision that the life term of the existing Assembly was to be reckoned not from the day of its election in 1946 but from March 1948, when it met for the first time after partition. But in March 1953 the Muslim League government was still not prepared to face the electors and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, therefore, extended the term of the provincial Assembly for another year.

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[29] *The Pakistan Times*, July 27 and 30, 1953.

[30] *The Pakistan Times*, July 18, 1955.

To strengthen their positions, the leaders of the Muslim League, at the same time, began a demagogic campaign under the slogan that provincialism, which, they alleged, endangered the unity of Pakistan, had to be eradicated. They also intensified their repressive measures against the East Bengal national movement, the leaders of the political opposition parties and mass organisations, and the active members of the workers, peasants and youth movements.

But the repressions could not stifle the mounting popular dissatisfaction. In spring 1953, all educational institutions of Dacca were in the grip of a strike, the participants of which demanded the release of political prisoners and the ending of discrimination against Bengali, their native language.[31] There were also increasing protests against the foreign policy of the government and the intended entry of Pakistan into an aggressive Middle-Eastern bloc.[32] A. H. Bhashani appealed to the people to organise a day of struggle against imperialism throughout Pakistan. The East Pakistan Youth League condemned the military alliance with the United States for which the government was paving the way and stressed that such a pact would undermine the very foundations of Pakistan's sovereignty and independence.[33]

In autumn 1953 Dacca became the scene of mass meetings at which resolutions were passed demanding full autonomy for East Pakistan, the recognition of Bengali as a state language, new elections to the Constituent Assembly, and so forth.[34] A rising wave of popular dissatisfaction with the activities of the Muslim League swept through the province.

The people of East Pakistan countered the policy of coercion and arbitrary rule by uniting their forces. During the preparations for Martyrs Day, February 21—which commemorated the death of the patriots killed in 1952—all organisations opposing the Muslim League united in an All-Party bloc. Several tens of thousands attended a huge meeting in Dacca on February 21, 1954, called by this bloc.[35] Mighty demonstrations carrying black banners moved through the towns of the province.

It was the struggle against coercion and the arbitrary rule of the Muslim League government, and for full provincial autonomy and the cessation of discriminative practices against Bengalis that formed the political basis for the unification of the parties and organisations which opposed the Muslim League in East Pakistan.

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[31] *Cross Roads*, New Delhi, May 17, 1953.

[32] *Ibid.*, February 8, 1953.

[33] *The Pakistan Times*, January 4, 1954.

[34] A. Gledhill, *Pakistan. The Development of its Laws and Constitution*, London, 1957, pp. 69-70.

[35] N. Chakravarty, *Black-Out in East Pakistan*, Delhi, 1954, p. 43.

As early as September 1952 the Youth League of East Pakistan issued an appeal to create a United Front embracing all opposition organisations. The suggestion was taken up by the left wing of the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party in 1953. As a result of negotiations conducted by the leaders of the two parties, an agreement was reached in December 1953 according to which the opposition forces were to present a single list of candidates in the forthcoming elections. Fazlul Haq had already earlier arranged to co-operate with the Nizam-i Islam Party, the organisation of the orthodox ulamas of East Pakistan set up in 1953. The combined opposition of these parties, which were soon joined by the Ganatantri Dal, to the Muslim League government marked the beginning of the United Front, of which Fazlul Haq became leader. Committees of the Front were soon set up in almost all constituencies of the province.

Several other parties joined the United Front during the election campaign. They mainly represented the interests of the top layer of the wealthy Hindu minority in East Pakistan, and included the National Congress headed by P. P. Gomez, B. K. Das and B. K. Dutta, the United Progressive Party headed by K. K. Dutta, the Scheduled Castes Federation, and a few smaller organisations.

The Communist Party of Pakistan declared that it supported the fight of the United Front against the Muslim League and for the democratic rights of the people. The manifesto which the provincial organisation of the Communist Party of Pakistan published on January 8, 1954, helped to create the alliance of political parties directed against the Muslim League in the eastern wing of the country.

Although the Communists were subjected to severe repressions and persecutions by the reactionaries, their work contributed to the unification of the progressive forces in the fight for democracy and social progress, and thus strengthened the position of the left-wing leaders of the United Front. Even the leaders of the liberal landlords and the religious and communal organisations which formed part of the anti-League coalition were compelled to take this into account. The programme of the United Front, known in Pakistan as the Twenty-One Points, therefore, contained a number of democratic demands, although the Front was from the outset a heterogeneous and rather unstable amalgamation of organisations that were so different and pursued such diametrically opposed aims as the Awami League and the Ganatantri Dal on its left wing, and the Nizam-i Islam Party on the right.[36]

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[36] The text of the United Front Programme can be found in *Dawn*, April 4, 1954, and *The Pakistan Times*, April 6, 1954. For an analysis of the Twenty-One Points, see С. Ф. Левин, «Партия Народная Лига», in *Пакистан. История и экономика*, Москва, 1959, стр. 131-134.

In the main the demands expressed the principles which had often been proclaimed by members of the Bengali national movement, namely, that East Pakistan should be granted full provincial autonomy while the central government was to retain responsibility only for defence, foreign affairs and currency. To end the disparity of the eastern wing of the country with regard to military matters, the programme stressed that the General Staff and Naval Headquarters should be transferred from Karachi to East Bengal and ordnance factories built there (Point 19). Bengali should become one of the state languages, free compulsory primary education should be introduced and the teaching conducted only in the native tongue (Points 1, 10, 17).

The fulfilment of the principles laid down in the programme of the United Front would have abolished the discrimination against East Pakistan and established equality between the two parts of the country.

Much attention was given in the Twenty-One Points to the bourgeois democratic reorganisation of the province and its economic development, in accordance with the interests of the Bengali national bourgeoisie. The programme further demanded that all incomes derived from rent should be abolished without compensation, that surplus land should be handed over to landless peasants, that the rent should be reduced to a reasonable level and the issue of certificates for the rent falling due, which made it possible to auction the property of indebted peasants, should be discontinued (Point 2). It was envisaged to set up agricultural co-operatives, to improve and develop the irrigation system and to introduce various other measures designed to raise agricultural production, solve the food problem and eliminate the constant threat of famine (Points 4 and 7).

Although these points of the programme did not deal with the abolition of landlord property as such, nevertheless, if put into practice, they would have done away with the survivals of pre-capitalist relations of production in the agrarian system of the province and removed the main obstacles from the path leading to the development of capitalism.

The third point of the programme called for the nationalisation of the jute trade and the purchase of jute from the producer at fair prices; it also demanded that cases of speculation in jute be investigated and those found guilty punished. This point of the programme was likely to benefit the upper crust of peasants and those landlords who cultivated their own land, that is the jute growers.

The programme also envisaged the industrialisation of East Pakistan (Point 8), development of salt production and measures to improve conditions for small-scale and cottage industries (Points 4 and 5).

Further demands of the United Front were democratisation of the country's administrative apparatus, safeguarding of the fundamental freedoms, repeal of the Safety Acts and release of political prisoners, separation of the judicial and the political power, the granting of full rights to refugees and improvement of their lot (Point 6). It also called for the ending of corruption (Point 13), a revision of wage scales and reduction of the differences between the rates of pay of the higher and lower government officials (Point 12). The United Front declared, moreover, that if it came to power its ministers would receive a salary of not more than a thousand rupees per month. Finally, the East Pakistan United Front demanded guaranteed economic and social rights for the workers in accordance with the conventions of the International Labour Organisation (Point 8).

The Muslim League was unable to counter this programme with any positive proposals. In an effort to utilise for its own purposes the religious fanaticism of the backward sections of the population, the central government sent mullah agitators to East Pakistan. Rumours were set afloat alleging that the United Front was financed by Hindus living abroad, and that its leaders were conspiring to hand over East Pakistan to West Bengal. High-ranking government officials and Muslim League leaders made demagogic speeches at public meetings declaring that a United Front victory would spell the end of Pakistan and accusing their political opponents of holding anti-Islamic views. To give itself a better chance to prepare for the elections and to disorganise the opposition, the central government unexpectedly postponed the elections, which were to have begun on February 16, until March 8, 1954.

In their election campaign the Muslim League leaders used "the Indian threat" as a bugbear to increase the anti-Indian sentiments of the population and to play upon their religious feelings. It was announced that February 26 was to be observed as Kashmir Day in East Bengal, but the scheme miscarried. The authorities then stepped up their measures of intimidation against the opposition. Police raids on a mass scale were carried through in Dacca, Chittagong, Narayanganj, Dinajpur and other towns. Progressive newspapers were confiscated by the police. In the course of a few days approximately 1,200 persons were arrested. The main blow of the reaction was directed against the Communist Party. Hundreds of active party members were either arrested or driven underground.

The government of Pakistan also tried to enlist American support. It requested the US government to make public the decision to grant American military aid to Pakistan, in the hope that such an announcement might help the League to gain an election victory. Complying with this request President Eisenhower declared on February 21, 1954, that Pakistan would be granted military assistance in accordance with the Mutual Security Programme.

The government press, which ignored the mood and the wishes of the population and failed to evaluate correctly the strength and the influence of the opposition, wrote with official optimism about the inevitable defeat of the United Front and forecast a victory for the Muslim League, which, it predicted, would win 75 to 80 per cent of the Muslim seats.[37]

The election campaign was bitter and fierce. The 16 contesting parties put forward 1,285 candidates for the 309 seats in the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan.

Voting took place from March 8 to 12, 1954. The result of the poll was a crushing defeat for the Muslim League. The United Front won 223 of the 237 Muslim seats. Three seats went to the Independents and one to the Khilafat-i Rabani, a religious party of the Muslim community. The Muslim League managed to get only 10 (!) representatives in the Legislative Assembly. Among the defeated were some of the most prominent leaders of the League. All the ministers of the provincial government, including the Chief Minister of the province Nurul Amin, failed to get into the Assembly.[38]

Within the United Front it was the Awami League which gained most of the Muslim seats (142). The Krishak Sramik Party won 48 seats and the Nizam-i Islam Party, 19.[39]

The majority of non-Muslim seats, 68 of a total of 72, also went to parties which either were members of the United Front or supported it. Of these the Scheduled Castes Federation won 27 seats and the National Congress, 24. The Communist Party gained four seats in the Legislative Assembly; in most constituencies it had not put up its own candidates, for it did not want to split the democratic forces, but had asked the electorate to cast their votes for the United Front.

The elections demonstrated the bankruptcy of the ruling party, and showed that the Muslim League, and the clique of bourgeoisie and landlords that headed it, had lost the confidence and the support of the majority of the population of Pakistan.

A United Front government, with Fazlul Haq as Chief Minister, was formed in East Pakistan on April 3, 1954. Three prominent members of the Krishak Sramik Party, Ashrafuddin Choudhury, Syed Azizul Haq and Abu Husain Sarkar, were also members of the cabinet. The composition of the government showed that the group of liberal landlords in the leadership of the United Front was determined not to share the power with the left-wing leaders of the newly elected Assembly. Fazlul Haq, moreover, constantly stressed his desire to co-operate with the central government. "I shall not form the Ministry," he said, "unless I am assured of the Centre's co-operation and encouragement.... By quarrelling we have to gain nothing..."[40] The policy which Fazlul Haq pursued undermined the unity of the coalition.

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[37] *Dawn*, January 27, 1954, and March 4, 1954.

[38] *The Pakistan Times*, March 17 and 19, 1954.

[39] *Dawn*, October 20, 1954.

Fazlul Haq announced that the first measures of his government would be to declare Bengali one of the state languages of Pakistan; to release political prisoners; to abolish the visa system that existed between East Pakistan and the border regions of India, since it disrupted the economy of the province; furthermore, he declared that "he would take immediate steps to undertake a thorough investigation into jute trade and industry with a view to exploring the possibility of enabling fullest profit to jute cultivators."[41] The primary tasks outlined thus show that Fazlul Haq intended to put into practice those points of the United Front programme which most fully met the requirements of the upper strata of the Bengali national bourgeoisie and the liberal landlords.

Despite the inconsistency, indecision and the desire to compromise, which the leaders of the United Front displayed after their election victory, events in East Bengal exerted a strong influence on the political life in all regions of the country. They brought about an intensification of the fight waged by the progressive forces for a radical revision of the home and foreign policy which the ruling circles pursued, they led to a sharpening of contradictions and of the factional conflict within the ruling camp.

A popular movement demanding the dissolution of the unrepresentative Constituent Assembly, immediate general elections and the resignation of the Muslim League government, swept the whole country. Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif, one of the leaders of the Awami League in West Pakistan and President of the All-Pakistan Peace Committee, declared that "the General Elections in East Bengal had expressed a vote of no-confidence of the majority of the population of this country in the executive both in Bengal and at the Centre and their policies."[42] The leader of the Azad Pakistan Party, Mian Iftikharuddin, proposed on behalf of his party to replace the Muslim League government in the centre by a provisional government consisting of representatives of all parties, which was to organise general elections and then to hand over power to the parliament elected by the people. The Red Shirts and the progressive parties of Sind also demanded the resignation of the government. The democratic forces showed a growing desire to consolidate their ranks and to co-ordinate their actions. Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani appealed to progressive politicians in both wings of Pakistan to attend a joint conference "to chalk out a common programme of action for the removal of the enemies of the people from power."[43]

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[40] Quoted from *New Age*, March 28, 1954.
[41] *The Pakistan Times*, April 3, 1954.
[42] *Ibid.*

The All-Parties Conference, which was held in the North-West Frontier Province in April 1954 and was attended by the opposition parties, decided to set up a United Front. Its purpose was to lead the struggle for the dissolution of the unrepresentative Legislative Assembly of the province and for the dismissal of the provincial Muslim League government.[44]

Democratic public opinion demanding a change in the foreign policy of the country grew ever louder. The left-wing leaders of the Awami League, the Sind Awami Mahaz, the Sind Hari Committee, the Azad Pakistan Party, and other national democratic parties and organisations pointed out how dangerous it was for Pakistan to join the aggressive military blocs and called the US-Pakistan military agreement a slave pact and a "trap laid by the USA to gain substantial influence in the Eastern countries." [45] The dissatisfaction with the rapprochement between Pakistan and the United States was so strong that even several of the Muslim League leaders had to take account of it and support a revision of the country's foreign policy.[46]

In the prevailing atmosphere of general dissatisfaction the ruling circles of the United States tried to bolster up the Muslim League government. They pretended that the events in East Pakistan were unimportant. The USA ambassador in Pakistan, Mr. Hildreth, "was reported to have told pressmen at Peshawar that elections in East Bengal were just provincial elections and to his mind the Central Government was not affected from its results, nor was the military aid agreement between the Pakistan Government and the United States." [47] This declaration of the American ambassador, which was an act of direct interference in the internal affairs of the country, called forth mass protests in both wings of Pakistan.

Trying to cope with the situation, the government of Mohammad Ali carried through a number of political measures, whose aim was to split the ranks of the opposition and to isolate and crush the left wing. To prevent concerted action of the opposition parties in East and West Pakistan, the ruling circles fanned anti-Bengal sentiments in the western part of the country, and organised public protests against the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages.

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[43] *The Pakistan Times*, April 6, 1954.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *New Age*, March 21 and 28, 1954.

[46] مزدور دونیا (*Mazdur Dunya*), Lahore, August 12, 1954.

[47] *The Pakistan Times*, April 6, 1954.

At the same time, the central government attempted to disrupt the United Front from within and to strengthen its own position in East Pakistan by agreeing to make certain concessions to the Bengal national movement. On April 19, 1954, the Constituent Assembly passed a resolution recognising both Bengali and Urdu as state languages of Pakistan, and at the same time stipulated that English should continue to be used as an official language for another twenty years.[48] There were rumours that East Pakistan was to be granted additional loans and that the central government was to be broadened by the inclusion of leading right-wing politicians of the United Front.

Simultaneously the ruling circles increased their reign of terror and stepped up the prosecution of those advocating a radical revision of the government's home and foreign policy. Several newspapers were banned because they came out against the US-Pakistani military alliance.[49] The full weight of the repressive measures was directed against the Communist Party, the vanguard of the progressive forces of the people of Pakistan.

Such an evil measure as police provocation became the principal weapon of the ruling circles in their fight against the national democratic movement. In March 1954 provocations of police agents led to disorders at a paper mill in Chandraghona (East Pakistan), as a result of which 13 persons were killed and scores wounded.[50] Reactionary elements provoked disorders also in other industrial enterprises of the province kindling the flames of hostility between Bengali and non-Bengali workers, and between Bengali and Marwari employees. The clashes which subsequently occurred took a toll of human life. The biggest collision took place at Adamjee's jute mills in Narayanganj on May 15, 1954. Many hundreds of casualties were the result of the sanguinary fights; over 600 were killed.

This murderous provocation was, according to Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani, part of a secret conspiracy devised by the leadership of the Muslim League to discredit the United Front government. The Communist Party, which warned the progressive forces against the imminent danger and urged them to greater unity, stressed in its appeal to the people issued on May 20, 1954, that the disorders might be used as a pretext to dismiss the United Front government and to proclaim Governor's rule in East Pakistan.[51] Meetings protesting against the provocative actions of the reactionaries and stressing the need for unity among the patriotic forces were held throughout the province. Fazlul Haq's government appointed a special commission to investigate the causes of the disorders at the Adamjee mills and to expose those responsible for them.

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[48] *The Pakistan Times*, April 20, 1954.

[49] *Eastern World*, 1959, No. 3, pp. 27-28.

[50] *The Pakistan Times*, March 24, 1954.

[51] *New Age*, May 30, 1954.

But an objective investigation and the discovery of those responsible for the death of hundreds of persons did not suit Mohammad Ali's cabinet. Without waiting for the results of the inquiry the central government announced that the Communists were responsible for the riots. The Prime Minister declared that a Communist conspiracy existed and that it was necessary to take appropriate measures to handle the situation. Fazlul Haq's government was presented with an ultimatum demanding immediate measures against the Communists, the suppression of the democratic movement and the dissolution of the progressive organisations. But Fazlul Haq's government refused to comply with these demands.[52] Thereupon the Chief Minister was accused of having a leaning towards Communism.

Mohammad Ali and the bloc of bourgeois and landlords whose interests he represented understood very well that the diminishing prestige of the ruling clique might receive the death blow by an investigation into the circumstances accompanying the disorders at the Adamjee mills, and equally by an investigation into the charges of corruption raised against Muslim League officials in East Pakistan which Fazlul Haq's cabinet threatened to undertake. Mohammad Ali, therefore, decided to get rid of the United Front government.

Taking advantage of the false report published in the *New York Times* alleging that Fazlul Haq planned to proclaim an independent East Pakistan,[53] the central government declared him "a traitor to Pakistan."[54] Fazlul Haq's government refuted these charges and issued a special statement in which it declared that it stood for a united Pakistan. It said, "East Pakistan and West Pakistan are integral parts of one component whole and it is one and indivisible and nothing shall part us. We are for the autonomy of provinces and not for their independence, nor for separation of each other."[55] A. H. Bhashani made a similar declaration.

The central government paid no attention to these refutations. On May 30, 1954, the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan was dissolved, the United Front government dismissed and Governor's rule proclaimed in the province. Because the central government doubted that the Governor of East Pakistan, Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, would be firm enough, a new provincial Governor, Major-General Iskander Mirza, was appointed; he was a former officer of the Anglo-Indian colonial army who had already during the colonial period made a name for himself by suppressing the Pakhtun national-liberation movement.

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[52] *New Age*, June 6, 1954.

[53] For further details, see N. Chakravarty, *Black-Out in East Pakistan*, p. 48.

[54] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 48.

[55] The quotation is taken from *New Age*, June 13, 1954.

Under the slogan of fighting the Communists the authorities initiated a series of measures designed to suppress the national-liberation movement of the province. During the first week of Governor's rule 659 active members of the United Front were arrested, including 13 deputies of the Legislative Assembly.[56] By the middle of June over a thousand were imprisoned.[57] Fazlul Haq and several other members of his cabinet were kept under house arrest. The premises of the United Front were closed, strict censorship introduced, meetings and demonstrations banned, and even groups of more than five persons were not permitted to gather in the streets. Forty thousand policemen were concentrated in the province, not counting military units.[58]

The Communist Party of Pakistan was attacked with particular fury. On July 5, 1954, it was officially banned in East Pakistan. Special police commissions (so-called committees for the defence of workers) were set up, whose purpose was the discovery and subsequent dismissal of persons employed in industrial enterprises who were either Communists or in sympathy with the ideas represented by the Communist Party of Pakistan. Factory owners were warned that they would be held personally responsible if Communists were either taken on or not dismissed.[59] The organisers of these repressions hoped that by causing a wave of anti-Communist hysteria they would deceive the people of East Pakistan and conceal the part played by police agents in provoking the disorders at the Adamjee mills and causing so much bloodshed.

The Bengal national movement in East Pakistan was hard hit by the repressions of 1954. These acts, however, were not a sign of strength but, on the contrary, showed up the weakness of the ruling circles of Pakistan. They demonstrated that, in the situation created by the growing opposition to the home and foreign policy of the Muslim League government, the ruling clique could only pursue its chosen policy by resorting to police provocation and other arbitrary acts. But such measures could not diminish popular discontent. The unwillingness of the government to take into account the dissatisfaction of the people merely intensified and prolonged the political crisis, for the problem of East Pakistan could not be solved by the proclamation of Governor's rule in the province.

The events of 1954 were, undoubtedly, influenced by certain specific features of the Bengal national movement, whose leaders were closely associated with commerce and banking and with the landlords. The policy of Fazlul Haq's government, which tried to restrict the influence of the progressive forces and to reach a compromise with the central government, hampered the advance of the popular mass movement in the province.

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[56] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, June 11, 1954.

[57] According to official data, more than 500 of those arrested were still in prison in October 1954 (*Dawn*, October 11, 1954).

[58] *New Age*, June 13, 1954.

[59] *Ibid.*

In the fight for provincial autonomy, the right-wing leaders of the United Front relied more on parliamentary manoeuvres and secret negotiations with their political opponents in Karachi than on the support of the popular masses, whose direct actions frightened them.

When Fazlul Haq became Chief Minister of East Pakistan, he, therefore, continued to keep in prison all Communists arrested by the previous government,[60] as one can see from the facts published in the Western press, although he issued a decree on the release of political prisoners.[61] The weakness of the mass organisations of peasants and workers had an adverse effect on the fate of the United Front government. When the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan and the feudal magnates of the Punjab made their premeditated thrust against the government of East Pakistan, no organised force existed in the province whose mass action could have compelled the ruling clique of the country to retreat.

Chapter XIV

THE AMALGAMATION OF WEST PAKISTAN INTO ONE PROVINCE. DISSOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The events in East Pakistan described in the preceding chapter strongly influenced political life in the western wing of the country, where the growing democratic movement demanded a radical solution of the agrarian and national questions and was strongly opposed to the home and foreign policy of the Mohammad Ali government.

Having dismissed the United Front government, the ruling circles also stepped up their repressive measures in West Pakistan (under the pretext that this helped to strengthen the security of Pakistan) where, immediately after the introduction of Governor's rule in the eastern wing, many progressive politicians were arrested. On July 24, 1954, the Communist Party was banned in West Pakistan. This was the signal for new mass arrests. Firozuddin Mansoor, the acting General Secretary of the Communist Party of Pakistan and leader of the Peasant Union, Mirza Ibrahim and Mohammad Afzal, leaders of the Pakistan Trade Union Federation, together with many active members of the peace movement and progressive journalists were imprisoned. Altogether more than 1,300 persons were arrested.[1]

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[60] See, for instance, *Manchester Guardian*, July 19, 1954.

[61] *The Pakistan Times*, April 6, 1954.

Several leaders of bourgeois-democratic opposition parties, who opposed the Muslim League policy, were also subjected to repressions. Among them were Arbab Sikander Halil, the Vice-Chairman of the Frontier Awami League, who was sentenced to one-year imprisonment, and Sabir Hasan Ansari, the secretary of the Karachi branch of the Azad Pakistan Party, who was arrested.[2]

With the support of the authorities and under their patronage, Muzaffar Hasan, a right-wing politician, set up the reactionary Anti-Communist Front of Pakistan in Karachi in July 1954. Its alleged purpose was the fight against subversive elements who endangered public law and order, Indian agents and members of the Communist "fifth column" in Pakistan. Branches of the Anti-Communist Front soon sprang up in various towns of the country. But its activities met with no response among the broad public of Pakistan. Since the Anti-Communist Front failed to justify the hopes of its organisers, it fell into decay and soon disappeared altogether.

The policy of repression which the ruling circles pursued with regard to the members of the workers', peasants', and national movements in West Pakistan did not produce the expected results either.

The Muslim League candidates were defeated in the by-elections to the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Frontier Province which were held in the Mardan constituency, despite the open support they received from government officials. The fact that the representatives of the Frontier Awami League were elected was, as Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif, the head of the Awami League in the North-West Frontier Province, pointed out, a vote of no confidence both in the provincial Muslim League government and the central government.[3] Muslim League candidates were also defeated in by-elections held in several Punjabi constituencies.[4] The national movement of the Pakhtuns, Sindhis and Baluchis was visibly growing.

In spring 1954, Abdul Ghaffar Khan proposed the creation of Pakhtunistan, a province that was to comprise all areas inhabited by Pakhtuns in the western wing of the country. The proposal found warm support among the progressive Pakhtuns.

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[1] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, August 6, 1954.

[2] *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, August, 7, 1954; *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, November 21, 1954.

[3] *Civil and Military Gazette*, August 10, 1954.

[4] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1954 and October 21, 1954.

The demand for immediate general elections, the end of the arbitrary police rule, and the release of political prisoners became every day more intense. The political tension was aggravated by the difficult economic position of the country, the economic instability, as American observers called it, which manifested itself by a lack of urgently necessary commodities, which could only be obtained on the black market; by a shortage of industrial raw materials and spare parts and a growing foreign currency deficit.[5] In 1954 the public debt rose considerably, while state revenue diminished and the trade turnover shrank.[6] The shortage of consumer goods caused great hardship among the broad masses of the population.

Developments made it increasingly difficult for the ruling circles to pursue the political course that was most likely to bring them the greatest advantages. The Muslim League, the landlords of the Punjab and the big bourgeois of West Pakistan who stood at its head ran the risk of finally forfeiting their influence and power in the lesser provinces of the western wing. The danger was the more real because as early as the spring and summer 1954 there were plans to co-ordinate the activities of the progressive and national forces of East and West Pakistan. The ruling circles came to the conclusion that under the circumstances the continued existence of several provinces in West Pakistan was intolerable.

The Punjabi group of the Muslim League conceived the idea of merging all administrative units into a single province, the so-called "One Unit" scheme. The initiators of the unification plan thought that it would help to rally all the right-wing elements of West Pakistan around the ruling circles enabling them to suppress the progressive opposition and the national democratic movements, thus giving them an opportunity to preserve their ruling position in the country.

The idea of unification was supported by the landed magnates of Sind and the big landlords in several districts of Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan which were in the grip of peasant movements, since these landowners feared to lose their estates if the smaller provinces were preserved in West Pakistan and the national democratic forces were to come into power there. The attitude of the landed magnates towards the question of unification was, incidentally, not always consistent due to their fear that unification might unduly strengthen their fellow landlords from the Punjab, and that open and uncompromising support of the "One Unit" proposal would completely undermine their authority and influence in their own region.

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[5] *The New York Times*, January 16, 1955.

[6] *The Pakistan Times*, October 21, 1954.

It should be noted that the ruling circles of the USA favoured and supported the unification of West Pakistan, for they perceived that the national democratic movements of the peoples of Pakistan endangered their plans to use the country as a stronghold of their aggressive policy in the Middle East and South-East Asia. In their view, the transformation of West Pakistan into a single unit would pave the way for a strong-arm government in Pakistan capable of consolidating the position in the country and carrying into effect a policy to the liking of the American imperialists.

Suggestions to amalgamate West Pakistan into one unit were already made before 1954. As early as November 1947, Sir Archibald Rowlands, M. A. Jinnah's adviser on economic matters, recommended the unification of the western wing, but although the Father of Pakistan approved the proposal in principle, he considered it premature and postponed the scheme.[7] The advocates of unification asserted that M. A. Jinnah intended to carry out the plan in 1948.[8] In any event it is undoubtedly true that before the victory of the United Front in East Pakistan, which constituted a threat to the undivided rule of the governing clique, unification was not seriously considered.[9] The situation changed in summer 1954.

The Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali, devoted a great part of the speech he delivered at a meeting in Karachi on August 5, 1954, to the dangers of provincialism. The government politicians and high officials who mounted the rostrum after him elaborated the thesis of the Prime Minister and pointed out that provincialism and the fight for the creation of separate provinces served the enemies of Pakistan.[10]

However, when the unification plan was considered by the Muslim League Parliamentary Party it was voted down by a majority consisting of Bengalis, Sindhis and Baluchis. The plan, which was then brought up for discussion in the Constituent Assembly in September 1954, was strongly opposed by a number of deputies, and above all Abdus Sattar Pirzada, the Chief Minister of Sind. Of the 110 members of the Legislative Assembly of Sind, 74 deputies supported the stand made by their Chief Minister in a written declaration.[11] Bengali deputies also spoke against the projected unification of West Pakistan and the bill was defeated.

The attitude taken up by the Constituent Assembly was due to two reasons. First, even the right-wing deputies were forced to take into consideration public sentiments, for the lesson which in spring 1954 the people of East Pakistan gave those candidates to the provincial Assembly who had paid no attention to the demands of the national forces was still fresh in their mind. Second, the Bengal section of the Muslim League and the Muslim League leaders from the smaller provinces of West Pakistan who supported it had an absolute majority of votes in the Constituent Assembly,[12] and these deputies did not wish to strengthen the hands of their Punjabi colleagues too much.

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[7] H. Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan*, Oxford, 1956, pp. 78-79.
[8] *Dawn*, Karachi, July, 27, 1955.
[9] K. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, London, 1957, p. 186.
[10] *Civil and Military Gazette*, August 7, 1954.
[11] *Dawn*, October 24, 1954.

When the Constituent Assembly considered the report of the Basic Principles Committee in September 1954, a plan for the reorganisation of the administrative division of West Pakistan, which differed radically from the "One Unit" proposal, was, therefore, carried mainly by the votes of deputies representing East Pakistan and Sind. It envisaged the creation of six provinces in West Pakistan, namely, the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Bahawalpur, Khairpur and Baluchistan. The rulers of the princely States of Bahawalpur and Khairpur, which were to be turned into provinces, were given the same power as the governors of the other provinces. The Baluchistan States were to become special regions within Baluchistan, while the North-West Frontier States and the Pakhtun tribal areas were to be made regions of the North-West Frontier Province. It was expected that the constitution of Pakistan which was being prepared would confirm the new administrative divisions. The promulgation of the constitution was to take place on December 25, 1954, the seventieth anniversary of Jinnah's birth,[13] and it was to come into force on January 1, 1955.

The Punjab leaders of the Muslim League strongly opposed the decision of the Constituent Assembly, for they considered that it jeopardised the powerful position they held in the country. Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Daultana, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani and others asserted that the proposed administrative division of West Pakistan would lead to the country's disintegration, and demanded the implementation of the "One Unit" plan. The reason for their opposition was of course not anxiety for the territorial integrity of Pakistan, but a sober evaluation of the alignment of the political forces it would bring about.

The representatives of the landlords from the Punjab and the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan quite rightly thought that, if the proposed administrative division was carried into practice, their rule would come to an end, since the national opposition forces would win in the elections to the legislative assemblies of the smaller provinces of West Pakistan, just as it had happened in East Pakistan.

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[12] In the first Constituent Assembly, which had 76 members, 44 seats were occupied by representatives of East Pakistan. Since in the question under debate several of the deputies from Sind (e. g., Pirzada Abdus Sattar and Mohammad Hashim Gazder) and such opposition members as Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mian Iftikharuddin took a stand similar to that of the East Pakistan deputies, the proposal to unify West Pakistan could not possibly succeed.

[13] *Dawn*, September 23, 1954.

But the group of Bengali politicians within the governing bodies of the Muslim League and the Constituent Assembly (Khwaja Nazimuddin, Fazlur Rahman, Tazimuddin Khan and Nurul Amin) and the Muslim League leaders in Sind and Baluchistan (Abdus Sattar Pirzada and Mohammad Hashim Gazder) did not intend to capitulate. They were, on the contrary, determined to use what they considered to be a favourable situation, which arose because of the diminishing influence and prestige of the government and the Punjabi clique backing it, to consolidate their own position in every possible way.

The struggle that followed had not only a domestic aspect, but to a certain extent it also reflected imperialist contradictions and the competition of the American and British monopolies for the decisive influence in Pakistan. The representatives of East Pakistan in the Muslim League turned towards Britain because of their old connections with it, while the leaders of the Muslim League in the Punjab, headed by Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor-General, considered a further rapprochement with the USA more advantageous. Inter-imperialist rivalry and the direct support which the Punjabi clique received from the American monopolies undoubtedly affected the outcome of the internal struggle waged in Pakistan in autumn 1954.

The first blow was struck by the Bengali group. Seeking to deprive the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, of a weapon which would enable him to unseat many of the Bengali leaders during the coming political contest, it carried a bill in the Constituent Assembly on September 20, 1954, repealing the infamous PRODA. [14]

From the point of view of the Bengali deputies the adoption of the bill was the more urgent because Iskander Mirsa, who had been appointed Governor of East Pakistan by Ghulam Mohammad, was preparing to start legal proceedings under PRODA against many Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly who had held government posts before March 1954.

On the next day, September 21, the Constituent Assembly passed another bill, this time clearly directed against the Governor-General, since it restricted his rights to a considerable extent. [15]

According to this act only members of the Constituent Assembly could in future become ministers in the central government, for it laid down that the prime minister and other cabinet ministers could be appointed by the Governor-General only if they were at the time members of the Assembly. It also stipulated that the government was to be responsible to the Assembly, and moreover, that the government as a whole had to retire if there was a vote of no confidence in any one of the ministers. Finally the Governor-General was required to exercise his powers only in accordance with the advice of the cabinet.

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[14] *The Pakistan Times*, September 21, 1954.

[15] *The Pakistan Times*, September 22, 1954.

It is not difficult to see that, since a vote expressing no confidence in even one of the ministers was sufficient to overthrow the government and hand over power to its opponents, the law made the government and the Governor-General fully dependent on the representatives of East Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly, as they were backed by the majority of deputies. It seemed that the Bengali group was about to win the day. But Ghulam Mohammad and his associates were not prepared to give way.

The ruling circles tried to enlist the support of the USA. At the end of October 1954 the Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, set off on a journey across the ocean. It was known that their aim was to obtain economic and military assistance from the United States. A government crisis could have wrecked the negotiations that were going on in Washington. But the opposition headed by Khwaja Nazimuddin, Fazlur Rahman and the other Bengali right-wing leaders were, apparently, not prepared to take this risk. By the time Mohammad Ali and Mohammad Ayub Khan returned to Karachi, having obtained the promise of American economic "aid" to the extent of $ 110 million [16] and of military "aid", the amount of which was not specified, the opposition had missed the moment for a decisive blow.

Mohammad Ali and Ayub Khan drove from the airfield direct to Government House, the residence of the Governor-General. A conference was held there, which was also attended by Iskander Mirza and M. A. H. Ispahani, Pakistan's High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, who had been summoned from London. [17] It was decided to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and to declare a state of emergency in the country. According to statements which were made later by generals Musa and Ayub Khan the question of military dictatorship was considered and Ghulam Mohammad asked Ayub Khan to assume the leadership of the country.[18]

On October 24, 1954, the Governor-General issued a proclamation announcing that the constitutional machinery had broken down and declaring a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. [19]

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[16] *The New York Times*, January 16, 1955.

[17] K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, p. 141.

[18] See, for instance, *The Pakistan Times*, November 19, 1958.

[19] The text of the proclamation introducing a state of emergency can be found in *The Pakistan Times*, October 24, 1954.

The Constituent Assembly was dissolved, censorship introduced and gatherings of more than five persons were forbidden in the streets of Karachi. Power was handed over to Mohammad Ali's reconstituted cabinet. The proclamation also contained the promise that a new Constituent Assembly would be elected as soon as possible.

When deciding upon this measure, the ruling clique took into consideration the extreme unpopularity of the first Constituent Assembly and the fact that the ignominious end of this unrepresentative institution was unlikely to hurt the feelings of anyone. The feeble protests of the Bengal group, which commanded a majority in the Assembly, did not frighten Ghulam Mohammad and his associates, since it was not supported by the people. [20]

The reorganised cabinet was sworn in the same evening (October 24, 1954). A few particularly odious Muslim League politicians, whose extreme right views were well known—such as M. A. Gurmani, who was appointed Governor of the Punjab, and Sardar Bahadur Khan, who became Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan in November 1954—had been removed from the government [21]. They were replaced by men whose relations with the Punjabi clique were not so obvious and who could therefore better defend its interests.

M. Ayub Khan joined the cabinet as Minister of Defence and Iskander Mirza as Minister for Home Affairs. These appointments secured the support of the leading army circles and high-ranking officers for the new government. To satisfy the claims of the territorial magnates from Sind, one of the biggest landlords of the province, Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, was appointed Minister of Information and Education. M.A.H. Ispahani, a businessman, became Minister of Industry and Commerce. The Ministry of Finance remained in the hands of Choudhury Mohammad Ali, a prominent right-wing member of the Muslim League, who was a religious fanatic and follower of Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, the leader of the Jamaat-i Islami. The Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali, also took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

To consolidate the new government, to broaden its political basis and to facilitate the solution of the problems facing it, the ruling circles tried, at the same time, to come to an understanding with the right-wing leaders of the Bengali and Pakhtun national movements about their representation in the government. As a result of the negotiations, which went on for about two months, H. S. Suhrawardy, who headed the right faction of the Awami League, and A. H. Sarkar, a close associate of Fazlul Haq, the leader of the Krishak Sramik Party, joined Mohammad Ali's government, after having received assurances that certain concessions would be made to the top strata of the propertied classes in East Pakistan.[22] One of the right-wing leaders of the Pakhtun movement, Dr. Khan Sahib (the brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan), joined the government even earlier.

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[20] Tamizuddin Khan, the President of the Constituent Assembly, disputed the right of the Governor-General to dissolve the Assembly. The Sind Chief Court, to which he applied for a writ, upheld his plea and declared on February 2, 1955, that the Governor-General had acted unlawfully in dissolving the Constituent Assembly. Ghulam Mohammad, then, appealed to the Federal Court, the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In its decision of May 10, 1955, the Federal Court upheld the action of the Governor-General, declaring that the latter had the right to disband and convene the legislative bodies since supreme power over them was vested in the British Crown.

[21] *The Pakistan Times*, November 8, 1954.

The ruling group thus succeeded in weakening the opposition in the Constituent Assembly and consolidating its own position to such an extent that it was able to start a drive against the opposition forces in the provinces. On November 2, the government of the princely State of Bahawalpur was dismissed and the Legislative Assembly, constituted there after the elections of May 8, 1952, dissolved.[23] On November 8, 1954, a decree of the Governor of Sind (the office was at the time held by I. H. Mamdot, the biggest landlord of the Punjab) was published, which charged the provincial government headed by A. Pirzada with maladministration and dismissed it. G. M. Sayed and Pirzada himself pointed out that the removal of the latter was due to his stand against the merging of the units of West Pakistan into a single province.[24] M. A. Khuhro, an ardent advocate of the unification proposal, became Chief Minister of Sind.

The ruling clique considered that the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly, the dismissal of the governments of Bahawalpur and Sind and the fact that supporters of the "One Unit" plan had been made Chief Ministers in the Punjab and Sind, had cleared the way for the unification of West Pakistan. It was well known that the government of the North-West Frontier Province, headed by Sardar Abdur Rashid, favoured unification. As regards Khairpur, the Legislative Assembly of this princely State decided not to tempt fate and voted, as early as November 10, 1954, for the inclusion of the State in the united province.

On November 22, 1954, the Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali, announced in a broadcast the government's decision to carry through the integration of West Pakistan and declared that unification would simplify the drawing up of the constitution and that it was in full accord with the "spirit of Islam which transcends all territorial boundaries." He said, "We must cease to regard ourselves as Bengalis, Punjabis and Sindhis. We must think of ourselves only as Muslims and Pakistanis.... I am sure you are all fully aware of the dangers of provincialism."[25] Other arguments put forward in favour of unification were that it would help to save state funds by reducing administrative expenditure and would lead to the better co-ordination of plans for the utilisation of natural and other resources.

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[22] The fact that H. S. Suhrawardy and A. H. Sarkar accepted ministerial posts in the government of Mohammad Ali led to sharp differences of opinion in the United Front of East Pakistan, and many leaders of its left wing condemned this step (see *The Pakistan Times*, January 5 and 9, 1955).

[23] *The Pakistan Times*, November 3, 1954.

[24] *Dawn*, November 9, 1954; *The Pakistan Times*, November 9, 1954; August 14, 1955.

Malik Firoz Khan Noon and Sardar Abdur Rashid, the Chief Minister of the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, welcomed the decision of the government. By an order of the Governor-General issued on December 17, 1954, a Council for the Administration of West Pakistan was set up, which was to make recommendations regarding the administrative machinery of the united province. The Council consisted of the Governors and Chief Ministers of the administrative units that formed the western wing of the country. [26] Its first meeting chaired by Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, the Governor of the Punjab, was held on December 18, 1954. The ruling clique was obviously in a great hurry to carry its plans into practice. Reports that the Council had already presented its observations appeared in the press as early as the beginning of February 1955; [27] such speed was quite unprecedented in Pakistan. Another order was issued by the Governor-General on March 27, 1955, which announced the establishment of a single province in West Pakistan. A few days later M. A. Gurmani was appointed Governor of the new province and Dr. Khan Sahib, Chief Minister. It seemed that the Punjabi group and its supporters had scored a big success and could now celebrate their victory. But the following events showed that the time for celebrations had not yet arrived.

The unification of West Pakistan encountered the determined opposition of the progressive public and the national democratic parties throughout the country. In Sind enforced unification met with the resistance of the Sind Awami Mahaz (the Sind People's Front, led by G. M. Sayed), the Sind Hari Committee, the provincial organisation of the Awami League and a number of smaller organisations. The national democratic opposition pressed for a federal constitution for the country which would ensure that several fully autonomous provinces were set up in West Pakistan on a linguistic basis. [28] Similar demands were put forward by progressive parties and organisations in other parts of Pakistan, such as the Red Shirts, Vror Pakhtun (the Pakhtun Fraternity, led by Abdus Samad Achaksai) and the Frontier Awami League. The demands were also supported by the Azad Pakistan Party, the Awami League in East Pakistan and the Ganatantri Dal.

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[25] The full text of Mohammad Ali's speech can be found in *The Pakistan Times*, November 23, 1954. As early as October 30, 1954, it was officially announced that the recommendations made by the Basic Principles Committee of the first Constituent Assembly regarding the administrative division of West Pakistan had been set aside.

[26] *The Pakistan Times*, December 18, 1954.

[27] *Pakistan Standard*, Karachi, February 6, 1955.

The opponents of unification pointed out that the creation of a single province would hit the economic interests of the national minorities, whose rights would be infringed upon even more than was the case hitherto, and would, moreover, have a detrimental effect on their languages and cultures. [29] They stressed that unification would establish the domination of the Punjab over the whole of West Pakistan, place the smaller provinces at the mercy of the Punjabi big landlords and provide the Punjab with an opportunity of exploiting economically Sind and the North-West Frontier Province. [30]

The demand for a national referendum on the question of unification, which was raised by the Sind Awami Mahaz, found general support. But the government rejected the proposal, alleging that to take a nation-wide vote on this question was an unnecessary and rather slow procedure.

The ruling circles started a compaign which was intended not only to scare the opposition in Sind but also to crush it and thus secure the adoption of the «One Unit» scheme. Newspapers opposing unification were banned and their collaborators put into prison. Dozens of school and university students who took part in demonstrations demanding autonomy for Sind were also imprisoned. [31] G. M. Sayed, the leader of the democratic opposition, was arrested. [32] Even members of the provincial Legislative Assembly who opposed unification were subject to repression. The building in which the Assembly met and the town of Hyderabad were overrun with swarms of policemen on the day the vote was taken on the question of unification. In this atmosphere "One Unit" resolution was approved by the Legislative Assembly of Sind on December 11, 1954. [33] The methods of coercion employed by the champions of unification added several new terms to the political vocabulary of Pakistan. But even these methods could not stifle the opposition of the popular masses to unification.

When M. A. Khuhro, one of the principal advocates of unification, was appointed Chief Minister, the pressure of public opinion compelled the Supreme Court of Sind, on March 11, 1955, to declare the appointment unlawful, since Khuhro had been earlier disqualified from holding government office because of abuse of power. The champions of the unification scheme thereupon announced that they had discovered a plot to kill the members of the Sind cabinet and to cause disorders. A new wave of arrests followed, members of the Legislative Assembly and former ministers who belonged to the opposition were arrested.[34] These measures gave rise to numerous expressions of protest in all parts of the country, many resolutions were passed calling for the dismissal of the Chief Minister of Sind and for the institution of a legal investigation into his conduct.

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[28] *New Age*, New Delhi, November 21, 1954.

[29] H. Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan*, pp. 79-80, 82.

[30] *Manchester Guardian*, January 7, 8, and 10, 1955.

[31] *The Pakistan Times*, November 23, 1954.

[32] *New Age*, November 21, 1954.

[33] *Dawn*, December 12, 1954; *The Pakistan Times*, December 12, 1954.

The movement for the restoration of parliamentary rule in the country, for general elections and the convocation of a representative Constituent Assembly capable of drawing up a constitution was gathering momentum.

The growing dissatisfaction with the policy pursued by the Mohammad Ali government intensified the disagreements within the ruling bloc. Circles associated with the army leadership, the big landlords of the Punjab and the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan insisted upon a firm policy and the use of the police to suppress the opposition and eradicate provincialism. They openly considered the introduction of a military dictatorship in the country, designed to maintain power in the hands of the Punjabi clique of the Muslim League.[35]

Against this policy stood the top strata of the civil service and politicians connected with the landlords and bourgeoisie of East Pakistan and certain groups of landlords in West Pakistan who feared that a dictatorship might infringe upon their interests and considered that it would be easier to pursue a course advantageous to them if a semblance of traditional bourgeois parliamentary institutions was retained. A prominent representative of this trend in the government camp was Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, the Minister of Justice, who advocated the restoration of parliamentary forms of government, and threatened to resign if his demands were not accepted.[36]

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[34] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1955.

[35] It is characteristic that as early as May 1948 one of the leaders of the landed magnates of the Punjab, M. Firoz Khan Noon, delivered a speech against the opposition in the Constituent Assembly, in which he declared, "This provincialism really is going to lead to dictatorship... and I tell you that today dictatorship is not a bad thing for Pakistan". Mian Jaffar Shah, a former minister in the Muslim League government of the North-West Frontier Province, said in May 1955, "I have complete confidence in our Forces, and it is my heart's desire that they should take charge of the administration" (The quotations are taken from K. Callard, *Pakistan...*, pp. 185, 301).

[36] *The Pakistan Times*, January 10, 1955.

Discontent and strife within the Muslim League were mounting. The All-Pakistan Conference of the League, which was to take place at the end of October 1954, was therefore postponed until the following January, and subsequently until April 1955.

The growing opposition forced the champions of the strong-arm policy to yield to the pressure, and to call off the state of emergency and set up a new Constituent Assembly. This was announced in a decree issued by the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, in May 1955. The Assembly was to consist of 80 deputies equally divided between East and West Pakistan. Seventy-two of its members were to be chosen by the provincial assemblies and the electoral colleges of Karachi and Baluchistan. The question regarding the election of the representatives from the States and the tribal areas (for which eight seats were reserved) was left open, since it was to be decided by the Constituent Assembly itself.

The ruling circles, in whose mind the lessons of the elections held in East Pakistan in spring 1954 were still fresh, as were those of the by-elections held in West Pakistan in the summer and autumn of the same year (in which the Muslim League was invariably defeated), were afraid to face free general elections.

A new outbreak of strife and rivalry within the ruling camp was triggered off by the coming election. Parliamentary rule was restored in East Pakistan, so that the election of the deputies to the Constituent Assembly could be held. The question who should be asked to form the provincial government caused sharp differences of opinion. Iskander Mirza strongly objected to the reinstatement of Fazlul Haq. A. H. Sarkar therefore resigned from the central government and was appointed Chief Minister of East Pakistan. Quarrels about the distribution of ministerial posts in A. H. Sarkar's cabinet, and the fact that the leadership of the Krishak Sramik Party refused to accept representatives of the Awami League as members of the government led to the withdrawal of the Awami League from the United Front. [37] Ataur Rahman Khan, who headed the Awami League Parliamentary Party in the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan, became leader of the opposition.

The withdrawal of the Awami League from the United Front greatly weakened the latter and, at the same time, strengthened the hands of the right-wing elements in the leadership of the United Front who were prepared to compromise and sought an opportunity to come to terms with the Muslim League.

Despite the undemocratic way in which the Constituent Assembly was set up, the direct pressure exerted by the government on the members of the provincial assemblies to secure the election of politicians it approved of, and the arrests of opposition members, the elections which were held in June 1955 showed that the influence of the ruling bloc and the Muslim League had declined still further. Out of a total of 80 seats it obtained only 25, while it had had 64 members in the first Constituent Assembly. Only one candidate of the Muslim League in East Pakistan—Mohammad Ali Bogra—was, with great difficulty, elected to the Constituent Assembly.[38] Half the members of the central government lost their seats in the Constituent Assembly. The United Front of East Pakistan managed to get 16 of its members into the Assembly and the Awami League, 13. Only 14 of the politicians who occupied the 76 seats of the first Constituent Assembly in Autumn 1954 were elected deputies to the second Assembly.

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[37] *Dawn*, June 24, 1955.

The Muslim League, which had lost most of its political stock and had no longer a majority in the Constituent Assembly, could not on its own form a government. To retain power, its leaders were compelled to form a coalition government and to seek an understanding with their former adversaries.

When the new Assembly met in July 1955, the government of Mohammad Ali Bogra received 40 votes—consisting of those of the Muslim League; the Awami League, whose leader H. S. Suhrawardy was a member of the cabinet; and the Independents. The United Front, the Hindu parties of East Pakistan and M. F. Noon's group which had three members in the Assembly—altogether 26 deputies—voted against.[39] But the Muslim League-Awami League parliamentary bloc was unstable. Headed by the Muslim League, such a coalition was incapable of satisfying either the national bourgeoisie of East Pakistan or the national bourgeoisie of the smaller provinces of West Pakistan that supported the provincial organisations of the Awami League in the western wing of the country, because all attempts to carry out any of the bourgeois reforms advocated by these social forces were from the outset condemned to failure. In July 1955, the Awami League, therefore, demanded the resignation of Mohammad Ali Bogra's government and the creation of a coalition government headed by H. S. Suhrawardy.[40]

But the Punjabi clique within the Muslim League leadership was able to form another parliamentary coalition which allowed it to retain the post of the Prime Minister and to maintain its decisive position in the government. As a result of prolonged secret negotiations an agreement was reached with the leaders of the Krishak Sramik Party and the Nizam-i Islam Party in the United Front to form a coalition in the Constituent Assembly and set up a coalition government under the ægis of the Muslim League. The United Front received six cabinet posts in the new government. The unscrupulousness and place-hunting of the right-wing political leaders of the United Front thus enabled the Muslim League leaders to remain in power.

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[38] *Pakistan Standard*, June 24, 1955.

[39] Because they voted against the government F. Noon and his supporters were expelled from the Muslim Leage on August 1, 1955.

[40] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1955.

Several changes took place during this period in the leadership of the ruling bloc. A new "strong man," Iskander Mirza, made his appearance, he had good connections and was supported by the military circles[41] and top civil servants. The following description of him was given by *The Observer*: "He is a strong protagonist of the Commonwealth, favours military alliances with the US, and is a champion of Muslim unity." [42] Iskander Mirza became acting Governor-General on August 5, 1955, and Governor-General of Pakistan on September 19, replacing Ghulam Mohammad who retired. His advance to the forefront immediately affected the fate of Mohammad Ali Bogra, the Prime Minister, who was compelled to resign on August 5. He was superseded by Choudhury Mohammad Ali, up to then Finance Minister.

These changes showed that, because of the growing popular dissatisfaction and the slump in the prestige of the Muslim League, the ruling circles of Pakistan thought it advisable to remove the most odious figures from the political scene and replace them by politicians whom they considered better able to pursue a policy advantageous to them. Such personal changes, however, could not lead to a revision of the political course represented by Ghulam Mohammad and Mohammad Ali Bogra.

The first question that the government of Choudhury Mohammad Ali asked the new Constituent Assembly to consider was the unification of West Pakistan (on August 23, 1955). The opposition to the unification scheme had, by that time, become so strong in all parts of Pakistan that even many Muslim League leaders, both in the centre and in the provinces, who had at first supported the "One Unit" plan, were now forced to revise their views for fear that they would otherwise be politically isolated and lose the last remnants of their authority. Although some students assert that the changed attitude of a number of politicians was "due to folly and to the dangerous habit of speaking first and thinking afterwards," [43] one must assume that it was caused by weightier reasons. Strong discontent among the Pakhtuns compelled the government of the North-West Frontier Province headed by Sardar Abdur Rashid in summer 1955 to protest against unification. On July 18, 1955, the government was dismissed and replaced by a new cabinet headed by Sardar Bahadur Khan. The chief ministers of Sind, the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province were thus removed as a result of the struggle between the champions and opponents of the unification of West Pakistan.[44]

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[41] Iskander Mirza was Defence Secretary in the government of Pakistan from 1947 to 1954.

[42] *The Observer*, London, October 12, 1958.

[43] H. Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan*, pp. 81-82.

The bill on the integration of West Pakistan met with strong opposition in the second Constituent Assembly; for tactical reasons this opposition was supported even by one of the sponsors of the bill, F. Noon. The opponents of the bill demanded a referendum. They pointed out that the purpose of the unification scheme was the consolidation of the political and economic position of the landlords and bourgeois from the Punjab to the detriment of East Pakistan and the smaller provinces, and that the passing of the bill would deepen the crisis in the country. They sharply criticised the violent methods which the ruling clique employed to enforce their plans.

The representatives of the national democratic and progressive parties countered these plans by tabling a proposal, which envisaged the creation of a zonal federation on a cultural and linguistic basis in West Pakistan, consisting of four autonomous provinces, namely, the Punjab, Pakhtunistan, Sind and Baluchistan. The question of whether to incorporate Karachi in West Pakistan led to serious differences of opinion even among the supporters of unification. The representatives of East Pakistan demanded that Karachi, the capital of the state, should remain a special federal area. Big West-Pakistani merchants and manufacturers, such as Adamjee, Ispahani, Najmuddin, Valibhai, who had considerable economic interests in East Pakistan, held similar views.[45] On the other hand, the Punjabi landlords and big entrepreneurs of West Pakistan whose interests were primarily concentrated in the western wing of the country, demanded the incorporation of Karachi in West Pakistan.

The government bill was debated for almost a month and finally carried by the votes of the Muslim League deputies and the parties of the United Front supporting it. On October 5, 1955, the Governor-General issued a decree on the establishment of West Pakistan as a single province, with Lahore as its capital. The new province was split into ten divisions—Peshawar, Dera-Ismail-Khan, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Hyderabad, Quetta and Kalat—without taking into consideration the distribution of the national and ethnical groups that inhabited these divisions, and the economic and cultural ties that had grown up in the course of history. The question of Karachi was settled in a way that could satisfy neither the protagonists of integration nor its opponents. The administration of the capital remained in the hands of the central government, but at the same time the representatives of Karachi were given seats in the Legislative Assembly of the united province, which seemed to indicate that it was part of West Pakistan.

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[44] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[45] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1955; February 17, 1956.

The formal proclamation that the new province had come into existence was issued on October 14, 1955. M. A. Gurmani became Governor of the Province. Since Gurmani was a Punjabi, Khan Sahib was made Chief Minister in the hope that this would weaken dissatisfaction among the Pakhtuns. The chief ministers of the former provinces—M. A. Khuhro, the former Chief Minister of Sind, Sardar Bahadur Khan of the North-West Frontier Province, and Hamid Khan Dasti of the Punjab—became cabinet ministers. Sponsors and partisans of the unification plan, such as M. M. Daultana, Qurban Ali and Abid Husain, also joined the government. The Legislative Assembly of the unified province came into being in January 1956; it consisted of 306 deputies chosen by the former provincial assemblies and the electoral colleges for Karachi and Baluchistan. As soon as West Pakistan was set up as a single province, a fight for power began among the rival political factions, each defending specific personal and local interests.

Moreover, the establishment of a single province failed to end the strife and disagreement generated by the unification scheme. Even local Muslim League organisations in Sind, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province demanded the repeal of the unification act. The Baluchistan branch of the Muslim League passed a resolution declaring that in creating one unit in West Pakistan the government had not only failed to achieve the final aim—unity and progress—but had even increased existing disunity, backwardness and poverty.[46]

To secure the abrogation of the unification act, the national democratic parties and other organisations of West Pakistan formed a united front in the autumn of 1955. This body comprised the Red Shirts, Vror Pakhtun, Sind Awami Mahaz, the Hari Committee, Ostoman Gall (Party of the Masses) — the national-democratic organisation of the Baluchis led by Abdul Karim, a veteran of the Baluchi national movement—and the Awami League of the former North-West Frontier Province, which on this issue opposed the right-wing leaders of the Party, who favoured unification and had helped to achieve it when H. S. Suhrawardy was Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Mohammad Ali Bogra.[47] The Sind Awami League supported the fight against unification. The Awami League in the eastern wing of the country also came out against the unification of West Pakistan [48] and the Azad Pakistan Party, too, backed the movement.

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[46] *Dawn*, October 17, 1956.

[47] Because the Awami League in the former North-West Frontier Province headed by Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif opposed the One-Unit scheme, it was disaffiliated by the right-wing leadership of the party in January 1956, and H. S. Suhrawardy asked Ghulam Mohammad Khan Lundkhor to organise a new branch in the province (*Dawn*, January 25, 1956).

The peoples of West and East Pakistan combined to fight together for national self-determination and against the despotic policy of the ruling clique, which regarded with scorn their aspirations and interests.

Although the bloc of territorial magnates and sections of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie associated with them had succeeded in merging the various units of the western wing into a single province, against the will of the peoples of West Pakistan, this action had not solved even a single one of the problems facing Pakistan, but on the contrary, increased political tension. From the autumn of 1955 onwards, the struggle against unification became one of the most burning aspects in the political life of the country.

It should be noted that the creation of a single province in the western wing of the country adversely affected the international position of Pakistan, and led to friction with Afghanistan. The Afghan government officially protested against the incorporation of the areas inhabited by Pakhtuns into the amalgamated province and recalled its ambassador from Karachi. The government of Pakistan rejected this protest on October 18, 1955, and in turn withdrew its ambassador from Kabul.[49]

Chapter XV

PAKISTAN AND THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY ALLIANCES

In autumn 1949 the imperialist powers attempted to tie India, Pakistan and Ceylon to NATO by means of a "mutual defence" pact. According to the plans of the imperialists, India was to become the mainstay of the proposed agreement.

But the hopes of the American imperialist circles to transform India into an anti-Communist bulwark proved false. The desire to pursue a neutral foreign policy was growing in India due to the following circumstances: the declining influence of the reactionary forces and of the British ruling circles; the rising democratic movement of the Indian people and the all-Indian peace movement, which increased particularly after India was declared a republic on January 26, 1950; the sharpening contradictions between the Indian national bourgeoisie and the Western monopolies; and finally the slump in the prestige of the American imperialists as their true attitude to the peoples of Asia in general, and the Indian people in particular became evident.[1] The clearer it became that the imperialist circles intended to unleash an aggressive war against the socialist countries, the stronger grew this desire of the Indian people. The Indian press voiced the sentiments of the Indian public when it wrote that India must pursue an independent and neutral peace policy.[2]

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[48] *The Pakistan Times*, October 24, 1955; *Pakistan Standard*, October 24, 1955.

[49] Л. Б. Теплинский, «Проблема Пуштунистана во внешней политике современного Афганистана», *Краткие сообщения Института востоковедения АН СССР*, выпуск XXXVII, 1960, стр. 12-15; Н. Л. Халфин, «Проблема Пуштунистана», *Краткие сообщения Института Востоковедения АН СССР*, Москва, выпуск XXXV, 1959, стр. 44-48.

India, and its government, refused to become obedient instruments in the hands of the imperialist monopolies. India declined the invitation of the USA to participate in the San Francisco conference in 1950 and did not sign the so-called peace treaty with Japan drawn up by American diplomats. The Indian government recognised the Chinese People's Republic and stood up for the restoration of China's rights in UNO. India's position facilitated the conclusion of an armistice in Korea on July 27, 1953.[3] It became clear that as far as India was concerned the plans of the aggressive forces had miscarried. This in turn increased Pakistan's importance with regard to the imperialist policy pursued by the USA in the Middle East and South-East Asia.

The constantly growing interest the United States took in Pakistan is graphically demonstrated by the figures of American economic "aid" granted to that country. In 1951, under the First Technical Co-operation Agreement of February 9, 1951, based on the US Point Four Programme, Pakistan received a total of $500,000, and in 1952, under the agreement of February 2, 1952, it was granted $ 10 million. In 1953 the technical "aid" which Pakistan received from the USA, under the agreements of March 27 and December 28, 1953, amounted already to $ 34.2 million. These funds, however, could not be used by the Pakistan government according to its own judgement. The agreements stipulated that Pakistan was not to accept technical assistance from other countries or international organisations without the consent of the government of the USA. Since American "assistance" was provided under the Mutual Security Programme adopted by the US Congress in 1951, Pakistan was obliged to adhere to the trade restrictions which the United States imposed with regard to certain countries.[4]

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[1] *Новейшая история Индии*, Москва, 1959, стр. 555.

[2] *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, June 13, 1952.

[3] В. П. Нихамин, *Очерки внешней политики Индии, 1947-1957*, Москва, 1959, стр. 92.

[4] For further details see Ю. В. Ганковский, «Военно-политическое проникновение США в Пакистан»; С. А. Кузьмин, «Экономическая экспансия американского империализма в Пакистане», both published in *Политика США на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке*, Москва, 1960; Р. М. Мукимджанова, «Экономическое проникновение США в Пакистан (1951-1956)», in *Краткие сообщения Института востоковедения* АН СССР, Москва, выпуск XXXI, 1959.

Numerous experts and advisers were sent by the USA to Pakistan to check how American "aid" was used.[5] The penetration of American experts into all sections of the state apparatus and the principal economic branches enabled the ruling circles of the USA to control the development of Pakistan's economy and give it a direction which suited their own interests best. Even deliveries of food to relieve famine—supplied in accordance with the agreement of November 4, 1952, and the law signed by President Eisenhower on June 25, 1953—were used by the American ruling clique for political ends, as an instrument of American foreign policy.[6] The Pakistan government took it upon itself to popularise this "aid" among the population, while American representatives were allowed to supervise the distribution of wheat from overseas. In the hands of the rulers of the USA, the supply of food-stuffs became an important means of influencing the policy of Pakistan and interfering in its internal affairs.[7]

The imperialist groups of the United States have taken into account the changes caused in the world arena by the growing power and influence of the socialist states. "The imperialists are using new methods and new forms to maintain colonial exploitation of the peoples. They resort to whatever means they can (colonial wars, military blocs, conspiracies, terrorism, subversion, economic pressure, bribery) to control the newly-free countries and to reduce the independence they have won to mere form, or to deprive them of that independence. Under the guise of 'aid,' they are trying to retain their old positions in those countries and capture new ones, to extend their social basis, lure the national bourgeoisie to their side, implant military despotic regimes and put obedient puppets in power. Using the poisoned weapon of national and tribal strife, the imperialists seek to split the ranks of the national-liberation movement; reactionary groups of the local exploiting classes play the role of allies of imperialism."[8]

While the American imperialists "aided" Pakistan they tried to obstruct the extension and development of its relations with the socialist countries and to prevent Pakistan from turning to the Soviet Union for genuine and disinterested assistance without any political strings attached, which would have helped to consolidate its independence. The USA knew very well that the USSR was one of the first states which responded to the appeal of the Pakistan government for supplies of food-stuffs at the end of 1952 and sent a considerable quantity of wheat to Pakistan in exchange for jute and cotton.[9] The United States also took into consideration that Pakistan might request the capitalist powers of Western Europe to provide the necessary assistance.

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[5] *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, July 21, 1951; *Khyber Mail*, Peshawar, August 14, 1953.

[6] *Бюллетень иностранной коммерческой информации*, ноябрь 28, 1953.

[7] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, August 13, 1953.

[8] *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p. 44.

Under the guise of "aid" the American monopolies penetrated the market of Pakistan and increased the export of American industrial commodities and surplus agricultural products to Pakistan. American "aid" destroyed the protectionist barrier of imperial preferences and enabled the monopolists of the USA to wage a successful fight against their British competitor on the Pakistan market. Thus international contradictions, too, induced the American ruling groups to render "aid" to Pakistan.

United States "aid" in the form of official and semi-official government loans and various "free" grants strengthened and expanded American influence in Pakistan, and this in turn affected the foreign policy of Pakistan.

In autumn 1951 Pakistan signed the "peace treaty" with Japan prepared by the USA at the San Francisco conference, and in June 1952 it officially recognised the puppet government of emperor Bao-Dai in Viet-Nam.

American economic "aid" also paved the way for the military and political penetration of Pakistan by the United States. After the failure of their attempts, in 1949-1950, to set up a military bloc of Muslim states on a Pan-Islamic basis, the ruling groups of the USA supported by the governments of Britain, France and Turkey, on November 10, 1951, put forward the so-called Middle East Defence scheme which was closely related to NATO.

They attempted to organise an aggressive military bloc in this part of Asia in the hope that it would help them to achieve several important military and political objectives. In preparation for a new world war the imperialists sought to encircle the socialist countries by a chain of military bases and bridge-heads. They also intended to turn the proposed military alliance into a weapon that would enable them to suppress the anti-colonial struggle of the Asian peoples, to undermine their solidarity, to divide them politically and economically and, finally, to enslave these peoples. The alliance was to assist them in utilising the vast human and material resources of the Asian countries, and to place these resources at the disposal of the imperialist monopolies. Furthermore, it was intended to serve as a means of putting pressure on the governments of the Asian countries which carried on an independent peaceful foreign policy.

Each of the imperialist sponsors of this aggressive military alignment, moreover, pursued aims which were often contrary to the interests of the other partners; for example, France and Britain were trying to strengthen their positions in the East, while the USA sought to oust the old colonial powers in order to take their place.

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[9] In September 1952, a Soviet-Pakistan trade agreement was signed, which made provisions for the Soviet Union to deliver 150,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan (*Chronology of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1957, p. 82).

In 1951 and 1952, negotiations were conducted regarding the co-operation of Pakistan in the proposed military bloc and the construction of military and air bases on its territory. In connection with this, several high-ranking officials of the USA War Department visited Karachi. In February 1952 Choudhury Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported the idea of a defensive alliance consisting of the countries of the Near and Middle East. But the alliance remained on paper. The reasons for this failure were the traditional hatred with which the Asian peoples regarded the British and French colonialists, the growing anti-American sentiments, the fall in the prestige of the USA brought about by the military reverses which the American imperialists suffered in Korea, and the determined opposition of India and Afghanistan, Pakistan's neighbours, and of the Arab countries to such a military pact. The progressive forces of Pakistan also came out against a Middle East Command, for they regarded it as a means of suppressing the national-liberation movement of the Asian peoples and a further step towards a new world war.

The imperialist monopolies of the USA were compelled to resort to evasive action, i. e., to knock together the aggressive bloc in instalments, by concluding bilateral military agreements.

This manoeuvre was to conceal the fact that a single military bloc was being set up in the Near and Middle East (the so-called northern defence link, to use the terminology of John Foster Dulles) and the part the United States played in it. In summer 1953 Dulles visited this region, paying special attention to Turkey and Pakistan. The American press stressed that such strong and reliable friends as Pakistan and Turkey could serve as a sheet-anchor for the Middle East as a whole.[10]

In September and October 1953, Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, were invited to Washington. Members of the Armed Services Committee of the US House of Representatives also visited Pakistan in October 1953. Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor-General of Pakistan, paid an unofficial visit to the United States a month later. During his stay, as the American newspapers reported, the question of American arms deliveries to Pakistan was discussed, and in exchange the USA sought to obtain military and air bases.[11] In December 1953, the US Vice-President, Richard Nixon, went to Karachi. Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan visited Ankara towards the close of 1953 and Celal Bayar, the President of Turkey, paid a return visit to Karachi in January 1954.

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[10] *The New York Times*, January 2, 1954.

[11] *The New York Times*, November 2, 1953.

The negotiations carried on during these numerous visits prepared the ground for the conclusion of a military alliance between Pakistan and Turkey and an agreement on American military "aid" to Pakistan. The American press pointed out that Pakistan's participation in the military bloc that was being organised was a condition for the granting of this "aid."[12]

The men responsible for American foreign policy endeavoured to bring pressure to bear upon India and other Asian states that pursued a peaceful foreign policy. Reports appeared in American newspapers that the Washington-Karachi pact would spell the end of Washington's patience with Asian neutralism, which had found its strongest expression in the policy of the Indian Prime Minister Nehru.[13] The American ruling circles hoped to frighten the Indian government and to induce it to ask the United States for military assistance.[14] But they miscalculated, India was able to stand up to these intimidations. Thereupon, in a personal letter to Prime Minister Nehru sent on February 26, 1954, Mr. Eisenhower "promised that any request from India for military assistance 'would receive my most sympathetic consideration.'"[15] The ruling groups of the USA reckoned that the acceptance of such "aid" would commit the Indian government to a policy that conformed to the wishes of the American "benefactors." But the Indian government declined the offer made by the USA and strongly criticised the American policy in Asia.[16]

The Indian public vigorously supported the determined stand made by Jawaharlal Nehru's government. Mass demonstrations against the American policy were held throughout the country. The chairman of the All-India Forward Bloc, General Mohan Singh, declared, "it has now been demonstrated to all peace-loving peoples of the world that America's present policy is a source of great danger and a threat to world peace and to Asia's freedom in particular."[17]

Under these circumstances the Washington politicians speeded up the conclusion of the Pakistani-Turkish military alliance. The Agreement for Friendly Co-operation between Pakistan and Turkey was signed in Karachi on April 2, 1954, and came into force on June 12 of the same year.[18] The pact served as a basis for the aggressive military alignment in the Near and Middle East. The United States hoped with the help of this pact to extend its sphere of influence to the southern borders of the Soviet Union, to weaken Britain's position in the Middle East, to bring the rich mineral oil resources of this region under its control, to split the group of Arab and Asian countries, and to isolate India.

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[12] *The New York Times*, January 6, 1954.

[13] *The New York Times*, September 10, 1953.

[14] В. П. Нихамин, *Очерки внешней политики Индии. . .*, стр. 128.

[15] Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and Pakistan," in *Current History*, Philadelphia, March 1958, p. 143.

[16] For further details, see В. П. Нихамин, *Очерки внешней политикиИндии…*, стр. 130-132.

[17] The quotation is taken from *New Age*, New Delhi, March 21, 1954.

Although the pact between Pakistan and Turkey was called an Agreement for Friendly Co-operation and contained several articles on the development of cultural and economic relations between the two countries, the military principles formulated in Articles 4 and 6 were its real basis. They provided for consultation and co-operation between the contracting parties in the sphere of defence, and the manufacture of weapons and other military equipment, and stipulated that other states could also join the alliance.

The press in a number of Eastern countries made no secret about the aggressive nature of the pact. American newspapers, too, wrote openly about it[19] and stressed its anti-Soviet character. Popular demonstrations against the agreement were held in India, Afghanistan and the Arab countries. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries as well as India, Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Nepal, and Ceylon made formal protests to the governments of Pakistan and Turkey. The notes of protest pointed out that one could not regard the pact as a defensive alliance since neither Pakistan nor Turkey were threatened by anyone; and that the agreement did not serve the true national interests of the two countries but merely increased international tension.

The peoples of the Arab states and the progressive sections of the population of Iran put up a determined resistance against the attempts of the USA to draw their countries into the military alignment the beginning of which was marked by the pact between Pakistan and Turkey. The plans of the United States also encountered a certain amount of opposition from the British ruling groups aspiring to dominate the aggressive military bloc that was being set up in the Near and Middle East.

The anti-imperialist movement of the peoples of the Arab countries and Iran and the Anglo-American competition for ascendancy in the proposed bloc balked the plans of the American imperialists for the creation of an aggressive military alignment in the Near and Middle East.

The ruling groups of the USA then considered it opportune without further delay to conclude an agreement regarding American-Pakistani military co-operation. On May 19, 1954, the United States and Pakistan signed the Mutual Aid and Security Agreement in Karachi.[20] According to this agreement the United States undertook to supply Pakistan with weapons, military equipment and other war materials it might require and also to send military advisers. American military supplies were to be imported duty free, while USA military personnel supervising the utilisation of the American "aid" were granted diplomatic immunity. The government of Pakistan, in its turn, undertook to deliver raw materials and semi-finished goods to the United States and to collaborate with the American ruling groups in restricting trade with the socialist countries.

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[18] The full text can be found in the *Middle East Journal*, Washington, 1954, No. 3, pp. 337-338.

[19] See, for example, *The New York Times*, December 31, 1953; September 2, 1954.

After the conclusion of the agreement of May 19, 1954, American military "aid" to Pakistan, which was designed to convert the country into a jumping-off ground for an attack on the socialist countries, was sharply increased. In summer 1954 a large group of American officers, headed by Major-General V. Saxton, went to Pakistan as military advisers. Such high-ranking American officers as Admiral Redford and General Van Fleet inspected the armed forces of Pakistan at the close of 1954 and the beginning of 1955.[21] By summer 1955 the American military mission in Pakistan numbered 250 persons.[22] It was with their assistance that the army, air force and navy of Pakistan were being enlarged and modernised.

The construction of new and the extension and re-equipment of already existing strategic roads, military bases, ports, airfields, strong points and military installations began on a large scale. The bulk of the American "aid" was sent to the western wing of the country where an intensive military building programme was carried on in Chitral, Gilgit, Quetta, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and other districts situated on the approaches to the southern borders of the Soviet Union. The main forces of the Pakistan army were also stationed there. Articles appeared in the American and British press at the end of 1954 reporting that supplies of American arms and other military equipment were 50 per cent higher than orginally planned.[23] To maintain its "defensive capacity" Pakistan received $60 million additional "aid" in 1955. American specialists were in charge of the military training centres that were set up to prepare an adequate number of officers.

Having chosen a course that involved the country in aggressive blocs, the ruling groups of Pakistan supported the plan to create a military alliance in South-East Asia. The scheme for it had been drawn up by the United States and officially announced in the Anglo-American declaration of April 13, 1954. Pakistan participated in the Manila Conference—where the only countries from South-East Asia to be represented were Thailand and the Philippines [24] — and on September 8, 1954, signed the South-East Asia Defence Treaty, which came into force on February 18, 1955.[25] This treaty formally set up the aggressive military SEATO bloc. Its military and political clauses were designed to suppress the national-liberation movements in the Asian countries, and its clearly hostile intentions were directed both against the socialist countries and the peace-loving states of the Asian continent. As regards the economic aspects of the agreement, their purpose was to transform Pakistan and the other South-East Asian countries into suppliers of strategic raw materials for the American industry and to increase the inequality of their position in the imperialist system of division of labour.[26]

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[20] The text of the agreement can be found in *The Middle East Journal*, 1954; No. 3, pp. 338-340.

[21] *New Age*, January 2 and March 13, 1955.

[22] See А. А. Змеев, *Пакистан. Экономика и внешняя торговля*, Москва, 1956, стр. 96.

[23] *The New York Times*, October 22, 1954; *The Times*, London, October 22, 1954.

On September 23, 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact[27] (since August 1959 SENTO). The ruling circles of Pakistan undertook, under certain circumstances, to permit the military forces of the member countries of this aggressive alignment to use the country's territory, its airfields and ports.

By signing the military agreement with the United States, and joining SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan placed its army under Washington's control and allowed the transatlantic monopolies in charge of the military alignments to decide the destiny of the country,[28] since the armed forces of Pakistan could at any moment be involved in military operations in the Near and Middle East and South-East Asia.

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[24] India, Burma, and Indonesia refused to take part in the conference; Ceylon, which in 1954 had a right-wing United National Party government headed by Kotelawala, after hesitating for a short while, took up a similar position. The principal members of the conference were the USA, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand, that is non-Asiatic powers.

[25] See *The Department of State Bulletin*, 1954, No. 795.

[26] For further details, see R. K. Karanjia, *SEATO. Security or Menace?* Bombay, 1956; Н. С. Мерзляков, «СЕАТО — орудие подавления национально-освободительного движения в странах Юго-Восточной Азии», in *Советское востоковедение*, 1958, № 3; С. М. Нестеров, *США и СЕАТО*, Москва, 1961.

[27] A series of agreements of a military nature facilitated the creation of the Baghdad Pact. On February 24, 1955, Iraq and Turkey signed a mutual co-operation agreement, which Britain officially joined on April 5, 1955, and Iran on November 3 of the same year. At the first session of the Council of Ministers of the five member states of the agreement, held in Baghdad on November 22, 1955, the Baghdad Pact was formally signed. A representative of the USA attended the meeting as an observer.

[28] Although, for tactical reasons, the United States did not adhere to the Baghdad Pact, it was in fact a member, for it played an active part in the principal bodies of this alliance.

The consolidation of the positions of the American monopolies in Pakistan caused uneasiness in Great Britain and aggravated the contradictions between the imperialist powers in this part of Asia. As early as 1951, on the initiative of Great Britain, a six-year plan of assistance to the less developed countries was adopted at the Colombo Conference, which was attended by the states of the British Commonwealth. The Colombo Plan was to place certain obstacles in the path of American economic expansion in the countries of the Commonwealth, i. e. the former British colonies.[29] In May 1953, Britain granted Pakistan a loan of £10 million for the purchase of British industrial commodities and machinery, reckoning that this would strengthen its influence in the country.

The British ruling groups sought to restrict the purchases of American weapons by Pakistan, since this tended to strengthen the position of the USA in that country. The British Minister for Commonwealth Affairs, who visited Karachi in the autumn of 1953, said that he regretted these purchases and declared that it would be better for Pakistan to have the same type of armament as Great Britain.[30] British newspapers showed their dissatisfaction with the American-Pakistan military alliance, which undermined British influence in Pakistan.[31]

The endeavours of the British monopolies to arrest the growth of the American influence in Pakistan proved, however, unavailing. Pakistan's increasing dependence on foreign "aid," the bulk of which came from the USA,[32] led to a further expansion of American influence in the country. This found its expression in the agreements between the United States and Pakistan signed on January 11 and May 26, 1955.[33] According to the provisions of the first of these agreements, Pakistan undertook to facilitate the import of American commodities, thus aiming one more blow at the system of imperial preferences which favoured Britain. The second agreement gave American investors in Pakistan the right to export their profits, and provided safeguards in case of nationalisation.

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[29] For further details, see С. А. Кузьмин, «К вопросу об империалистических противоречиях в Пакистане», *Советское востоковедение*, 1958, № 3, стр. 78-80; В. М. Коллонтай, «Английские программы «помощи» экономически слабо развитым странам», in *Краткие сообщения Института востоковедения АН СССР*, Москва, выпуск XXXV, 1959, стр. 79-81.

[30] *The Pakistan Times*, November 20, 1953.

[31] *The Times*, January 14, 1954.

[32] According to American and Pakistan sources, up to September 1956, US economic "aid" reached $ 465 million, or 68.8 per cent of the total economic assistance Pakistan received from abroad, which amounted to $ 675 million. In addition, the Americans sent food-stuffs to Pakistan and also military "aid," the true amounts of which are unknown (see N. D. Palmer, *The United States and Pakistan*, p. 143; *Foreign Aid and Its Utilisation in Pakistan*, Karachi, 1956).

[33] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1955.

In 1954, the Pakistan authorities withdrew the special privileges enjoyed by the British companies which exploited the country's mineral wealth. They opened thereby the door to the oil resources of Pakistan to the American capitalists, who in 1954-1955 signed a number of very profitable agreements with the government of Pakistan for the prospecting and exploitation of oil fields.[34]

The aggressive groups of the USA that sought to draw Pakistan into military and political blocs argued that the existence of a mystical "Communist threat"[35] necessitated a close military alliance between the two countries. The ruling circles of Pakistan, however, were least of all concerned with a "Communist threat." Their aim in joining the military and political alignments was to be able to negotiate with India regarding the Kashmir and other controversial issues from a position of power. Furthermore, Pakistan wished to enlist the support of the USA with respect to the Pakhtun question. It was in the hope of distracting the attention of the popular masses of the country from the pressing political problems at home and to strengthen their position that the rulers of Pakistan accepted American military "aid" and fanned anti-Indian and anti-Afghan sentiments.

Pakistan's adherence to the military blocs not only complicated relations with India but adversely affected the rapprochement between the Indian and Pakistani governments, whose points of view regarding the solution of the controversial problems dividing the two countries seemed in 1953 to be drawing closer. The Indian government had already in 1949 and 1951 approached Pakistan with the suggestion for an agreement renouncing war as a means of solving disputes between the two countries. Although no such agreement was concluded, the Indian offer improved relations between Pakistan and India. In March 1953 an Indo-Pakistan commercial agreement was signed. The following August a meeting between Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Bogra was held in Delhi. It led to the signing of an agreement on August 20, 1953, which was important in principle because it indicated how the Kashmir problem could be solved without interference by the imperialist powers.[36] An understanding was reached about the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide its future status. This plebiscite was to be carried through under the supervision of an administrator elected by the governments of India and Pakistan from among the representatives of a small neutral country (at the time the agreement was concluded the office of administrator was held by the American Admiral Nimitz).[37] Progressive public opinion in India and Pakistan approved of the advance made towards the settlement of the Kashmir problem, and so did the government of Kashmir.

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[34] А. А. Змеев, *Пакистан...*, стр. 14; С. А. Кузьмин, *Экономическая экспансия американского империализма в Пакистане*, стр. 335-336.

[35] J. S. Roucek, "The Geopolitics of Pakistan," in *The Social Studies*, Philadelphia, November 1953, No. 7, p. 225.

[36] В. П. Нихамин, *Очерки внешней политики Индии...*, стр. 124.

The military "aid" which Pakistan received from the USA became an obstacle on the road to the expected rapprochement with India. For the government of Mohammad Ali Bogra, hoping that with the help of the Western imperialist circles it would be able to reach so strong a position that it could obtain unilateral concessions from India, declared, on September 21, 1954, that it had repudiated the agreement of August 20, 1953, broken off all direct negotiations with India on the Kashmir issue and submitted the question for re-consideration to the Security Council. When the rulers of Pakistan took this step, they relied on the benevolent attitude of the Western powers associated with them in the military alliances, who had a majority of votes in the Security Council, and demanded that a plebiscite be held in Kashmir under the supervision of UNO observers.

In an attempt to bring pressure to bear on India and to improve their standing in their own country, the ruling circles of Pakistan countenanced reports in the semi-official press calculated to fan anti-Indian sentiments and even open appeals to start a *Jihad*, a religious war for the liberation of Kashmir. Demands were also made for the dispatch of UNO troops to Kashmir and Junagarh. Armed clashes and incidents on the borders of India and Pakistan took place almost daily (over 600 occurred in 1955). The ruling groups of Pakistan supported the Portuguese colonialists who refused to return the ancient Indian territory of Goa to the Indian Republic. On their way to Goa Portuguese warships were able to use the facilities of Pakistan ports.[38] The government of Pakistan backed the Dulles-Cunha statement of December 2, 1955, which declared Goa a Portuguese province, and the leading bodies of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO discussed the Kashmir question in March and April 1955.[39]

All this roused the indignation of the Indian people and was regarded by India as a threat to its independence. The Indian press, prominent public figures and many politicians pointed out that American military supplies led to increased tension between India and Pakistan and had a detrimental effect on the economy of India, for they necessitated considerable additional expenditure for defence purposes. Under the new circumstances, created by Pakistan's participation in military alignments, the Indian public and government decided that it was impossible to solve the Kashmir problem by means of a plebiscite.[40] Moreover, the India-Pakistan agreement of August 20, 1953, had been torn up as a result of the policy of the Western powers and their Pakistani associates.

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[37] According to the decision of the UN Security Council, in which the Anglo-American states held a majority, Admiral Nimitz was in March 1949 appointed administrator charged with the task of supervising the proposed plebiscite in Kashmir.

[38] *Civil and Military Gazette*, August 7, 1954.

[39] *Manchester Guardian*, March 9, 1956; *Government of Pakistan Foreign Relations*, Karachi, 1956, p. 56.

Both the conclusion of the military "aid" agreement between the USA and Pakistan and Pakistan's adherence to military alignments complicated still further relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan which were already tense because of the Pakhtun problem. Afghan newspapers warned the government of Pakistan that the conclusion of a military alliance with the USA and the establishment of American bases in Pakistan would lead to grave consequences and that these actions endangered peace in the Middle East.[41]

Afghanistan strongly protested against the fact that the North-West Frontier Province, which was inhabited by Pakhtuns, was being transformed into a military base and that Pakhtuns were recruited for the army of Pakistan. The Afhgan government turned down the proposals, made by Pakistan and Turkey in April 1955, to join their military alliance. In an effort to put pressure upon Afghanistan and to force it to make unilateral concessions, the Pakistan authorities closed the southern borders of Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 1955 and thus disrupted the foreign trade of the country. During this difficult period the Soviet Union came to the aid of the Afghan people and, on June 28, 1955, permitted Afghanistan freely to convey everything it required as transit goods across Soviet territory. The economic pressure which Pakistan brought to bear on Afghanistan was combined with open military threats. Armed clashes took place on the Afghan-Pakistan border. This compelled the Afghan government to declare a state of emergency (from May to July 1955) and to mobilise the army.[42]

Tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan subsided to a certain extent in autumn 1955, when the two countries reached an agreement to open their state frontiers for the transit of Afghan goods. But a new crisis in their relations arose in connection with the discussion of the Pakhtunistan problem at the SEATO session in spring 1956. The government of Afghanistan officially protested against the decisions of the session, which meant that Pakhtun territory came within the zone of operation of the aggressive military alliance.[43]

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[40] *New Age*, April 8, 1956; *The Hindustan Times*, September 7, 1956.

[41] انیس (*Anis*), Kabul, December 29, 1953.

[42] *Anis*, May 5 and 16, 1955.

[43] *Anis*, March 11, 1956.

Relations with the Arab states were also complicated as a result of Pakistan's participation in aggressive military alignments. The New York *Daily News* remarked, in February 1956, that the Pakistan government had to consider whether agreements with the West could be a sufficient compensation for the hostile attitude of the Arab countries.[44]

The imperialist circles of the USA used their dominating position in the military blocs which Pakistan joined, and also the economic dependence of the latter, to interfere in the domestic affairs of the country. We have already drawn attention to the part played by the USA in the dismissal of the United Front Government in East Pakistan and the declaration of a state of emergency in the country in spring and autumn 1954. Twenty-four hours before the introduction of the state of emergency, an American newspaper, which displayed an unusual degree of insight, wrote that the friends of Pakistan in the United States wished the Prime Minister success in his struggle to maintain the political stability which a free and independent Pakistan required.[45]

As the USA consolidated its position in Pakistan it interfered to an increasing extent in the internal affairs of the country and its interference assumed more open forms. The American monopolies rendered assistance, financially and in other ways, to reactionary pan-Islamic organisations, such as the Jamaat-i Islami and the Nizam-i Islam, in their fight against the democratic forces opposing Pakistan's participation in military alliances.[46] They also set up various Pakistan-American associations and societies in the country for the same purpose. In the struggle for ascendancy in Pakistan, waged with increasing ferocity by the USA and Great Britain, the American ruling groups made use of the reactionary organisations which they financed to undermine the British position in the country.

The fact that the ruling circles of Pakistan submitted to the dictates of the transatlantic monopolies was bound to give rise to protests on the part of broad sections of the population of the country, including the lower and middle strata of the national bourgeoisie. Such a policy could bring the people of Pakistan nothing but oppression and poverty, growing taxation[47] and the threat of a devastating atomic war. The opposition against the political course pursued by the authorities of Pakistan was growing throughout the country. A progressive Pakistani paper wrote, "People in this country are slowly but surely awakening to a realisation of the fact that the only sane policy for this country is one of steering clear of the Great Power conflict, of making a positive contribution to world peace and of pursuing an independent course of action in foreign policy which is guided by three vital considerations of enlightened self-interest, firm opposition to imperialism in Asia and Africa and promoting a world settlement through negotiations."[48]

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[44] See *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1956, No. 3; see also K. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, London, 1957, p. 322.

[45] *The New York Times*, October 23, 1954.

[46] *The Pakistan Times*, November 18, 1953; *Free Press Journal*, August 15, 1956.

[47] In 1947-1948 tax revenues accounted for 41.1 per cent of the receipts in the budget of Pakistan, while in 1955-1956 their contribution rose to 72.5 per cent (see Л. Р. Гордон-Полонская, «Экономическое положение Пакистана», in *Советское востоковедение*, 1957, № 2, стр. 59.

While negotiations for the conclusion of a military alliance were carried on between Pakistan and the United States, the opposition and democratic forces fought for an independent neutral foreign policy. On the initiative of Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani, the left-wing leader of the Awami League, who was supported by the Azad Pakistan Party, the Communist Party of Pakistan, the trade-union committee of Karachi, and other organisations, a day for struggle against imperialism was organised on September 11, 1953. Mass organisations of peasants, such as the Sind Hari Committee, protested against Pakistan's adherence to military pacts.[49] The leaders of the national democratic parties declared their opposition against the pro-American policy of the government.[50] At mass meetings and in the democratic press they stressed that the acceptance of American "aid" would lead to American domination in Pakistan.[51] Because of the unpopularity of the proposed military alliance even right-wing leaders of the Awami League spoke in favour of neutrality, at public meetings. H. S. Suhrawardy, for instance, declared on December 7, 1953, that "a military pact with the USA will mean a blow to our national independence and initiative."[52]

A certain weakness and disunity of the democratic movement in Pakistan allowed the ruling groups of the country and the US monopolies to draw Pakistan into the system of aggressive military alliances. But the people of Pakistan continued to fight against the policy which was transforming their country into a jumping-off ground for a new world war.

The worsening of the economic position of the country, which was largely caused by the rising military expenditure,[53] and the ruthless manner in which the transatlantic monopolies exerted pressure in order to obtain further advantages and privileges, led to dissatisfaction even among certain sections of the big bourgeoisie. After Mohammad Ali's visit to the USA in autumn 1954 the Industrialists' Association of Karachi expressed its resentment because additional privileges were being granted to the American monopolies in Pakistan, and because the Prime Minister invited foreign capitalists to invest their capital in the industry of the country offering them especially favourable terms, while completely ignoring the needs of the home industry.[54]

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[48] *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1953.

[49] *The Pakistan Times*, December 21, 1953.

[50] See *New Age*, March 21, 1954; *The Pakistan Times*, April 3, 1954.

[51] امروز (*Imroze*), Lahore, March 12, 1954.

[52] The quotation is taken from *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1957.

[53] In 1948-1949, 41.3 per cent of the expenditure of the Pakistan budget was earmarked for military purposes, while in 1955-1956 it rose to 59.2 per cent of the total expenditure. Moreover, a considerable part of the funds that were not reflected in the budget were also allocated for military needs (see А. А. Змеев, *Пакистан...*, стр. 54-55; Л. Р. Гордон-Полонская, *Экономическое положение Пакистана*, стр. 53).

The business circles of Pakistan strongly opposed the friendship, trade and navigation agreement which the United States sought to impose on Pakistan. This agreement would grant American businessmen in Pakistan the same conditions as the indigenous entrepreneurs. In a reference to the significance of the proposed agreement, made on the eve of Mohammad Ali's departure to the USA, Fazlur Rahman, one of the Bengali leaders of the Muslim League and Minister of Commerce in the central government, "sounded a note of warning and raised his voice against what he considered to be a move to reduce Pakistan to the position of an American colony."[55] The ruthless actions of the imperialist monopolies induced financiers, merchants, the developing national bourgeoisie, and even a section of the landlords to advocate an expansion of the mutually beneficial economic relations with the socialist countries.

All this compelled the ruling groups of Pakistan to put off the conclusion of the friendship, trade and navigation agreement proposed by the United States and to take a number of steps calculated to demonstrate their intentions to develop closer relations with the socialist camp. An economic delegation was sent to the USSR in 1954, while in 1955 a delegation from the Pakistan Association for the Development of Science visited the Soviet Union. The value of Pakistan's trade with the socialist countries increased from $ 36 million in 1954 to $ 42 million in 1955, or by 17 per cent.

The fact that the foreign policy of the government of Pakistan was unpopular at home; the fear of becoming isolated from the Asian states, in particular of losing all authority in the Arab countries;[56] and to a certain extent the discontent caused by the strong pressure which the foreign monopolies exerted induced the ruling groups of Pakistan to participate in conferences designed to strengthen the solidarity of the African and Asian states.

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[54] *New Age*, November 7, 1954.

[55] *Karachi Commerce*, October 2, 1954.

[56] "Mr. Zahiruddin, of the Awami League, accused that the Government's foreign policy had lowered Pakistan's prestige, 'By entering into this unholy alliance we have antagonised our brothers-in-faith Egypt and Saudi Arabia'" (*New Age*, April 1, 1956).

Despite American pressure, Pakistan, therefore, took part in the conferences of Prime Ministers from the five South-East Asian countries held in Colombo from April 28 to May 2, 1954, and in Bogor from December 28 to 29, 1954, and supported the proposal to convene a conference of Asian and African countries in April 1955.

Together with 28 other Afro-Asian states Pakistan attended the Bandung Conference from April 18 to 24, 1955. It thereby incurred the displeasure of the American ruling groups. But at the same time the United States endeavoured to use the Pakistan delegation, and also the delegations of Turkey, the Philippines and Iraq at the Bandung Conference as their mouthpiece, and their attempts were to a certain extent successful. The Prime Minister of Pakistan countered the Panch Shila (Five Principles) of peaceful coexistence with his own seven principles, which included the right of self-defence, exercised singly or collectively. This was intended to justify Pakistan's participation in the aggressive military alignments headed by the Western imperialist groups.

PART FOUR

PAKISTAN 1956-1958

Chapter XVI

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN IN 1947-1957

At the approach of Pakistan's tenth anniversary the basic problems of its independent economic development were still unsolved. This had an increasing influence on the country's domestic situation and on its foreign policy. The Pakistan economy was in a deep crisis. The balance of payment deficit swelled to unprecedented proportions. The balance of trade with the sterling and dollar zones, which pumped much of the country's gold and foreign exchange out of Pakistan, was unfavourable. Pakistan's economic dependence on the United States increased.

The cost of living in the towns mounted continuously. The famine spread to more areas. The food situation was worse than it had been during the first years after partition.

In the circumstances, the review in 1956 of the Six-Year Economic Development Plan actually amounted to a review of the economic policy of the governing Muslim League in its nine years of rule. It was the failure of this policy that largely shaped the subsequent fortunes of the League, and, at the same time, the political changes in 1956-1958 which began with the League's losing its monopoly on power and culminated in a military coup d'état. When the new Five-Year Plan was discussed in 1956 and 1957, the governing classes, and the people, had to decide what to do about Pakistan's further economic development.

The agrarian question and the development of a national industry had been the main problems when the country began to build up an independent economy. The Muslim League tried to rectify the food situation and to increase the output of industrial crops—but it did not do anything to resolve the basic problem, that of land. It tried to promote industrial development without resolving the matter of financing it, without building up the due power resources, without an iron-and-steel industry and without a domestic engineering industry. It had been this programme, doomed to failure before it ever got underway, that the Six-Year Economic Development Plan was to have realised.

So long as instruments and means of production are privately owned there can be no question of adequate national planning. Yet S. M. Akhtar, a prominent theorist of the economic policy of Pakistan's governing bloc, pointed out that freedom of private enterprise was the main feature of Pakistan's economy.[1] The Six-Year Plan and the subsequent Five-Year Plan envisaged partial government controls and, in some cases, direct participation by the state in measures promoting the country's economic development. Essentially, planning concerned the public sector only, and since building in this sector, as in the private sector, depended on foreign capital and imported equipment there were no reliable guarantees as to its fulfilment.

In the private sector, state regulation amounted chiefly to taxation privileges, new capital investments in some branches of industry, long-term credits through the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation and the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), and to a pertinent import policy.

The review of the Muslim League's nine years of power showed that it had neglected planned economic development and employed government controls to create favourable conditions for big capital at the expense of the minor industries, to promote the industrial development of the Punjab at the expense of the other national areas, and to build up the textile industry at the expense of the other industries.

A relatively high rate of industrial growth was in evidence after partition, especially after 1953. From 1948 to 1957 it increased more than four times over.[2] By 1957 the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation completed 34 of its 50 projects, its investments in the new enterprises mounting from Rs. 640 million in 1955 to Rs. 850 million in 1957. About 60 per cent of this sum came from the state treasury, about 20 per cent were private investments, and 20 odd per cent foreign "assistance" and the loan of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.[3]

Private capital was invested in just the most profitable industries which, as indicated by the authors of the Five-Year Plan, offered the best outlook for big profits in the shortest possible time.[4] Most of it went into the cotton industry. Output leaped from 80,500,000 metres of cloth in 1948 to 458,800,000 metres in 1956, and from 2,800 tons of surplus yarn (i. e., yarn the factories could not use, and marketed) to 81,300 tons. After 1955 Pakistan's cotton industry has not only been meeting the domestic demand, but also exporting its products.[5]

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[1] S. M. Akhtar, *Economics of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1951, pp. 275-313.

[2] The industrial production index, based on 17 key industries, was 100 in 1950, 235 in 1953, 421 in 1956 (for details, see В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, Москва, 1958, стр. 58).

[3] *Ansari's Trade Directory of Pakistan and Who's Who, 1957*, Karachi, 1957, pp. 47-53.

[4] *The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960*, Vol. II, Karachi, 1956, p. 222.

The investments of the Pakistani big bourgeoisie in the light industries increased from year to year. Wherever new branches of industry had to be built up, and a risk was involved, it made the most of state capitalism methods. In so doing, it sought to direct the public funds into the currently most profitable industries. This applied primarily to the jute industry, which called for considerable outlays, but was vitally important for Pakistan, the world's chief jute producer, and augured large profits.

Helped by the PIDC (which provided 25 to 50 per cent of the funds), the private firms of Adamjee, Amin and a few others founded 14 jute mills in a relatively short time (1951-1957), equipping them with up-to-date machinery nearly twice as efficient as the enterprises of neighbouring India. The concentration of labour at these mills was very high.[6]

In 1951, when the first jute mill was started up, the output of jute articles amounted to 1,400 tons. In 1957 this figure climbed to 151,200 tons. The bulk of the output was exported, with Pakistan soon becoming a dangerous competitor to India.[7]

But while the light industries grew at a relatively high rate, nothing was done to build up the country's power resources, nor its iron-and-steel and engineering industries. The power industry coped with the domestic demand to a lesser degree in 1956-1957 than in 1953-1954.[8] The coal output dropped from 562,900 tons in 1954 to 524,300 tons in 1957. The rise in the output of oil and oil products (from 65,000 to 294,000 tons in 1957) and of electric power (129 million kwh in 1948 to 772,200,000 kwh in 1956) fell short of what the developing light industries needed. The cement industry, also built up by the Industrial Development Corporation, was the sole exception. Its output nearly doubled, climbing to 1,095,000 tons in 1957, and met the negligible domestic demand.[9]

One of the proclaimed objectives of the PIDC was to build up a Pakistani iron-and-steel industry. But no effective moves were made in that direction.

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[5] *Statistical Bulletin*, Karachi, May 1957, p. 579; May 1958, p. 578; *Pakistan Trade*, Karachi, August 1957, p. 12.—The cotton industry had 4,800 looms in 1947 and 25,200 in 1956. The rise in the number of spindles was from 177,400 to 1,685,000. The number of factories increased from 17 to 53 (*Investment in Pakistan*, Washington, 1954, p. 23; *Pakistan Trade*, April 1956, p. 48; August 1957, p. 12).

[6] Total capacity of the 14 mills was 220,000 tons. They employed more than 32,000 workers (*Ansari's Trade Directory... 1957*, p. 53).

[7] For details, see В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 64-65.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

[9] *Statistical Bulletin*, May 1957, pp. 571-572; May 1958, pp. 573-578.

The centralisation of capital by the Pakistan big bourgeoisie had not yet reached the degree necessary for tackling the building of a national heavy industry. Neither did the ruling classes tackle the problem of accumulation through democratic reforms and profit restrictions on the big financiers and landlords, or by extending relations with the socialist countries, as neighbouring India did. As regards the development of its heavy industry, Pakistan banked on "assistance" from the imperialist powers, but its expectations fell through. The British and American industrial missions (1950) opposed the idea of a Pakistan steel industry.

The Industrial Development Corporation's contract for a 70,000-ton steel mill, signed in 1953 with Krupp's of West Germany, was not being implemented. In 1956 and 1957 the PIDC stated repeatedly that all it needed to launch the project were government instructions. But it was not as simple a matter as that, for Krupp's showed little inclination to live up to its commitments.[10]

The 1954 bill and the government decisions of 1955, which increased the share of the foreign monopolies in the key industrial branches to 60 per cent, allowed them to re-export capital and offered added incentives for them to invest in the heavy industries, did not produce any palpable results. To be sure, there was a marked increase in the import of private capital, but this was chiefly invested in the light industries, as before, where the foreign monopolies competed with the burgeoning local firms.[11] The several joint companies operating in the power industry, particularly the Anglo-Pakistani and American-Pakistani oil companies, did not develop any new deposits and were not inclined to exploit the natural resources which they controlled to meet the country's needs.[12]

The industrial policy of the Muslim League, as we see, failed to promote the country's independent development. In the absence of a heavy industry, the relatively high rates of growth of the light industry only made the financial crisis more acute and enhanced Pakistan's dependence on the imperialist powers.

At the same time, increasing enterprise on the part of the big Pakistani bourgeoisie caused contradictions between it and the foreign monopolies. The big Pakistani bourgeoisie set its mind on shaking off economic dependence on Britain and on ousting the British firms ensconced in some of the economic spheres. It was also bent on exploiting the inter-imperialist antagonisms in order to conclude more advantageous deals with the foreign firms, and hoped to get US aid.

The attitude of the big bourgeoisie towards the public sector was a dual one. By the end of the nine-year-long rule of the Muslim League there was a distinct tendency to limit the public sector, whose consolidation and extension was consonant with the interests of the middle and small bourgeoisie, which happened to coincide at that stage with the national interests of Pakistan's independent economic development.

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[10] *Ansari's Trade Directory...* 1957, p. 48.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

[12] *Pakistan Trade*, April 1956, p. 25; September 1956, p. 4; *Investment in Pakistan*, p. 24.

The big industrial bourgeoisie, which emerged in the said period, wanted government help in building new branches of industry. But it objected to the state owning the commissioned enterprises, and opposed government control and government participation in profits in any shape or form. Its spokesmen in the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation sought deliberately to turn that body from an agency serving the needs of the state into an agency ministering to the interests of private firms. The latter held the bigger parcel of shares in enterprises built jointly with the PIDC. Shares of enterprises built entirely on PIDC funds were gradually sold to private holders. Its directors declared that it was the purpose of the PIDC to transfer all its enterprises into private hands as quickly as possible.[13]

The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation was founded in 1957 to promote private industrial enterprise. Its assets consisted of government, State Bank and private investments (Rs. 12 million), investments by private US firms (Rs. 3 million), British firms (Rs. 3 million), Japanese firms (Rs. 2 million), and loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Corporation was to assist private industrial enterprise with capital, equipment, technical personnel and managers, to promote private investments (of Pakistan and foreign capital) in industry, help private individuals acquire state-owned enterprises and shares of industrial companies, and to further the establishment of joint private companies that would build new and modernise old factories and mills.[14]

The functions and activities of this new corporation demonstrated that the policy of developing the private sector and curtailing the sphere of the public sector inevitably accentuated Pakistan's dependence on the imperialist powers.

By 1956-1957 the climate had become relatively favourable for the big bourgeoisie to extend its industrial activities. But the middle and small national bourgeoisie did not have equal opportunities. Industrial development proceeded very unevenly. The new factories (save the jute mills) were concentrated chiefly in Karachi and industrial areas of the Punjab.

The smaller textile mills and food factories operated by various groups of the national bourgeoisie worked below capacity, owing to competition from bigger firms and to difficulties with equipment and raw materials. Some had to go out of business.

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[13] *Investment in Pakistan*, p. 64; *Ansari's Trade Directory... 1958*, pp. 48-51.

[14] *Government Sponsored Corporations*, Karachi, 1953, pp. 87-91.

Hand-loom weaving was in a sore predicament. The number of hand-looms had increased from 100,000 in 1947 to 418,000 in 1956 and output had grown from 276,000,000 metres in 1951 to 457,000,000 in 1956, largely due to the continuous influx of weavers from India. In 1955 and 1956 about 40 per cent of the hand-looms stood idle, and in 1957 these looms were worked to 50 per cent of capacity.[15]

All along until 1955, the governing classes scorned the interests of small-scale industry and the handicrafts. But inasmuch as the handicrafts supplied nearly half the country's textiles, certain measures were framed in 1955 and 1956 to give them a helping hand. A corporation, in which the government held 51 per cent of the shares, was founded to promote small-scale production. Its purpose was to obtain government import licences for raw materials, to distribute imported raw materials among the various branches of small-scale industry, and to assist in sales at home and abroad. [16]

But this did not alter the general trend of industrial development observed during the preceding decade. The big bourgeoisie continued to consolidate in the light industries, and factory competition ruined many of the small enterprises.

The new Five-Year Plan indicated that the big bourgeoisie, which was part of the ruling bloc, was dissatisfied with Muslim League policy. It mirrored the changes in the position of the big bourgeoisie and reflected its point of view on the major economic problems (its determination to widen the domestic market, to curtail landlord privileges, to secure new sources of finance and to obtain with government aid the optimum conditions for the private undertakings of big capital).

Under the Five-Year Plan investments totalled over Rs. 11,600 million (of which the public sector was to furnish Rs. 8,000 million and the private sector the rest). More than 36 per cent of the outlays were to be covered with foreign funds (Rs. 400 million in foreign investments and Rs. 3,800 million in foreign "aid") and about 54 per cent with domestic resources (government credits totalling Rs. 1,500 million and private capital investments 5,900 million).

Most of the public funds were to go into agriculture: 36 per cent into irrigation schemes and power projects, and 14 per cent directly into farm development. About 20.5 per cent was earmarked for transport and communications, 13.6 per cent for industrial building, and the rest for public health, education and other social welfare purposes. Private investments were to go into industrial building (30 per cent), agriculture, commerce and transport (45 per cent), and housing (25 per cent). The plan envisaged relatively high rates of industrial development, a marked increase in power-generating capacities and a 20 per cent rise in the national income.

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[15] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 118-119.

[16] *Government Sponsored Corporations*, pp. 75-76.

The Planning Committee and the Industrial Development Corporation were headed by representatives of the biggest industrial firms, which virtually controlled the country's commerce, industry and finance.

The struggle between the various companies and groups of the big bourgeoisie, which were developing into monopoly alignments towards the close of the Muslim League's nine years of power, exercised a steadily mounting influence on the various political groups within Pakistan's ruling bloc.

As in some other ex-colonies, the monopolies in Pakistan arose not on a basis of highly developed capitalism, but in an environment of primitive, colonial-type capitalist relations. Some big bourgeoisie groups, which had put most of their capital into banking and finance in the first few years after partition, had control of the biggest commercial, banking and industrial operations by the end of the first decade, winning increasing dominance over the country's economic development. The fact that Pakistan's big industrial bourgeoisie sprang from the former compradore, banking and landlord groups, had a considerable bearing on the general situation. Few big industrialists emerged from the small and middle bourgeoisie, because, among other things, the Muslim League's economic policy acted as a brake on accumulation in the small-scale industries. The big bourgeoisie was therefore connected with the landlord class and was at loggerheads with the small and middle bourgeoisie. Big capital revealed signs of decay before it ever scaled the rung of highly developed industrial capital.

The Adamjee family was very prominent in the jute industry, controlling about half of the production plant and competing effectively with Bachhraj Saraogi, the jute magnate. The Adamjees were also fairly strong in the West Pakistan cotton industry and headed a number of commercial and insurance firms, and the country's second largest bank, the Muslim Commercial Bank.[17]

The Habib family, which controlled the Habib Bank, the country's biggest private banking firm, textile mills, a shipping company and several insurance and commercial firms, competed with the Adamjees in the textile industry.[18]

Most of the cotton and woollen mills (the so-called industrial colony in Ismailabad and the factories of Lyallpur, Nowshera) and commerce and insurance in the Punjab were concentrated in the hands of a group headed by the successors of Sheikh Mohammad Ismail, a big pre-partition industrialist of northern India. The Ismails owned the Australasia Bank. The youngest of the successors, Sheikh Mughis, presided over most of the enterprises, while Sheikh Naseer, another heir, was connected with a number of publishing houses and government committees, and was a director of the PIDC. Sheikh Farooq was President of the Associated Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Multan Division.[19]

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[17] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 100.

[18] *Ansari's Trade Directory... 1958*, p. 539.

The Valibhai family, connected with the Adamjee monopoly group through the Muslim Commercial Bank, was very prominent in Sind. The Valibhais headed one of the country's biggest insurance companies, which had branches in Britain, a number of commercial firms and an Ahmadiya shipbuilding firm in Karachi, where they also owned engineering workshops, workshops making electrical equipment and one of the country's biggest docks, and where they controlled the distribution of electric power.[20]

In Sind, the Valibhais competed with firms controlled by Mohammad Ali Rangoonwala, President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries, director of the National Bank of Pakistan, director of a number of stock exchanges and commercial firms, including Bengal Oil Mills, Premier Insurance Co., the Khyber Tobacco Co. and Frontier Industries Ltd. Rangoonwala owned many food factories, including a large oil mill in Karachi. In 1956, Rangoonwala announced plans of founding a pharmaceutical enterprise, which would establish an industry entirely new for Pakistan.[21] The big industrial groups headed by Syed Waheeduddin of Bahawalpur, the Ispahanis, Dadas, Ameens, Mians and Dawoods increased their industrial investments, and their companies boasted a relatively high centralisation of commercial, industrial and banking capital.[22]

Their representatives held responsible offices in various economic bodies, departments and corporations. But most of the ministerial and government offices were held at the time of Muslim League rule by members of the landlord group. This caused discontent among the big bourgeoisie, which was eager to consolidate its political standing. For this reason, among others, many of its members joined political parties opposing the League.[23]

Furthermore, as its industrial activities widened, the big bourgeoisie sought to extend the domestic market, and called on the big landlords to invest their capital in industry. They also insisted on an expansion of the raw materials resources. However, none of this was practicable until the settlement of the agrarian problem.

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 558-559.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 524.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 546.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 521, 535, 546, 556, 561; В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 98-102.

[23] The *Azad Daily*, organ of the Awami League, belonged to Sheikh Hasam-ud-Din, chairman of the Pakistan Industrial Co-operative Bank and the Punjab Transport Operators, Ltd., and holder of substantial stock in Lahore's textile industry. He was also a member of the Working Committee of the Awami League, which he financed (*Ansari's Trade Directory... 1958*, p. 530).

Those landlords who had shares in industrial, financial and commercial companies were, to some extent, also in favour of a land reform and expansion of capitalist methods in agriculture.

The Bhurgris, Sind's biggest landholders who owned many of Sind's cotton and ginning mills, controlled and largely financed the co-operative movement in the province (Rasool Khan Bhurgri headed the Sind Mercantile Co-operative Bank and the Sind Industrial Co-operatives Corporation).[24]

Pakistan's biggest rural capitalist, Sardar Mohammad Ghazanfarullah Khan, proprietor of 6,000 acres of cultivated land, was at once a director of the Bank of Bahawalpur, partner in the Jinnah Cotton Co., managing partner in the Mechanical Farming and Construction Co., managing director of German Tractors and Machinery Co. Whenever the authorities wished to show a foreign visitor how capitalist trends flourished in Pakistan's agriculture, they took him to Ghazanfarullah Khan's estate in Isakhel, where all field jobs from ploughing to harvesting were thoroughly mechanised.[25] Bachhraj Saraogi, the jute magnate, was another big landholder.[26]

The landlord class as a whole was interested in developing capitalist enterprise in the countryside at the expense of the peasants, while retaining possession of most of the acreage. At the same time, the above-named landholders and many other proprietors of large capitalist-type farms, who also invested in the sphere of finance and banking and in industry, wished to abolish the most backward of the feudal institutions, including the privileged forms of feudal landownership, which hindered capitalist enterprise in the countryside. But only few of the landlords appreciated the interests of their class as a whole, and these few had little or no influence on the ruling Punjab-Sind group heading the Muslim League. The final say was with the men who clung to their old-time feudal privileges. The landlords obstructed the realisation of the agrarian laws—limited though they were—adopted by the Muslim League under pressure of the 1948-1950 peasant movement.

Only the first stage of the reform—purchase of the estates of the upper stratum of landholders—was carried through in East Pakistan. The institution of rent-collecting intermediaries survived, and the land was not re-distributed. Furthermore, it was mostly the estates of Hindu landlords who had moved to

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[24] *Ansari's Trade Directory... 1958*, p. 528.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 556.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 517.

India that were purchased. By mid-1956 the government bought 432 estates.[27] The sub-infeudation system was abolished in just two *tahsils* of the Bakarganj district and five *tahsils* of Khulna, where the government purchased the land of intermediaries and turned over what amounted to three per cent of East Pakistan cultivated arable to occupancy tenants under the re-allotment scheme.[28] In West Pakistan the agrarian reform was not carried through at all.

Under pressure of the big landlords, who were at the helm of the state, the courts disregarded the bills abolishing *jagirs* and did not enforce the specified ceiling for the private landlord holdings.

North-West Frontier Province was the only one where occupancy tenants were allowed to redeem, and enter into full possession of, their holdings. The statutory restrictions imposed on eviction of tenants and limiting the landlord's share of the peasants' harvest were not observed.[29]

The peasants were denied land proprietor's rights in the new irrigated land colonies developed by the state, and had to purchase these rights from the government.[30]

Inasmuch as the agrarian problem hung fire, the government-sponsored campaign, which included a series of measures aimed at increasing food crops, did not bear fruit.

The increase in irrigated acreage envisaged in the Six-Year Plan was not effected in full. Less than one million hectares of new land was irrigated and developed between 1947 and 1955. The Ghulam Mohammad Lower Sind system was ready by 1956, and so were the first section of the Thal irrigation system (West Pakistan) and the Ganges-Kobadak system (East Pakistan), but none of the Six-Year Plan projects were really completed.[31] The landlords were eager to seize the newly irrigated land and obstructed settlement of landless peasants there. Thereby they hindered cultivation. While the many litigants with claims to the newly irrigated land appealed to the law, the acreage lay idle.[32]

The other reason why the new land development did not increase the acreage to any marked extent was soil erosion and salinisation, which assumed vast proportions.[33] Pakistani economists point out that the problem of combatting erosion and bogging up has become a vital and urgent national task.

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[27] *Karachi Commerce*, 1959, Vol. XV, No. 7-8, p. 22; *Human and Social Impact of Technological Change in Pakistan*, Vol. I, Oxford, 1956, p. 50.

[28] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*; *The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960*, Vol. II.

[29] This was evident from the increasing number of evictions of tenants: 3,360 share-croppers were driven off the land in West Pakistan in 1949-1951, and 9,119 in 1952-1954 (*The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, December 9, 1955; *Capital*, Calcutta-Bombay-Madras, December 1955, pp. 77-80).

[30] Cf., *Economic Observer*, Karachi, February 1958, p. 13.

[31] *Pakistan Trade*, April 1956, pp. 21-22.

[32] В. Г. Растянников, «Техническая база сельского хозяйства Пакистана», *Пакистан. История и экономика*, Москва, 1959, стр. 119.

The technical standards in the countryside remained extremely low. The fairly substantial increase in the number of tractors was due to their greater employment at landlord estates and state farms.[34]

The farming methods of the peasants were the same as in the colonial period. Mineral fertilisers were hardly used. Soil depletion increased year after year. The yield of the chief crops dropped, from 1949-1950 to 1955-1956: rice by 4.4 per cent (from 9.2 centners per hectare to 8.8 centners per hectare) and wheat by 14.69 per cent (from 8.8 centners per hectare to 7.5 centners per hectare).[35] The output decreased for this reason, in spite of the greater acreage sown to food crops. The output index for all farm crops was as low in 1955-1956 as in the lean years of 1951-1952 and 1952-1953, while the grain output index was even lower, as low as in the pre-war years of the colonial period. The gross wheat harvest shrank from 3,900,000 tons in 1948-1949 to 3,100,000 tons in 1955-1956, and that of rice from 8,400,000 tons to 7,800,000 tons. In 1953-1956, Pakistan produced 540,000 tons (4 per cent) less grain crops and gram flour than in 1949-1952.[36] The Six-Year Plan targets, which envisaged an increase of grain output by 3,000,000 tons, were thus unfulfilled.

Lean years followed. Nearly ten times as much grain was imported in 1956-1957 as in the first five post-partition years (1947-1952).[37] The famine in East Pakistan was so great that the distribution of food had to be controlled by the army. The food problem assumed disastrous proportions.

The problem of credits to agriculture was also unsolved. "Relatives" and "friends" (mostly prosperous peasants) were still the main suppliers of loans to the peasants. In the Punjab, for example, they accounted for over 63 per cent of all agricultural credits, and for about 60 per cent in the Narayanganj District of East Pakistan.[38] There were no professional money-lenders, who had mostly been Hindus, in West Pakistan, while in East Pakistan money-lenders furnished no more than two per cent of all credits. The percentage of government credits was negligible. The Pakistan Agricultural Development Finance Corporation founded in 1952 issued loans totalling 15,224,035 rupees between 1953 and 1956, chiefly for the purchase of farm machinery, implements, cattle and seed, but dealt exclusively with landlords and rural co-operatives. Even the prosperous peasants were generally unable to secure loans from it.[39] The sphere of the Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Society and of village co-operatives whose number had increased from 10,000 in 1948 to 30,000 in 1955, was, in effect, just as limited. In early 1956 the co-operatives furnished loans to only 12 per cent of the country's rural population.[40] The increase in the number of village co-operatives did not signify any substantial increase in co-operative loans to peasants. The bulk of the registered credit co-operatives were on the brink of ruin and existed mostly on paper. More than 40 per cent of the co-operatives registered in West Pakistan in 1956-1957 and more than 24,000 co-operatives in East Pakistan, were bankrupt and inoperative.[41] The rich peasants, the petty traders, to say nothing of the mass of the peasants, were disappointed by the government's rural credits policy.

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[33] For details, see *ibid.*, p. 121.

[34] In 1947, Pakistan had as few as 500 tractors. In 1956 this figure mounted to 3,806 (*ibid.*, p. 92).

[35] *Ibid.*, *p.* 123.

[36] *Pakistan Trade*, April 1956, p. 51; September 1956, p. 58; *Statistical Bulletin*, November 1956.

[37] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 48-49.

[38] *Credit Inquiry Commission. Report*, Karachi, 1959, p. 9.

The big bourgeoisie and the landlord industrialists who were connected with it, disapproved of the Muslim League's agrarian policy. Their representatives drew up the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan, envisaging an increase of irrigated acreage by 3,000,000 acres and a 13 per cent increase in grain output. Their plan recommended completion of the agrarian reform in East Pakistan by the end of 1956 and urged a ceiling for land holdings in West Pakistan. The land surpluses bought from the landlords by the state were to be granted to peasants. Privileged landlord ownership was to be abolished and restrictions imposed on the big landowners leasing land on exorbitant terms. The plan insisted that farmers who employed machinery and hired labour should be provided the most favourable conditions. However, the ceiling recommended by the Planning Committee was very high—as much as 150 acres of irrigated land, or 300 acres of semi-irrigated land, or 450 acres of non-irrigated land—while the compensation specified for land surpluses was immense. The redemption payments fixed for the peasants were too high for all but the most prosperous.[42]

The Planning Committee thus visualised abolition of large-scale privileged landownership and a partial re-allotment of the land to the prosperous section of peasants. This would promote development of capitalist-type landlord farms and facilitate capitalist enterprise among the prosperous peasants. At the same time, the Committee sought to shift on the peasants the burden of compensating the landlords and envisaged compulsory payment by peasants of the redemption charges. Yet the growth of capitalist enterprise in the absence of a thorough re-allotment of land among peasants would, as the previous years had shown, generate wholesale evictions of tenants.[43] The recommendations of the Planning Committee, as we see, were designed to settle the agrarian question and promote the development of agriculture along capitalist lines at the expense of peasant interests. They were aimed, on the whole, at consolidating the economic position of the governing bloc. At the same time, they reflected the changes that had occurred in the countryside after partition: the weakening of the landlords who clung to the privileges of the colonial period and to semi-feudal farming methods, the extension of enterprise by the landlord class as a whole, and a certain improvement in the position of the prosperous peasants.

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[39] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 48-49.

[40] *Karachi Commerce*, February 18, 1956.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 19-26.

[42] *The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-60*, Vol. II, pp. 118-130.

The big landlords, who played a decisive role in the central leadership of the Muslim League, continued to resist any and all agrarian change, and it could scarcely be hoped that the recommendations of the Planning Committee would be translated into reality so long as the Muslim League remained in power. Yet the unsolved agrarian problem jeopardised the Five-Year Economic Development Plan as a whole.

The Muslim League had totally failed to solve the chief economic problems facing the country. The big bourgeoisie and the section of landlords connected with it came out increasingly in support of the opposition parties and set their minds on wresting the monopoly on political power from the League, which, as we have already said, was headed by the most reactionary group of landlords from the Punjab and Sind.

Chapter XVII

THE PAKISTAN CONSTITUTION AND POPULAR OPPOSITION
(1956)

The unresolved problems of Pakistan's independent economic development and the aggravation of internal contradictions, most of all the national ones, produced a political crisis, manifested in the East Bengal disturbances of 1954 and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly that same year.

The government took severe measures to suppress the popular discontent and the mounting democratic national movements. But the contradictions remained, and the "calm" in the latter half of 1955 was distinctly explosive. A conflict brewed within the governing bloc between the men who thought democratic institutions unsuited to Pakistan and advocated dictatorial methods to squash the left-wing opposition, and the men who opposed undisguised dictatorship. So far, it was the latter who had held the upper hand. They believed, and with good reason, that repressive measures alone would not cope with the mounting popular discontent and pressed the Constituent Assembly into promulgating the Constitution (February 29, 1956), which the President endorsed on March 2.

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[43] A detailed analysis of the Planning Committee recommendations may be seen in В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 34-46.

Thus, the initial attempt of the reactionaries to end the constitutional forms of government failed.

But the democratic forces were still too weak and too disunited to win a decisive say in the making of the country's domestic and foreign policy. The Constitution reaffirmed the power of the bourgeois-landlord bloc, but indicated at the same time that this bloc was eager to impart to its power the complexion of bourgeois and "Islamic" democracy. All in all, it was anti-popular in substance, being based on the "one-nation theory" and ignoring the wish for national autonomy entertained by the peoples inhabiting Pakistan. It is only natural, therefore, that many sections of the population disapproved of the Constitution.

The new period in Pakistan's history, which opened in 1956, was marked by a struggle of the democratic forces, who sought unity, against the consolidated forces of reaction. This led to a still more acute political crisis in 1958.

The Constitution did not remove the basic contradictions on the political scene. Quite the reverse, it added to the friction within the governing bloc, and failed to stop the endless debates over some of the cardinal questions of Pakistan's political make-up. It was as late as March 23 that the highly controversial issue about the nature of the state was finally resolved when the Constituent Assembly proclaimed the Dominion of Pakistan an Islamic Republic.[1]

Although Pakistan was proclaimed a secular state, its political system was shaped to suit the injunctions of Islam. The preamble contained in full Liaquat Ali Khan's resolution of March 7, 1949. Article 1 of Part I read, "Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and is hereinafter referred to as Pakistan."[2]

The Constitution of Pakistan consisted of 13 Parts, 234 Articles and 6 Schedules. Supreme power was vested in the "Parliament of Pakistan consisting of the President and one House to be known as the National Assembly." The Constitution provided that the President be elected by an electoral college consisting of the members of the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. He was endowed with a considerable amount of independence. In effect, he had many of the powers exercised in the colonial period by the Indian Viceroy.

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[1] *Chronology of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1957, p. 173.

[2] This and subsequent references and quotations related to the Constitution are based on *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1957.

The President had the authority to convene the National Assembly, to close it, or, if need be, to dissolve it before its term of office ran out. He was vested with the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, the Ministers and other top-ranking officials. He was empowered to proclaim a state of emergency and possessed the right to withhold his assent from bills passed by the National Assembly, making it reconsider these bills; with respect to bills passed by the provincial legislatures, he had the power of veto. Between sessions of the National Assembly, the President was entitled to issue directives, which had the power of law. The wide powers vested in the President virtually enabled the ruling classes to use them for an assault on the constitutional form of government, which they did during the military coup of 1958.

In spite of the great latitude of his authority, the President was in many ways dependent on the Prime Minister, who was vested with full executive powers. Article 37 of the Constitution stipulated that "there shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at the head, to aid and advise, the President in the exercise of his functions." This created a pattern whereby inimical political groups could oppose the President's authority to that of the government, and to exploit this factor for their own ends.

The National Assembly, the country's chief legislative body, consisted of 300 members, the seats being divided equally between East and West Pakistan. An additional ten seats (five for each of the two provinces) were reserved for women for a term of ten years. The term of office of the National Assembly was set at five years. The Assembly was to pass decisions by a simple majority vote of attending members, and in case of a split vote the Speaker exercised the casting vote. Bills passed by the National Assembly entered into power after endorsement by the President.

The Constitution declared Pakistan a Federal Republic, preserving many of the failings of the British federal scheme set out in the 1935 Government of India Act. The federal arrangement did not settle the question of self-administration for the various national areas—firstly, because the Constitution provided for the establishment of a single province of West Pakistan and, secondly, because it did not afford East Pakistan the weight due to it by virtue of its population size. In the question of language, however, the ruling group was compelled to honour the wishes of the Bengali national movement. Bengali was declared Pakistan's official language on a par with Urdu.

The weaknesses of the federal arrangement also stemmed from the fact that the wide powers of the President and the Central

Government virtually reduced to nil the autonomy of the provinces.

The structure of executive and legislative authority in the provinces duplicated that of the Federation. The basic provincial organs of power were the legislative assemblies, the provincial governments and the governors.

The terms of reference of the Federation covered matters of defence and foreign relations, security, citizenship, foreign commerce, money circulation, etc.

Questions of civil and criminal law, labour legislation and economic regulation fell within the joint competence of the Federation and the provinces. Agrarian relations and matters pertaining ot agriculture, industry and public education referred to the sole competence of the provincial authorities.

This distribution of functions hampered country-wide economic planning and solution of the highly important agrarian problem. Specific groups within the ruling bloc were enabled to retard implementation of bills limiting the interests of the privileged classes, while allowing interference by the Federation in internal provincial affairs and condoning discrimination against one of its constituent parts. Since the Federation was not built on a national basis, it did not bother to create the proper conditions for the development of the peoples inhabiting Pakistan.

The princely States within Pakistan, a legacy of the colonial period, were retained. Their rulers were not held responsible to either the provincial assemblies or the National Assembly, and were subordinate to the Central Government and the President solely in matters concerning the competence of the Federation.[3]

The Constitution stood firm guard over the property rights of citizens. Article 15 read: "(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law. (2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for a public purpose, and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation therefore and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given."

This article also pointed out that the term "'property' shall mean immovable property, or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in any such undertaking."

Article 15 was fashioned by the governing classes as an insuperable barrier to the abolition of large-scale landlord estates without compensation and to the nationalisation of the property of foreign monopolies in Pakistan territory. The constitutional protection afforded to the property of foreign monopolies, a burden left over from Pakistan's colonial past, mirrored the dependence of the governing bloc on the imperialist powers.

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[3] The so-called Special Areas (tribal border areas, etc.) were under the direct authority of the President and the Governor of West Pakistan.

The Constitution guaranteed all citizens freedom of trade and business enterprise, provided "that nothing in this Article shall prevent (a) the regulation of any trade or profession by a licensing system, or (b) the carrying on, by the Federal or a Provincial Government or by a corporation controlled by any such Government, of any trade, business, industry or service, to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons."

This clause ministered to the policy of state capitalism and to the principles of planning and protectionism enunciated by the governing classes.

All controversies arising between the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures, and matters related to the interpretation of the Constitution were to be referred to the Supreme Court, appointed by the President.

In effect, the Constitution accorded the "Muslim nation" a place of privilege *vis-à-vis* the religious minorities. None but a Muslim could be President. The conduct of citizens was to be governed by the injunctions of the Quran. The mullahs and ulamas were entitled to intervene in matters of state and to influence the decisions of the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies. Article 198 read, "No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, hereinafter referred to as Injunctions of Islam, and existing law shall be brought into conformity with such Injunctions."

A special committee formed by the President of the most prominent mullahs and ulamas was empowered to rule whether or not a law accorded with the injunctions of Islam. The Constitution reflected the ambition of Pakistan's ruling bloc to act as leader of the Muslim states in the world arena. It contained a clause which, alongside general professions of Pakistan's wish to co-operate peacefully with all countries, emphasised that the state "endeavoured to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries."

To sum up, the Constitution reflected the standpoint of the ruling bloc on the key questions of economic and political life. It safeguarded the monopoly on land held by the governing class of landlords and precluded a democratic solution of the agrarian problem. At the same time, it reflected the increased interest shown by the big bourgeoisie in industrial enterprise and guaranteed it beneficial conditions—a protectionist policy, establishment of state-sponsored corporations, economic councils, etc.

The makers of the Constitution were avowed exponents of "Muslim nationalism." They acted on the notion that the subcontinent had a "Muslim nation" and ignored the national interests of the peoples inhabiting Pakistan.

All the countries that flung off the colonial yoke had proclaimed civil freedoms, and since the ruling classes of Pakistan still maintained constitutional forms of government, they could not help doing likewise. The Constitution established the equality before the law of all Pakistan citizens, regardless of religion, caste and social background. Slavery and all forms of forced labour were prohibited legislatively for the first time in the history of the peoples of Pakistan. Freedoms of speech, assembly and association were granted, but there was the provision that all the fundamental rights were "subjected to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law." This meant, in effect, that the said freedoms were not guaranteed.

The Constitution afforded all citizens of Pakistan universal suffrage. All mentally sound citizens over 21 years of age, residing in a constituency not less than six months before January 1 of the year when the electoral roll was prepared or revised, were entitled to be electors. The right to be elected was vested in all persons who had attained the age of 25 years. The Constitution set out in detail the composition and functions of the election commissions and the procedure of preparing the electoral roll.

Yet the main controversy, that over the principle of electorate, remained unsolved. Article 145 of the Constitution said, "Parliament may, after ascertaining the views of the Provincial Assemblies and taking them into consideration by Act provide whether elections to the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies shall be held on the principle of joint electorate or separate electorate...."

The keenest issue on the country's political scene, one to which many others (equality of citizens, "Muslim" and "Pakistani" nationalism, etc.) were related, was thus to be governed by a parliamentary act. This act could be passed and rescinded by a simple majority. This tied the question of the form of electorates to the attitude of the political group that happened to be in power, and created additional obstacles to universal elections.

The cumulative effect of the contradictions in Pakistan's internal affairs—class, social and national—set off a bitter controversy over the character of the electoral system and the form of elections.[4] The democratic parties and organisations called for a joint electoral roll of Muslims and the religious minorities. Most of the parties of the governing bloc backed elections based on the principle of religious communal representation. This arrangement created the illusion of an identity of interests of the "Muslim nation," impeded the struggle of the various peoples for national autonomy, and created a climate that fostered a split of the democratic forces on a religious basis. The governing Punjab group depicted the Bengali opposition as Hindu, and strove to discredit the left-wing workers' and peasants' unions, many of whose leaders were Hindus, by branding their activities as intrigues by enemies of Islam.

The country's progressive forces naturally protested vehemently against the separate electorates system. The outcome of the battle over this most important political issue depended in each province on the strength of the local democratic movement.

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[4] For details, see В. Н. Москаленко, «К вопросу о всеобщих выборах в Пакистане», *Пакистан. История и экономика*, Москва, 1959, стр. 194-217.

On April 25, 1956, the election commission submitted its report to the government. On August 2, the Legislative Assembly of West Pakistan passed a resolution espousing separate representation, while on October 1, after the Awami League came to power, the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan voted in favour of the joint electoral rolls.

On October 11, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed an election law envisaging separate electorates for the Western Province and joint rolls for the Eastern Province.

The tenor of the 1956 Constitution showed clearly that the drawn-out struggle over its various drafts had yielded no palpable results. It differed from the various projects discussed by the first Constituent Assembly in that it conceded vital points to the right-wing opposition, affording privileges to Muslims, allowing for intervention in the country's political affairs by the ulamas, restricting the autonomy of the different peoples inhabiting Pakistan, and furnishing added safeguards to the interests of the foreign monopolies. The broad powers of the President and the limited responsibility to the National Assembly of the President and the Cabinet, with no responsibility at all to the people, created a favourable background for dictatorial forms of government, which fact was exploited to the full at the time of the military coup in 1958.

The Constitution created discontent among the population. It completely ignored the demands of workers and peasants. The national interests of the Bengalis and the various peoples of West Pakistan were also neglected. The peasants turned to the various national movements, previously confined in the main to the middle strata in the towns. In many of the issues the national bourgeoisie, the small landholders and the tribal chiefs, removed from power, gave their support to the left-wing opposition. All this created favourable opportunities for the unification of the various trends among the country's democratic forces in 1956-1958 in the struggle against the foreign and domestic policy of the ruling circles.

Within the governing bloc, too, opposition to the dominant Punjab group was mounting. The Muslim League—the oldest political party of the propertied Muslims, which enjoyed much influence among the masses, the party that had headed the Pakistan movement and had been the best-organised political force in the early years after the founding of Pakistan—suffered almost total eclipse.

The mounting political awareness of the working class, which shaped the position of its trade unions, was the most important upshot of the urge to unite among the country's progressive forces.

The reformist unions, which had concentrated on alleviating the workers' lot by legal means and had been loyal to the Muslim

League, helping it to enhance its influence among the masses, began to criticise its policy. The League, which had not passed a single law in its years in power to improve the working conditions of the Pakistan proletariat, was no longer able to parade as an exponent of "Islamic socialism." The slogan was picked up promptly by the opposition parties.

In 1956, the All-Pakistan Confederation of Labour, whose membership embraced about 75 per cent of the country's organised workers and office employees (about 335,000), often acted in concert with other workers' unions in behalf of the class demands of the proletariat and of the democratic slogans issued by the progressive political organisations. Yet the opportunities of the Communists and their revolutionary working-class leaders to conduct legal activities were greatly curtailed. Many Communists were imprisoned, most working-class organisations lacked leadership for this reason, and the forces of the organised proletariat were dispersed between the various trade-union centres of divergent political trends.

The left-wing trade unions of the Pakistan Trade Union Federation were divided into two centres.[5] One had 64 member unions with a total membership of 45,000, consisting chiefly of West Pakistan textile and railway workers. The other centre had 17 member unions and 15,000 members, belonging chiefly to Karachi trade-union bodies.

Left-wing forces controlled the North-West Railway Workers' Trade Union, headed by Mirza Mohammad Ibrahim, the prominent West Pakistan workers' leader. This Federation, which was not associated with any of the above-mentioned centres, had a membership of 10,000 at the beginning of 1956.

The Pakistan Postmen and Lower Grade Staff Union, with a membership of over 10,000, was also an independent union. So were the union of oil workers and the seamen's union, with a membership of 30,000.[6]

Many of the big trade-union centres were headed by petty-bourgeois intellectuals and people belonging to the national bourgeoisie—members of the Azad Pakistan Party and the left wing of the Awami League. A. H. Bhashani, Chairman of the East Pakistan railway association, for example, which was the biggest trade union in that province, was leader of the Awami League left wing.

The Communists had to surmount many difficulties in their ideological struggle against bourgeois nationalism in the labour movement. The slogan of sound industrial development based ou Islamic principles, advanced by the left wing of the national bourgeoisie, was popular for this reason in 1956 and 1957, although it was no more than a projection of the theory of "Islamic socialism."[7]

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[5] The split occurred in 1952, after the arrest of nearly all the more prominent trade-union leaders.

[6] *Directory of Labour Organisations, Asia and Australia*, Washington, 1958, Ch. 27, pp. 2-5, 16-17, 18-24; J. R. Andrus and A. F. Mohammad, *The Economy of Pakistan*, London, 1958, p. 446.

However, with police terror at a high pitch throughout the country, co-operation with the Azad Pakistan Party, the Ganatantri Dal and the left wing of the Awami League was virtually the only opportunity the Pakistan Communists had of conducting legal activities among the working people. Making the most of this opportunity, they were able to head many manifestations of the working class, the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia in 1956.

With popular discontent over the policy of the Muslim League running high and mounting continuously, the various progressive organisations supported the economic struggle of the working class, encouraged workers to join trade unions and did much to draw working people into the political struggle for their general democratic slogans.

Strikes followed one another in quick succession, ending the temporary lull in the working-class and democratic movement observed in 1955 under the impact of the reactionary offensive after the political crisis of 1954. In 1954 and 1955, the number of strikes had shrunk from 107 to 75, and the number of strikers from 68,000 to 42,100. In 1956 there were 150 large strikes, involving more than 111,800 strikers, caused mainly by the steep drop in the workers' real wages after 1955.[8]

In 1955/56-1956/57 the cost-of-living index of the industrial proletariat climbed from 106 to 111 in Karachi, 93 to 100 in Lahore, 83 to 92 in Sialkot, 95 to 103 in Khewra, and from 99 to 108 in Narayanganj. In the meantime, the average monthly wage of factory workers rose merely from Rs. 80 to 83, while in the textile industry it dropped from Rs. 74.9 to 73.2.[9]

These average figures and official statements implied a marked deterioration in the diet of workers, especially the unskilled ones, a marked differentiation in wages not only from industry to industry, but also from factory to factory within the same industry, and indicated the refusal of the industrialists to issue cost-of-living allowances in spite of the sky-rocketing prices of consumer goods.

The struggle of the proletariat was more organised and tenacious in 1956-1958 than in any of the preceding periods. The concentration of workers at the various factories had risen. The army of skilled workers had increased. This tended to enhance the class consciousness of workers and to improve their organisation. The biggest changes had occurred in the numerical strength and structure of the textile workers. They also were the first to fall victim to the industrialists' offensive. This is why they stood in the van of the strikers in 1956. Their struggle in West Pakistan was led by the united textile workers' association, which had members of various political creeds.

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[7] See, e. g., *The Pakistan Times* and *Dawn* for 1957.

[8] *Pakistan Labour Gazette*, 1957, No. 4, p. 586.

[9] *Statistical Bulletin*, May 1957, pp. 594-595, 647; *Pakistan Statistical Year Book*, 1955, Karachi, 1955, p. 191.

Establishment of trade unions according to industries and organisation of general strikes, which developed into a most important form of struggle, constituted the distinctive features of the working-class movement in the period under review.

More than 1,000 workers of the Lahore textile factories went on strike in May 1956. They wanted cost-of-living allowances, a wage increase, sick pay, payment for idle time, and the re-employment of dismissed trade-union members.

The biggest Punjab trade unions—the Industrial Workers Union, the Bata Mazdoor League, the Pakistan Oxygen Works Labour Union and the Anjuman Mint Mulazameen—appealed in a joint statement to the workers' organisations throughout West Pakistan "to extend unstinted financial and moral support to the workers engaged in the struggle."[10] As a result, the industrialists were compelled to make some concessions.

No sooner the Lahore strike ended, than the textile workers of Ismailabad (Multan District) went on one of the biggest strikes in Pakistan's history. It attracted the attention of all Pakistan progressives and gave a severe shock to the industrialists and the government, which fell back on brutal police measures and wholesale arrests.

There had been no strong trade-union organisation in Ismailabad until then. The strike broke out spontaneously. On July 7 more than 7,000 workers downed tools. A trade union of Ismailabad textile workers was formed on the initiative of Azad Party functionaries, who were active among the Multan textile workers. The trade union appointed a strike committee, which submitted 14 demands to the administration. The chief demands were: payment of cost-of-living allowances for six months up to and including July 12, double rates for overtime, full wages for the strike period, an end to the victimisation of strikers, and dismissal of specific managers notorious for their ill-treatment of workers.

The administration refused to make concessions. On July 14 the strike was declared unlawful, the strike pickets were dispersed, and many strikers were brutally manhandled by hired gangs. More than 500 workers were either dismissed or demoted, and the families of most of them were flung out of the factory-owned dwellings with their wretched belongings. But the workers stood firm. On the following day about 2,400 of them held a demonstration in protest of the arrest of their leaders.

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[10] *The Pakistan Times*, May 24, 1956.

The government countered by applying Article 144 of the Criminal Code, which prohibited public manifestations, assemblies and gatherings. A state of emergency was declared in Ismailabad. The wholesale arrests continued. Twelve of the strike leaders were brought before a special tribunal.

The workers of the mechanical, engineering and railway workshops in Lahore, also on strike at the time, declared their solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Ismailabad textile workers. The Azad Pakistan Party, Awami League, Ahrar Committee, Jamaat-i Islami and Islam League appealed to the government to satisfy the workers' demands. The appeal was also signed by the Multan Chamber of Commerce and the Multan association of clothing merchants.

This forced the hand of the administration. It made a few concessions, but it accompanied them with the threat of a lock-out, and warned that it would recruit a new labour force. In these circumstances, the strike ended at the close of July.[11] It was a splendid school for the textile workers of Multan, and no less so to all workers and progressives in the country. Once again, and this time on an unprecedented scale, the governing classes were given to feel the strength of the proletariat when it was organised.

The Multan strike opened the eyes of many people. No trade-union group professing to defend workers' interests, could any longer stay loyal to the Muslim League, or neutral even.

When the strike ended, 22,000 Karachi textile workers started one of their own. More than 3,000 textile workers went on strike in Sargothi in August 1956, followed by those of Lyallpur in October.[12] The strikers demanded cost-of-living allowances and higher wages. Some of the strikes broke out in response to dismissals of trade-union leaders and discrimination against union members.[13]

The struggle gradually gained a political complexion. The workers initiated mass campaigns against the new Constitution and the domestic and foreign policies of the government.

There were workers' demonstrations and political meetings in all the big cities on May 1, 1956. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan that the working people marked that day of proletarian solidarity in so highly organised a manner.

In June, thousands of Karachi dockers passed a resolution demanding that the government take effective measures against the French aggression in Algeria. They allowed the government fourteen days, and warned that if it failed to act, they would hold a general political strike and refuse to load French ships. This set off a mass protest campaign against the French colonial war in Algeria and against the support given it by the

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[11] *The Pakistan Times*, July 8-31, September 7, 1956.

[12] *The Pakistan Times*, August 2, 29, 31; October 10, 17, 24, 27, 1956.

[13] *The Pakistan Times*, October 17, 1956.

United States. The dockers' strike came off. For several days, French ships were unable to leave the port.[14]

The railway workshops announced their support of the dockers. The democratic parties and organisations passed resolutions denouncing the war in Algeria. A wave of meetings and demonstrations swept the country. The Foreign Minister was compelled to state officially that Pakistan deplored the French colonial war and sympathised with the Muslims of Algeria, the victims of French terrorists. To be sure, no other more effective measures materialised, but the campaign was a big success all the same. For the first time, the Pakistan working class had acted as an independent political force, and this had a resounding impact on the country's politics.

Not only the democratic organisations, but the bourgeois and landlord groups as well, thought it highly important henceforth to win the favour of the masses, primarily the working class. The political parties had to state their attitude towards the labour problem. They admitted, at least publicly, that it was essential to improve the working and living conditions of the proletariat.

Two opposite trends arose in Pakistan's development. The more reactionary section of the bourgeoisie and landlords opposed all flirtations with the proletariat. They wanted the trade unions, strikes and political actions of the working class banned once and for all. They wanted to do away with the constitutional forms of government, and to institute a dictatorship. As for the peasants, the middle strata in the towns and the left wing of the national bourgeoisie, the working-class struggle had a distinctly revolutionising effect on them. The country's progressives sought unity, in order to tackle the basic problems of economic development in concert and to ring in democratic changes in the country's domestic and foreign policy. Thus, the workers, and the democratic forces in general, gave whole-hearted support to the anti-feudal demands made by the peasants since 1956.

The left-wing trade unions and the Hari Committee took the lead in Sind. The Hari Committee of Khairpur, the trade unions of textile and railway workers, the tonga drivers' union, the union of workers in the small-scale industries, the cement industry and the metal-working shops joined hands to organise the Pakistan Federation of Labour which embraced workers, landless tenants and farm labourers. The campaign for joint workers' and peasants' action spread rapidly, involving all sections of the population in Sind.

Conscious of the influence and popularity won among the peasants by the Hari Committee with its calls for the abolition of landlordism, the Awami League of Sind launched a mass campaign in the summer of 1956 against the zamindari system. It appealed to the President of Pakistan, asking him to abolish that system prior to the elections to the various legislatures.[15]

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[14] *The Pakistan Times*, June 10, 1956.

The peasant movement in Sind grew to such proportions that no political party banking on mass support could afford to ignore the *hari* demands. The Hari Committee was at the time the strongest peasant body in Pakistan. Progressives in other parts of the country joined in the concerted effort to win a solution of the agrarian problem.

But, for the most part, the peasant unions were still organisationally weak and still strongly influenced by petty-bourgeois ideology. The Azad Pakistan Party and the left wing of the Awami League solicited support in the countryside and took the lead in most of the mass peasant actions.

In the Punjab, the peasants demanded a stop to the wholesale evictions of tenants. They wanted the government land to be distributed among tenants and land-hungry peasants. In East Pakistan, they called for action to prevent the horrors of the 1943 famine.

A mass march of tenants to Lahore, the best-organised manifestation of Pakistan peasants since the 1950 uprising in East Bengal, began in early July 1956. It magnetised all of Pakistan.

By 1956 the evictions of tenants had assumed such disastrous proportions that the All-Parties Committee, which consisted of representatives of all the bigger political parties of the country, including the ruling party, demanded on April 17 that newly irrigated land be at once made available to evicted tenants on easy terms. It also called for an unconditional ban on further evictions.[16] But the Muslim League government ignored these demands. The government land was seized by landlords, while the evictions continued.

The Awami Jamhour Party (the People's Democratic Party)—an organisation of Punjab tenants and small landholders—headed by functionaries of the Azad Pakistan Party and the left wing of the Awami League, urged the peasants to send their representatives to Lahore, to hold a hunger strike and a mass *hartal* there, and to stay in the city until the government met the peasants' demands.

Delegations converged on Lahore from the most remote villages, and by July 10 more than 2,000 peasants had assembled there, setting up a camp in the streets near the government offices.

The workers, artisans, traders and intellectuals of Lahore promptly formed a peasant aid fund and aid committees. On July 10, a mass meeting passed a resolution that the peasants would stay in the city until the government will have honoured the following demands:

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[15] *The Pakistan Times*, June 28, July 10, 1956.
[16] *The Pakistan Times*, July 11, 1956.

(1) Distribution of government land among the small landholders and tenants; (2) allocation of not less than 12.5 acres of irrigated land to every evicted tenant; (3) sale of government land to peasants at reasonable prices and financial assistance to those who receive non-irrigated plots; (4) permanent and protected rights of tenure in the border areas to all tenants, whether of local stock or refugees.[17]

The government rejected the peasants' demands. Some leaders of the Awami Jamhour Party were arrested and a state of emergency was declared in the city. Article 144 of the Criminal Code was invoked against the peasants, and they were forcibly taken back to their villages.

Hired gangs harassed the peasant encampment, but nothing the government did could break the spirit of the embattled peasants. The Awami Jamhour Party urged A. H. Bhashani, leader of the left wing of the Awami League of East Pakistan, to come to West Pakistan and organise a mass campaign in support of the landless tenants. Bhashani consented. All parties, save the Muslim League, declared their support of the evicted tenants. The lawyers of Lahore announced that the peasant demands were perfectly lawful. All the big West Pakistan trade-union centres pledged their support. Solidarity strikes broke out at many Lahore factories. At long last, the government announced officially that it would distribute state-owned land to landless peasants, fix the rents according to the quality of the allotted land, and appoint a special committee to investigate the situation.

The peasant march to Lahore had a galvanising effect on Pakistan's progressive public opinion. People saw that the government could be made to accede to the just peasant demands. The working people in the Punjab acted in fraternal solidarity. The joint actions of the progressive parties and organisations in support of the peasants indicated that conditions had ripened in Pakistan for a united front to combat the reactionary policies of the ruling party.[18]

The peasant movement in East Pakistan succeeded in making the government take effective measures against famine. It was started by Bhashani, who declared a political hunger strike on May 2, 1956. Bhashani demanded a grant of Rs. 500 million to the provincial government to cope with the food problem, fixed rice prices (Rs. 15 per maund), and distribution of food in the villages. The peasants of most districts in East Pakistan joined the movement against the government's agrarian policy. The movement was headed by the left wing of the Awami League and supported by the Azad Pakistan Party and other West Pakistan mass organisations.

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[17] *Ibid.*

[18] For details on the peasants' march to Lahore, see *The Pakistan Times*, July 4-23, 1956.

Bhashani's political hunger strike set off a strong reaction throughout the country, and the government hastened to declare officially that it would extend food grants to East Pakistan. Bhashani ended his strike, but since the government did not live up to its promises, the unrest continued. In August 1956, hunger-stricken peasants organised a march to Dacca. In scale and impact, this march equalled the peasant march to Lahore.[19] The Muslim League leadership had yet another occasion to see that its agrarian policy was a total failure.

The big landlords, eager to preserve semi-feudal relations in the country and opposed even to the most modest of agrarian reforms, were at the same time bitterly antagonistic to the idea of granting autonomy to the various national areas. For this reason, the anti-feudal movement merged in many places with the national movements, although the latter retained their specific features.

The failure of the Muslim League's policy on the national question was the last straw. Popular unrest reached its pinnacle and sealed the fate of the party that had ruled for nine years. The national discrimination shown by the ruling Punjab group affected nearly all strata of the population in the national areas. The democratic movement was, therefore, distinctly national-minded and the demand of autonomy for the various national areas, advanced by the local bourgeoisie, secured mass support.

At the proposal of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a veteran of the Pakhtun national-liberation movement, the Anti One-Unit Front held a meeting in Peshawar in May 1956, in conjunction with the Awami League of West Pakistan and the left wing of the Awami League of East Pakistan, to examine the project of a democratic all-Pakistan opposition party. But the meeting had to be called off, because Abdul Ghaffar Khan and many other leaders of the Front were arrested.[20] However, the various opposition groups continued to discuss the matter. The Azad Pakistan Party and the Sind Awami Mahaz passed a resolution at the close of May 1956 to the effect that the projected party should be governed by general democratic principles and have a concrete economic programme. The economic programme, based on the Azad Pakistan Party Manifesto of 1953, contained the following propositions: 1) The purpose of all political activity should be to improve the standard of living of the masses and to eradicate poverty and illiteracy; 2) policies and action should not be governed by emotional or transitory considerations; 3) cultural and regional differences among the people must be recognised because otherwise they give rise to serious political difference in the long run; 4) the political party must be organised on non-communal basis.

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[19] *The Pakistan Times*, August 11, 12, 18, 1956.
[20] *The Pakistan Times*, May 9, June 15, 18, 1956.

The manifesto was welcomed in 1956 by all the most influential democratic organisations of West Pakistan.[21] In summer and autumn 1956 the movement for an all-Pakistan progressive party spread to most of Sind, Baluchistan, the Pakhtun border areas, and East Pakistan.

Mass pressure compelled the government to release Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the other democratic leaders. The Pakistan intelligentsia, organised by the Pakistan Association of Progressive Writers and one of the country's most popular poets, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, was more politically active. The Pakistan Peace Committee played a prominent part in the campaign in support of the Algerian people, and so did the Democratic Youth Federation and the Democratic Students' Federation. The Muslim League had quite obviously lost its grip on the minds of Pakistan's younger generation.

In a desperate try to regain influence, the League sponsored a new youth organisation in June 1956, the Pakistan Youth Movement, with the declared purpose of reviving "Islamic patriotism" among the young people. Its programme said that the Movement was loyal to the government and that it expected the government's good will and assistance. It also declared, however, although in vague terms, that it was up to the youth to improve the condition of the people. Unlike most of the progressive youth organisations of Pakistan, the new body adhered firmly to the principle of a single Muslim nation and refused to support the movement against the "One-Unit" scheme.[22] But there was discontent over government policies in its ranks as well.

The urge for unity grew from day to day among the progressives. Early in September 1956, opposition parties (Sind Awami Mahaz, Azad Pakistan Party, Vror Pushtun, the Red Shirts, and Ostoman Gall) convened a conference in Lahore to frame the fundamentals of the programme and the constitution of the National Party of Pakistan. This new party held its first conference on November 30 in Lahore.

The new party announced that it would work for Pakistan's withdrawal from military blocs, for anti-imperialist co-operation with other Muslim countries, for unity among the anti-imperialist nations, and for world peace. At home, its main purpose was to fight for democratic institutions and civil freedoms, for free elections, for the equality of citizens, irrespective of religion, caste and nationality, for the abolition of feudalism, for industrialisation, and for the improvement of the lot of the people. The party also announced its support of the movement for national autonomy and the federation of self-governing national territories.[23]

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[21] *The Pakistan Times*, May 27, October 8, 1956.

[22] *The Pakistan Times*, July 12, 1956.

The progressive forces had thus made the first step towards unity. Thanks to the vigour of the popular movement in 1956, good opportunities appeared for the establishment of a united democratic front.

Chapter XVIII

THE AWAMI LEAGUE IN POWER

One of the signs of the deepening political crisis in Pakistan was the fact that factional strife played an increasing part in the fight for power waged by various groups within the parties that formed the ruling Muslim League-United Front coalition.

In the circumstances brought about by the growing national democratic movement and the increasing opposition to the unification of West Pakistan, a section of the big landlords of this province—mainly from the West Punjab and the administrative district of the former North-West Frontier Province—decided to break with the Muslim League and set up a new political organisation; for they considered that the League, which had lost its former political stock and its mass support, could no longer successfully defend their interests.

The "one-nation theory" was to provide the ideological foundation for the new party. According to this theory, after the establishment of Pakistan, all its citizens constituted a single nation, irrespective of the religious, racial or ethnic group to which they belonged. The politicians desiring to create a new party held that the "two-nation theory" on which the activities of the Muslim League were based, had not justified itself under the new conditions and even that, to a certain extent, it endangered the political stability of Pakistan. In advancing the "one-nation" principle they sought to give theoretical reasons for the unification of West Pakistan into a single province. They thought that the adoption of this principle would enable them to fuse all the right-wing forces of the country, irrespective of their religion and nationality, into a monolithic bloc. By breaking with the Muslim League, the supporters of the new political party hoped that they would be able to dissociate themselves in the eyes of the people from the political course of the League, for which many of them were personally responsible, and thus improve their political standing.[1]

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[23] Ю. В. Ганковский, «Административная реформа 1955 г. в Западном Пакистане», in *Краткие сообщения Института востоковедения АН СССР*, выпуск XXXI, Москва, 1959.

[1] Three months after the creation of the new Republican Party one of its founders, Syed Abid Husain, Minister of Public Works and Communications of

On March 19, 1956, the Chief Minister of West Pakistan, Khan Sahib, declared his intention to create and lead a party of the integrated province of West Pakistan. In making this decision Khan Sahib relied on the support of 57 members of the Legislative Assembly of the unified province, who represented the former North-West Frontier Province, the tribal areas and the Frontier States.

The possibility of a rival political party emerging disturbed the leaders of the Muslim League. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, who was at that time chairman of the League, M. M. Daultana, M. A. Khuhro, Sardar Bahadur Khan, and several other politicians who were closely connected with right-wing pan-Islamist circles attempted to bring down Khan Sahib's cabinet and to get the office of Chief Minister of the province into their hands, for they quite rightly believed that this would strengthen their position.

At a meeting in Lahore on April 3, 1956, the Muslim League Party in the Legislative Assembly of West Pakistan adopted a resolution according to which only a member of the Muslim League could become minister or head of the provincial government.[2] Since at that time the Muslim League had a majority of votes in the Assemly—245 out of 306—the decision meant that Khan Sahib, who was a non-party man, would have to resign. And indeed, Sardar Bahadur Khan, although he was still a member of Khan Sahib's cabinet, requested M. A. Gurmani, the Governor of West Pakistan, to depose the Chief Minister and appoint him, Sardar Bahadur Khan, head of the provincial government.[3]

However, neither the Governor of the province, nor the authorities in Karachi which supported him, showed any desire to give way before the pressure exerted by Nishtar, Daultana, Khuhro and their group. Personal motives also played a part in this; for example, the rivalry between Gurmani and Daultana. But the principal reason was that, at a time when the mass discontent with the policy of Choudhury Mohammad Ali's government was growing, the ruling circles considered it expedient to keep Khan Sahib at the head of the government of West Pakistan; for of all the politicians who had carried through and defended the unification of West Pakistan Khan Sahib had the greatest influence in the parts of the country inhabited by Pakhtuns. By retaining Khan Sahib as Chief Minister, the centre and the groups backing it hoped to weaken the opposition to the integrated province and to consolidate their own power.

These circumstances decided Khan Sahib's final victory. His

West Pakistan, addressing the party convention in Abbottabad, said "that the Republican Party was the outcome of the misdeeds of the Muslim League Party during the last nine years" (the quotation is taken from *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, July 29, 1956).

[2] *Dawn*, Karachi, April 4, 1956; *The Pakistan Times*, August 14, 1956.

[3] *Dawn*, April 9, 1956.

political antagonists, Daultana, Khuhro, and Sardar Bahadur Khan, were forced to resign.

A split took place in the Muslim League. On April 23, 1956, the supporters of Khan Sahib announced the formation of the Republican Party. It was known that they were backed by Iskander Mirza, the President of Pakistan. The founders of the Republican Party declared that it was not a religious or communal organisation and that it would loyally support the central government headed by Choudhury Mohammad Ali.[4]

A Republican bloc was formed in the Legislative Assembly of West Pakistan on April 29, 1956, which held a majority of votes, i. e. 189 out of a total of 306 votes.[5] The provincial government, thus, became a Republican Party government.

The programme and aims of the Republican Party and the social background of its members differed very little from those of the Muslim League. Kazi Faiz Mohammad, the General Secretary of the Sind Awami League, said very aptly of the new party that it presented old wine in new bottles.[6] The Republican Party, just as the Muslim League, defended the interests of the landed magnates of West Pakistan. Among those who joined the new party and became its leaders were many big landlords from the western wing of the country—for example M. F. Noon, M. G. A. Talpur, and Sardar Mohammad Khan Leghary, sardars and tribal chiefs, and also prominent industrialists and businessmen, including Syed Amjad Ali who represented the Ali group, one of the wealthiest financial and industrial groups of Pakistan. The influx of members of these social strata was especially rapid after the Republican Party became the ruling party.

The jagirdars and zamindars who had bossed the local Muslim League organisations often merely changed the signboard and joined the Republican Party in a body, for they considered that the latter could protect their interests better than the Muslim League, which had lost political power and was going downhill. For example, the committee of the Muslim League in Khairpur which was presided over by Mirza Mumtaz Hasan Kizilbash, a big landlord, just changed its name and henceforth called itself committee of the Republican Party.[7] When tribal leaders adhered to the Party they enrolled thousands of members of their tribe, who depended on them, at the same time. Sardar Bahtiar Khan Dhomki, for instance, joined the Republican Party together with 12,000 of his fellow tribesmen.[8] It is hardly surprising that by the spring of

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[4] For further details about the setting up of the Republican Party, see *New Age*, New Delhi, May 6, 1956.

[5] *New Age*, May 6, 1956.

[6] *The Pakistan Times*, June 30, 1956.

[7] امروز (*Imroze*), Lahore, January 23, 1957.

[8] *Dawn*, January 31, 1957.

1957 the membership of the Republican Party had reached 1,230,000.[9]

For many a West Pakistan bourgeois or landlord who was a member of the Muslim League the change-over to the Republican Party was simply a tactical manoeuvre, the reason for which was often the desire to achieve personal success. The progress of Abdus Sattar Pirzada, a prominent member of the Muslim League, can serve as a vivid example. On the opening day of the Legislative Assembly of West Pakistan in May 1956 he fiercely opposed the Republican Party, but when he saw that the Party gained the upper hand he left the Muslim League like a sinking ship and, on the second day of the legislative session, went over to its enemies. For this action Pirzada was rewarded with the Ministry for Law in the provincial cabinet.[10]

The leadership of the Republican Party—which, as we have already mentioned, declared that the organisation was not based on religious or communal principles—succeeded in winning over the top strata of the Christian community in the West Punjab and of the Hindus in Sind.[11] But its efforts to extend its sphere of influence to East Pakistan failed. The decision to set up a branch of the Republican Party in the eastern wing of the country, where the national democratic movement was steadily growing, was only supported by small right-wing groups, for example the group of Abdus Salam Khan, which represented certain sections of local Muslim landlords, and by individual politicians who were known to be personally connected with the Republican leaders.[12]

The leaders of the Republican Party, wishing to secure mass support for their organisation, published an alluring draft manifesto and decided to hold a party conference in Lahore in September 1956. The draft manifesto recommended that the size of land holdings should be limited to 250-300 acres and that the government should hand over land that was not used to tenants on reasonable terms. It suggested that steps should be taken to increase agricultural output and to cancel the land debt.[13] The Republican Party

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[9] *The Pakistan Times*, March 14, 1957.

[10] *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, May 21, 1956; *Pakistan Observer*, Dacca, May 22, 1956.

[11] *The Pakistan Times*, August 3, 4, and 25, 1956.

[12] *Imroze*, August 31, 1956; *The Pakistan Times*, August 29 and September 10, 1956.

[13] When their authors included these clauses in the draft manifesto, they had presumably the recommendations in mind which their political opponents, the leaders of the Muslim League, published in April 1956. For the Muslim League's manifesto promised to abolish big landlord property (the owner was to receive "fair" compensation) and to distribute the land among landless tenants (*The Pakistan Times*, April 23, 1956). The Republican leaders did not wish to lag behind their opponents in this question—naturally, so long as it remained on paper.

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promised to improve the state apparatus, "to inculcate a spirit of sacrifice and national service among the officials and to curb selfishness, and provincialism." The Ad Hoc Committee has recommended that every labourer should be provided with a "house with at least two rooms besides the provision of free educational, medical and cultural facilities."[14]

None of these clauses, however, contained any practical provisions for putting the recommendations into practice. In fact, the draft manifesto, which was deliberately couched in vague terms and promised something to everybody, did not commit the Republican Party to anything.

The leaders of the Republican Party had no intention of committing themselves to any concrete steps, which could not be implemented unless the social and economic structure of the country was revised. Their principal aim was to maintain inviolate the political and economic position of the big landlords in West Pakistan. All other issues were subordinated to this basic strategic aim, and were decided according to tactical considerations. This explains why the Republicans could so easily change their standpoint when taking decisions with regard to seemingly important questions of principle.

For example, at the beginning of 1956, when the second Constituent Assembly debated the draft constitution of Pakistan, Khan Sahib advocated joint electorates and common electoral rolls irrespective of the religious denomination of the voters, and declared that separate electorates on religious principles were the result of the British rule.[15] However, during the session of the Legislative Assembly of West Pakistan in May of the same year, when Khan Sahib wished to draw to his side as many deputies as possible from among the members of the Muslim League, he betrayed the principle of common electorates and moved a resolution recommending separate electorates on a religious basis, this was duly adopted by the Republican Party on May 30, 1956. A few months later, on September 13, 1956, Khan Sahib published a declaration in which he again advocated joint electorates.[16]

Because the Republican Party did not offer, and could not offer, the people of Pakistan a practical programme capable of improving their condition, it tried to win mass support by using the Kashmir question to rouse popular indignation. "The liberation of Kashmir was one of the fundamentals of the draft manifesto of the Republican Party,"[17] wrote *The Pakistan Times*. But the hopes of the Republican leaders that the anti-Indian campaign would enable them to divert the attention of the broad masses of the population from the vital domestic problems, and to rally the people around the banner of the Republican Party, were not realised.

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[14] *The Pakistan Times*, July 15, 1956.

[15] *The Pakistan Times*, January 9, 1956; August 14, 1956.

[16] *Imroze*, September 15, 1956.—For further details about the various phases through which the Republican Party and its leaders passed, see *The Round Table*, December 1957.

[17] *The Pakistan Times*, July 29, 1956.

The convention of the Republican Party held in September 1956 showed that the main support of the Party were the rich landlords from the West Punjab, who constituted the bulk of the delegates to the convention. The greater part of Sind, Baluchistan, the tribal areas, and the federal area of Karachi were not represented at all. There was only one delegate from East Pakistan.[18]

The formation of the Republican Party and the fact that it became the ruling party in West Pakistan undermined the coalition government of Choudhury Mohammad Ali. The disintegration of the Muslim League-United Front coalition, which had already begun in spring 1956, when the second Constituent Assembly debated the draft constitution of Pakistan, proceeded at an accelerated pace.

Between January and March 1956, the Ganatantri Dal, the Pakistan National Congress, the Scheduled Castes Federation, and the United Progressive Party broke with the United Front in the eastern wing of the country.[19] Abdus Salam Khan's group followed their example a little later.[20] This completed the collapse of the United Front which became a parliamentary coalition consisting of the Krishak Sramik Party and the Nizam-i-Islam Party, two right-wing organisations of the East Pakistan bourgeoisie and landlords. Although the differences of opinion within the Scheduled Castes Federation and the United Progressive Party enabled the provincial government, headed by A. H. Sarkar, to retain several members of the religious and communal minorities in the cabinet, it was obvious that its last days had arrived.[21]

At mass meetings and protest demonstrations organised by the opposition parties, the strongest of which was the Awami League, the people of East Pakistan demanded the dismissal of Abu Husain Sarkar. On August 31, 1956, the government of the United Front was compelled to resign. A state of emergency was imposed in the province and the Legislative Assembly dissolved. But the decree announcing the state of emergency could neither relieve the tension caused by the general discontent, nor still the hunger of the thousands of starving peasants in East Pakistan.

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[18] K. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, London, 1957, p. 75.

[19] These parties left the United Front mainly because they rejected the draft constitution, which was based on Islamic principles and infringed upon the rights of the people of East Pakistan (see *Dawn*, January 4, 10, and 12, 1956; March 4, 1956).

[20] *Dawn*, July 14, 1956.

[21] From July to August 1956 the Sarkar government was supported by no more than 90-95 members of the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan, which had 300 deputies. The by-election to the National Assembly of Pakistan, in which the candidate of the United Front received only 85 votes, while his opponent from the Awami League obtained 143 votes and won the seat, was symptomatic of the declining influence of the United Front (*Dawn*, September 6, 1956).

After the failure of several attempts to form a new government under the leadership, or with the participation, of the United Front, the Governor of East Pakistan, Fazlul Haq, was compelled to give in to the demands of the opposition, which threatened to organise a civil disobedience campaign, and on September 4, 1956, he requested Ataur Rahman Khan, one of the right-wing leaders of the Awami League, to form a government. The state of emergency in East Pakistan was revoked on September 6 and a coalition government was established in which the principal posts were in the hands of the Awami League. The Ganatantri Dal, the Pakistan National Congress, the Scheduled Castes Federation, the United Progressive Party and the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League headed by Rafik Husain were represented in the new cabinet.

The political crisis in East Pakistan and the formation of Ataur Rahman Khan's cabinet meant that the government of the Muslim League-United Front coalition had lost its backing in *both* wings of the country. It became clear that nothing could keep it in power. The coalition government was visibly breaking up. On August 28, 1956, two Muslim League ministers, I. I. Chundrigar and Ali Mohammad Rashdi, resigned. A few days later two other ministers, Azam Khan and M. R. Kayani, declared that "the Muslim League Party had become a 'cesspool of intrigue and political blackmail'"[22] and went over to the Republican Party.

Choudhury Mohammad Ali, who tried to remain in power, accused the Muslim League of undermining his authority and on September 8, 1956, announced his resignation from the Muslim League and his retirement from the post of Prime Minister. His decision was prompted by the hope that, with the help of the Republican Party and Khan Sahib — who had declared that Choudhury Mohammad Ali had his full support — he would lead the new central government.[23] But these hopes did not come true.

Iskander Mirza asked Suhrawardy, the right-wing leader of the Awami League, to form a new cabinet. Having come to the conclusion that in the given political situation the Republican

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[22] *The Pakistan Times*, September 7, 1956.

[23] A new coalition composed of 16 United Front deputies and 22 from the Republican Party came into being in the National Assembly of Pakistan, which had 77 members in September 1956. It seemed that this coalition, supported by six other deputies, who represented several small right-wing parties, could form a Republican Party-United Front government. Republican leaders, such as Syed Abid Husain and Mirza Mumtas Hasan Kizilbash, publicly expressed their hope that President Iskander Mirza would request Choudhury Mohammad Ali to head the new cabinet.

Party was unable to set up a stable central government,[24] Khan Sahib decided to support H. S. Suhrawardy as Prime Minister.[25]

A coalition government headed by Suhrawardy and consisting of the Awami League and the Republican Party was thus brought into existence. The Muslim League and the United Front, which had already been forced into opposition in the provinces, now went into opposition in the centre too.

The fact that Suhrawardy's coalition government was formed signified that the ruling strata of the propertied classes of Pakistan had made a reappraisal of values and had moved those bourgeois and landlord politicians into the forefront of the political life who had won a measure of popularity by criticising the political course pursued by the Muslim League and were able to carry through a more flexible policy; for the ruling strata realised that otherwise they could not maintain their dominant position in the country, stop the growth of the national movement in both wings, and check the advance of the workers' and peasants' movement. That the Prime Minister's office was offered to Suhrawardy, a Bengali, who had for a number of years represented and defended the interests of East Pakistan, indicated that to strengthen their position and to reduce the antagonism between the two parts of the country the ruling circles considered it necessary to make certain concessions to the dominant group in the Bengali national movement.

Because of the growing popular opposition to the home and foreign policy of the ruling groups, the latter deemed it advisable to come to an understanding with the right wing of the opposition party. They were the more ready to enter into this agreement because it did not lay down any terms,[26] and the disposition of forces in the National Assembly of Pakistan and the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan enabled them to paralyse any attempts the Awami League leaders might undertake to carry into effect the reform programme announced by the party.[27]

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[24] *The Pakistan Times*, October 1, 1956.

[25] *The Pakistan Times*, September 11, 1956.

[26] Cf. the statement which Abdul Qaiyum Khan, the General Secretary of the Republican Party, made to the press (*The Pakistan Times*, October 8, 1956).

[27] The correlation of forces which existed in the National Assembly in September 1956 was as follows: the government coalition had 52 deputies, including the 30 deputies of the Republican Party (27 from West Pakistan and 3 from East Pakistan); the Awami League had 14 seats; the Ganatantri Dal, 1; and the parties representing the Hindu bourgeoisie and landlords of East Pakistan, 7. The opposition had 25 votes. Approximately 200 deputies supported the government coalition in the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan, of which only 99 were members of the Awami League and 11 of the Ganatantri Dal. The opposition disposed, of roughly 85 votes. (*The Pakistan Times*, September 2, 9, and 11, 1956, *Imroze*, September 15, 1956). Such a disposition of forces made the governments of Suhrawardy and Ataur Rahman Khan directly dependent on the right-wing bourgeois and landlord parties which supported them.

As regards the liberal landlords and bourgeois of East Pakistan, whose interests the right-wing leaders of the Awami League expressed, they consented to the establishment of the coalition government in Karachi and Dacca in the hope that with the support of wide sections of the population in East Pakistan and the former smaller provinces of the western wing of the country, where strong Awami League branches existed, they would succeed in obtaining substantial concession from the territorial magnates and the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan and their allies in East Pakistan.

The coalition with the right-wing bourgeois and landlord parties helped at the same time such Awami League leaders as Suhrawardy and the group surrounding him to withstand the pressure of the left wing of the party, headed by A. H. Bhashani, which insistently demanded that the bourgeois-democratic tenets contained in the party programme were put into practice. Subsequent events showed that the promises in the sphere of domestic policy, comprising an extensive programme of bourgeois democratic reforms, liberally laced with pseudo-socialist phrases, which the right-wing leaders of the Awami League freely distributed while they were in opposition, were nothing but a tactical manoeuvre in the fight for power.

The liberal landlords and bourgeois of East Pakistan needed the support of the people in the struggle which they waged against the territorial magnates and the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan to attain conditions that were more favourable to the development of capitalism in their province.[28] The broad masses of East Pakistan were to a certain extent also interested in the outcome of this struggle, for they suffered both because they were being exploited by the upper strata of the propertied classes of West Pakistan and because pre-capitalist relations still survived in the agrarian system of the country. The working class, the peasants, craftsmen and petty traders expected that a government headed by the Awami League would substantially improve their living and working conditions, abolish both feudal oppression and the privileges of the landowners, and do away with national discrimination.

However, any attempt to carry out the democratic reorganisation of the country expected by the popular masses that supported the party, and desired by the left wing of the Awami League, was from the outset doomed to failure, since the Awami League shared power with the Republican Party in the central government, and with the right-wing parties of the bourgeoisie and the landlords in the provincial government of East Pakistan.

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[28] С. Ф. Левин, "Партия Народная Лига", in *Пакистан. История и экономика*, Москва, 1959, стр. 147.

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The Suhrawardy government began its political life under very difficult circumstances. Many of the social and economic problems that Pakistan inherited from the colonial period had been left unsolved by the preceding governments. A number of new difficulties, moreover, had arisen since.

One of the most acute and complex issues confronting the new government from the very first days of its existence was the food problem.

Owing to the prevalence of semi-feudal relations in the agrarian system of the country, the poverty-stricken and downtrodden state of the peasants, and the extreme backwardness of agricultural methods, Pakistan was unable to meet the food requirements of the growing population. Between 1948 and 1956 the population of Pakistan increased from 73.6 million to 83.4 million, or by 11.8 per cent, while the grain harvest fell from 14.6 million to 12.4 million, or by 15 per cent, during the same eight-year period.[29]

As we have already mentioned, the Six-Year Plan, which was drawn up in 1950, provided for an annual increase in grain output; the increment was to have reached three million tons by 1956 but the plan broke down. Consequently the per capita production of rice and wheat dropped from 378 pounds to 286 pounds, or by 24.4 per cent.[30]

The food crisis which began during the years 1951-1953 continued to grow worse. Grain production could not even provide the beggarly daily ration of 453 grammes per person, which, according to the official statistics of Pakistan, was considered necessary to supply the food requirements of the average Pakistani. The output of other food-stuffs, such as sugar, butter, meat and fish, was also too low to meet the needs of the country. Pakistan was experiencing a chronic food shortage. Many thousands were living on the brink of starvation, while at the same time landlords and speculators were making huge fortunes by selling grain and other food-stuffs at inflated prices.

Suhrawardy's government promised to take effective steps at once to overcome the food difficulties. As regards this question, the Awami League was especially responsible, because its representative, Dildar Ahmad, became Minister for Food and Agriculture in the new cabinet. Since the food crisis could not be overcome unless far-reaching agrarian reforms were carried out, the Awami League undertook an investigation of the problem.

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[29] For further details, see А. А. Змеев, *Пакистан. Экономика и внешняя политика*, Москва, 1956, стр. 37-39. В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 34-43.

[30] *Basic Data of the Economy of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1959, pp. 63, 67.

Already in September and October 1956 the left-wing leaders of the party demanded that the central government should take effective measures to abolish the jagirdari and zamindari systems, put an end to the eviction of tenants and distribute the land among landless peasants without delay.[31]

The Awami League called a conference on the agrarian question which met in Dacca in January 1957, and adopted a number of decisions designed to limit the holdings of landlords and improve the position of the peasants. The conference asked the National Assembly of Pakistan to change Article 15 of the Constitution, which prohibited the confiscation of private property without payment of a compensation to the owner, to make it possible to seize the estates of landlords without compensation. It was decided to put into practice the agrarian laws of 1949-1951, which had been brought to naught by the landed magnates, and to establish a firm upper limit for the amount of land to be left in the hands of landlords. Measures defending the rights of tenants and limiting the size of the rent to a third of the harvest were proposed. The conference also advised the government to take all necessary steps to ensure that none of the compensation payments made up to them were taken out of the country, and to make certain that they were used to build up the national industry.[32]

The recommendations of the Dacca Conference with regard to the agrarian question repeated the demands which the leaders of the Awami League had advanced numerous times while they were in opposition.

These recommendations, which reflected the attitude of the left wing of the party and showed the way to the solution of the country's food difficulties, were backed by all progressive organisations in both wings of Pakistan. For example, Mian Iftikharuddin, the leader of the National Party, stressed during a budget debate in the National Assembly in February 1957 that the food problem could not be solved unless agrarian reforms were immediately carried out.[33]

It should be observed that the more far-sighted members of the ruling classes of Pakistan understood that to solve the food problem it was necessary to carry out agrarian reforms; this was demonstrated by the recommendations which the Planning Committee published at the end of 1956. An upper limit of 150 acres of irrigated land and 450 acres of non-irrigated land was to be established for land holdings and the surplus land to be handed over to the peasants who tilled it provided the landowner was paid an adequate compensation.[34] Dr. Zahid Husain, Chairman of the Committee, who maintained that parts of the landlords' estates had to be handed over to the peasants, pointed out that as a result of this measure agricultural production would undoubtedly increase.[35]

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[31] *Imroze*, September 18, 1956; *The Pakistan Times*, October 14, 1956.

[32] *The Pakistan Times*, January 29 and 30, 1956; *Dawn*, January 29 and 30, 1956.

[33] *The Pakistan Times*, February 23, 1957.

But the recommendations of the Dacca Conference were violently rejected by the right-wing bourgeoisie and landlord parties in both wings of Pakistan and by kindred spirits in the Awami League closely associated with Suhrawardy.

The suggestion to confiscate landed property without compensation was opposed in East Pakistan by the Pakistan National Congress, the United Progressive Party, and the Scheduled Castes Federation, which were allied to the right wing of the Awami League in the coalition government.

The opposition of the right wing brought also to naught the attempts of the government of Ataur Rahman Khan to speed up the state purchases of estates owned by the zamindars of East Pakistan. [36]

To counteract any endeavour to alter the agrarian system of the country, the big landlords of West Pakistan set up the West Pakistan Zarai (Landowners) Federation, which was headed by one of the big landlords, Sardar Mohammad Khan Leghari.[37] The formation of this "non-party" organisation was warmly welcomed by the leaders of the Republican Party.[38]

The right-wing members of the Awami League, whose representatives headed the governments in Karachi and Dacca, refused under these circumstances to carry through the land reforms since, for fear of losing power, they did not wish to fall out with the politicians with whom they had joined forces in the coalition. But at the same time they did not want to lose the support of the progressive forces of the party and, therefore, sought to disguise their refusal by declaring that the land reforms, which were necessary to increase food production, could only be put into practice after having been approved by the provincial governments.[39] They were thus able to shelve the demands of the Left. The debates on the agrarian reforms which had begun in the National Assembly of Pakistan were adjourned indefinitely.[40]

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[34] *Economic Observer*, December 1956.— For a detailed description of the Planning Committee's recommendations, see В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 34-43.

[35] *The Pakistan Times*, December 12, 1956.

[36] For a detailed account see С. Ф. Левин, *Партия Народная Лига*, стр. 152-153.

[37] *The Pakistan Times*, March 22, 1957.

[38] See, for example, the statement made by Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, a big Pakistani landowner, one of the leaders of the Republican Party and Minister for Home Affairs in the Suhrawardy government (*The Pakistan Times*, March 28, 1957).

[39] Cf. Suhrawardy's statement to representatives of the press (*The Pakistan Times*, February 2, 1957).

The right-wing groups of the Awami League, which declined to carry through the agrarian reforms, tried to alleviate the food crisis, which became daily more severe, by a number of palliative measures.

The government initiated a broad propaganda campaign advocating modern agricultural methods. In addition to exhibitions and training centres, several state farms and nursery gardens, as well as mobile and stationary veterinary points, were organised in the countryside. These enterprises were designed to demonstrate the determination of the coalition government to revolutionise agriculture.[41]

In February 1957, Rs. 34 million were allocated to carry out 640 small irrigation schemes in East Pakistan, which were expected to bring 5,200 acres of waste land under cultivation. When the draft Five-Year Plan was revised it was decided to earmark Rs. 760 million for irrigation work in the province for the remaining period up to 1960.[42] The import of fertilisers sold to peasants at reduced prices was increased. The government granted loans to private individuals and associations working in the countryside to carry out various agricultural improvements.

The 1957-1958 budget of West Pakistan gave priority to the increase of agricultural output in the province and earmarked approximately Rs. 97 million for this purpose. A government proposal to establish an Agricultural Bank with an authorised capital of Rs. 200 million was approved by the National Assembly in April 1957.

But these measures could not solve the food crisis as long as the agrarian system of the country remained unaltered. Only the small top layer of tenants with hereditary rights and those landlords who farmed their land along capitalist lines profited by them.

When considering the measures here outlined it becomes obvious that, while they signified a complete rejection of the radical reorganisation demanded by the left wing of the Awami League, they were fully in line with the views of those who vindicated and wished to maintain the landlord system in agriculture, but held that limited agrarian reforms had to be carried out in Pakistan. In this context one can, for example, quote from a speech delivered by M. A. Gurmani in the second Constituent Assembly. After demanding that the private property rights of the landlords should be safeguarded, he declared that "the real question before the country was how to reorganise land holdings and increase production by the introduction of mechanical and scientific agricultural methods and by applying manures."[43]

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[40] *The Pakistan Times*, February 21, 1957.

[41] See the speech which Hayrat Husain, Minister for Agriculture in East Pakistan, delivered in December 1956 (*The Pakistan Times*, December 13, 1956).

[42] *The Pakistan Times*, January 3, 1957.

The fact that more than 1.5 million acres of fertile land in West Pakistan, ready to be brought into cultivation after the completion of the irrigation system in Sind, remained untilled despite the growing food shortage revealed the true nature of the right-wing leaders of the Awami League. The delay in opening up the irrigated land occurred because the government was faced with the alternative of allotting the land either to the landlords or the peasants.[44] The opposition of the big landlords prevented the distribution of the land to small proprietors; while, on the other hand, public resistance stopped the landlords from seizing these lands, although in some cases big zamindars and jagirdars appropriated irrigated land under various pretexts.[45]

The case of the irrigated lands was the more intolerable because in 1957 not only East Pakistan, but also West Pakistan was suffering from a severe grain shortage. It was estimated that the grain deficiency in the eastern wing amounted to 450,000 tons and in the western wing at least to 500,000 tons.[46]

To ease the position in the regions affected by famine, steps were taken to improve the supply of food-stuffs to these parts; the struggle against the smuggling of grain across the border and against black market speculations was stepped up.[47]

The government also tried to create food reserves and compelled the landlords to sell grain at fixed prices to the state.[48] Although the purchase price was usually fixed above the market price obtaining at harvest time, the government efforts failed because the landlords preferred to sell their surplus grain on the black market. Thus, the plan for the creation of food stocks in East Pakistan which was drawn up for 1957 was fulfilled only 40 per cent.

The philanthropic campaign launched in the afflicted areas, including the establishment of mobile kitchens and the free distribution of bread, could not disguise the failure of the attempts to increase agricultural production and create government stocks of food.

To overcome the food difficulties, the Suhrawardy government was compelled to increase grain imports. While Pakistan imported 2.42 million tons of grain between 1947 and 1956, the grain imports for 1957 alone amounted to 1.12 million tons.[49] But even such substantial imports of food grains could not abolish the threat of famine. In 1957 the per capita consumption of grain was only 482 grammes per day, against 544 grammes in 1949. Prices for the necessaries of life continued to soar in 1957; as compared to 1955, the cost of living went up by 15 to 50 per cent in various towns of Pakistan.[50] The authorities were unable to halt speculation and the rising cost of living. Thus the condition of the working people grew even worse.

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[43] *The Pakistan Times*, February 16, 1956.

[44] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 50.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-52.

[46] *The Pakistan Times*, January 24, 1957; *Dawn*, April 6, 1957.

[47] *Dawn*, January 9, 1957; *The Pakistan Times*, February 2, 1957.

[48] В. Г. Растянников, С. А. Кузьмин, *Проблемы экономики Пакистана*, стр. 53.

The inability of the Suhrawardy government to abolish the feudal survivals in the agrarian structure of the country and to solve the food problem had far-reaching consequences. The food imports exhausted the foreign currency reserves of Pakistan,[51] which fell by Rs. 242 million between December 1956 and December 1957, limited the country's ability to step up the import of means of production, and doomed the proposed industrial development to failure.

Allocations for the projects of the Five-Year Plan were cut by Rs. 800 million in April 1957.

Because of the balance of payments deficit the import of semi-finished commodities and raw materials had to be restricted, which placed a number of industries in a very difficult position. The rate of industrial development and the level of industrial production fell in Pakistan in 1957, for the first time since the country had achieved independence.[52] There was a sharp drop in rayon output and many enterprises which manufactured metal wares, agricultural implements, and so on, had to curtail production.[53] Famine and the rising prices of food and other necessaries, which reduced the purchasing power of the people, adversely affected various industries that depended on the home market.[54] This reduced or brought to naught the effect of measures — such as the raising of the tax-free annual income from Rs. 4,500 to Rs. 5,000; a reduction in the rate of income tax for enterprises which made a profit of less than Rs. 12,000 per annum; and the granting of state loans on favourable terms to factory owners [55] — designed to benefit the lower and middle strata of the bourgeoisie, which had been introduced by the Suhrawardy government in an attempt to broaden and consolidate its social basis.

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[49] *Ten Years of Pakistan, 1947-1957*, Karachi, 1957, p. 106; *Dawn*, August 14, 1959.

[50] *The Pakistan Times*, March 16, May 11, and 21, 1957.

[51] According to an official statement made by Suhrawardy, Rs. 320 million were spent on the supply of food-stuffs to East Pakistan during the first five months of his government (*The Pakistan Times*, February 8, 1957).

[52] *Statistical Bulletin*, Karachi, May 1959, p. 565.

[53] *The Pakistan Times*, January 17, June 8 and July 26, 1957.

[54] *Dawn*, October 13, 1956; *The Pakistan Times*, July 10, 1957.

[55] *The Pakistan Times*, February 18 and March 7, 1957.

With the establisment of the Suhrawardy government the correlation of forces within the ruling camp was, to a certain extent, altered in favour of the commercial bourgeoisie and liberal landlords of East Pakistan. This was reflected in a number of government measures. Already during the first months after the Awami League had come into power, the local authorities of East Pakistan were given greater power to decide questions concerning the economic life of the province. In the interests of the landlords and rich peasants who were jute growers, a state corporation for the jute trade was set up towards the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957. Larger state funds were allocated for the development of power stations, industry and transport in the eastern wing of the country. The import of means of production for East Pakistan increased, and the granting of import licences was readjusted in favour of businessmen from East Pakistan. The government tried to create conditions in the province which were likely to induce landlords, merchants and well-to-do peasants to invest their capital in the industrial sphere.[56]

But the intensification of the agrarian and food crisis in spring 1957, the depletion of the currency reserves and the deficit in the balance of payments compelled the government to curtail these measures. Already in February 1957 it was officially announced that the budget of East Pakistan would have an agricultural bias.[57]

The first six months of the rule of the Suhrawardy government showed that the right wing of the Awami League was quite content to wring certain concessions from the big bourgeoisie and landlords of West Pakistan for the benefit of the top strata of the propertied classes in East Pakistan, and that it had no intention of putting into practice the programme of social and economic reorganisation which it had advocated before September 1956. The broad masses of peasants, craftsmen and workers, who had expected that the Awami League government would improve their lot, received nothing. The eviction of tenants from the land continued. The burden of taxation grew heavier; unemployment increased; hunger and poverty became more intense.

The policy which the Suhrawardy government pursued with regard to the national question caused intense discontent among the population in both wings of the country. The Bengalis were disappointed because discrimination against them was still practised when appointments were made to the civil and military administration, and in West Pakistan the movement against the "One-Unit" scheme continued.[58] The local branches of the Awami

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[56] С. Ф. Левин, *Партия Народная Лига*, стр. 165.—For further details, see *The Pakistan Times*, December 19, 1956 and January 4, 1957.

[57] *Dawn*, February 25, 1957.

[58] *The Pakistan Times*, February 5 and 19, 1957.

League—in Karachi, Sind, the Punjab, and especially in Pakhtunistan—played a very active part in this movement. But the right-wing leaders of the party paid no heed to the popular opposition.[59]

The foreign policy adopted by the government of Suhrawardy greatly contributed to the fall of its prestige.

One of the principal reasons for the widespread popular dissatisfaction, which had led to the crisis in the Muslim League and the resignation of the government of Choudhury Mohammad Ali, was the foreign policy of Pakistan, and in particular the pro-imperialist attitude of the ruling clique during the Suez conflict in 1956. The right-wing leaders of the Awami League and the leadership of the Republican Party took advantage of this discontent in their struggle for power. At numerous meetings held in summer 1956, which were attended by thousands of people, the leaders of both parties appealed to the government to support their Egyptian brothers[60] and to defend Egypt's right to nationalise the Suez Canal. They recorded the solidarity of the people of Pakistan with the peoples of the other Asian countries who were fighting against imperialism, and for freedom and independence; and they demanded that the foreign policy of the country should be changed. Such speeches delivered by the leaders of the Republican Party and the right wing of the Awami League greatly contributed to the growth of their popularity in Pakistan. But the fact that they criticised the foreign policy of the Muslim League did not mean that they were resolved to change it after taking over power. Subsequent events showed that the attacks on the Choudhury Mohammad Ali government were for the leaders of these two parties merely a tactical manoeuvre in the struggle for power.

The foreign policy pursued by the ruling clique of Pakistan, which bound the country to the aggressive military blocs, remained unaltered after the Suhrawardy government came to power. Just as its predecessor, the latter failed to help the Egyptian people in its fight against the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression, and at the same time assisted the American imperialists in Asia in their policy of expansion. When the representatives of the four Muslim signatory states to the Baghdad Pact met at the close of 1956, Pakistan supported the invitation extended to the United States to become a full member of this aggressive alliance.[61] Similar offers were several times addressed to the government of the USA later on, too.[62]

The Suhrawardy government announced that it fully supported the Eisenhower Doctrine, which it considered the best guarantee of peace, and participated in the preparation of various concrete measures which led to increased international tension.

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[59] *The Pakistan Times*, April 2, 1957.

[60] *The Pakistan Times*, August 5, 1956.

[61] *The Pakistan Times*, November 26, 1956.

[62] *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 25, 1957; *National Herald*, Lucknow, June 4, 1957.

All this was conducive to the continued military penetration of the country by the USA.[63] A consequence of Pakistan's collaboration in the military blocs was that foreign militarists could use Pakistani territory for their aggressive designs even against the wishes of the government of Pakistan.[64]

This collaboration, moreover, prevented the country from normalizing and extending its relations with the socialist and non-aligned states and made it difficult to settle controversial issues by mutual agreement with its neighbours. Not only the progressive sections of the population but also the more far-sighted members of the ruling circles understood these implications.

The obligations Pakistan as a member of the military alliances was obliged to shoulder had an adverse effect on its still weak economy and increased its economic dependence on the Western Powers, and above all on the United States.

This as we shall demonstrate later, caused even big businessmen to express a certain degree of dissatisfaction.

Pakistan's participation in aggressive alignments increased its military expenditure, which, in turn, made it even more dependent on the USA.[65] According to official data, Pakistan spent 70 per cent of its budget,[66] or Rs. 899.5 million, on defence purposes in 1956-1957, as against Rs. 819 million in 1955-1956 and Rs. 713 million in 1954-1955. The excessive military expenditure placed a heavy burden on the economy of the country, impeded its development and increased its direct dependence on American "aid," which in 1957 amounted to 40 per cent of the Pakistan budget.[67] Amjad Ali, the Minister for Finance, said with regard to the position of Pakistan in spring 1957: "Our economic dependence on America has grown beyond expectations."[68]

This forced the Suhrawardy government to make further concessions to the United States monopolies and to open the gate to the country even wider than before. On July 1, 1957, a Pakistani-

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[63] For further details, see Ю. В. Ганковский, „Воечно-политическое проникновение США в Пакистан", in *Политика США на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке*, Москва, 1960, стр. 286-292.

[64] See, for example, *Dawn*, December 9, 1957.

[65] An American expert, who visited Pakistan, wrote that the level of defence expenditure increased Pakistan's dependence on the United States (see N. D. Palmer, *The United States and Pakistan*, in *Current History*, Philadelphia, 1958, Vol. 34, No. 199, p. 144).

[66] The figures are taken from a statement made by F. Noon, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Suhrawardy government (*Imroze*, December 1, 1956; see also *The Christian Science Monitor*, Boston (Mass.), August 17, 1957).

[67] Cf. the speech of F. Noon in the National Assembly of Pakistan (*The Pakistan Times*, April 10, 1957).

[68] *The Pakistan Times*, May 22, 1957.

American convention on duties was signed, which granted substantial privileges to American capital.[69]

The home and foreign policy of the Suhrawardy government caused increasing dissatisfaction among wide sections of the population; not only the peasants, the craftsmen, the working class and the radical intelligentsia were affected, but also the lower and middle strata of the bourgeoisie. Manifestations of this discontent were the growth of the workers' and peasants' movements and of the national movements in both provinces of Pakistan, and the intensification of factional strife within the Awami League, whose left wing sharply criticised the party leadership.

A. H. Bhashani and his supporters demanded that radical agrarian reforms should be immediately carried out and the antiquated jagirdari and zamindari systems abolished without payment of compensation, and declared that this was the only way to bring about the economic advance of the country, to solve the food crisis and raise the living standard of the population. The group had the backing of the progressive public of the country when it urged that steps should be taken to halt the ejection of tenants from the land they tilled, to distribute newly irrigated lands to peasants in West Pakistan and give them greatly increased government assistance, to tighten price control and step up the fight against smuggling.[70]

The left wing of the Awami League and the national democratic parties, i. e., the Ganatantri Dal and the National Party, insisted upon the immediate introduction of measures to improve the position of craftsmen, traders, the intelligentsia and small businessmen.

The national democratic forces of the country came out in defence of the rights of the national minorities in West Pakistan and demanded that the united province be abolished and replaced by a federation of autonomous units created in accordance with the political, economic and cultural interests of the people inhabiting the western wing. They pointed out that economic progress and political stability in West Pakistan could not be achieved unless the national aspirations of the peoples living in the smaller provinces were satisfied.[71]

The progressive sections of the public expressed their strong discontent with the foreign policy of the Suhrawardy government. Democratic politicians, who considered the aggressive military alliances in which Pakistan participated as a new form of imperialist colonialism,[72] demanded a thorough revision of the foreign

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[69] *Pakistan Times*, Karachi, August 1957, p. 25.

[70] *The Pakistan Times*, January 1, 1957; *Dawn*, April 1, 1957.

[71] *The Pakistan Times*, February 3, 1957.

[72] *The Pakistan Times*, May 11, 1957.

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policy and the adoption of an independent, peaceful and neutral course of action.

Towards the close of the first decade of Pakistan's existence, trends favouring independent economic development were growing in the country; as a result, not only the lower and middle strata of the national bourgeoisie, but also a number of big businessmen advocated the introduction of measures designed to restrict the activities of American capital in the country and to stimulate the development of an indigenous economy. The opposition of Pakistani business circles compelled the Suhrawardy government to postpone indefinitely the conclusion of the friendship, trade and navigation agreement which was to place American companies operating in Pakistan on an equal footing with Pakistani entrepreneurs. There was also a growing demand for a revision of the system of import licences, since it did not sufficiently take into account the needs of the Pakistani industry.[73]

Many factory owners and merchants who had supported Suhrawardy up to September 1956 were disappointed with the economic policy of the government and left the Awami League.

But Suhrawardy and his associates paid no attention to the growing dissatisfaction with the political course pursued by the government and did not honour the pledges they had given before September 1956. The leaders of the Awami League-Republican Party government coalition were, consequently, losing the prestige they had won while in opposition. Evidence of this was the political crisis which developed in West Pakistan in spring 1957.

Manifestations in the form of mass meetings, popular demonstrations and hartals, led by the National Party, which demanded the creation of a zonal federation on a linguistic basis in West Pakistan, became at the beginning of 1957 so widespread that even the spiritual fathers of the "One Unit" scheme, the leaders of the Muslim League, had to take note of them. Hoping that the wave of popular discontent with the enforced unification of West Pakistan would sweep them again into power, they tried to utilise the tense situation to re-establish their lost influence. With this aim in view, the members of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party tabled a motion in the Legislative Assembly of West Pakistan proposing that the united province should be abolished and superseded by a zonal federation of autonomous units.[74]

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[73] For further details, see С. А. Кузьмин, *Экономическое развитие Пакистана и внешний рынок*, Москва, 1960, стр. 85-86.

[74] The leaders of the Republican Party were justified in pointing out that only political place-hunting induced the Muslim League politicians to resort to this stratagem, for it was precisely the Muslim League which in summer 1954 brought the united province into being [(Cf. the speech which Syed Abid Husain, the General Secretary of the Republican Party, delivered at a public meeting in Jhelum (*The Pakistan Times*, March 23, 1957)].

Because it was felt that this step of the Muslim League, in conjunction with the rising popular movement for the reversal of the decision to unite West Pakistan into a single province, could bring down the Khan Sahib government, and especially in view of the negotiations that were going on between representatives of the Muslim League and the National Party to register a vote of no-confidence in the government (information about these talks had found its way into the press),[75] a group of Republican Party members of the provincial Legislative Assembly decided to change front in good time. On March 20, 1957, when the motion to abolish the united province was debated, 30 deputies who were members of the Republican Parliamentary Party joined the opposition. The provincial government headed by Khan Sahib tottered on the brink of disaster and was saved only by the support of the Centre.

By order of President Iskander Mirza the session of the Legislative Assembly was adjourned and President's rule imposed on West Pakistan.[76] The functions of the government were taken over by the Governor of the province, M. A. Gurmani, who was an advocate of a unified West Pakistan.

The imposition of a state of emergency, certainly, could not relieve the tension in the country. A sign of the deepening crisis was the dismissal, on July 7, 1957, of Khan Sahib, the Chief Minister of West Pakistan. His successor was Sardar Adbur Rashid, who had in 1955 supported the plan to establish a federation of autonomous units in the western wing of the country and was, as a "reward," dismissed from his post as Chief Minister of the North-West Frontier Province. He formed the new provincial government on July 18, 1957. The ruling clique expected that Abdur Rashid's appointment would lessen political tension in West Pakistan by creating the illusion among members of the national movements in this wing of the country that their demands would be satisfied.

The events which took place in West Pakistan from March to July 1957 dealt a serious blow both at the Republican Party and the Suhrawardy government, which depended on the co-operation of this party. The developments in East Pakistan which split the Awami League weakened the central government further.

The national bourgeoisie of East Pakistan, as we have already said, was not satisfied with the concessions which the upper crust of the propertied classes of the province had wrung from the big bourgeoisie and the landlords of West Pakistan after the formation of the Suhrawardy government. The movement for the implementation of one of the most important principles of the Awami League programme, the achievement of full regional autonomy for East Pakistan, was growing in the province. On April 2, 1957, the provincial Legislative Assembly adopted a motion, tabled by members of the left-wing parties, to grant full autonomy to East Pakistan without delay, leaving only defence, foreign affairs and currency in the hands of the centre.[77]

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[75] See, for example, *Dawn*, January 24, 29 and 31, 1957.

[76] *The Pakistan Times*, March 21 to 23, 1957.

The proposal was fiercely attacked by the ruling circles of the country. M. G. A. Talpur, the Pakistan Minister for Home Affairs, declared in a statement to the press that the move was a "great threat to the unity, nay to the very existence of Pakistan and could only cause sorrow to our friends and joy to our enemies." The implementation of the resolution would, in his opinion, lead to the secession of the eastern wing from Pakistan and its merging in the Indian State of West Bengal. He concluded, therefore, "the Central Government, under no circumstances, will allow this move to succeed; it will smash it with an iron hand."[78]

A situation had arisen when the right-wing leadership of the Awami League, headed by Suhrawardy, had to choose whether to meet the demands of the Bengali national movement, and thereby risk splitting the government coalition and causing the downfall of the cabinet, or to reject these demands, remain in power but lose the support of the left wing of the party and the masses of the people in the eastern wing of the country. The right-wing leaders chose the latter course which meant fighting the democratic sections both in the party and in the country.[79]

Suhrawardy and his associates endeavoured to consolidate their position, to avert their repudiation by the people at large and to halt the incipient crisis within the party by conducting a widespread campaign propagating class peace and bourgeois-democratic freedom. But this campaign could not check the growing class struggle of the proletariat and peasantry, and the gravitation of the political forces towards the extremes. Nor could these processes be arrested by the police repressions to which the Suhrawardy government resorted.[80] On the contrary, they led to a further aggravation of the internal situation and deepened the crisis within the Awami League.

The right-wing leaders of the Awami League took a number of steps to induce landlords and big bisinessmen to join the party, hoping thereby to reduce the influence of its democratic wing. They even prepared plans for the formal amalgamation of the Awami League with the Republican Party and the Krishak Sramik Party.

A sign of the trend towards the political extremes was the revival of the Islam Mahaz (Islam Front) in spring and summer 1957. This union of Muslim religious and communal parties and organisations of the extreme right, which defended the interests of the most reactionary sections of the landlords and the commercial and industrial big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan and the top layer of the Muslim divinity, came into being towards the close of 1956.[81]

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[77] *Dawn*, April 4, 1957.

[78] *The Pakistan Times*, April 5, 1957.

[79] For further details, see С. Ф. Левин, *Партия Народная Лига*, стр. 172-188.

[80] *The Pakistan Times*, July 4, August 20 and November 2, 1957.

The main activity of the Islam Mahaz was the fight for separate electorates set up on a religious and communal basis; it appealed to the religious prejudices of the backward sections of the population and kindled the flames of religious and communal antagonism. The campaign was directed by a special committee for the defence of separate electorates which was headed by Nishtar, the chairman of the Muslim League, Maudoodi, the leader of the Jamaat-i Islami, and Ispahani, one of the biggest businessmen of Pakistan.[82]

The principal aims of the Islam Mahaz were to distract the attention of the people of Pakistan from the fight for the burning issues of the day; to split the masses and prevent them from taking concerted action for a radical reorganisation of society and drastic changes in the foreign policy; to undermine the growing strength of the national democratic organisations; to deliver a blow at the national struggle of the Bengalis in East Pakistan by setting the Muslim population of Bengal against the Hindus of Bengal; and to weaken the national movement in West Pakistan.

The achievement of these ends would have helped to consolidate the shaky positions of the territorial magnates and the upper bourgeoisie of West Pakistan. The Islam Mahaz launched an extensive campaign under the slogan — the defence of Islam. But the drive of the right-wing forces found little response among the population and was repulsed by the democratic sections of the country.

An indication of this was the debate on the Electorate Bill in the National Assembly of Pakistan from April 19 to 24, 1957. The majority of deputies took into account the sentiments of the general public and voted for joint electorates and common electoral rolls, thereby rejecting the idea of separate electorates. The right-wing groups had failed to strengthen their positions by making use of religious prejudices and religious and communal strife in their attempt to split the democratic movement and thus check the growing influence of the Left.

The solidarity and the desire to close their ranks was growing in the national democratic camp as a result of the struggle for a radical revision of the government's domestic and foreign policy. In April 1957, Bhashani visited West Pakistan, where he conferred with the left-wing leaders of the local branch of the Awami League and the leaders of the National Party. They decided to invite representatives of the progressive parties and other progressive organisations to an All-Pakistan conference.

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[81] The Islam Mahaz was headed by the Muslim League and included the Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamaat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, the Nizam-i-Islam Party, the Khilafat-i-Rabbani, the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim League and several other organisations.

[82] *The Pakistan Times*, October 4, and 21, 1956; *New Age*, October 21, 1956.

The outcome of this conference, which was held in Dacca on July 25 and 26, 1957, was the creation of the National Awami (People's) Party, a democratic organisation covering the whole of Pakistan. It comprised progressive parties in both wings of the country such as the National Party, the left wing of the Awami League, the Ganatantri Dal, and several smaller organisations. The very formation of the National Awami Party "was an event of historic import for the Pakistan people." [83]

The National Awami Party, which was led by such veterans of the anti-imperialist struggle as Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, G. M. Sayed, and Mian Iftikharuddin, declared that its primary task was the fight for the unity of all the progressive forces of Pakistan in order to bring about drastic changes in the home and foreign policy of the country. The aims of the party were to create a democratic state, free of all imperialist fetters and of all feudal and imperialist features; to carry out radical agrarian reforms; to industrialise the country; to revoke the enforced unification of West Pakistan and grant full autonomy to the national regions of the country; to hold democratic general elections; to improve the living conditions of the working people; to annul the military agreements signed by Pakistan and pursue an independent neutral foreign policy; and to bring about the participation of Pakistan in the struggle of the Asian and African peoples against imperialism and colonialism.[84]

Because of its democratic nature the programme of the National Awami Party won the support of the broad masses of the people. Despite the fact that some of its demands were not sufficiently clearly formulated and that it was not quite consistent in the pursuit of its aims, "the new party", as A. Ghosh wrote, "had immense potentialities. It was the first all-Pakistan party of a mass, progressive character."[85] The creation of the National Awami Party prepared the ground for a united democratic anti-imperialist front in Pakistan.

The coming into being of the National Awami Party and the split in the Awami League meant that the Suhrawardy government had finally lost the support of the democratic forces. From now on, its existence depended entirely on the leaders of the Republican Party and on the big landlords and upper bourgeoisie of West Pakistan backing them.

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[83] A. Ghosh, *Pakistan Portent*, New Delhi, 1958, p. 14.

[84] *The Pakistan Times*, July 28, 1957.

[85] A. Ghosh, *Pakistan Portent*, p. 14.

The fight within the government coalition, and between the various factions of the parties it comprised, continued to grow. The leaders of the Republican Party decided, therefore, that it would be expedient to form a political bloc with the Muslim League. They no longer attached any importance to the alliance with the Awami League, which had lost prestige and, after the split, had become a right-wing party of bourgeois and landlords confined to East Pakistan. At the beginning of October 1957 the Republican Party left the coalition [86] and thus brought about the fall of the Suhrawardy government on October 11, 1957.

On the basis of an understanding between the Republicans and the Muslim League a new coalition government was formed by I. I. Chundrigar, [87] it was supported by the right-wing bourgeois and landlord parties — the Muslim League, the Republican Party, the Krishak Sramik and the Nizam-i Islam. But the government remained in power for only two months, for differences on the electorate question caused the Republican Party to leave the coalition and brought about the fall of the Chundrigar government. On December 16, 1957, it was succeeded by a Republican Party government, which was headed by F. Noon.

The government crises which followed each other were symptomatic of the growing class contradictions and the intensification of the factional strife within the ruling groups of Pakistan.

Chapter XIX

THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1958

The characteristic feature of the year following the resignation of the Awami League government — October 1957 to September 1958 — was the steadily growing economic and political crisis in Pakistan.

Symptomatic for the continuing deterioration of agriculture was the fact that the acreage of land under cultivation decreased, the yield of food crops fell and the level of rural production and consumption declined still further. Agricultural output in Pakistan decreased by 4.2 per cent in 1958, while the yield of rice, the principal food crop, dropped by almost 6 per cent.[1] The per capita production of food crops, and in particular of cereals, did not reach the pre-war level, i. e., that of 1936-1938. To make good the growing food deficit the government was compelled substantially to increase the import of food-stuffs, such as flour, grain and pulses.[2]

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[86] The Republican Party left the government coalition because of disagreements on the "One-Unit" question. While the Republican leaders were for tactical reasons prepared to withdraw the "One-Unit" slogan, the leadership of the Awami League did not want to make any concessions to the national movements of the western wing of the country.

[87] Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar (born in 1897) joined the Muslim League in 1924 and was one of the right-wing leaders of the Muslim movement in India before partition. From 1940 to 1946 he headed the Muslim League organisation in the Bombay Presidency and after the establishment of Pakistan held various high diplomatic and government posts, he was, for example, Minister for Commerce, Industry and Labour and Minister of Law. He consistently defended the interests of big business and of the landed magnates of West Pakistan.

The growing food imports had an adverse effect on the economic position of the country. During the first nine months of 1958 Pakistan's balance of trade showed a deficit of Rs. 470.7 million. From December 1957 to September 1958 the currency reserves fell by Rs. 1.021 million, to Rs. 762.2 million. This compelled the Pakistan authorities considerably to restrict the import of industrial commodities, in the main machinery and raw materials,[3] which in turn led to serious difficulties in the industrial sphere. Because of lack of fuel, raw material and machinery many enterprises were forced to cut down production and could often use only half the available productive capacity. According to a statement made by Amjad Ali, the Minister for Finance of Pakistan, the industry of Karachi operated at 35 per cent of productive capacity in 1958 (up to the coup d'état).[4]

The country's economy was further strained by the worsening conditions of foreign trade, the fact that the United States curtailed its purchases of Pakistani commodities, the fall of prices on the world market for such important export items of Pakistan as jute (the price of which dropped by $ 5-10 per ton) and cotton, and the reduced export of wool, hides, etc. As a result of the diminished export of cotton, cotton yarn and wool Pakistan suffered a loss of Rs. 196.1 million from January to October 1958, as compared with the same period of 1957.[5]

The settlement and employment of millions of refugees from India still remained an unsolved problem which required large funds. British observers pointed out that Pakistan experienced great difficulties during the year 1957-1958.[6]

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[1] *The Financial Times*, London, May 11, 1959.— For further details, see *Экономическое положение стран Азии и Африки в 1957 г. и первой половине 1958 г.*, Москва, 1959, стр. 45.

[2] *Pakistan Trade*, Karachi, January 1959, p. 16.

[3] From January to October 1958, as compared with the same period of 1957, the import of coal and coke into Pakistan fell by Rs. 16.5 million, that of machinery by Rs. 14.2 million, metals and ores by Rs. 4.3 million, mineral oils by Rs.4 million (see *World Trade Information Service*, Washington, 1959, No. 38, p. 4).

[4] For further details, see *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, Москва, 1959, № 8, приложение, стр. 58.

[5] *World Trade Information Service*, 1959, No. 38, p. 4.

[6] *The Financial Times*, September 15, 1958.

The ruling groups of Pakistan, nevertheless, fulfilled the obligations they had assumed when signing the military alliances, and continued to push forward the militarisation of the country. In spring 1958 Pakistan's budget for 1958-1959 was approved which further increased allocations for military purposes while at the same time reducing expenditure for social services.[7] Revenue from direct and indirect taxation rose by Rs. 114 million during the fiscal year. The volume of money in circulation was greatly increased in 1958, which led to inflationary tendencies.[8]

The deficit in the national budget rose sharply and was to an increasing degree covered by means of foreign loans and "grants," which indicated the depletion of the domestic finances and a growing dependence on the Western imperialist monopolies.

The abolition of price control in February 1958, which served the interests of the top strata of the country's propertied classes, further increased the price of the principal consumer goods. For example, the price of rice at the end of May 1958 had risen by 20 per cent, as compared with December 1957. This forced the subsistence minimum up and increased the difference between the income of the working people and that of the propertied classes of Pakistan.[9] Among the masses of the people diseases of poverty, such as tuberculosis, were rife, and epidemics caused tens of thousands of deaths every year. Although, since independence, the country made some headway in the fight against the cultural backwardness inherited from the colonial period, well over 80 per cent of the population were still illiterate and the acute shortage of schools, doctors and hospitals was hardly alleviated[10]. Despite the seriousness of the situation only 290 million Rupees — out of a total of 2,600 million Rupees — was allocated to health and social services under the Six-Year Plan of Development (1951—1957), and a mere 6.2 per cent of the total expenditure of the First Five-Year Plan (1955—1960) was earmarked for educational purposes and 3.1 per cent for health services: and even these modest targets were not reached.

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[7] *Pakistan Trade*, April 1958, pp. 10-13, 18.

[8] *Karachi Commerce* (*Revolution Day Supplement*), August 1959, p. 9.—The fact that the State Bank of Pakistan raised its discount rate from 3.5 per cent to 4 per cent indicates that a considerable amount of surplus money was in circulation.

[9] The rising food prices placed a particularly heavy burden on the workers, since they spent up to 75 per cent of their earnings on food (*Statistical Bulletin*, Karachi, May 1959, p. 588). This caused the cost of living index of the Pakistani workers to rise by an average of 7 per cent from January to February 1958. (*Imroze*, Lahore, February 24 and 28, 1958. In 1958, the cost of living went up by amounts varying from 0.9 per cent to 8.2 per cent in different towns of Pakistan, according to the estimates of British economists (see *The Financial Times*, May 11, 1959).

[10] The total number of schools in West Pakistan rose from 10,900 to 19,100 between 1947/48 and 1957/58 (*West Pakistan Year Book, 1958*, Karachi, 1959, pp. 115—116). During the same period 4 universities and 15 technical colleges were opened in Pakistan (before 1947 there was not a single technical college in the country) and a number of specialised educational establishments and teachers training colleges built. Although this was a step forward it did not solve the problem, for more than half the children of school age were still without any schooling. In fact the country needed at least twice as many schools and colleges in addition to greatly improved teaching methods.

Because of the increasing underutilisation of productive capacity unemployment rose steeply; according to unbiassed observers, Pakistan had in 1958 no less than 11 million unemployed and partially employed consisting in the main of agricultural workers.

The number of industrial injuries reached at the same time record heights, because the factory owners tried to shift the burden of the economic difficulties, which the industry of Pakistan experienced, on to the back of the workers by the intensification of labour.[11]

The difficult economic position of the country, the fact that the workers were deprived of political rights and the unpopularity of the home and foreign policy of the ruling clique led to the growth of the democratic movement in Pakistan.

Between October 1957 and September 1958 the labour movement became noticeably stronger. The government therefore adopted several laws which gave the authorities the right to demand that strikes be called off, and in case their orders were not heeded to arrest the strikers. Employees in state and public enterprises were, according to these laws, forbidden to use strikes as a weapon in the struggle to secure the satisfaction of their requirements.[12] But these measures, which virtually outlawed strikes, could not stop the growing dissatisfaction of the working class. In 1958, the working-class movement displayed greater persistence and organisation than ever before. Strikes and demonstrations took place in all important towns of Pakistan. In suppressing working-class actions the police often resorted to the use of arms, beating and shooting down strikers and demonstrators.[13]

The strike at the enterprises of the foreign oil companies in West Pakistan which took place in May and June 1958 marked an

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According to official data 30 per cent of the population suffered from malaria, and 200,000 died of tuberculosis every year. In East Pakistan alone cholera caused 15 to 30 thousand deaths annually. Pakistan had moreover an exceptionally high rate of infantile mortality. The authorities, nevertheless, consistently failed to fulfil the plans for the development of the health services adopted in 1947, 1951 and 1956.

[11] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, April 1, 1958.

[12] *The Pakistan Times*, January 4, 1958.—From autumn 1957 onwards government bans of strikes in private enterprises too became more frequent (*The Pakistan Times*, January 6 and 7, 1958).

[13] See, for instance, *Dawn*, Karachi, June 17, 1958.

important stage in the fight of the proletariat for its rights. The semi-official press regarded it as one of the biggest strikes in the history of the country.[14] Although the government declared the strike illegal and imposed a state of emergency on the district in which the oil works were situated, the workers continued their struggle until they were promised that their demands — including the principal demand, a wage rise of 40 per cent — would be satisfied.[15]

The strike of the oil workers found warm support both in Pakistan and beyond its borders. Sixty-five trade unions in the federal area of Karachi, working-class organisations in East Pakistan and the International Federation of Petroleum Workers declared their solidarity with the strikers. Several trade-union organisations in India and Ceylon supported the striking workers.[16]

In addition to economic demands designed to improve their living conditions, raise their wages, and force the factory owners to respect trade-union rights, the proletariat of Pakistan put forward political demands with increasing insistence at numerous meetings, demonstrations and strikes held in 1958. They pressed for the repeal of the anti-labour legislation, the abolition of the yellow trade unions and their replacement by militant organisations, and the democratisation of the state structure; they called upon Pakistan to leave the British Commonwealth, conduct an independent foreign policy and break with the military blocs; they demanded the industrialisation of the country, the nationalisation of large-scale industry, the abolition of landlord property rights, and so on.

Unbiassed observers noticed that between October 1957 and September 1958 the militancy of the working class of Pakistan reached an unprecedented height.[17]

In addition to the working-class movement, the peasant movement too revived in 1958; it became more widespread and better organised. While during the first years of Pakistan's existence the most oppressed sections of the peasantry, the tenants at will, who possessed no land, played the most active part in the peasant movement, now the top strata of the peasants, i. e., occupancy tenants, who had heritable rights, and small peasant proprietors, joined in the anti-feudal struggle. This was mainly due to the fact that the development of capitalism in agriculture steadily increased the contradictions between the top strata of peasants and the semi-feudal landlords, who tried to preserve untouched the existing agrarian system. By the beginning of 1958, moreover, considerable sections of peasant proprietors and occupancy tenants, who had previously formed the social support of the landlords in the countryside, had come under the influence of the National Awami Party.

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[14] *Pakistan Quarterly*, Karachi, 1958, No. 2, p. 67.

[15] *Dawn*, May 23, 1958; *Morning News*, Karachi, April 17, 1958.

[16] *Pakistan Today*, London, 1958, No. 3, p. 17.

[17] *World News* (the quotation is taken from *Pakistan Today*, 1959, No. 1, p. 10).

On the initiative of the left-wing forces an All-Pakistan Peasant Association was formed in January 1958, which was headed by A. H. Bhashani, one of the most popular democratic leaders of the country. The Association pressed for the immediate abolition of landlord property rights and the introduction of agrarian reforms. A campaign demanding agrarian reforms began, in which literally the whole country participated. One of its principal stages was the march of thousands of peasants to Lahore in March 1958.[18] At meetings and demonstrations held throughout the country, the peasants demanded that the eviction of tenants from the land should be stopped, landlord property rights abolished and uncultivated state land handed over to peasants without compensation payments.[19]

But the semi-feudal landlords did not give in. One of their recognised leaders, the Prime Minister F. Noon, declared at a meeting in Multan in April 1958 that his government did not intend to carry through any radical agrarian reforms. Such a policy was bound to result in a further decline of the influence of the ruling clique in the countryside, and to increase the authority of the democratic forces which advanced a programme of far-reaching agrarian reorganisation.

Even the so-called middle class, i. e., the urban petty bourgeoisie, the owners of small industrial and commercial enterprises, the intelligentsia, civil servants in the lower income brackets, and so on, were seriously dissatisfied with the policy of the ruling circles. The artisans and small traders demanded that the government should immediately take steps to improve their difficult position.

The intelligentsia pressed for measures to halt the steadily growing unemployment and to raise their extremely low living standard. In 1958, Pakistan was gripped by an unparalleled teachers' strike, in which more than 50,000 school teachers participated; thousands of educational institutions had to close. Post and telegraph workers and other government employees went also on strike.

The students of Pakistan played an active role in the democratic movement. Martyrs Day — observed annually on January 8, the anniversary of the shooting down of the student demonstration in Karachi in 1953 — was in 1958 marked by numerous meetings and stormy demonstrations which were dispersed by the police with truncheons.[20] That the desire for concerted action was growing among the progressive youth organisations was demonstrated at the youth conference of East Pakistan held in summer 1958.[21] In defiance of police bans, a delegation of the progressive National Students' Union of Pakistan attended the Fifth Congress of the International Students' Union.

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[18] *The Pakistan Times*, March 10, 11, 1958.

[19] *The Pakistan Times*, February 13, 15 and April 4, 1958; *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, January 23 and August 22, 1958.

The national movements continued to grow in Pakistan. After the resignation of the Suhrawardy government, the big bourgeoisie and landlords of West Pakistan withdrew the economic concessions which the upper strata of the propertied classes of the eastern wing had wrested from them.[22] When the budgetary appropriations for the remainder of 1957-1958 were revised, the share of East Pakistan was substantially curtailed,[23] and new taxes imposed in the province. The huge trade deficit of West Pakistan, which amounted to Rs. 792.5 million, was again to a considerable extent made good at the expense of the eastern province, which had an active trade balance but received only 31 per cent of the commodities imported by Pakistan, i. e., Rs. 685.1 million out of a total of Rs. 1,887.8 million.[24]

The dissatisfaction with the domestic policy of the central government spread in 1958 to all sections of the population of East Pakistan and manifested itself in a new upsurge of the national movement under the slogan of full regional autonomy for the province.

The struggle for the reorganisation of West Pakistan and the establishment of a zonal federation on a linguistic basis continued. Towards the end of the summer of 1958 armed clashes were taking place in Baluchistan, where the tide of the national movement was rising especially fast.

It is significant that the immediate cause of the skirmishes was the decision of the central authorities to build in Baluchistan military bases, air fields and oil reservoirs. To carry out these plans, many Baluchis had to be moved from their homes, which called forth strong resistance on their part. The situation in Baluchistan was further complicated at the beginning of October 1958, after Iskander Mirza, the President of Pakistan, ordered the arrest of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalat — the biggest of the Baluchistan States — who had come out for the independence of the State.[25] Armed clashes took place in Kalat and in autumn 1958 detachments of Baluchi insurgents destroyed military installations and lines of communication built by the Pakistan authorities with the assistance of American military advisers.

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[20] *The Pakistan Times*, January 9, 1958.

[21] For further details, see В. Н. Москаленко, „*Молодежное движение в Пакистане* (1947-1958)", in *Краткие сообщения Института народов Азии АН СССР*, выпуск XLII, 1961, стр. 115-118.

[22] See the statement of Majibur Rahman Khan, the General Secretary of the East Pakistan Awami League, on the economic policy of the Chundrigar government (*The Pakistan Times*, November 12, 1957).

[23] С. Ф. Левин, „Партия Народная Лига", in *Пакистан. История и экономика*, Москва, 1959, стр. 192.

[24] *Statistical Bulletin*, October 1959.

As discontent with the foreign policy of the ruling clique was spreading throughout the country, the fight for a complete and drastic revision of the political course and for the adoption of an independent peaceful foreign policy became more intense. This discontent manifested itself in speeches delivered by members of the National Assembly,[26] in popular demonstrations and protest meetings against Pakistan's continuing participation in the system of aggressive alliances and the construction of foreign military bases on its territory. In autumn 1957, mass demonstrations against the building of American military and air bases in Gilgit were held in Muzaffarabad, Punch, Sialkot, and other districts of West Pakistan and "Azad Kashmir." Speaking in the National Assembly on September 4, 1958, I. I. Chundrigar, the former Prime Minister, called for a revision of the foreign policy. Even the Pakistan National Congress, a party representing the bourgeoisie and landlords, advocated an independent neutral foreign policy.[27]

The American press had to admit that the growing economic and political dependence of Pakistan on the USA had tended to increase anti-American sentiments in the country.[28] Not only the broad masses of the people but certain sections of the upper classes, too, were opposed to the domination of the country's economy by foreign monopolies. Businessmen whose industrial or commercial activities were hampered by the competition of foreign companies demanded that the government should take drastic measures to stimulate the development of the indigenous industry and restrict the penetration of imperialist monopolies into the economy of Pakistan. The business circles of Pakistan pressed for the development of commercial relations with all countries, independent of their political system, on the basis of bilateral agreements, provided the countries were prepared to accept rupees for the commodities they sold to Pakistan and to buy goods from Pakistan.[29]

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[25] *The Pakistan Times*, October 8, 1958; *The Times*, London, October 7, 1958.

[26] *Civil and Military Gazette*, March, 3, 1958.

[27] *The Pakistan Times*, October 7, 1958.—The anti-American utterances of many right-wing politicians were largely due to their political bias which was closely connected with the antagonism between the United States and Great Britain fighting for predominance in Pakistan. Often the purpose of such speeches was to gain personal popularity and to improve one's political standing. But certain politicians undoubtedly had the growing anti-American sentiment in Pakistan in view when they made anti-American statements.

[28] See, for example, *Time*, New York, August 14, 1958.

[29] *Karachi Commerce*, November 14, 1959.

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Dissatisfaction was growing with the activities of American emissaries and experts in Pakistan, who paid no attention to either the traditions of the country or local conditions,[30] and merely tried to make the economy of Pakistan ever more dependent on the United States. It was stressed that the huge sums spent on the maintenance of the American advisers — on the average amounting to Rs. 12,000 a month per person [31] — absorbed a considerable part of the funds received from the United States, and that the conditions and the direction of American "aid" deprived it of any real value, since it tended to preserve and increase the economic and political dependence of Pakistan on the industrialised capitalist countries of the West.

The anti-imperialist sentiments in Pakistan became especially strong after the revolution in Iraq, which took place on July 14, 1958, and the Anglo-American intervention in the Lebanon and Jordan. The progressive sections of the country were outraged by the fact that the ruling circles of Pakistan openly approved the policy pursued by the imperialist powers in the Near East.[32]

It was because of the growing anti-American feelings and the intensificafion of the propaganda directed against the USA, which the opposition parties conducted, that the State Department summoned the American ambassador in Karachi, James M. Langley, to Washington in September 1958.

The dissatisfaction with the policy pursued by the ruling clique of Pakistan affected even the army. According to reports in the Indian press, more than 200 men were arrested after a mutiny had broken out in the Pakistan Air Force in spring 1958. In summer 1958, after the revolution in Iraq, several groups of young officers came into being in the army of Pakistan, whose views regarding the foreign policy of the country and the alliance with the Americans differed from those held by the high command.[33]

The national democratic movement was growing and consolidating its position in the country. All patriotic and progressive forces of the nation were interested in the solution of national problems. That was the basis on which they could unite.[34] The National Awami Party became the nucleus of such a unification. The democratic nature of its programme and its determined struggle for the radical change of the whole home and foreign policy of the country gained it the support of the broad masses. The membership of the National Awami Party in the former North-

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[30] *Eastern World*, London, September 1957.

[31] *The Times of India*, New Delhi, August 20, 1958.

[32] Iskander Mirza, the President of Pakistan, sent a special message to President Eisenhower, expressing his approval of the US intervention (see *The Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, August 4, 1958, p. 183).

[33] *Twentieth Century*, London, November 1958.

[34] *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1961, p. 44.

West Frontier Province alone reached 200,000 in February 1958.[35]

In view of the worsening economic conditions and the aggravation of the domestic situation in Pakistan, the ruling circles endeavouring to remain in power discarded the cloak of parliamentary institutions and bourgeois democracy and resorted, to an increasing extent, to military and police repressions against the progressive forces. Progressive politicians were taken into protective custody although no charges were brought against them. "The violation of constitutional conventions and of democratic procedure became a normal feature of Pakistan's political life."[36] The anti-democratic Safety Act, which was adopted in 1952, was continuously renewed. Even correspondents of American right-wing newspapers,[37] who can hardly be suspected of exaggeration, reported that the use of violence was a characteristic feature of Pakistan's government in 1958.

Strife within the ruling camp centring around the question of how to strengthen the position of the ruling classes and by which means to solve the economic and political crisis in Pakistan, grew fiercer every day.

The big landlords of West Pakistan, who were represented in the leadership of the Republican Party, high-ranking army officers and close associates of President Iskander Mirza demanded that bourgeois parliamentary democracy should be restricted, or even abolished, and replaced by strong-arm methods. They intended to put into practice the scheme advanced by Iskander Mirza in his speech of March 23, 1957, to establish Presidential government in Pakistan, similar to the American system, i. e., that the government should be responsible to the head of the state and not to the National Assembly. Thus, it was alleged, the government would obtain the necessary stability. The President's rights were to be considerably extended; in particular, he was to be granted the right to dissolve the provincial legislative assemblies, this was to make the government independent of any crisis that might arise in provincial politics. An organisation specially set up to achieve these aims conducted an extensive propaganda campaign, which was inspired and supported by the ruling clique.

As early as November 1955, Khan Sahib and other leaders of the Republican Party had proposed that all parties and other political organisations should be dissolved and demanded the establishment of a so-called Revolutionary Council consisting of the ten best men of the nation, who were to wield absolute power in the country. Righ-wing politicians prepared plans for the crea-

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[35] *The Pakistan Times*, February 15 and 17, 1958.

[36] A. Ghosh, *Pakistan Portent*, New Delhi, 1958, p. 5.

[37] Such as *The York Times* (For further details see *Pakistan Today*, 1959, No. 1, p. 2).

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tion of a duumvirate with dictatorial powers and even proposed to place Iskander Mirza on the throne and thus establish monarchical government in Pakistan. It was expected that Iskander Mirza would consolidate his position by marrying a member of the Pahlavi family, the ruling dynasty of Iran.[38] On the other hand, under the pretext that democracy was bankrupt, proposals were made with increasing insistence since 1959 to place absolute power in the hands of the army high command.

The establishment of a strong central authority was opposed by a group of politicians who were mostly connected with the top-ranking civil servants, the leadership of the Muslim League, the right wing of the Awami League, and the bourgeois and landlord parties of East Pakistan. They considered that the British-style bourgeois parliamentary democracy, which had stood the test of time for so long, was best adapted to maintain the privileges of the ruling classes. Personal motives and the fear of being pushed into the background played a considerable role in determining the attitude of these politicians to the proposed establishment of some form of open dictatorship in Pakistan. Moreover, the bourgeois and landlord leaders of East Pakistan presumably took into account that the rights of the upper classes of the province were likely to be further curtailed.

The government crises, which recurred with increasing frequency, were a sign of disagreements within the ruling camp and of factional strife. In 1958, East Pakistan experienced two ministerial crises, the removal of the provincial governor, the dismissal of the government and the imposition on June 24, 1958, of President's rule for two months.[39] When in September 1958 the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan debated the provincial budget, fierce fighting broke out between members of the ruling bloc and the opposition. In the course of this skirmish the President of the Assembly was killed and several deputies seriously injured.

The murder of Khan Sahib, the leader of the Republican Party, on May 9, 1958, was a further sympton of the tense political situation in West Pakistan. In summer 1958, Sardar Abdur Rashid, the head of the provincial cabinet, was replaced by Muzaffar Ali Kizilbash, a protégé of President Iskander Mirza and one of the biggest landlords of the province. The fight waged by rival cliques weakened the Republican Party, which was in power, to such an extent that in autumn 1958 it was brought face to face with complete disintegration.[40]

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[38] For further details of the schemes to introduce strong-arm methods in Pakistan, see *The Pakistan Times*, July 14, 1956; March 26, 28; April 10; September 18; October 9; November 5; and December 1, 1957; *New Commonwealth*, London, September 1957, p. 304; *The Eastern Economist*, New Delhi, April 12, 1957.

[39] *The Times*, June 25, 1958; *Manchester Guardian*, June 25, 1958.'

[40] *Dawn*, September 29, 1958.

Big industrialists and businessmen who had grown strong during the period of independence, high-ranking civil servants and other new men who became important only after the division of India [41] endeavoured to supplant the big landlords of West Pakistan at the helm of the state.

President Iskander Mirza, who was a Shiite, tried to obtain help and support from the members of his religious community, and, to consolidate his power, surrounded himself with Shiites, thus placing them in the foreground of the political scene. Among the Shiites supporting him were M. A. Kizilbash, Kasim Batti, the brothers Sajad and Amjad Ali — all three big businessmen and millionaires — and Nakvi, Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In the armed forces, too, Iskander Mirza promoted in the first place Shiite officers. All this caused dissatisfaction among rival bourgeois and landlord groups and Orthodox Sunnite divines.

To curb the activities of the Muslim League, the ruling Republican Party on September 20, 1958, banned all military and para-military organisations which served political aims. This meant that the National Guard, the striking force of the League, which had 15,000 members, had to be dissolved. The protest meetings which the Muslim League organised were dispersed by the police.[42]

It was not only the rivalry and strife within the ruling clique which undermined the authority and discredited the leadership of the right-wing parties, but also the rapid growth of bribery and corruption, which even the police divisions specially set up to fight corruption were unable to check. The politicans who had remained in the foreground during the eleven years of Pakistan's existence were so thoroughly discredited that the bourgeoisie and the landlords were compelled to look for new men who were not compromised by the part they had played in various unscrupulous political schemes and dark financial transactions, and who were therefore better able to defend their class interests.

The progressive sections of the people of Pakistan and the leaders of the national democratic parties pressed for the alteration of the home and foreign policy pursued by the ruling bloc and the normalisation of the political situation in the country. As a first step towards this goal they demanded immediate general elections, so that a representative National Assembly could be chosen in a democratic way, and the formation of a government responsible to the Assembly. But the ruling groups feared general elections, for they understood that the progressive democratic forces would

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[41] Samin Khan, *An Introduction to Basic Democracy*, Karachi, 1960, p. 41.
[42] *Dawn*, September 21 and 24, 1958.

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win.[43] The general election was therefore several times postponed and finally fixed for autumn 1958. But on September 4, 1958, it was again postponed until February 15, 1959. This anti-democratic manoeuvre of the government caused an outburst of anger among the broad masses of the people and aggravated the situation in the country still further.[44]

The Republican Party and its leader F. Noon, who headed the central government, decided that a reorganisation of the cabinet and the inclusion of several representatives of the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party would help them to cope with the growing dissatisfaction. Accordingly, on October 2, 1958, the number of government ministers was increased from 14 to 26.[45] But Suhrawardy was dissatisfied because his party received only five posts in the reorganised cabinet, which did not allow him to control the election mechanism. The Awami League therefore withdrew its members from the Noon government. Pakistan was faced with another government crisis, which gave rise to a new wave of demands for immediate general elections. But the ruling groups were not prepared to make such a concession.

The USA imperialists, in whose plans Pakistan played an important role, closely watched the internal development of the country and tried to influence it by supporting and financing the activities of various reactionary parties and sending advisers and divers specialists to Pakistan. But objections to the American policy were increasingly voiced by progressive sections of the population and the national-democratic forces of the country.

The leaders of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO observed with growing concern that the people of Pakistan followed with great sympathy the revolutionary changes that took place in Asia and Africa. They feared that, as a result of a victory of the left in the country, Pakistan might withdraw from the military blocs, thereby disrupting the system of aggressive alliances that the Western powers imperialists had built up in Asia. The imperialists considered that this could be avoided by establishing a strong government in Pakistan.

There were also growing contradictions within the ruling bloc. Worried by the inability of the ruling clique to sustain a stable political government, the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie that had emerged since independence openly expressed discontent with the fact that power was concentrated exclusively in the hands of the West Pakistani landed magnates. Under these circumstances, the idea of establishing a military dictatorship attracted the propertied classes of Pakistan who hoped thus to consolidate their shaky position.

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[43] *New Commonwealth*, August 1958, p. 80; *New Age*, New Delhi, October 26, 1958.

[44] A. Ghosh, *Pakistan Portent*, p. 12.

[45] *Dawn*, October 3, 1958.

During the night of October 7 to 8, 1958, a military coup d'état took place in Pakistan. First, President Iskander Mirza summoned the ambassadors of the USA and of a few other states and "assured them that Pakistan, a member of the Baghdad Pact and the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), would honour her foreign commitments in spite of the political changes at home."[46] Then the President published a declaration consisting of five points which suspended the constitution of March 23, 1956, dismissed the central and provincial governments, dissolved the National Assembly and the provincial Legislative Assemblies, banned all political parties, proclaimed martial law throughout Pakistan, and appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, chief administrator charged with the implementation of these measures.[47] M. F. Noon and the members of his government were placed under house arrest.[48]

The coup was successful because the preceding regime was completely discredited in the eyes of the people.[49] The National Assembly, too, had compromised itself, since for a number of years it had sanctioned laws which condemned wide sections of the population to hunger and poverty.

To translate the President's proclamation into reality, General Ayub Khan issued a decree dividing Pakistan into three zones which were headed by military administrators. These zones were: *A*—the Karachi Federal Area, *B*—West Pakistan, and *C*—East Pakistan.[50] Later zones *B* and *C* were divided into several districts, in each of which sub-administrators, senior officers of the Pakistan army, wielded absolute power.

Meetings, demonstrations, strikes, and the printing and distribution of any material which had not been passed by the military censor, were banned. Infringement of these decrees was punishable by many years of strict imprisonment.[51]

Mass arrests of leaders and active members of national-democratic organisations, of progressive journalists and writers and of members of the workers, peasants and youth movements were taking place throughout the country.[52] Many old and experienced leaders of the anti-imperialist struggle, such as Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Abdus Samad Khak Achakzai, G. M. Sayed, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Mirza Ibrahim, and Firozuddin Mansoor, were thrown into prison.

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[46] *The New York Times*, October 10, 1958.

[47] The full text of Iskander Mirza's proclamation has been printed in *The Pakistan Times*, October 8, 1958.

[48] *The Statesman*, Calcutta-Delhi, October 10, 1958.

[49] *Economic Weekly*, Bombay, October 18, 1958, p. 1325.

[50] Major-General Malik Sher Bahadur, Lieutenant-General Azam Khan, and Major-General Umrao Khan were appointed administrators of the military zones (*The Pakistan Times*, October 9 and 10, 1958).

[51] *The Pakistan Times*, October 8 and 9, 1958.

[52] *Daily Mail*, London, October 11 and 13, 1958; *The New York Times*, October 14, 1958.

Several ministers and statesmen belonging to right-wing and landlord parties were also arrested. A number of right-wing leaders who had compromised themselves by openly championing the interests of the most reactionary sections of landlords were debarred from further participation in the political life of the country.

General Ayub Khan possessed enormous power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. This enabled him to secure for himself not only the office of Prime Minister in the government set up after the coup d'état, but also the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Kashmir Affairs. Ayub Khan's growing authority perturbed and alarmed President Iskander Mirza and his associates. To curb the power of Ayub Khan, Iskander Mirza proposed that, while remaining Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, he should hand over the post of Commander-in-Chief to the President, i. e., Iskander Mirza.

This move led to results that had not been foreseen by the President and his advisers. Pressure brought to bear upon him by high-ranking officers compelled Iskander Mirza to declare on October 27, 1958, that he had "decided to step aside and hand over all powers to General Ayub Khan."[53] According to an official statement made by Ayub Khan, Iskander Mirza's resignation was caused by the anxiety which the people felt because two men were standing at the helm of the state, as this might have led to political compromise. It was, moreover, known that Iskander Mirza was closely associated with many of the old politicians who had been removed from the political arena by the military coup d'état. During the night of October 27, 1958, therefore, Generals Azam Khan, K. M. Sheikh, and W. A. Burki called on Iskander Mirza and suggested that he should resign; he agreed saying that he was prepared to take this step, if the interests of Pakistan demanded it.[54] On November 2, 1958, Iskander Mirza and his wife left for Britain.

According to reports which appeared in the British and Indian press, Iskander Mirza did not retire voluntarily.[55]

After Iskander Mirza's retirement Ayub Khan became President of Pakistan. The office of Prime Minister was abolished and the President became head of the cabinet with powers to appoint and dismiss the members of the government and to direct its work.

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[53] *The Pakistan Times*, October 28, 1958.

[54] *The African and Colonial World...*, London, 1958, No. 12, p. 12.

[55] *The Times*, October 27, 1958; *Hindustan Standard*, October 31, 1958.

General Musa, Vice-Admiral Choudhury and Vice-Marshal of the Air Force Asghar Khan, the commanders of the three principal fighting arms, the army, navy and air force, became Ayub Khan's deputies with regard to military administration. The most important ministerial posts in the government which Ayub Khan formed went also to generals of the Pakistan army. Generals were in charge of the Ministries of Labour, Home Affairs, Health, Social Security, Agriculture and Food, Refugee Affairs, Public Works, and the States and Frontier Regions. Absolute state power was therefore concentrated in the hands of high-ranking officers headed by General Ayub Khan.[56]

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[56] In October 1959, the anniversary of the coup d'état, the rank of Field Marshal was conferred on General Ayub Khan.

CONCLUSION

The new state of Pakistan, whose history forms the subject of this book, came into being during a period marked by two events of world-historical importance. The first of them was the emergence of the world socialist system, which has become the principal and decisive factor in the development of mankind. The other important event was the break-down of the colonial system which had been in a state of crisis ever since the First World War and the Socialist October Revolution in Russia. Lenin's prediction that the near future would see the awakening of the peoples oppressed by imperialism, made shortly after the October Revolution, has come true.

The radical change in the correlation of forces which took place in the world arena in favour of socialism greatly contributed to the upsurge and victory of the national-liberation movements.

The colonial system disintegrated in the course of a fierce and complex struggle which the national-liberation forces supported by the socialist states and the international working-class movement waged against imperialism and its reactionary allies in the countries fighting for their freedom. The progress and the results of the struggle in a given country depended to a very great extent on the distinctive features of the country's historical development, its economic and cultural level, the correlation of class forces and the class character of the organisations leading the national-liberation movement. These factors also continued to operate when the former colonial and semi-colonial nations, having gained political independence and established sovereign states, faced the possibility of achieving economic independence, by finally freeing themselves from the yoke of the imperialist monopolies and the system of colonial plunder. The existence of the Soviet Union and the world socialist system, on whose disinterested support and assistance they could rely, gave these nations the opportunity of solving this second important problem of the national-liberation struggle. The imperialist powers and the reactionary forces within the newly formed states could turn the political sovereignty which their stubborn fight had won into a mere illusion and an empty formality unless they attained economic independence. Economic independence was essential not only for the achievement and consolidation of full political sovereignty but also for the liquidation of the grave consequences the prolonged colonial rule had left, and for the rapid improvement of the living standard of the population.

The analysis of the principal stages of Pakistan's history shows that despite the difficulties caused by the partition of 1947, the means of overcoming the grim heritage of the colonial past existed in the country, for Pakistan was an independent state, the colonialists had lost their political power and a number of important economic positions, such as the exclusive ownership of the mineral resources, the irrigation system, the means of communication, the railways, and so on. The country could rely on the support of the USSR and the other socialist states in its fight for economic independence.

But the existing possibilities could only be turned into reality if Pakistan decided to choose the path of radical social and economic reorganisation, resolved to reconstruct the colonial economic system which came into being during the British rule, wage a determined struggle against the feudal survivals and to abolish the domination of the foreign monopolies and their hirelings in all spheres of economic and political life.

But the rulers of Pakistan did not venture to choose this road. They preferred the slow method, so distressing for broad sections of the population, the method of gradual evolution and gradual transformation of the backward social and economic institutions handed down from the colonial period and their adaptation by degrees to the needs of the capitalist development of the country. During this period all difficulties connected with the elimination of the colonial heritage were shifted on to the shoulders of the popular masses, that were often subjected not only to capitalist exploitation but also to feudal and semi-feudal exploitation, while all the advantages benefited a small section of rich landlords and big factory owners.

The choice of this method was no mere chance but was determined by the class nature of the governments which followed each other in Pakistan, and the fact that the forces backing them were closely associated with the feudal landlords and foreign monopolies.

A contributory factor was the weakness and disunity of the democratic movement in the country, which had been disorganised and crippled by the partition of 1947 and was therefore unable to exert a sufficiently strong influence on the policy of the ruling circles.

The basis on which the power of the reactionary strata of the population rested was thus left intact and consequently also the influence of the foreign monopolies. This meant that the fundamental social and economic problems, and above all the agrarian problem, remained unsolved. As long as the semi-feudal system of agrarian relations continued to exist it was impossible effectively to tackle any of the other tasks, such as the industrialisation of the country in order to overcome its economic backwardness, the raising of the living standard of the population and the democratization of the social and political life.

Under these conditions the imperialist monopolies and their reactionary allies within Pakistan succeeded in drawing the country into the system of aggressive military blocs, which imperilled the independence of Pakistan and made the restoration of its undermined sovereignty one of the primary problems of its political life.

Pakistan's participation in military alliances did not only restrict and undermine the sovereignty of the state but also hampered its economic and social development. It strengthened the position of the reactionary elements in the country and placed the heavy burden of the steadily growing military expenditure on the weak economy of Pakistan thereby increasing its dependence on the imperialist powers and impeding the elimination of the consequences of the colonial rule.

Owing to the specific features of its historical development and the distribution and correlation of the class forces, Pakistan was able to pass only through the first stage (and even that not completely) of the national-liberation revolution and, having obtained political independence, got stuck in the very beginning of the second stage which should have brought it economic independence. This was bound to intensify all social and economic contradictions in Pakistan.

The further growth of capitalist relations, which went on despite all the difficulties the country had to face, led to a polarisation of class forces. The progressive sections, who stood for a thorough reorganisation of the social fabric along democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal lines, became stronger and more united; whereas the ruling classes tended to split into an increasing number of rival factions. The ruling group of Pakistan, whose social basis was continuously shrinking, was confronted by the very real possibility of its being ousted and replaced by a coalition of progressive forces headed by the National Awami Party.

The big bourgeoisie, whose discontent was rising, sought to seize the principal positions of state power. Religious and feudal elements, who criticized the government from the extreme right, grew also increasingly active. The situation was further complicated by the difficult economic condition prevailing in Pakistan.

That was the background against which the political events described in the last chapter were enacted in the autumn of 1958. They introduced significant changes in the political life of the country. The narrow section of semi-feudal big landlords and the leadership of the right-wing bourgeois and landlord parties associated with them lost their dominant political influence. It was at their expense that the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie which arose and grew strong during the period of Pakistan's existence and the relatively numerous sections of landlords engaged in commercial activities extended and consolidated their position. The bulk of the latter consisted of so-called medium landlords, and it is noteworthy that the officers of the Pakistan army were recruited from their ranks. In particular, certain groups of Pakhtun landlords came to the forefront after the coup d'état, as they were closely connected with the army officers who now occupied the leading posts in the central government apparatus, the civil service and the armed forces.

The social strata that came to the forefront in 1958 largely determined the policy of the new government. The domestic measures—e. g. the agrarian reform, the "new industrial policy," the changes made in the sphere of taxation and foreign trade, and the Basic Democracies — carried through during the following period show that they were introduced with an eye to extending the social basis of the ruling group.

The land reform carried through in 1959 and 1960 did not seriously change the agrarian system of the country. It was designed to strengthen landlord property rights as a whole, while slightly restricting the rights of the semi-feudal big landlords, and to induce the landlords to run their estates along capitalist lines. The rural bourgeoisie that arose from the ranks of the well-to-do peasants, also benefited by the reform since it improved its economic and legal position.

The agrarian reform was, moreover, calculated to strengthen the social basis of the new regime in the countryside by winning over the rich peasants, and especially the small proprietors and hereditary tenants, and to disrupt the united anti-feudal struggle of the peasants. It is worth noting that the hope placed on the well-to-do top strata of the countryside was no mere accident, for the rank-and-file of the Pakistan army and the non-commissioned officers came from this section of the peasantry. As regards the bulk of the peasants, the millions of tenants who either owned no land at all or had a small plot of land, they received nothing whatsoever. The organic composition of the capital employed in agriculture remained rather low, a considerable agrarian surplus population continued to exist and the food problem was left unsolved.

The reforms which the new government introduced in the industrial and commercial sphere made numerous concessions to big capital employed in building new, and expanding already existing, enterprises. This, in fact, led to a considerable contraction of the public sector. That the economic development of Pakistan was increasingly controlled by the centre and the influence of the provincial authorities was reduced to a minimum undoubtedly corresponded to the interests of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie whose representatives together with those of the landlords held the key positions in the central government and therefore controlled the country's economy.

New concessions were granted to foreign private investors, the rule that foreigners could only set up enterprises in Pakistan with the participation of indigenous capital was abolished and foreign capital received new guarantees against nationalisation. The realisation of the plans for the economic development of Pakistan became even more dependent on foreign aid. The disproportion in the economy was, moreover, increasing since the decisive branches — those engaged in the production of means of production — were not expanding, which made the economy of the country and its stability dependent on foreign trade and the conditions obtaining on the capitalist world market, and gave the western monopolies, especially those of the USA, further opportunities to penetrate into Pakistan. This tended to maintain the economic dependence of Pakistan on the Western industrial powers and enabled the imperialist monopolies to intensify the exploitation of the country by way of exchanging non-equivalent values.

Pakistan remained, and still remains, a member of the military blocs headed by the Western powers. Its participation in compact military and political alliances made the improvement of relations with its nearest neighbours difficult, hampered the development of mutually beneficial economic and cultural relations with many countries, and led to the growing political and economic dependence of Pakistan on the imperialist monopolies.

Broad sections of the population realised increasingly clearly the necessity of changing the direction of the foreign policy of Pakistan, of destroying the semi-colonial economic structure and replacing it by a developed, diversified independent economy, of overcoming the colonial heritage and rapidly improving the living conditions of the population.

The more far-sighted members of the top strata of the propertied classes and of the ruling bloc understood that new ways and means had to be found. The economic difficulties experienced by Pakistan, the growth of the opposition forces despite the repressive measures used against them, and the fact that certain aspects of the policy pursued by the imperialist monopolies caused dissatisfaction even in the ruling circles, gave rise to the desire to improve political and economic relations with the peace-loving states. It was this which, for instance, caused Pakistan officially to request the Soviet Union to assist in prospecting for mineral and fuel resources. The ruling circles of Pakistan were bound to know that the economic and technical assistance which the USSR gave to the former colonies was based not on temporary considerations and changing circumstances, but on the very nature of the Soviet social system. The agreement of co-operation with regard to prospecting for oil signed by Pakistan and the USSR on March 4, 1961, was the most favourable agreement of its kind ever concluded by Pakistan. The Soviet Union has proved once again that the principles on which it builds its relations with other countries, irrespective of their social system, are equality, mutually advantageous co-operation and non-interference in their internal affairs. It is precisely for this reason that broad sections of the population and the business circles of Pakistan have welcomed the agreement.

An analysis of the specific features of the historical development of Pakistan since its independence shows that the solution of the basic economic and political problems facing the country from the outset was prevented by the following factors: the orientation of its foreign policy towards the Western imperialist monopolies and its participation in aggressive military and political blocs; the preservation of the feudal survivals in the agrarian system; the lack of political rights of the population and the suppression of political liberties; the continuing uneven economic development of different parts of the country and the national oppression of East Pakistan and the smaller provinces of West Pakistan.

Not only wide sections of the population but also the ruling groups of the country recognise that in order to consolidate the political sovereignty of Pakistan and achieve economic independence, these problems must be solved without delay. There are, however, several roads leading towards independent economic, social and political development. Contemporary history as a whole and in particular the experience of the nations that have freed themselves from the colonial yoke and set up independent states demonstrate that the countries which have most successfully eliminated the grim consequences of the colonial past and thereby ensured the rapid advance of their people are not the countries that follow the capitalist road.

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